




OXFORD

Vanessa de Harven

THE UNITY OF STOIC METAPHYSICS

Everything is Something

The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics

The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics

Everything is Something

VANESSA DE HARVEN

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Vanessa de Harven 2025

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, transmitted, used for text and data mining, or used for training artificial
intelligence, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law,
by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization.
Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to
the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2024945878

ISBN 9780198930167

DOI: 10.1093/9780198930181.001.0001

Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

For A. A. L.

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xv

Introduction	1
The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics	4
Grounding	6
Physicalism	10
Some Caveats	12
A Coarse-Grained Orthodoxy	14
An Uncharitable Bias	18
A Principle of Maximal Charity	21
Methodology	24
Summary	28

SECTION I. SOMETHING

1. Plato's <i>Sophist</i>	33
The Patricide	36
The Presocratics	38
The Battle of Gods and Giants	39
The Late Learners	44
Plato's Challenges	44
Conclusions	45
2. Ontological Criteria	47
The <i>Existence</i> Criterion	48
The <i>Subsistence</i> Criterion	52
Part 1: Availability for thought	53
Part 2: Particularity	69
Conclusions	73

SECTION II. BODIES

3. Body as Such	79
Body Defined	80
Body Defended	84
Body Continuous	88
Digression on Stoic Mereology	90

Continuous, Not Gunky	99
Conclusions	106
4. Bodies Blending	108
Blending Laid Bare	108
Objections to Blending	114
Conclusions	124
5. Basic Bodies	126
Ἀρχή (<i>Archē</i>)	127
Interpretive Landscape	129
Ἀρχαί (<i>Archai</i>)—Plural	133
Separable and Independent	143
Causal Unity	151
Conclusions	153
6. Building Bodies	155
Ἀρχαὶ καθ' Αὐτά (<i>Archai kath' Hauta</i>)	156
The Cosmogony	161
Conclusions	169
7. The Categories, State of the Debate	170
Interpretive Landscape	172
The Central Texts	181
Dexippus	188
Simplicius	190
Conclusions	198
8. The Categories, A Fresh Start	200
ὑποκείμενον (<i>Hypokeimenon</i>)	200
Ποῖον (<i>Poion</i>)	207
Ποιότης (<i>Poiotēs</i>)	212
Ἰδίως Ποῖον (<i>Idiōs Poion</i>)	216
Each of Us is Four	221
Developmentalism Defanged	232
Conclusions	246

SECTION III. INCORPOREALS

9. The Incorporeals, A Grounded Account	255
Interpretive Landscape	257
Textual Evidence of Grounding	267
Linguistic Evidence of Grounding	278
Conclusions and Forecast	281
10. Space	286
Void	286
Room	312
Place	318

Surface	324
Meeting the <i>Subsistence</i> Criterion	327
Conclusions	330
11. Time	332
Dependence Defended	332
Everlasting Recurrence	340
Puzzles of the Present	348
Puzzles Dissolved	354
Dependence Vindicated	369
Meeting the <i>Subsistence</i> Criterion	370
Conclusions	371
12. The <i>Lekta</i> , Why Language is Earthborn Too	372
Interpretive Landscape	373
Some Preliminaries	375
<i>Lekta</i> are <i>Sēmainomena</i>	382
<i>Lekton</i> Defined	384
Impressions	390
Rational Impressions	394
<i>Lekta</i> —Products of Thought	403
Birth of a <i>Lekton</i>	411
<i>Lekta</i> in the Causal Context	418
<i>Subsisting</i> and Obtaining	432
Meeting the <i>Subsistence</i> Criterion	440
Conclusions	441

SECTION IV. NEITHER CORPOREAL NOR INCORPOREAL

13. Limits	447
Interpretive Landscape	448
Both—Diogenes Laertius 7.135	450
<i>Subsistence</i> according to Thought	454
Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal	459
Conclusions	467
14. Creatures of Fiction	469
Seneca, <i>Epistle</i> 58	470
Conclusions	478

SECTION V. EVERYTHING

15. Concepts	485
Interpretive Landscape	487
What Concepts Are	488
What Concepts Do	493

X CONTENTS

What Concepts Are Not	498
Conclusions	501
16. Everything is Something	502
Something	502
Everything	507
Conclusions	509
<i>Bibliography</i>	513
<i>Index Locorum</i>	527
<i>Index Nominum</i>	531
<i>Index Rerum</i>	533

Preface

For each author and work cited I give the reference to LS parenthetically; when passages do not appear in LS, I include SVF, and when not in SVF I provide the name of the editor. In the interest of space, I include the Greek or Latin only when it is not in LS. When I transliterate the original language I use the nominative or infinitive except when prepositions or other context call for another form.

Acknowledgments

This book began as my doctoral dissertation at UC Berkeley, and my greatest debt remains to my advisor Tony Long, to whom this book is dedicated, for his wisdom, patience, and gentle guidance then as now. I am grateful as well to Dorothea Frede and Klaus Corcilius, the other members of my dissertation committee, for helping me sow the seeds of this book. Since then, this work has developed and matured in various ways, but it remains the same project at heart, to show that the Stoics are sophisticated physicalist thinkers pursuing a one-world metaphysics in response to Plato.

I would also especially like to thank Michele Alessandrelli, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Brad Inwood, Wolfgang Mann, Ricardo Salles, and Clerk Shaw for extensive conversation and correspondence about this material over the years. Without the insights, suggestions, objections, and encouragement of you all this book would not be what it is.

So many others have left their mark on this book in one way or another, and I offer them inadequate thanks for their feedback with this list (and apologies to anyone I may have left out): Louise Antony, Andy Arlig, Sosseh Assaturian, Michael Augustine, Dom Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Susanne Bobzien, Jim Bogen, Phil Bricker, Ada Bronowski, Eric Brown, Ben Caplan, Victor Caston, Tim Clarke, David Crane, Maya Eddon, Matt Evans, Jyl Gentzler, Mary Louise Gill, Miles Gillett de Harven, Margaret Graver, Jim Hankinson, Gary Hardegee, Verity Harte, Reier Helle, Rob Heller, Ian Hensley, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Tushar Irani, Brian Johnson, Julia Jorati, Rachana Kamtekar, Jim Kelly, Jacob Klein, David Konstan, Kurt Lampe, Joe Levine, Patricia Marechal, Anna Marmodoro, Mike Martin, Chris Meacham, Susan Sauvé Meyer, Vladimir Mikeš, Dana Miller, Georgia Mouroutsou, David Murphy, Eileen O'Neill, Gary Ostertag, Doris Palca, Taylor Pincin, Nate Powers, Laura Quilter, Gretchen Reydam-Schils, David Sedley, Umer Shaikh, Simon Shogry, Jeff Sullivan, Christie Thomas, Wolfhart Totschnig, Rosemary Twomey, Justin Vlasits, Katja Vogt, and Steve White.

The work has also benefited tremendously from audiences and workshop participants who have heard bits and pieces at the APA Eastern Division Meeting, Brown University, Centre Léon Robin (Université de Paris-Sorbonne), Cornell University, Colgate University, Dartmouth College, École Normale Supérieure, Harvard University, New York University, Oxford University, Temple University, The Czech Academy of Sciences, University of Cambridge, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of Notre Dame, University of Pennsylvania,

University of Texas Austin, and Wellesley College. I would also like to thank the students in my seminars for their questions and suggestions.

I am grateful to the referees for the press for their generous feedback and to Peter Momtchiloff for guiding this book to fruition, as well as to Rachel Addison for her careful copy editing. Finally, I thank Megan Huang for early help editing and compiling the bibliography and Jungmin Ohn for her invaluable help seeing it all through: citing, editing, indexing, and exhorting. Financial support was provided by the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Engagement, University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Previous versions of some of the material in this book have appeared in earlier publications, and I am grateful for the permission to use the following articles here: “How Nothing Can Be Something: The Stoic Theory of Void.” *Ancient Philosophy* 35, no. 2 (2015): 405–29 (Chapter 10). “Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind. *Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity*, J. Sisko, ed. Vol. 1 of *The History of the Philosophy of Mind*, 6 vols., R. Copenhaver and C. Shields, eds. 215–35. New York: Routledge, 2018. (Chapter 12). “Something Stoic in Plato’s *Sophist*,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 63 (2024): 237–97 (especially Chapters 1 and 2). “The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism,” *Apeiron* 55, no. 2 (2022): 219–45 (Chapters 3, 7, and 8). “The Resistance to Stoic Blending,” *Rhizomata* 6, no. 1 (2018): 1–23 (Chapter 4). I also thank *The Review of Metaphysics* for permission to use the quotation from W. V. Quine, “On What There Is.” *The Review of Metaphysics* 2, no. 5 (1948): 21–38, as the epigraph to the Introduction and to Chapter 16.

Abbreviations

BS	Boeri, M. D. and Salles, R. <i>Los Filósofos Estoicos, Ontología, Lógica, Física y Ética</i> . Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2014.
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. <i>Die Fragmente deer Vorsokratiker</i> . Berlin: Weidmann, 1906.
DL	Dorandi, T. <i>Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
EK	Edelstein, L. and Kidd, I. G. <i>Posidonius: Vol. 1, The Fragments</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
IG	Inwood, B. and Gerson, L. P. <i>Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings</i> , 2 ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1988.
LS	Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. <i>The Hellenistic Philosophers</i> , 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
LSJ	Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, S., McKenzie, R. <i>Greek-English Lexicon. Revised Supplement</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
SE, M. 1–6	Bury, R. G. <i>Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors</i> . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.
SE, M. 7–8	Bury, R. G. <i>Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians</i> . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935.
SE, M. 9–10, 11	Bury, R. G. <i>Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists</i> . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936.
SE, PH	Bury, R. G. <i>Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism</i> . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
SVF	von Arnim, H. <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1924.

Introduction

A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: “What is there?” It can be answered, moreover, in a word—“Everything”—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so, the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.¹

I will begin by explaining the title of the book, *The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics: Everything is Something*. It is, of course, a reference to W. V. O. Quine’s famous dictum above. And, as I will argue, the Stoics were indeed engaged in the Quinean project of counting their entities in or out of the ontology by reference to the variables of quantification: something, nothing, and everything.² The Stoics are famous for rejecting Plato’s Forms by denying that they are Something. Thus they are embroiled in what Quine calls “the old Platonic riddle of non-being. Non-being must in some sense be, otherwise what is there that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed *Plato’s beard*: historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam’s razor.”³ This book argues that the Stoics bring a sharp razor to Plato’s beard, consisting not only of ontological criteria by which to *count* things in and out, but also, on the other side of the blade, of metaphysical principles by which to *ground* their entities, making everything there is either a body or something ontologically dependent on body—thus explaining *how* everything can be Something in a one-world metaphysics. The Stoics use the two edges of their new razor (counting and grounding) to cut away Plato’s otherworldly Forms, and to shape a bold new physicalism that includes a surprising variety of things that *are not*. In so doing, as I will argue, the Stoics are responding to the old Platonic riddle of *non-being* in the *Sophist*, as well as to the famous Battle of Gods and Giants that follows. I am not the first to notice an affinity between the Stoics and Plato’s earthborn Giants; that is a commonplace by now. However, to my mind, the full force of Plato’s prescriptions and the extent of the Stoic response

¹ Quine, “On What There Is,” 21.

² Quine, “On What There Is,” 32.

³ Quine, “On What There Is,” 21, original emphasis. For a discussion of Plato’s beard in connection with the *Sophist*, and in particular the idea that Plato’s ontology is not so bloated as scholars have thought, see Thomas, “Speaking of Something.”

have been underappreciated; both the counting and the grounding of Stoic metaphysics speaks to desiderata that emerge from the *Sophist*, starting with the patricide of Father Parmenides over *non-being*.

The Stoic commitment to counting can be seen in their introduction of two distinct criteria for being Something (*ti*), their highest ontological genus: one criterion for things that *exist* or have *being* or *are* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*), and another for those that do not *exist* but are not therefore nothing at all. What there is for the Stoics is whatever is Something. One might also put the point by saying that the Stoic ontology picks out what is real, or really Something, a genuine constituent of the world;⁴ or, in Quinean terms, the quantities of the variable bound by Something. Another point of putting it this way, and, generally, of working in terms of the genus Something, is to allow *existence*, or *being* to be restricted to corporeal reality, i.e. to be used in a technical sense that is not exhaustive of reality but applies to a subset of what there is. The Stoics are thus able to say, without pain of contradiction, that only bodies *exist*, but not everything that is Something *exists*.⁵ The ontological criterion for *existence* or *being*, drawn from the Battle of Gods and Giants, is the capacity (*dunamis*) to act or undergo, to do or suffer, to be agent or patient, and generally to enter causal relations;⁶ since all and only bodies are capable of causal interaction, it follows that all and only bodies *exist*. The second ontological criterion admits those things that do not *exist*, i.e. are not capable of causal interaction, but nevertheless can be said to *subsist* because they are proper objects of thought and discourse, objective features or real constituents of the world that we can refer to, think about, and discuss.

The move to *subsistence* is no Meinongian (or, in Quine's terms, Wymanian) enterprise of unactualized possibles or entities we countenance independent of *being* and *existence*, motivated by concerns about intentionality and meaning. Rather, the language of *subsistence* in Stoic hands signals ontological dependence, revealing a novel non-reductive physicalism motivated by concerns about Plato's

⁴ Real in a sense like Fine, "Question," 168, 171–2, 176, which captures the "thick" sense of "exists" as predicating something about a thing's status as a genuine constituent of the world. Note that in my *characterizing* the genus Something as picking out what is "real," or "really Something," there is no claim that the Stoics themselves were *describing* their genus this way, and hence no reason to seek any particular Greek to correspond to my use of "real" in explicating the Stoic sense of Something and what there is.

⁵ This need not raise the specter of gerrymandered quantifiers, nor cast the Stoics in the role of Quine's Wyman (i.e. Meinong). What there is for the Stoics will be whatever can be quantified over, just as for Quine, and this will include things that are said to *exist*, as well as things that are Something *non-existent*, on which see Denyer, "Token Reflexivity," n. 6. The quantifier may be restricted to a domain by the model, but this does not make the quantifier gerrymandered; cf. Chalmers, "Ontological Anti-Realism," and van Inwagen, "Creatures of Fiction." The "is" of *Everything is Something* is thus not a sort of second-order "is" short for "is, or *subsists* as," nor is it contradictory in asserting of the incorporeals, for example, that they *exist* in any technical sense. Likewise for the phrase, "what there is." For reservations about a strict affinity with Quine, see Mignucci, "Logique modale." For thoughts about rendering "*einai*" as "*existence*," see my Chapter 1, n. 3.

⁶ Plato, *Sophist* 247 D 9–E 2, 248 C 4–5, and elsewhere: *Phaedrus* 270 D 3–5, *Theaetetus* 156 A 8–9, *Timaeus* 57 A 3–5.


other-worldly Forms (the “occult entities” of Quine’s McX). Here the Stoic commitment to a metaphysical hierarchy can be seen, in their commitment to metaphysical principles that explain how everything there is (everything that is Something) either is a body or depends on body. The Stoics generate a rich world order from just two corporeal principles (*archai*). These two bodies, the one divine active *logos* and the other passive matter (*hulē*), are the ungrounded grounds of everything else there is. These two bodies are the grounds not only of the bodies composed out of them (which *are*, or *exist*), but also of incorporeal entities like time and space, as well as of products of thought like creatures of fiction and idealized limits—which do not *exist* (and hence, *are not*), but are nevertheless Something real (and hence *subsist*). So we see that the Stoics are committed not only to counting their entities with ontological criteria, but also to grounding them with a hierarchical structure of reality that bottoms out in two fundamental bodies.

The first point of saying in the title that everything is *Something*, then, is to signal the Stoic commitment to a new and principled ontological genus, Something, set over *existence* on the one hand and *subsistence* on the other, according to two distinct ontological criteria. Further, that the ontology is *ordered*, in the sense that the Stoics do not merely count things in or out and leave it at that—either as an unordered list of entities (a “flat” ontology) or as a categorized list (a “sorted” ontology”).⁷ Rather, they give a hierarchical structure of reality, taking certain entities (the principles, or *archai*) as basic or fundamental, and elucidating the dependence ordering of everything else on them. Hence the Stoics go beyond the bound variables of Quinean counting to what has lately been called neo-Aristotelian grounding, giving an account, first, of the fundamental entities that form the sparse structure of reality and then of what is grounded in, dependent on, and derivative from them.⁸

The next point is that in saying *everything* is Something I intend to signal that the Stoic ontology is complete and comprehensive: everything the Stoics countenance is Something. This point has a negative side and positive side. On the negative side, I signal my denial that the Stoics recognized entities called Not-Somethings

⁷ For discussion of the difference between flat, sorted, and ordered ontologies, see Schaffer, “Grounds,” 355, where he offers the following:

In lieu of three thousand further words:



⁸ Schaffer, “Grounds,” 351.

(*outina*), which scholars have attributed to them as a class “in metaphysical limbo” between Something and nothing at all (rendering the ontology of Something incomplete).⁹ On the positive side, I signal that I will uphold a tripartite ontology according to which the Stoics recognize three kinds of Something: bodies, incorporeals (like time and space), and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal (like creatures of fiction and geometrical figures), rendering the ontology comprehensive of all entities they recognize.¹⁰ Hence, the tripartite ontology is comprehensive insofar as the genus Something accommodates everything there is (this is the positive point), and complete in that it leaves nothing out in metaphysical limbo (this is the negative point). The book is thus divided into five sections: *Something*, *Bodies*, *Incorporeals*, *Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal*, *Everything*.

The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics

So much for why everything is Something. Now on to *The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics*, which is thicker and thornier. Most succinctly, the unity of Stoic metaphysics consists in the fact that the Stoics are *both* counting *and* grounding their entities. The ontology, i.e. the final inventory of what there is, is generated not just by logical criteria for counting entities in or out, which would yield a merely sorted (if not flat) ontology, but also by metaphysical principles that ground each entity in two fundamental bodies, yielding a tightly ordered ontology and genuinely unified, one-world metaphysics. There is much to clarify and explain in what I have just said.

First, I am observing a distinction between the terms “metaphysics” and “ontology,” according to which the ontological enterprise of counting *what* or *which* things there are is distinct (and to some extent separable) from the metaphysical enterprise of describing *what* or *how* those things are, i.e. what they are *like*. It is impossible to say precisely how the Stoics take these two enterprises as such to be related (whether completely separable or completely inextricable or somewhere in between), and I do not intend to impute to the Stoics anything like explicit attention to questions of metametaphysics. Nevertheless, I think we do have the resources to hazard a guess as to where on the spectrum of views they might fall if put the question. My hunch is that the Stoics would agree with Achille Varzi that ontology can (and maybe sometimes should) be conducted without metaphysics, but also with his character Gamma’s intuition that “a good philosopher should complete the picture by *also* spelling out the underlying metaphysics.”¹¹ Likewise,

⁹ The phrase comes from Sedley, “Universals,” 89, but the attribution of Not-Somethings to the Stoics is a widespread orthodoxy that persists despite the forceful challenges of Caston, “Something and Nothing”; I agree with Caston that there are no Not-Somethings, but I disagree with the bold thesis that concepts are Something (Chapter 15).

¹⁰ As suggested by LS, 163–6, 301.

¹¹ Varzi, “Ontology Without Metaphysics,” 414, original emphasis.

they could be sympathetic to Kathrin Koslicki's suggestion that the ontologist and the mereologist have different jobs, in fact that the ontologist first counts what there is, and only then does the mereologist's job begin.¹²

So when I say that the Stoics are both counting and grounding their entities, I take it that they are observing this distinction, although not that they are using these or other special terms in doing so, or that they are self-consciously describing their metaphysics in addition to undertaking it. The unity of Stoic metaphysics consists in the interplay between these two enterprises. Neither their ontological criteria nor their metaphysical grounding principles alone are sufficient to explain the Stoic ontology; both edges of the razor are required to account for how exactly the Stoics groom Plato's beard. Ontological criteria alone cannot yield an ordered metaphysics, and metaphysical principles alone cannot count things in or out. Thus, the unity of Stoic metaphysics consists, first of all, in an ordered ontology that results from a reflective equilibrium of counting and grounding as distinct but cooperative enterprises. It is also impossible to say with any precision how this reflective equilibrium might have proceeded, or even whether the Stoics were self-conscious about it. Nevertheless, I think they could agree with the sentiment that Wolfgang-Rainer Mann attributes to Aristotle:

It is the task of ontology to provide specific criteria for what is to count as real in the relevant way, and to evaluate the claims made on behalf of various candidates as satisfying those criteria. Alternatively, its task is to recognize certain items as the fundamental ones, and then to formulate *criteria* according to which precisely those items will count as really real.¹³

¹² Koslicki, *Structure*, 171, 196. Thus, the Stoics according to my hunch would disagree with Schaffer, "Grounds," 363, 373, that existence questions are completely subsumed under the grounding questions, but agree (against Varzi) that existence and grounding questions are interwoven, at least. Similarly, they would disagree with Fine, "Question," 159, 161, 172, that a complete metaphysics will determine a complete ontology all by itself, although certainly they will take ontology to be a part of metaphysics, and agree that ontological questions are substantive and autonomous enough to be stated and debated; the Stoics would agree that how things stand in the world determines what things count, but would maintain that one can think first and separately about what it is to count as Something real. We could say, further, in the language of Chalmers, "Ontological Anti-Realism," 78–9, 92, 100, that the Stoics are heavyweight realists about existence questions (though not heavyweight to an extreme that denies the existence of ordinary objects), and that they are anti-realists with respect to "cupcups" and other gerrymandered entities, including parts of the continuum. The worry that ontological counting could not be conducted without reference to *what things are like* (and hence that the distinction between ontology and metaphysics collapses) only arises on the tendentious assumption that in describing metaphysics as the enterprise that says *what things are like* the Stoics have no other sortals available by which to count things in or out. In characterizing the grounding principles as explanatory of *how* things are, i.e. what things are *like* as dependent entities, the Stoics do not thereby give up the word "like" and with it the use of all other sortals; for example, the sortal "Something" remains available for counting entities in or out of the ontology.

¹³ Mann, "Elements, Causes, and Principles," 32, original emphasis. For the idea that the Stoics operated this way with their criterion for *existence*, bringing to bear "secondary criteria" to ensure that only bodies are admitted as *existents*, see Brunschwig, *TGS*, 87–90, on which see also my Chapter 2, n. 9.

Finally, the unity of Stoic metaphysics consists, further, in the fact that Stoic grounding explains *why* each entity counts as Something. Counting and grounding, as the two edges of Occam's razor, might each constrain the ontology without bearing, in addition, the explanatory relation that I am now pointing out. What I am adding to the picture is the idea that grounded entities count as Something, i.e. meet the criterion that they do, because of their dependence on bodies; for example, according to this picture, the incorporeals (canonically: time, place, void, and the *lekta*, roughly, the meanings of our words) meet the ontological criterion for *subsistence because* they inherit their properties from underlying body. The ontological dependence of incorporeals on their "host bodies" explains both *how* the incorporeals are real and *why* they count as Something. Thus, the unity of Stoic metaphysics consists not only in the ontology being ordered, rather than merely sorted, but also in the ordering explaining why each thing counts as Something. This is not just the observation of a distinction between metaphysics and ontology, i.e. between grounding and counting, nor the view that one enterprise subsumes the other (since counting is still required), but the further and distinct point that the metaphysics explains why the things that do count, count. We might illustrate this reflective equilibrium as follows:




Fig. I.1 Counting and Grounding

Grounding

The term "grounding" is vexed, so let me say now what I do and do not mean by it; I adopt this term with some hesitation and several important qualifications. What I mean, first and most generically, is what Jonathan Schaffer's neo-Aristotelian means by grounding:

The neo-Aristotelian will begin from a *hierarchical view of reality* ordered by *priority in nature*. The primary entities form the sparse structure of being, while the grounding relations generate an abundant superstructure of posterior entities. The primary is (as it were) all God would need to create. The posterior is

grounded in, dependent on, and derivative from it. The task of metaphysics is to limn this structure.¹⁴

It is a testament not only to the great variety of grounding theories in contemporary analytic metaphysics but also to the great variety of interpretations of Stoic theory that I agree completely with D. T. J. Bailey that grounding as described by Schaffer is useful in understanding how incorporeals are dependent on bodies, and yet disagree about the grounding relation he ascribes to the Stoics.¹⁵ I agree that what the Stoics are up to is not (just) Quinean counting of what there is, but a metaphysical account of *how* these things are, analyzing things in terms of dependence and fundamentality; however, I do not see the incorporeals as independently *subsisting* roles or “offices” dependent on bodies to be occupied, and hence realized.¹⁶ Let me clarify.

I welcome the words of Schaffer’s neo-Aristotelian as a general description of Stoic metaphysics, which I take to be hierarchical in the sense he describes, yielding an ordered rather than a sorted ontology.¹⁷ More specifically, I take “Stoic grounding” to signify, univocally, an asymmetrical, irreflexive, and transitive ontological dependence relation between countable *entities*—not a relation between facts, propositions, events, or states of affairs.¹⁸ Much of the contemporary

¹⁴ Schaffer, “Grounds,” 351, original emphasis.

¹⁵ Bailey, “Structure,” 255–7.

¹⁶ Note that Bailey is not ascribing Quinean counting to the Stoics, as I am, but contrasting the grounding he wishes to ascribe with Quinean counting; hence my parenthetical “just” to signal my commitment to the Stoics’ both counting and grounding their entities.

¹⁷ Schaffer, “Grounds,” 350–6; thus the Stoics would reject the move of Azzouni, “Simple metaphysics and ‘ontological dependence,’” to treat what is derivative as non-existent (or, in Stoic parlance, to deny that what is derivative is Something).

¹⁸ In this I am less ecumenical than Schaffer about what kind of grounding relations there are, since my objective is not to cover all possible kinds of grounding but to cover what grounding relations the Stoics in particular take there to be. I am not sure whether to say that Stoic grounding is a metaphysical primitive. I don’t think it is unanalyzable, but neither do I think it can be deduced from other principles. I also don’t want to attribute to the Stoics the *existence* (or *subsistence*) of grounding relations as countable entities in the ontology. For the Stoics, there are grounds and grounded entities; relations don’t count. I choose not to work in Bennett’s terminology of “building” in “Construction area,” because it does not capture the kind of ontological dependence that I want to attribute to the Stoics. The Stoics would be sympathetic to the idea that there can be a univocal sense of building that is asymmetrical and irreflexive, although perhaps not for the breadth of relations that Bennett seeks to accommodate under the term; indeed, Stoic physicalism would narrow the field significantly, and give positive reasons to embrace a spatiotemporal sense of overlap for the relation. I use the term “building” to describe what I call Stoic composition, a many-to-one part-whole relation of assembly or putting together of a composite whole out of several ingredients, which for Bennett is only one among many building relations. With respect to the ontological dependence relations that I classify as “grounding,” the Stoics would be happy to embrace the idea that the relata are of different levels of fundamentality, as well as the view that “fundamental” is to be understood simply as not grounded (or not built). For an account of grounding as a relation between facts, with the lucid plea that we “see how things look if we relax our antiseptic scruples for a moment and admit the idioms of metaphysical dependence into our official lexicon alongside the modal notions (metaphysical necessity and possibility, the various forms of supervenience) with which they are often said to contrast unfavorably,” see Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence,” 110.

literature takes grounding to be an epistemic relation between facts or propositions, or to be some other kind of metaphysical (but not ontological) dependence. This I want to reject as a description of Stoic theory. Certainly, the relation between grounds and grounded entities for the Stoics is *non-causal*, and the grounding body *explains* why the grounded entity *subsists* (e.g. the surface of a table *subsists* in virtue of the table). To this extent Stoic grounding is an explanatory relation, but it would be a mistake to think of it as a *merely* explanatory relation between *facts*, as opposed to an ontological dependence relation between *entities*; in this regard, the Stoics take a realist understanding of explanation, not a subjective, pragmatic, or purely epistemic approach.¹⁹

Further, Stoic grounding is not merely a relation of logical supervenience, nor is it adequately captured by a modal-existential analysis. As Schaffer says: “Supervenience is invoked to fake ordering structure within a flat ontology.”²⁰ Socrates and his singleton set are inter-entailing—each exists if the other does (if you believe in singleton sets); yet this hardly undermines the fact that Socrates is ontologically prior to his singleton set, which depends on him for its existence.²¹ Koslicki has argued along these lines, and brings a salutary non-modal focus to the topic of dependence raised in the grounding literature.²² She narrows the focus to include only relations between *entities* (as opposed to relations between realms of phenomena, facts, or propositions), and to include only *ontological* dependence relations (in contrast to causal, logical, and probabilistic dependence relations). On this account, successful explanations will reflect these real-world dependence relations by means of Real Definitions. Koslicki’s notion of a Real Definition is especially apt for capturing Stoic grounding; it holds that (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just

¹⁹ See Koslicki, “Varieties,” n. 27, for helpful remarks on the connection between ontological dependence and explanation. Cf. Kim, “Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence,” who speaks in terms of “explanatory realism” (in contrast to “explanatory internalism”) as the view that there is an objective dependence relation between events, states, and properties that underwrites the explanatory relation between statements. This kind of a “backing” theory, as it is sometimes called, is a good way to think of the Stoics, even if the objective relation between bodies and incorporeals, for example, is technically a relation between *entities* rather than between events, facts, states, or properties. Thus, I would be happy to describe the Stoics as explanatory realists in Kim’s sense, according to which the world is structured, or ordered, by metaphysical dependence relations that are asymmetric and transitive, and serve as the objective correlates of explanations. One of the virtues of this account is its explanatory unity and simplicity, which reflect the order and structure of the world’s objective dependence relations, generated by a minimum of independent entities; this is especially apt as a description of the Stoic ontology, even with the *relata* restricted to entities, and facts rejected from the picture. For remarks along these lines see Koslicki, “Varieties,” n. 25 (and n. 26 for sympathetic bibliography), and Ruben, “The Ontology of Explanation.”

²⁰ Schaffer, “Grounds,” 363–4.

²¹ Fine, “Essence and modality,” 4–5, makes the point that Socrates’ singleton set is no part of his essence.

²² Koslicki, “Varieties”; see also Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence,” for reasons to doubt that we can dispense with dependence and grounding idioms in favor of modal talk.

necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.²³

Koslicki's further suggestion that "we should adopt a sufficiently fine-grained approach to ontological dependence that allows us to recognize several species of dependence" is also applicable to the Stoics.²⁴ She introduces two species: Constituent Dependence, which involves "entities that have the character of *collections* or *constructions*, i.e., entities that are in some way built up from the constituents on which they are ontologically dependent;"²⁵ and Feature Dependence, according to which an entity "corresponds to" some feature of the entity on which it depends, e.g. in the way that a "hole corresponds to a certain feature had by an object (i.e. an opening)."²⁶ Koslicki is intentionally vague, allowing room for a rather wide variety of features and entities to fall under these two kinds of dependence. The Stoics do not accept all the entities Koslicki seeks to accommodate (e.g. sets, universals), and so the match with Koslicki's species of dependence will be only rough; nevertheless, it is productive to apply this opening distinction between such building operations, on the one hand, and "availing ourselves of the notion of *abstraction*, without supposing this notion must be given an explicitly epistemic construal," on the other.²⁷ In the end, I will argue that the Stoics recognize four varieties of ontological dependence: the composition of a whole out of several parts (as in the cosmology), the constitution of a non-composite whole by a single part (with no remainder, as in the Categories), the *subsistence* of the incorporeals as privations, and the *subsistence* of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal as constructions.²⁸

²³ Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201. For arguments in favor of (ii) specifically, i.e. the claim that metaphysical necessity and possibility are a posteriori for the Stoics, see de Harven, "Necessity, Possibility." With respect to (iii), I would add: "in accordance with the constraints imposed by the failure of Euthyphro's third definition of piety." Finally, the Stoics are in no way committed to Aristotelian essences, so the idea of an "essential nature" as it appears in (iii) should be understood accordingly; affinities with the contemporary Neo-Aristotelian, likewise, should not be taken to imply any other Aristotelian commitments to forms, essences, or what counts as substance.

²⁴ Koslicki, "Varieties," 197–201.

²⁵ Koslicki, "Varieties," 206, original emphasis.

²⁶ Koslicki, "Varieties," 208.

²⁷ Koslicki, "Varieties," 210; Schaffer, "Grounds," 377–8, also considers grounding an abstraction relation.

²⁸ Composition will be a many-one building relation between several parts and one whole (such that every proper part has a remainder), exemplified most strictly by the cosmogony out of two fundamental bodies, and most generally by the composition of ordinary bodies like humans and plants; constitution will be a one-one part-whole relation (such that there is a single Proper Part with no remainder), exemplified by the clay constituting a statue, and hand constituting a fist; perhaps these are two kinds of Constituent Dependence in the sense that they are both cases of building up, but not if Constituent Dependence is always of a composite whole with several parts (see "Digression on Stoic Mereology" in Chapter 3). The *subsistence* of incorporeals, on the other hand, will be cases of absence or privation, most like Koslicki's account of holes and boundaries (but not like tropes and universals); and the *subsistence* of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, i.e. creatures of fiction and idealized limits, will be cases of construction in which a product of thought takes on a certain life of its own, corresponding to certain features of the descriptions, illustrations, and logical commitments given in the fictions and frameworks that give rise to them. I will treat these latter two as kinds of Feature Dependence, the incorporeals as abstractions and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal as constructions (cf. Koslicki, "Varieties," 210, where she considers this ambivalence).

So, returning to the point at hand, when I say that the unity of Stoic metaphysics consists in the fact that the Stoics are both counting and grounding their entities, what I mean by “grounding” is that every entity there is for the Stoics, everything that is Something, is either fundamental (i.e. ungrounded, or ontologically independent) or dependent (i.e. grounded, or ontologically dependent). And what I mean by “unity” is, first, that the logical criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* work together with the grounding principles to yield the ordered ontology, as in Fig. I.1 above; and, second, that the grounding principles will explain how and why each thing counts as Something. Thus, when a Real Definition is explanatory of the essential nature of Something, it will also explain what makes it an individual, i.e. why it counts as Something. Now, what makes Stoic metaphysics a physicalist system is not the mere apparatus of counting and grounding in reflective equilibrium, but the fact the Stoics ground their ontology in *body*. This one-world metaphysics, as I hope to show, is a principled response to Plato’s *Sophist*; and as such it is neither flat-footed materialism nor other-worldly idealism, but a sophisticated non-reductive physicalism.

Physicalism

I have chosen the term “physicalism” for several reasons. First, I take it that for the Stoics everything is physical in the sense that there is nothing outside the natural world. This is uncontroversial to the extent that no one would deny the primacy of physics for the Stoics; on the other hand, interpreters who find the Stoics Platonizing or assimilating Epicurean theory reveal that there is some controversy over the substance of Stoic physicalism. I will address this at length over the course of the book, but for now, in introducing my terms, I note that if everything there is (everything that is Something) is either itself a body or dependent on body, and this ontology includes certain incorporeal entities alongside bodies (as all scholars agree it does), then the Stoics are not aptly described as *materialists*—they are not in the business of reducing everything to body, or of eliminating everything incorporeal. To the extent that the term “materialism” conjures a reductive or eliminative thesis, “physicalism” is better suited to reflect the Stoics’ more permissive ontology.

Further, even if the Stoics were reducing everything to body, it would still be better to call them corporealists rather than materialists. This is because matter (*hulē*) plays a very specific role in Stoic physics (namely the role of passivity, or undergoing action), and in fact accounts for just one half of corporeal existence; so, technically speaking, they are not committed to matter as what *exists*, but to body (*sōma*). Even keeping in mind the crucial technicality that the functional role of matter, as people commonly conceive it, is played by body in Stoic theory, there is a deeper reason to avoid calling the Stoics materialists, which is that the Stoics do not endorse the conventional picture of material substance (or, in Stoic terms body,

generically solid mass) as inherently inert and unintelligent—this is what makes materialism flat-footed. For the Stoics, body as such (solid mass) is not inherently inert and unintelligent, thick and dumb. On the contrary, Stoic god is itself a creative, rational mass—this is what makes Stoic corporealism nimble.

The Stoics are thus committed to a robust conception of *body* as what exists, not just matter, and so even on a reductionist reading they are better characterized as corporealists than materialists.²⁹ However, the Stoics are not reductive about their physicalism. Rather, they are committed to a one-world metaphysics, in which everything is either itself a body, or grounded in body for its *subsistence*—this recognition of grounded entities as Somethings is what I mean by “non-reductive.” To the extent that the Stoics reject Plato’s two-worlds metaphysics, the Stoics can be described, trivially, as reductive.³⁰ My thesis is more substantive, namely that the Stoics are non-reductive insofar as their grounded entities are neither eliminated from the ontology nor cast as “nothing but” their grounds, counting rather as entities distinct from their grounds. For example, when the Stoics say that time *subsists* according to the world’s motion, time is not thereby eliminated, or even reduced to the world’s motion; rather, time is identified as a grounded entity whose dependence on the world’s motion explains why it counts as Something in its own right. My working illustration of this dependence will be the flow of traffic, which is something over and above the cars on which it depends.

This non-reductive spirit of the Stoics can be seen not only in their recognition of incorporeals like time and *lekta* (“sayables”), and of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal like centaurs and giants, but also in their robust corporealism, or “inflationist somatology,” as Jacques Brunschwig puts it.³¹ The Stoic theory of the Categories also evinces the non-reductive spirit of their corporealism, counting each individual body as four by means of (what we now call) Leibniz’s Law-style arguments. This schema of the Categories is in many ways the most creative response to the Battle of Gods and Giants, departing altogether from the Platonic (and Aristotelian) model of properties inhering in subjects, and offering instead a constitution model, exemplified by the relation between clay and statue, hand and fist considered as distinct but colocated entities, to account for the identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies in entirely corporeal terms.

To summarize: the core thought behind the first part of the title, *The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics*, is that the Stoics offer a tightly ordered ontology limited

²⁹ For agreement on this point, see Cooper, “Physical Elements”; Hahn, *Origins*, 3; Sedley, “Matter,” 57–8; Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, 33; Weil, “Remarques sur le ‘matérialisme’ des stoiciens,” 560; M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” 128. For an analysis of the Stoics in terms of Comte’s definition of materialism as material monism in which “the inferior accounts for the superior,” see Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” who argues that the Stoics are neither materialists (since matter does not do any explanatory work) nor dualists (since the principles are bodies).

³⁰ See Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 289–94, for a helpful discussion of reductionism.

³¹ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 72.

on one side by logical criteria for counting entities in or out, and, on the other side, by metaphysical principles that ground everything there is, i.e. everything that is Something, in two fundamental bodies. This metaphysics of counting and grounding is permissive yet economical. It is permissive in counting each of us (i.e. each individual body) as four bodies, in counting four (and more) incorporeals, and in counting creatures of fiction and limits as neither corporeal nor incorporeal; in this regard, the Stoics are certainly non-reductive in spirit. On the other hand, Stoic metaphysics is economical. The criterion for *subsistence*, although it is weaker than the strong causal criterion for *existence*, sets certain spatiotemporal constraints on what counts as Something; the particularity constraint is how the Stoics eliminate Forms (and, as I will argue, concepts) from the ontology. At the same time, grounding principles constrain what candidates there are for the ontology; something sufficiently particular to meet the criterion for *subsistence*, but not itself grounded in the two corporeal principles, would not be admissible to the ontology. This permissive yet economical metaphysics, I submit, is best described as non-reductive physicalism.

Some Caveats

In addition to the core thesis that the Stoics are non-reductive physicalists, I intend several other things in speaking of the unity of Stoic metaphysics. Another sense of the term “unity” that I have in mind is the unity of composition: the unity of the two fundamental bodies in composing the cosmos as a whole, and, more generally, the unity that results when many things come to compose one. Certainly, a physics that begins with two independent bodies as the grounds of the cosmos owes an account of how those two individual bodies can become the one integrated whole to which the Stoics are clearly committed.³² So the unity of metaphysics will include an account of how it is that several bodies can be unified to compose a whole, as well as an account of what it is to be merely one (but not a whole) like the principles (*archai*), which are not composite. The unity of Stoic metaphysics in the sense I intend here is the unity that results when many individual things combine or assemble to form a composite whole, answering the Special Composition question, when does unity arise from plurality?³³ This unity is not *ontologically* complex,

³² I do mean to invoke Schaffer’s definition of an integrated whole (“Grounds,” 374)—but I do not mean to say that the Stoics are priority monists in the sense described in “Monism”; the commitment to two *archai* conflicts with that option. Nevertheless, the Stoics do think that there are integrated wholes, and that such wholes are explanatorily prior to their parts, without thinking that all there is is an integrated whole or that the whole is not composed of ontologically prior parts. More on parts and wholes in Chapter 3, “Digression on Stoic Mereology.”

³³ The name of the question is due to van Inwagen, *Material Beings*, 30–1, and I capitalize it to signal its place in Classical Extensional Mereology.

consisting of matter and form (material and immaterial), but *causally* complex, consisting of agent and patient (both of which are bodies).³⁴

One thing I do not particularly intend by “unity” and all this talk of being one is Stoic monism. It is unclear what the phrase “Stoic monism” even means. If it signals the material monism of the Milesians or of Heraclitus’ fire, as Robert B. Todd thinks it does, there is a loose sense in which the shoe fits: the Stoics do take the originary substance to be fire, and thus do see the world as made out of this one stuff, which in some sense persists in the things derived from it.³⁵ However, in no strict sense are the Stoics committed to this fire being one but not a whole composed of parts (i.e. one but non-composite); on the contrary, the fiery substance is itself a blend of two bodies, the active and passive principles (*archai*), *logos* and *hulē*. If the monism in question is the idea that the two principles are “intimately linked, and belong to the same body,” neither “radically independent from each other, nor ‘dependent’ in the sense that one comes from the other,” but still logically dependent on one another, as Jean-Baptiste Gourinat suggests, then this is not much of a monism.³⁶ If the phrase signals substance monism in the sense that there is only one substance from which the cosmos is derived, here again the shoe fits, but only loosely: it is absolutely true that for the Stoics the cosmos is derived from a single substance, namely the totality of body that constitutes the cosmos.³⁷ But this should not be heard as saying there is a single *entity* out of which the cosmos is composed; rather, if the Stoics are substance monists it is in the sense that body is the only kind of substance (stuff) that exists (they might thus be described as “kind monists” since they recognize not one, but two fundamental things, that are one in kind).³⁸

Further, all of this is compatible with the Stoic commitment to the cosmos as an integrated whole that is prior to its component parts, since *this* commitment need not entail that the Stoics are priority monists for whom the cosmos is, properly speaking, the only integrated whole (even if it is the only whole that is not a partial whole). Nor does the commitment to the cosmos as an integrated whole entail that the cosmos is not built out of pre-existing components; the priority of the whole begins only once

³⁴ For an account of the ontological complexity that Aristotle thinks only *his* forms can provide, and the surprising suggestion that Aristotle finds Plato and the Presocratics guilty of the same theoretical error (namely, giving only a list of elements on a horizontal par, but no vertically unifying principles), see Mann, “Elements, Causes, and Principles.”

³⁵ Todd, “Monism and Immanence.” Cf. Cooper, “Physical Elements,” for discussion of the originary substance and fire. The cosmogony will be addressed in Chapter 6.

³⁶ Gourinat, “Les stoïciens et le dualisme,” 170; Gourinat embraces the idea that this is not much of a monism, arguing that the Stoics are neither monists nor dualists.

³⁷ For an account of the Stoics as “substance monists” see Miller, “Substance Monism.” See M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” 135–6, on the difficulties of “doing cosmology” with a rigorously monistic vocabulary; Sedley, “Matter,” who characterizes Stoic physics as dualistic in the tradition of Hesiod, the Presocratics, and especially Plato’s *Timaeus*; and Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 68, for monism as equivalent to materialism.

³⁸ I am warmly indebted to Eileen O’Neill for conversation about the status of Stoic monism. For more on kind monism for the Stoics see Chapter 5, n. 47.

the whole is created, at the time of composition, or generation. All these qualifications to the way in which the Stoics are and are not monists show that the shoe (i.e. “Stoic monism”) does not really fit. Indeed, there is no evidence that for the Stoics all things are one, that there is only one thing, or even that there is only one substance. In other words, there is no Stoic monism; or, “Stoic monism” is not Stoic.

A Coarse-Grained Orthodoxy

In addition to the unity of one thing composed out of many, something else that I *do* mean by “unity” is that there is a certain orthodoxy to Stoicism, i.e. a unity to the school. This claim may sound controversial, especially to those who see primarily development and dissent among individual Stoics. But in fact I am advocating methodological modesty and restraint in our conjectures about Stoic thought. The orthodoxy that I elucidate is extremely coarse-grained, and entirely compatible with recognizing that there was internal disagreement among individual Stoics, as well as doctrinal development in the school. For example, taking Something to be the highest ontological genus, recognizing that only bodies *exist*, and holding that all incorporeals depend on body for their *subsistence*, are coarse enough commitments to give rise to any number of fine-grained debates, e.g. what entities will count as Something, or how many different incorporeals there are. Such debates do not undermine but, rather, underwrite the posit of an orthodoxy. In fact, most arguments in favor of deviant Stoic theories not only presuppose but rely on an orthodoxy from which to deviate; if this were true for all of them, and there were, indeed, no Stoic orthodoxy to speak of, the cases would collapse into a heap. This result, which amounts to denying that there was any substantive agreement among Stoics, I want to reject.³⁹

I see an important dissonance between the well-attested dominance of the Stoic school, the extent to which they were criticized, and their widespread influence, on the one hand, and a picture that ascribes no unity or basic orthodoxy to being a Stoic, on the other. So, when I speak of “the Stoics,” I do mean to signal an orthodoxy.⁴⁰ But when I make claims of an orthodoxy I do not thereby mean to deny that there was either disagreement or development among Stoics—even though

³⁹ Mattingly, “Early Stoicism,” 274, is, perhaps, an ally on this particular point (though certainly not on the unity that we each find): “Yet to the degree in which a thematic unity of doctrine founded in the character of its primary intuitions of the nature of the world can be pointed out in the teaching of the early Stoa, interpretations which proceed upon the assumption, explicitly or implied, that Stoicism is essentially a collection of haphazard, unconnected, and paradoxical apothegms, showing not so much inner unity as some ulterior purpose, are seemingly deprived of any *locus standi* as independently valid historical explanations.”

⁴⁰ I see no reason to assume (or deny) that the prevalence of textual evidence that speaks of “the Stoics” reflects either the fact that Chrysippus “won” and co-opted the right to write Stoic history, as Inwood suggests in “Unified,” n. 28, and “Why Physics?,” 204–6, or that sources had insufficient evidence to specify which Stoics held what views. It might just as well be that reports about “the Stoics” are intended as reports about the orthodoxy, as DL announces at 7.38. More on these issues ahead.

I will often argue against readings that find disagreement and development where there is no real evidence for it. In this respect my project is negative, arguing against fine-grained developmentalist accounts. The positive side of the project is much more coarse-grained. In fact, I take the orthodoxy that I propose to be compatible even with the claims of Ivor Ludlam that the Stoics had neither a physical school (a campus, so to speak), nor scholarachs, nor genuine succession stories tracing an orthodoxy from one person to the next.⁴¹ The orthodoxy I propose does not require or presuppose any of these “myths” and is compatible with a loose master-pupil relation as Ludlam proposes (although I will allow myself the use of words like “school,” “founder,” and, of course, “orthodoxy”). On the other hand, my account is also compatible with the view of W. D. Ross that Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus

“were the formative thinkers of the school, and that the members of the Middle and Later Stoa did little but repeat the older arguments, enforcing them by apt illustration and clever rhetoric, but often, also, losing consistency by borrowing ideas from other schools. Probably one might go further and say that all the main ideas of Stoicism are to be found already in Zeno—that the task of Cleanthes was simply that of systematising, and the task of Chrysippus, that of finding new arguments for old conclusions.”⁴²

Something else I clearly do not mean by “unity,” then, is the idea that Stoic philosophy is a grand, strongly unified system, or intricate set of interlocking propositions that comes crashing down should any one piece be moved. Brad Inwood has argued persuasively that Cicero’s evidence in *De Finibus* (particularly 3.74–5), which has been the basis of this longstanding picture of Stoic philosophy as “marvelously systematic,” is not to be taken this way; and he is right to urge “that the appropriate way to assess how the various theses and doctrines of the school fit together is to consider the arguments and doctrines on their own merits,” rather than being influenced by the hyperbole of Cicero’s Stoic *character* Cato.⁴³ Inwood is surely also right that “the idea that there is a single, general Stoic view on the question of the role played by physics should probably be shelved.”⁴⁴ All this, too, I take to be compatible with my positing a coarse-grained metaphysical orthodoxy for the Stoics; orthodoxy and systematicity are not the same thing. In fact, I take my account to be silent about the parts of philosophy, and the relation between logic, physics, and ethics. Nor do I intend to give necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to be a Stoic, even if some commitments would be disqualifying

⁴¹ Ludlam, “Two Stoic Myths”; thanks to Rob Heller for the reference.

⁴² Ross, “*Davidson’s Stoic Creed*,” 240. See also Stephens, “The Stoics and their Philosophical System,” 22, for the view that “Stoicism is better understood as a living, organic body of interrelated ideas.”

⁴³ Inwood, “Unified,” 239. In favor of a rigid *systema* that disallows doctrinal development, see Bronowski, *Lekta*, 17–78.

⁴⁴ Inwood, “Why Physics?,” 206.

(e.g. embracing atomism, denying blending). Not only is it implausible that there ever was any such set of “bylaws,” so to speak, but the scope of my project is nowhere near so broad. There are countless other defining commitments to being a Stoic, apart from the metaphysical orthodoxy that I will limn here—the whole of Stoic ethics, for example. So, my aims are modest.

That said, I think there *is* a certain Stoic orthodoxy to be found, a principled metaphysics infusing all aspects of Stoic philosophy. What I propose in this book as orthodox Stoic metaphysics is a set of commitments about what there is (counting) and what those things are *like*, or *how* they are (grounding). They are the guiding principles of Stoic philosophy, running through their physics, logic, and ethics. Some of these guiding principles will be more explicit to us than others. For example, the criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* are quite explicit (as one might expect for a logical criterion); but the principle of incorporeal *subsistence* (that all incorporeals inherit their properties from the bodies that underlie them) is nowhere explicit in so many words, and has to be reconstructed from evidence across a wide variety of contexts. The principle of *subsistence* according to thought (*kat’ epinoian*), on the other hand, which I will argue underwrites A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley’s controversial posit of the third ontological category, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, is quite well attested in the ancient texts (but underappreciated by commentators). There is no getting around the fact that Stoic scholarship consists in reconstruction from impoverished sources. Nevertheless, I submit, careful examination of the texts reveals a definite, if coarse, orthodoxy that constitutes the unity of Stoic metaphysics.

Sometimes Stoic philosophy is likened to a human being, with logic as the skeleton, ethics as the flesh, and physics as the soul (DL 7.40). On this animate model, I like to think of Stoic metaphysics as the commanding faculty (*hēgemonikon*) of soul, the rational part that reasons, and rules over the rest. This is the part by which an animal is aware of and engaged with itself and its surroundings, and in humans the rational nature of the *hēgemonikon* is what makes our impressions (*phantasiai*) conceptual, propositional, inferential, and significant—thoughts (*noēseis*) (DL 7.51, passage H/Chapter 12). Analogously, according to this heuristic, Stoic metaphysics plays the role of *hēgemonikon* in being the guiding principle that differentiates Stoic philosophy from Plato’s idealism as much as from brute Presocratic and Epicurean materialism. Stoic metaphysics is what makes the Stoics non-reductive physicalists. What I like about this way of putting it is that it does not call for metaphysics to be a distinct branch of philosophy somehow going *beyond* physics, logic, or ethics, nor does it upset the three traditional parts of philosophy. It is simply the claim that metaphysics plays this kind of commanding or guiding role in Stoic philosophy; the claim is itself coarse to the extent that it makes no fine-grained claims about the priority of the parts of philosophy, about which particular images individual Stoics embraced to illustrate the tripartite nature of philosophy, or about the status of Stoic metaphysics as a part of philosophy. Just as

theology can be seen as the culmination or fulfillment (*teletē*) of physics, without creating controversy over the status of Stoic theology as a part of philosophy (or worrying that there is no such thing as Stoic theology), so too one can say that metaphysics is the guiding principle (*hēgemonikon*) of Stoic philosophy without upsetting the status of physics, logic, or ethics as its parts (or worrying that there is no such thing as Stoic metaphysics).⁴⁵ Just as humans are rational, analogously, the Stoics are metaphysical.

This commitment to a Stoic orthodoxy, however coarse and fuzzy in its boundaries, raises the further question: how far does this “unity” extend? Does it begin with Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, and extend through the Roman Imperial era? This is another thorny issue. It is hard to determine, first of all, who the Roman Stoics are, and, secondly, what among their views we should take as evidence of Stoic orthodoxy. In fact, these issues are inextricable. Evidence of the Roman era, from self-identifying Stoics, has to be handled with particular care. Widespread syncretizing by avowed Stoics makes it hard to tell whether Stoicism is evolving or crumbling. My own view is that when we find Seneca, for example, disavowing the Stoic genus of Something and embracing *what is* (*quod est*) instead (*Ep.* 58), we should accept the distance he puts between himself and orthodox Stoicism. Seneca’s disavowals should be taken at face value, as evidence of the respect in which he is heterodox, and hence as confirmation of the orthodoxy from which he departs. Thus, I do not see in Seneca reasons to think the Stoic orthodoxy evolved, but, rather, reasons to think Seneca is not orthodox.⁴⁶

And, although I have emphasized that the Stoic orthodoxy I find is compatible with there being internal disagreement and development, and that it can be thought of as a family resemblance rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or “bylaws,” for being a Stoic, nevertheless I am committed to the orthodoxy, minimal as it is, having certain boundaries. The orthodoxy need not be perfectly criterial for being a Stoic (Seneca can deny that Something is the highest genus and still count as a Stoic in some sense), but neither need it be destroyed or amended by this kind of late-breaking heterodoxy. If Seneca disavows

⁴⁵ Regardless of whether theology is treated as a subdiscipline or not, Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1035A (26C) attests to theology as the completion, initiation, or fulfillment of physics; cf. Algra, “Stoic Theology,” for a helpful study of the status of theology in Stoic philosophy. For the view that the Stoics are not engaged in but, rather, turning away from metaphysics as “a study that goes beyond physics in offering some kind of deeper understanding of reality,” see Vogt, “Brutes,” 145. Note that when metaphysics is construed this way, as a study that goes *beyond* physics (or logic, or ethics for that matter), it had better be false to say that the Stoics are engaged in metaphysics. However, this does not show that there is no such thing as Stoic metaphysics; it only shows that Stoic metaphysics is not correctly construed in Aristotelian terms as a distinct part of philosophy going beyond physics (just as Stoic theology would not be correctly construed as going beyond physics).

⁴⁶ In contrast to Sedley, “Stoic Metaphysics at Rome”; Salles, “Roman Stoicism.” On these questions see also Inwood, *Seneca*, xix–xxi, and *Later Stoicism*; Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division.” I will return to these issues in Chapter 16. I also do not see good reason to think Seneca’s testimony (that the Stoics place Something over *being* and *non-being*) is misleading, as Vogt argues, “Brutes,” 147–9.

the orthodoxy that Something is the highest ontological genus, so much the worse for Seneca's Stoic credentials. So, to answer the question of how far the orthodoxy that I describe extends: it applies primarily to the early and middle Stoa from Zeno through Posidonius, and only with qualification to the late, Roman era.⁴⁷

An Uncharitable Bias

A distinct but closely related matter of interpretive complexity is the pervasive and persistent assumption of Stoic incompetence, which finds the Stoics backed into their theoretical commitments by their own philosophical failings. J. R. Mattingly puts this point very nicely: "Modern criticism of Stoicism has often appeared to proceed as if its motto were: *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. One is urged to find significance in Stoicism in spite of, and so to say beyond, its unenlightened dogmatism and metaphysical narrowness."⁴⁸ This assumption comes in more and less hostile versions. On one end of the spectrum there are those who take the Stoics to be downright incoherent by their own lights and who are on the attack against Stoic views. It is a longstanding tradition inherited from ancient commentators, including the Academics, Peripatetics, and Neoplatonists from whom we get most of our information. For example, Plutarch devoted a single work, *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions*, to showing how the Stoics flout common sense; and another to their sheer incoherence, titled *On Stoic Self-contradictions*. So, it's not surprising to read things like the following in contemporary scholarship: the Stoics "conced[e] the existence of four 'incorporeals' [. . . and] it is apparent that in the Stoic philosophy the term 'incorporeal' is a cause of embarrassment" because incorporeality and reality are "incompatible ontological realities"; thus the Stoics were "trapped in perplexities of their own making."⁴⁹ Call this the hostile end of the spectrum.

Others who assume that the Stoics couldn't avoid and didn't welcome Something as the highest genus are not inherently hostile, but still render the move ad hoc and are sheepish about it on the Stoics' behalf. For instance, although David Hahm takes himself to be vindicating Stoicism from "looking like some kind of schizophrenic eclecticism,"⁵⁰ he goes on to say that recognizing the incorporeals

⁴⁷ I am grateful to conversation and correspondence with Brad Inwood and with Ricardo Salles in thinking through these questions of orthodoxy.

⁴⁸ Mattingly, "Early Stoicism," 275.

⁴⁹ Tzamalikos, "Origen," 540, 553–4; for an extreme developmental account of the Stoic ontology and of the incorporeals in particular, see Isnardi Parente, "Incorporel." I put Weil, "Remarques sur le 'matérialisme' des stoïciens," 558, at this end of the spectrum as well, for taking the Stoics to be unaware of the foundations of their own paradoxical views, arguing in the guise of an apologist that "the Stoics might have been feeble thinkers, but they cannot have been crazy."

⁵⁰ Hahm, *Origins*, xiv.

as Somethings in contrast to beings “[s]ounds like a face-saving device to allow the Stoics to think and talk about things that have no substantial existence.”⁵¹ Likewise, Dorothea Frede has said that because *lekta* don’t fit the Stoics’ ontological scheme, i.e. the corporeal mold, too well, “the Stoics then had to introduce a special, somewhat airy sounding category of ‘somethings.’”⁵² Other scholars take other incorporeals to be the problem; for example, Emile Bréhier says: “identifying being with body, they are thereby *forced to admit* space and time, if not as existents, *at least* as definite things.”⁵³ Or Adam Drozdek: “the void, as an incorporeal, does not exist; therefore, the Stoics *resort to a terminological distinction* between existence and subsistence.”⁵⁴ Some take Something to have been introduced only later for creatures of fiction, like centaurs and giants.⁵⁵

Yet others assume, likewise, that Something is an ad hoc device, but without embarrassment on the Stoics’ behalf. For instance, Gerard Watson says “it is natural to expect that everything there is should come under one supreme class of Being, ὄν; but because of difficulties springing from their ἀσώματα [incorporeals] theory, the Stoics preferred to replace this with τὸ τί, [Something] which includes all that can be talked about, whether it has actual physical existence or not.”⁵⁶ On this account, again, the genus Something, developed in response to problems with incorporeals, is a theory the Stoics back themselves into when their brutish “materialism” fails them.

Similarly, in comparing them to the unreformed Giants of Plato’s *Sophist*, Michael Frede describes the Stoics in a way that makes it seem as though they are subject to rather than dictating their theory: “But the Stoics also realise that their theory makes reference to items like the void, space, time, and *lekta* which are not bodies, but which cannot be said to be altogether nothing, to have no status whatsoever. Hence for items of this kind they introduce the category of a something (*ti*).”⁵⁷ Though the details and degrees vary from hostile to sheepish to unapologetic, there is a common

⁵¹ Hahm, *Origins*, n. 24. Interestingly, the passage Hahm cites at the end of this quotation is Seneca, *Ep.* 58.15, where Seneca introduces not the canonical incorporeals but centaurs and giants instead. This goes to show just how tangled the threads of Stoic scholarship are. It is true that one would expect incorporeals to figure in the schema Seneca is providing here, but they do not. The fact that Hahm takes this passage as evidence for the incorporeals anyway, and, on that basis, takes Something as a mere face-saving device for incorporeals shows just how deep the assumption of Stoic incoherence runs.

⁵² D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 213–4.

⁵³ Bréhier, *Théorie*, 2, my emphasis; cf. 51.

⁵⁴ Drozdek, “Infinity,” my emphasis.

⁵⁵ Including, perhaps, the source of our evidence for centaurs and giants, Seneca, *Ep.* 58.13–15 (27A, passage A/Chapter 14), as well as Salles, “Roman Stoicism,” and Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division”; Zeller, *Outlines*, 214, argues that *being* was the early genus with Zeno, while Something was introduced by Chrysippus; Rist, “Categories and their Uses,” 41–3, argues against Zeller.

⁵⁶ Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 49–50, and, less charitably, 92–6.

⁵⁷ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 116. Cf. also Sedley, “Stoicism,” where he argues that because some predicates are not bodies, the *lekta* must be incorporeal, and because reducing time to body would make motion impossible, time must be incorporeal. Robertson, “Mathematical Objects,” 173, takes the incorporeals all to be “metaphysical consequences of bodies,” but still uses scare quotes in speaking of the “intermediate” metaphysical level of incorporeality.

assumption that the move to Something as highest genus is an ad hoc concession the Stoics had to make when their corporealism failed them. And this elementary assumption makes the ontology incoherent and unprincipled from the outset. I have made this point just in terms of complaints we find about the ontological genus Something, but this kind of uncharitable bias pervades scholarly interpretation of the Stoics, so that the dominant picture is of Stoic philosophy as a series of concessions and compromises toward a confused, crippled, or incoherent theory.⁵⁸

Most are not bothered by this result, but I reckon that they should be; for it treats the most prominent school of the Hellenistic era as a group of philosophical and metaphysical bumlbers, effectively stumbling backward into their theory. And we should think twice before accepting that their leading status as philosophers was not well earned. One of my aims in this book, then, is to do what I can to dislodge this deep-seated assumption, and offer a new motto, perhaps: *Tout comprendre c'est tout ranger*—"to understand it all is to put it all in order, or get it all organized"; in other words, to understand Stoic metaphysics is to understand how and why each entity is Something. So, with respect to the unity of metaphysics, another thing I mean by "unity" is that Stoic metaphysics, understood as the reflective equilibrium of distinct counting and grounding enterprises, is principled (not ad hoc), coherent (not contradictory), and comprehensive (with a place in the ontology for everything there is and nothing else between Something and nothing). In this, the Stoics are masters of their own philosophical destiny. As Brunschwig puts the sentiment: "far from being overcome by events beyond their control, they know exactly what they're doing and exactly what they want."⁵⁹ I take up this apologist

⁵⁸ E.g. Bailey, "Structure," 260, says that the Stoics have to "tolerate such items as times and places," and takes their "mania" and "appetites" for both bodies and incorporeals as his explanandum (255–7); Barnes, "Meaning," 210–1, describes the theory of incorporeals as an "unwelcome truth," and a "prestidigitation" to conjure away the appearance that *lekta* can act and be acted upon; Kahn, "Logic and LOGOS," 169–70, finds it worthwhile to develop a unified theory of *logos* "as a possible interpretation of Stoic metaphysics which would make their so-called materialism look much more like that of Spinoza than like Hobbes"; Mansfeld, "Zeno and Aristotle on Mixture," 308, says "the comparison of his [sc. Zeno's] account with Aristotle's not only reveals what he wanted to preserve, but also indicates the precise point where he was forced to break loose, and brings out what he had to invent in order to save his corporealism"; Menn, "Categories," argues that the Stoic Categories were developed to handle the shortcomings of their corporealism (218–9), itself cast as the pursuit of Plato's substance and quality distinction (215); he speaks of the Stoics having to "face the fact that not all predications can be explained through presence" of F-ness because it seems absurd to say that there is a body, sittingness, inhering in Socrates, and then takes the classification of place as an incorporeal to be a move made under the threat of regress generated by applying the substance-quality distinction to Stoic theory (220–1); Sellars, "Stoic Ontology," 185–7, says that the Stoics "also acknowledge the necessity of" other entities that "cannot be subsumed within a wider conception of body," and that the Stoics "get round" the "necessity" of the incorporeals; M. J. White, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 152, cites as a virtue of his account that it has "the effect of mitigating their [sc. their doctrines'] peculiarity."

⁵⁹ Brunschwig, TGS, 90; cf. 24–7 for Brunschwig's illuminating exposition of this uncharitable bias against the Stoic conception of Something as the supreme genus. For an insightful discussion of a more general bias against the Stoics, which left the school neglected by scholars in the 19th century, see Ierodiakonou, *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, 1–22. For further resistance to the interpretive bias that the Stoics are operating defensively and ad hoc with the introduction of their incorporeals, see Bronowski, *Lekta*, 284–6.

mantel and endeavor to show that Stoic metaphysics is considerably more sophisticated than even Brunschwig allows; for he buys the Stoics their theoretical competence in counting Somethings only at the expense of disorder and discord among the incorporeals.⁶⁰

A Principle of Maximal Charity

The strength and persistence of this interpretive bias, even among Stoic friends and apologists, is easily explained: most of our sources of information for Stoic theory are hostile critics. Given the absence of original sources and the length and depth of this polemical history, it is no wonder that scholars see the Stoics as victims of their own cleverness. Therefore, the real work of dislodging the deep-seated assumption of Stoic incoherence will take place in the detailed diagnosis of these critics' complaints, on a case-by-case basis. I will say more about my textual methodology soon. In the meantime, I hope to have said enough to expose the widespread bias and ask, at least, that we not assume (and hence not seek) Stoic incompetence; or, better, that we shift the burden of proof from the defense of Stoic competence, over to the prosecution. Or, best yet, that we work under the assumption that the Stoics were in fact competent thinkers, and seek to reconstruct a theory that is not just coherent (already contrary to so many interpretations), but even philosophically elegant.

The Stoics were arguably the most successful school of the Hellenistic era, lasting over 500 years. If they were as philosophically inept as their critics (and so many modern apologists) portray, they would not have lasted so long or engaged so fruitfully with their Academic and Epicurean neighbors as they did, nor would they have taken their place in history as they have. As an interpretive principle, this observation means that (a) other things being equal (primarily, being congenial to the textual evidence), an account of the Stoics that renders their thinking coherent and sophisticated is to be preferred over one that makes them confused and simplistic. It also means that (b) other things being equal, an account that finds the Stoics in theoretical equipoise with their predecessors and neighbors is also to be preferred. Thus I resist interpretations that consider the Stoics as derivative or unoriginal thinkers, rehashing Plato and Aristotle, or motivated by a desire to conform (as Hahm puts it).⁶¹ It is possible that the Stoics fell in with the

⁶⁰ Brunschwig, *TGS*, uses discord in the extension as evidence that the genus was conceived of first, independent of its extension. Thus in embracing the reflective equilibrium of counting and grounding I agree with Brunschwig, *TGS*, 26, that the class of *non-existent* Somethings was not arrived at inductively by examination of the shared properties of those things that are not bodies but also not eliminable, but disagree that it must therefore be arrived at independent of its extension.

⁶¹ Hahm, *Origins*, 47–8; this attitude was especially prominent with respect to Stoic logic with, e.g. Prantl and Zeller, until the work of the Kneales, Lucasiewicz, and Mates, on which see Muller, "An Introduction to Stoic Logic."

Epicureans on void, or that they retained certain Platonizing tendencies despite their rejection of Forms and enthusiasm for body, or that they were in pursuit of a subject-inherence model jury rigged for bodies. But given the Stoics' dominance as a school in a competitive intellectual climate, an account will be better if it finds the Stoics innovating and carving out new theoretical space that sets them apart from Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicureans alike.⁶² This principle of maximal charity—that other things being equal, one should choose the reading that makes the Stoics both competent and innovative—will guide this inquiry.

The principle of maximal charity applies to the way we see individual Stoics in relation to each other as well. I am going to operate on the hypothesis that it is legitimate to speak of “the Stoics” in reference to orthodox views that unify the school. As I have already emphasized, I do not thereby deny that there was internal debate or that individual Stoics left their mark on Stoic doctrine; rather, I take there to be core doctrine against which, as an agreed-upon background, there were more fine-grained internal debates. This methodological strategy is designed to show just how far and wide the agreement extends *without* encountering controversy. Thus, to the extent that my account fits the textual evidence and results in a coherent and creative account of Stoic metaphysics, it also serves to confirm the hypothesis of Stoic orthodoxy.⁶³ Admittedly (and designedly), it will be a limited orthodoxy that I confirm because the core commitments I advocate are coarse-grained and limited to their metaphysics.

Absent evidence to the contrary, then, I will treat evidence given about “the Stoics” as signaling doctrinal orthodoxy. I am skeptical that our sources use this label merely for lack of resources, and doubtful that Chrysippus co-opted the rights to the name, effectively suppressing alternative views. In the spirit of dislodging the anti-Stoic bias that sees the school as internally divided, I ask: why *not* take widespread reports about “the Stoics” as evidence of an orthodoxy? Let us at least pursue the possibility that Stoic theory was not developed as series of defensive moves against their own flat-footed commitments to body. The textual evidence is put as often in terms of “the Stoics” as it is in terms of an individual Stoic, and this may well be a reflection of the orthodoxy (not that all individual mentions signal

⁶² This desideratum does not presuppose that the Stoics were explicitly responding to or even directly acquainted with the works of Aristotle. For extended argument that the Stoics were indeed responding to Aristotle, see Hahm, *Origins*; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*; Sorabji, *MSM*; for a more cautionary approach, see Barnes, “Aristotle and Stoic Logic”; A. A. Long, “Theophrastus and the Stoa”; Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics*; Sedley, “Origins.” I am inclined to think, with Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 2, that Zeno and the early Stoics did not have access to Aristotle’s works, and that he was not the towering figure that he is in today’s history of philosophy, but that, nevertheless (following Lapidge, “ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα”), there must have been some contact and familiarity with Aristotelian ideas, even if only oral.

⁶³ Sedley, “On Signs,” 241, embraces a similar methodological approach: “I shall therefore work from the hypothesis that the opponents [sc. of the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon, as reported by Philodemus, *Sign.*] are Stoics of the mid or late second century B.C., hoping that the hypothesis will find further confirmation in my attempt to relate their doctrines to mainstream Stoicism.”

dissent, though). The suggestion is confirmed by Diogenes Laertius, who announces (at 7.38) that he will give a general or common account of Stoic doctrine in the Life of Zeno because Zeno was the founder;⁶⁴ in other words he makes explicit that he is going to report Stoic orthodoxy. After this, Diogenes speaks consistently of “the Stoics” to convey this common account. He speaks of “some Stoics” and individual Stoics when he is contrasting their views and indicating fine-grained disagreements (e.g. on the divisions of philosophy and order in which to teach them, 7.39–42, 84), or describing innovations (e.g. the Chrysippean division of propositions (*axiōmata*) into simple and not-simple, hypothetical, etc., 7.68–72); and when he cites individuals as *evidence* of orthodoxy, that too is made clear (e.g. at 7.48 he declares that he will quote only as much from Diocles the Magnesian (7.49) as much as comes within the scope of “our” introductory handbook; cf. 7.87, 90–1, 101, 110–1, 120–5, 127–9, 131). That Diogenes is reporting Stoic orthodoxy in the book on Zeno is confirmed again when he announces (at 7.160) that next he will report the heterodox doctrines of Ariston of Chios, Herillus of Carthage, and Dionysius the Renegade, a methodological point that he reaffirms and brings to a close (at 7.167) before describing Zeno’s successor Cleanthes.

The consistency of our textual evidence concerning the doctrines of Zeno, the Stoic founder, through Chrysippus, Mnesarchus, and Posidonius, is further evidence of a persistent orthodoxy. And the variety of corroborating sources (neutral and hostile, earlier and later) also speaks to a core unity: it is no small thing to find agreement among reliable neutral doxographers spanning several hundred years, as well as hostile sources spanning five centuries and a range of critical stances toward the Stoics. This makes the possibility of an orthodoxy worth taking seriously. Indeed, if there were deep doctrinal disagreements of the kind the anti-Stoic bias finds, one would expect for ancient critics to have exploited them to a much greater extent than they do, or for the phrase “the Stoics” not to have become such common currency, or for the doxographers to have paid the Stoics much less mind than they do. As it is, the disagreements that do show up in the evidence are often much less radical than commentators make them out to be, either because they are fine-grained enough to presuppose the orthodoxy I am pressing, or because they are orthogonal to the question on which they are invoked as evidence, or because the heterodox views fall into place as just that, heterodox. Furthermore, it is often the case that individual Stoics’ diverging paths are not even well described as disagreements to begin with, and that disagreement is fabricated where there is none.⁶⁵ I will urge caution in our conjectures about Stoic disagreement and

⁶⁴ κοινῇ δὲ περὶ πάντων τῶν στωικῶν δογμάτων ἔδοξέ μοι ἐν τῷ Ζήνωνος εἰπεῖν βίῳ.

⁶⁵ To give but a few examples: DL 7.41 describes widespread disagreement among various Stoics concerning the parts of philosophy, but this does not affect the shared commitment to a set of guiding metaphysical principles that I describe. Similarly, the interesting debate between Cleanthes and Chrysippus over whether walking (i.e. action, generally) is to be located in the commanding faculty of soul alone, or, rather, in the soul extending from the commanding faculty to the feet, is not a fundamental disagreement about the nature of soul that indicates any real heterodoxy on either part (Seneca,

development. So, in the end, the principle of maximal charity that I propose is in fact quite modest. And yet, for all this modesty and restraint, I realize that claims of orthodoxy can appear controversial against the backdrop of the interpretive bias that I have described, and so the proof will be in the details.

Methodology

This principle of maximal charity carries over to the textual methodology. First of all, it applies to our sources as much as to the Stoics themselves. Whether the reports are polemical, friendly, or neutral, all parties are due the benefit of the doubt. With respect to critics, this means assuming that their disagreements with the Stoics are philosophically substantive, and not just a matter of name-calling, trickery, or *ignoratio elenchi* (whether willful or otherwise). I urge the assumption of competence and substantive debate all around, i.e. for the Stoics and their critics alike. This is not just a “feel-good” matter. The core challenge facing every student of Stoic thought is the poverty of our textual evidence, which is both scant and highly fragmented; further, the textual evidence we do have is primarily second-hand and often from sources hostile to their views. So Stoic scholarship is a sort of archaeological enterprise, requiring both an overview of the site, and careful excavation of the details of each piece of evidence. What this means, practically speaking, is understanding each piece of textual evidence in its dialectical context, identifying the governing presuppositions of critical arguments of the source, and untangling the interpretive knots to reveal a substantive philosophical debate. It is

Ep. 113.23 (53L)). On the soul, again, Chrysippus’ cautions about construing impression (*phantasia*) on the model of a signet ring on wax reveals care and detail, not disagreement (DL 7.50 (39A3)). For arguments downplaying the distinction between the psychology of Chrysippus and Posidonius as portrayed by Galen, see C. Gill, *Structured Self*. Further, although Cleanthes and Chrysippus offer different responses to Diodorus Cronus’ Master Argument (Cleanthes denies the premise that all past truths are necessary, while Chrysippus constructs a clever counterexample to the premise that nothing impossible follows from something possible), this does not reveal deep doctrinal divide any more than it attributes to Chrysippus the view that metaphysical impossibilities are entailed by metaphysical possibilities (for further detail on these responses, see de Harven, “Necessity, Possibility”). Further, the Stoic commitment to body both as what is capable of acting or undergoing and as solid three-dimensional extension with resistance is not a matter of internal disagreement or doctrinal development: rather, doing/undergoing is the *criterion* for existence, which is met only by bodies, while being solid three-dimensional extension with resistance is the Stoic *definition* of body (*pace* Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division,” 160–1, “Zeno of Citium,” 158–67 (thanks to Rob Heller for reminding me of this article and bringing my attention to these arguments concerning body in particular), and Sorabji, *MSM*, 37). The idea that Mnesarchus and Posidonius disagree about the persistence of material subjects, as per Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” is based on the oddly empirical intuition that it “is difficult to suppose that the particular substance [sc. a lump of clay] neither loses nor gains any constituents during this period [sc. when it is remolded into a dog].” And, finally, Menn, “Categories,” rests his strongly developmental account of the Categories on a rather fine-grained disagreement concerning the unity of the virtues, between Aristo, a deviant Stoic, and Chrysippus in the defensive position—not to mention on the strongly biased assumption that the Stoics were pursuing the inheritance of Plato and Aristotle, failing at that endeavor, and thus stumbling backward into the theory of the Categories.

a last resort to write off recalcitrant testimony as too polemical to be of use; critics should be understood, whenever possible, to be making a good faith (even if unsuccessful) point against the Stoics.⁶⁶ To be clear: making the most of every piece of evidence and treating critics with maximal charity does not necessarily mean finding critics to be *correct* in their criticisms (since that would still be a one-sided case of charity); it means finding in critics' testimony the best possible case they can make against the best possible Stoics.

This "best-case scenario" approach requires identifying both critics' own theoretical presuppositions and the Stoics' opposing commitments that result in a substantive disagreement. For example, I will argue in defense of Stoic corporealism that the key to understanding the Stoic position, as well as their critics' complaints, is to recognize that the core, underlying disagreement is about hylomorphism.⁶⁷ When the Stoics make body fundamental, it is easy to see why critics making the hylomorphic presupposition that all body is a combination of matter and form will find it impossible for the Stoics to make a composite entity fundamental. One reaction to this complaint is to side with critics and seek for the Stoics an alternate conception of body as mathematical or, at any rate, not a literally physical notion. This is to concede at the outset that the Stoics are incoherent in their views, or at least in need of saving from themselves. If scholars share critics' presupposition that hylomorphism is true, or the only possible option for the time, then the theoretical options they carve out for the Stoics will be constrained accordingly, i.e. according to the assumption that the Stoics were victims of their own poor theoretical choices, not so much innovating as choosing from the existing options of their neighbors and predecessors, or that they were stumbling backward into their commitments.

A better reaction, I propose, is to diagnose critics' theoretical presuppositions (since it is the critics' testimony from which we are forced to begin), and then to use those presuppositions to diagnose the philosophical disagreement and identify the Stoics' own, countervailing presuppositions. This second step has often been absent. For example, if the Stoics do not endorse a hylomorphic conception of body, then there is in fact no reason that they cannot make body fundamental. What has not been considered is the possibility that the Stoics reject hylomorphism. This method yields a more charitable account both of the Stoic position and of critics' responses, revealing a more interesting and substantive philosophical debate than

⁶⁶ Not that there aren't cases of dialectical misfire that undermine a critic's own credibility, e.g. Alexander's arguments in *De Fato* XIV that the Stoics fail to preserve what is up to us (*to eph' hemin*) by appeal to assent and impulse certainly seem to be an egregious *ignoratio elenchi*. See Schofield, "Ariston," 86–7, for sound methodological remarks about the difficulty of working with doxographical evidence from hostile or distant sources.

⁶⁷ By hylomorphism I mean the idea that body is a composite of matter and form, where these are entities of different ontological order: the one material or corporeal, and the other immaterial or incorporeal. From the hylomorphic perspective, if something is to be body, tangible, and bulky, it must be due to the matter present in it (since form is incorporeal); and if something is to have shape, quality, or reason it must be due to form (since matter is entirely without qualities and intelligence in its own right).

has been appreciated. It also substantially simplifies the resulting theory, once the Stoics are not made to contort around hylomorphic constraints.

Another important commitment of this methodological approach is to take our textual evidence at face value. In addition to getting the most out of the available testimony, I am committed to giving a literal, face value reading of Stoic texts. For example, with hylomorphic presuppositions set to the side, as we have seen, there is no longer any reason to fabricate attenuated senses of “body” to avoid critics’ complaints about body as fundamental. Similarly, as we will see, with atomistic presuppositions about body as full, and resistance (*antitupia*) as total ricochet set to the side, the well-attested Stoic commitment to through and through blending (*krasis di’ holou*) as the complete coextension (and hence colocation) of two (or more) independent bodies can be taken at face value. Here again the guiding methodological principle is to identify the theoretical presuppositions that make blending look impossible to their critics, and then see that if the Stoics reject those presuppositions, a literal, face value reading of the texts falls into place (e.g. the coextension of two bodies is not incoherent after all). So, the principle of maximal charity extends to the textual methodology in two ways: first in taking the critics, too, as charitably as possible, by viewing the textual evidence in its dialectical context, identifying the governing presuppositions, and finding therein substantive philosophical debates; and, second, in taking our textual evidence about the Stoics at face value, finding a path to a literal reading of the words on the page so that we find, at once, that critics are reliable in their reports and the Stoics are coherent in their commitments, everyone saying what they mean and meaning what they say.⁶⁸

Another aspect of this approach, understanding the Stoics by their own lights and on their own terms, is a certain resistance to imputing historically distant views to them. In the case of blending, for example, once we see how the Stoic conception of body licenses the possibility of colocation, there is no need to attribute to the Stoics the contemporary mereological thesis of gunk, either as a way around the Stoic commitment to colocation (since it is not problematic in the ways that scholars have supposed since antiquity), or as a way to make the Stoic commitment to the continuum and infinite divisibility more familiar (since we achieve this acquaintance and understanding on their own terms). This is a tricky point to make because I clearly *do* think we should avail ourselves of current metaphysics in understanding and explicating the Stoics. However, I would like to do so not by equating any or all of Stoic theory with any particular view that is either current today or historically distant from the Stoics (in fact, my commitment to their theoretical equipoise resists equating any or all of Stoic theory even with their immediate predecessors and contemporaries), but, rather, by using the language and

⁶⁸ As Boys-Stones urges, “Locating the Cosmos,” 577, if we give the benefit of the doubt to Chrysippus, we should do the same for Plutarch.

terminology of contemporary analytic metaphysics to describe Stoic theory, as a heuristic device.

As I hope my brief engagement with contemporary metaphysics so far has made clear, there are as many points of similarity and contact between the Stoics and current contemporary thinking as there are points of difference and separation. So, although I *do* want to describe the Stoics as grounding their entities in body, for example, I do not thereby mean to say that the Stoics are “really” engaged in grounding as described by Schaffer or anyone else today. For, as much as that shoe fits (as a hierarchical account of reality), it also rubs the wrong the way (e.g. as a genus for too many relations). Similarly, while Koslicki’s valuable conception of varieties of ontological dependence is apt for capturing the idea of Stoic grounding that I do wish to convey, the varieties she offers do not match up perfectly well with those of the Stoics and, indeed, the range of cases that contemporary metaphysicians seek to accommodate under the umbrella term “grounding” far outstrips what we find in the Stoic ontology. Thus, the role of bringing contemporary metaphysics to bear on the Stoics is, for me, heuristic. We have a ready, perspicuous vocabulary available to use in describing Stoic theory, and I will avail myself of it in elucidating and reconstructing their views. This approach, too, is modest, but may appear controversial to a purist about ancient philosophy, e.g. one who takes the ancients to have been too alien in their thinking, too much *sui generis*, to connect with contemporary questions.

That said, the value and outcome of bringing ancient into contact with contemporary need not be purely heuristic; that is just my focus here. There are avenues of contemporary metaphysics to recommend to the Stoics; indeed, some of the value of working in terms of grounding and ontological dependence, as I do, is to suggest that the Stoics could welcome such explicit attention and terminology (without, of course, suggesting that they did in fact take this further meta-stance toward their theory). And the Stoics, for their part, have plenty to offer to contemporary debates; for example, the Stoics’ varieties of ontological dependence are more fine-grained than those that Koslicki develops, and may suggest ways to develop a taxonomy that better fits the variety of entities she seeks to explain.⁶⁹ Although it is beyond the scope of this project to pursue that direction here, I will signal along the way the areas in which Stoicism may have something to recommend to contemporary debates. For the time being, I hope to have shown the utility (and limits) of

⁶⁹ E.g. the smile-mouth relation understood along Stoic lines would be neither a case of composition (aligning roughly with her Constituent Dependence) nor a case of incorporeal *subsistence* (aligning roughly with her Feature Dependence), but, rather, a case of corporeal constitution according to the Stoic theory of the Categories (illustrated nicely by the fist-hand relation). There is reason to think Koslicki would welcome such a contribution, when she indicates that the two varieties of ontological dependence she distinguishes may not be exhaustive and that further species may well be called for (“Varieties,” n. 25), but it would cut against her commitments to form.

understanding the unity of Stoic metaphysics in the light of contemporary analytic metaphysics.

Summary

Section I—Something: The Stoics' highest ontological genus, Something (*ti*), is named after the indefinite pronoun "something." This section develops the suggestion that the Stoics arrived at this genus by careful reflection on Plato's *Sophist*, finding new depth to Plato's challenges as well as the Stoic response. Chapter 1 argues that the challenges that would have been salient to the Stoics are more fine-grained than has so far been appreciated, including logical concerns about saying *what is not* as much as physical concerns about *what is*. We find in the *Sophist* motivation not only for the Stoic ontological genus Something to make room for both *what is* and *what is not*, but also to develop a viable non-reductive physicalism in the challenge to bridge Plato's two worlds. Chapter 2 argues that the Stoics strike their first blow against Plato's Father Parmenides, prising apart Something from *being*, by introducing two distinct ontological criteria by which to count their entities in or out, one for *existence* and one for those things that do not *exist* but are nevertheless Something *subsistent*. Plato's challenges in the *Sophist* and the Stoic ontological criteria together lay the foundation for the rest of the book: from Something, through bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, to everything there is.

Section II—Bodies: This section offers an account of Stoic corporealism that takes us from the ontology of what *exists* to the metaphysics of body. It begins in Chapter 3 with the definition of body (*sōma*) as solid, three-dimensional extension, understood by the Stoics as fundamental (in contrast to hylomorphic conceptions of body as composed of matter and form), and as continuous (in contrast to atomistic conceptions of body as rigid and full). It continues in Chapter 4 with a rehabilitation of the Stoic theory of blending (*krasis di' holou*), the physical mechanism by which the Stoics build their cosmos out of two fundamental bodies, the principles (*archai*): divine, active reason (*logos*) and passive matter (*hulē*). Chapter 5 argues that these *archai* are indeed two distinct and independent bodies, and Chapter 6 shows how, nevertheless, the Stoics can deliver unity, making one out of many by the blending of agent and patient bodies. In addition to this cosmology, Stoic corporealism consists of an account of the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies—again in completely corporealist terms. Chapters 7 and 8 show that the Stoic Categories proceed not by the composition of one thing out of many, as in Stoic physics, but by the constitution of one thing out of one other, as a statue is constituted by clay, for example, or a fist by a hand. This is a self-consciously mereological analysis, which explains what makes something F in the various ways that it is; and this is not a part of physics, as scholars have

thought, but of logic. The Stoics thus divide Plato's labor for the Forms between cosmology, making one thing out of many, and the mereology of the Categories, making many out of one.

Section III—Incorporeals: This section takes us into a new dimension of Stoic physicalism. It argues that the Stoic incorporeals (*asōmata*)—space, time, and the *lekta*, or sayables—are all dependent on body. In contrast to bodies, which *exist*, Stoic incorporeals are said to *subsist* (*huphestanai*, have *hupostasis*). Chapter 9 argues that this *subsistence* consists in the incorporeals inheriting their spatial, temporal, and semantic properties from underlying body. Chapter 10 makes the case for the dependence of the spatial incorporeals: place, room, surface, and void all inherit their extension from the body or bodies on which they depend. Chapter 11 makes the case for time, which depends on the world's motion, and Chapter 12 for the *lekta*, which depend for their *subsistence* on rational impressions (themselves bodies). This univocal dependence of the incorporeals on body yields a sophisticated one-world metaphysics that orders its incorporeal and corporeal entities into grounded and ungrounded kinds, dependent and fundamental, rather than sorting them into contrary kinds, as Plato does. The Stoics are thus early non-reductive physicalists.

Section IV—Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal: This section argues in support of a tripartite ontology: the ontological genus Something includes not only bodies and incorporeals, but also a third class of entities that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. These entities are pure products of thought that do not correspond to anything in the physical world, including limits of the continuum, mathematical entities, and creatures of fiction. For example, there are no geometrical (i.e. perfect) cones or pyramids in the physical world; nor are there any minutes or seconds in the world, or Fahrenheits, nor centaurs and giants. These entities are idealized in the sense that there are no such things or divisions in the world, but they are not therefore ideal in any Meinongian or Platonic sense that puts them in a separate realm. Rather, they are pure products of thought and this remains a physicalist program that grounds its entities in body. To be Something that *subsists* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) is to be a social construct, something that is invented and takes on a public life of its own through the words and drawings that depict it, becoming Something about which we can say true and false things. For example, because we have invented and depicted them as we have, it is true that centaurs are half horse, false that pyramids have five sides, and true that there are sixty seconds in a minute. Thus what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is Something in a univocal sense, according to thought (*kat' epinoian*), underwriting the posit of a tripartite ontology. Chapter 13 takes up the case of limits (both geometrical limits and the limits of the continuum), and Chapter 14 of creatures of fiction, as attested in Seneca's *Epistle* 58.

Section V—Everything: This section returns to the Stoic ontology, arguing against the nearly universal view that there is a further class of entities,

Not-Somethings (*outina*), in metaphysical limbo between Something and nothing at all. Chapter 15 argues that concepts (*ennoēmata*) are off the ontological map altogether. It's not that we can't talk about concepts, or that they can't do their dialectical duties as genus and species and the objects of definition, but that concepts do not meet the ontological criterion for being Something. With the tripartite ontology in hand (covering limits and creatures of fiction), and concepts off the ontological map, Chapter 16 argues that the Stoic ontology is complete and comprehensive as it is, with the genus Something set over bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. There are no left-over entities and thus no reason to impose a class of Not-Somethings—everything is Something. Nor is there reason to impose a developmental narrative that finds the Stoics innovating or changing their mind about the ontology. Rather, the tripartite ontology stands as a coarse-grained orthodoxy against which, as shared background, more fine-grained debates take place.

SECTION I

SOMETHING

τί
ti

The Stoics' highest ontological genus, Something (*ti*), is named after the indefinite pronoun "something." This section develops the suggestion that the Stoics arrived at this genus by careful reflection on Plato's *Sophist*, finding new depth to Plato's challenges as well as the Stoic response. Chapter 1 argues that the challenges that would have been salient to the Stoics are more fine-grained than has so far been appreciated, including logical concerns about saying *what is not* as much as physical concerns about *what is*. We find in the *Sophist* motivation not only for the Stoic ontological genus Something to make room for both *what is* and *what is not*, but also to develop a viable non-reductive physicalism in the challenge to bridge Plato's two worlds. Chapter 2 argues that the Stoics strike their first blow against Father Parmenides, prising apart Something from *being*, by introducing two distinct ontological criteria by which to count their entities in or out, one for *existence* and one for those things that do not *exist* but are nevertheless Something *subsistent*. Plato's challenges in the *Sophist* and the Stoic ontological criteria together lay the foundation for the rest of the book: from Something, through bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, to everything there is.

Plato's *Sophist*

ένος γὰρ δὴ τό γε “τί” φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ “τινὲ” δυοῖν,
τὸ δὲ “τινὲς” πολλῶν.¹

In his seminal article, “La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême,” Jacques Brunschwig argues that the Stoics developed their ontology as a principled response to challenges in the famous Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato's *Sophist* (245 E 6–251 A 7).² This Battle is a debate between the Friends of the Forms (Gods) and the Sons of the Earth (Giants), both of whom make fatal concessions to the other in the fight over *being* or *what is* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*).³ In this discussion, first the

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, 237 D 9–10. Much of this chapter overlaps with section 3 of de Harven, “Something Stoic in the *Sophist*.”

² Brunschwig, *TGS*. A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 153, identifies an affinity with Plato's “materialists”; LS include *Sophist* 247 D 8–E 4 as 44h in vol. 2; and Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 97–100, correctly recognizes the Giants and Stoics as corporealists; but only Brunschwig has pursued the comparison so directly and systematically. For skepticism about the influence of the *Sophist* on the Stoics, see Sellars, “Stoic Ontology,” 201–2. Given the broad consensus that the Stoics were engaged with the dialogue, I take that much as given, and endeavor to show here just how much of the *Sophist* is reflected in Stoic metaphysics; note that by focusing on the *Sophist*, I do not deny that they had other influences within Plato (notably the *Timaeus*) or beyond. For helpful methodological remarks about the intellectual relationship of the Stoics to Plato, see Reydam's-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 16–7, 39, 83; and Tieleman, “Posidonius on the Void,” 78.

³ I italicize the terms “*being*,” “*what is*,” and “*existence*” to signal their technical use, and I use them interchangeably, following Brown, “Being in the *Sophist*” and “Innovation and Continuity”; Brunschwig, *TGS*; and Caston, “Something and Nothing,” who have shown at length that these terms often are used in a technical ontological sense. Pace Bailey, “Structure,” 257, who complains that “‘exists’ and ‘existence’ have been the source of much confusion, no doubt in part because of the ingrained Quinean interpretation of the word, and the accompanying perplexity about how there might be different *ways to be*” (original emphasis). Bailey's concern is that because Quinean existence is a thin conception of being, which merely counts entities in or out of the ontology, to render “*einai*,” “*to on*,” and “*ousia*” as “*existence*” is to deny that the Stoics countenance different *ways to be*, i.e. to deny that they are *grounding* their entities in terms of fundamentality and dependence. My position on the translation issue is that it makes little difference whether we render the Greek as “*existence*,” or as “*reality*” and “*being*” as Bailey prefers; my position on the substantive question of counting and grounding, as will emerge, is that the Stoics do indeed use thin ontological criteria concerned merely with counting, but that the Stoics are also actively engaged with questions of fundamentality and dependence (and, hence grounding), though not in the way that Bailey advocates. On Bailey see Alessandrelli, *Qualcosa*, n. 12, and Bronowski, *Lekta*, n. 73. Pace also Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–8, who raises concerns about casting “*einai*” as a technical term on the basis that not all uses of the verb have doctrinal purport. Of course, the claim is not that *all* uses of the verb are technical, but that *some* clearly are; thus the pervasiveness of the copula “is,” and the preponderance of non-technical uses of the verb “to be” in Greek do not undermine so much as underscore these technical uses. So, for example, the Stoics can say, without

Giants concede (antithetically) that there are incorporeal things and therefore that *being* is not, after all, the same as body, from which point they are induced to accept the Eleatic Visitor's "*dunamis* proposal" that *being* is the capacity to act or be acted upon.⁴ Then the Friends of the Forms (eventually) concede that in being known, the Forms (antithetically) are acted upon and hence *being* is not changeless after all. As Brunschwig sees it, the Stoics make no such concessions. Unlike the Giants, the Stoics are willing to say that justice and wisdom are bodies, and they use the *dunamis* proposal that *being* is the capacity to act or be acted upon to underwrite (rather than replace) the commitment to body as *being*. At the same time, the Stoics are sympathetic to the Gods' resistance to the Visitor's *dunamis* proposal, and in a certain solidarity they do not concede its use for incorporeal entities. Instead of broadening *being* to make room for incorporeals, Brunschwig argues, the Stoics develop a second, distinct criterion for being Something (*ti*); this criterion at once rejects Plato's Forms from the ontology, and admits their own line of incorporeals (place, void, time, and the *lekta*, or sayables, the meanings of our words), while leaving the *being* of bodies untouched.⁵ As Brunschwig puts it: "in preserving a spot for non-existent somethings, far from being overcome by events beyond their control, they know exactly what they're doing and exactly what they want."⁶

Pierre Aubenque has argued that Brunschwig does not go far enough in his claims, taking him to task for tempering the idea of a direct influence of the *Sophist* on the Stoics; as Aubenque points out, the Stoics can hardly have responded to Plato's challenges without being directly influenced by the dialogue.⁷ More importantly, Aubenque contributes a close reading of the *Sophist* showing that the crucial commitment of the Gods and Giants alike—which underwrites the paradox of their concessions—is Plato's own commitment to the inter-entailment

contradiction, that *what is* is only a part of what there is, without invoking a technical sense of "is" in its role as copula or in the Quinean phrase "what there is." By this token, too, the "is" of my title, *Everything is Something*, is not a second-order use short for "*exists or subsists as Something*," but a non-technical use of the verb "to be" (alternatively, if a positive account of the copula were required, it could be said to signal the use of a bound variable, so that the title is short for something like "Every *x* that is bound is part of the ontology"). Finally, I take Kahn's seminal works, "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept" and "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to be,'" to show that while existence did not emerge as a *distinct* concept until the Christian era, nevertheless existence was present already as a concept in the thinking of Parmenides and Plato, and thus, plausibly, for the Stoics as well without inviting anachronism; pressing Kahn's insights further, see Brown, "Being in the *Sophist*" and "The verb 'to be'."

⁴ I follow Brown, "Innovation and Continuity"; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*, in calling this "the *dunamis* proposal," but I also sometimes speak of it as "the action-passion criterion," following Brunschwig, "Stoic Metaphysics." It is sometimes referred to as "the Eleatic Principle," e.g. Vogt, "Brutes"; Bailey, "Structure"; Marmodoro, "Stoic Gunk" and "Stoic Blends."

⁵ Here, since I am describing Brunschwig's view, I say that the second criterion admits incorporeals; on my view it will admit both incorporeals and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; I will also argue that the Stoics recognize more than these four "canonical incorporeals."

⁶ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 90; cf. 86. All translations from *TGS* are my own.

⁷ Aubenque, "Occasion Manquée"; Aubenque, "Relativity or Aporcity," covers some of the same ground.

of *something* (*ti*) and *being* or *what is* (*on*), which is what underwrites the original Parmenidean paradox of saying *what is not*.⁸ As Aubenque shows, once *something* and *being* are prised apart, there is nothing paradoxical about saying that the sophist, or one who speaks falsely, says *something* that *is not*. Nor, likewise, is there anything paradoxical in the Stoic ontological genus *Something* being set over *being* (bodies) and *non-being* (incorporeals). Thus, the Stoics are not properly assimilated to the earthborn Giants, who remain trapped by the Platonic assumption that *something* and *being* are inseparable; they should be seen, rather, as forging a creative alternative that identifies and rejects this crucial piece of Platonic baggage. Aubenque's contribution is important not just for strengthening Brunschwig's observations of a connection between Stoic theory and the Battle of Gods and Giants, but also for showing that the Stoic response to the *Sophist* goes beyond the Battle to the Parmenidean problem of *being* and *non-being*.

In contrast, Katja Maria Vogt has cautioned that we should temper such optimism about the Stoic ontology, indeed that the Stoics were not really doing metaphysics at all: the lesson they took from Plato's *Sophist* is that *being* and *non-being* are equally confused, and hence to be avoided altogether.⁹ On Vogt's view, the Stoics are like the untamed Sons of the Earth insofar as they are unashamed to corporealize the soul and its virtues, but they are more sophisticated insofar as they reject the brutish conception of body as tangible and visible. More importantly, the Stoics are like the untamed Giants in rejecting the entire Platonic study of *being*. We might allow that the Stoics are engaged in metaphysics considered as the science of first causes and principles, i.e. insofar as this describes their physics, even that the Stoics engage in a certain ontological classification; but there is no study of being qua being, or ontology proper to be found in Stoic philosophy: "While many Stoic discussions are adequately called 'ontological', it is not clear that they are motivated by the question of what it means to say of an object that it is . . . a study that goes beyond physics in offering some kind of deeper understanding of reality."¹⁰ Thus according to Vogt, Stoic talk of *being* in terms of doing and undergoing reveals a concern for causation, not for *being* as such; likewise, Stoic talk of the incorporeals being of a different ontological status than bodies is not talk of *non-being*, and their being non-bodily does not mean that they *are not*; in fact, as Vogt sees it, "they do not say of anything that it is not, or is nothing."¹¹

I will argue that there is in fact a robust and sophisticated Stoic metaphysics, and that we should extend rather than temper the optimism of Brunschwig and Aubenque about the Stoic concern for *being* and *non-being*—in contrast not

⁸ In this section I italicize "*something*" to reflect Plato's technical use of the term; for the Stoic ontological genus I capitalize throughout the book. LS, 164, also point out this Platonist assumption, "that to be something is already to exist," but in connection with Plato, *Parmenides* 132 B–C.

⁹ Vogt, "Brutes," 142–5, responding to Brunschwig, *TGS*.

¹⁰ Vogt, "Brutes," 145.

¹¹ Vogt, "Brutes," 146.

only to Vogt, but also to Brunschwig himself.¹² In particular, I will argue that by introducing two distinct ontological criteria for being Something, the Stoics reach beyond the Battle of Gods and Giants to the patricide of Father Parmenides to reject the very dichotomy of *being* and *non-being* that generates all the intractable puzzles in the *Sophist*. The Stoic move beyond *being* is not a rejection of metaphysics (though it may be a rejection of *Plato's* metaphysics), or of questions about *being* and *non-being*, but a rejection of the view that the only alternative to *being* is total *non-being*, or nothing at all; *being* and *non-being* are only confused so long as the only alternative to *being* is nothing at all. The Stoics are thus very much engaged with questions of *being* and *non-being*, tangled in Plato's beard (as Quine describes Plato's riddle of *non-being*) and actively participating in the patricide of Parmenides.¹³ Stoic metaphysics is the principled engagement with these and many other questions about the nature of reality, which this book explores (and surely many more that this book does not).

I will proceed with a summary and analysis of the relevant text in the *Sophist* (237 A 2–251 D 3), broken into four sections: the Patricide, the Presocratics, the Battle of Gods and Giants, and the Late Learners. I will then offer an analysis of Plato's challenges as they might have been read by the Stoics. Note that in giving this analysis I do not claim to be elucidating *all* the richness of Plato's philosophical challenges, or to be giving a complete analysis of the text in all its interpretive complexity. I wish only to suggest that certain challenges would have been especially salient to the Stoics in response to the characters Plato presents here.

The Patricide

The question of *being* and *non-being* arises at 237 A 2 out of the discussion of the sophist as copy-maker. How can there be copies, if these are other than *what is* and anything other than *what is*, i.e. *what is not*, is nothing at all? It does seem that there really are copies, and, generally, that candidates on both (or all) sides of the debate over *being* and *non-being* have a reasonable claim to be real (and hence among *what is*). But if *something* can only be either *what is* or nothing at all (237 C 7–E 2),

¹² I go beyond Brunschwig, *TGS*, which has certain traces of sympathy for the view that the incorporeals are dependent on bodies, and depart from Brunschwig, "Stoic Metaphysics," which treats the incorporeals as independent, thus yielding a merely sorted ontology still compatible with a two-worlds interpretation (see Introduction for a discussion of grounding and the distinction between ordered, sorted, and flat ontologies). In embracing a tripartite ontology in Section IV, *Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal*, I go well beyond Brunschwig, and in rejecting the class of Not-Somethings in Section V, *Everything*, I oppose him.

¹³ Note that this does not mean that the Stoics embrace Plato's conception of metaphysics, or that they are constrained to Aristotle's study of being qua being, or to any other particular conception than their own. Nor, of course, does having their own conception of metaphysics, i.e. their own engagement with questions of *being* and *non-being*, entail that the Stoics are not really doing metaphysics. See Introduction for discussion of Plato's beard.

then however one delimits or defines *what is* (whether as Forms or as body) will automatically banish all other candidates, real as they may seem, to the dustbin of nothing at all (or to the realm of *becoming*, as the Friends of the Forms do). Hence the debate is a never-ending stalemate with nowhere for either side to go in the face of entities with a legitimate claim to *what is* but that do not fit the chosen mold.

In a little more detail now: the Visitor says that one who talks about false speaking or saying *what is not* “has the nerve to say that what is not is; for otherwise there would not come to be falsity” (at 237 A 3–4), and that this way of speaking (namely, saying that there is such a thing as false speaking) contradicts the testimony of the great Parmenides that “never shall this be proved, that what is not is” (237 A 8–9). In an effort to adjudicate the matter, the Visitor asks: to what does the name *what is not* apply (237 C 1–3)? He goes on to show that it cannot be applied to *what is* nor, therefore, to *something*, reasoning that it is impossible to say *something* as though it were naked and destitute of all things that *are* (*what is*) and that someone saying *something* must say some one thing, since the word “*something*” (*ti*, singular) is a sign of one thing and “*a pair of somethings*” (*tine*, dual) of two things, and “*somethings*” (*tines*, plural) of several (237 D 1–4). Thus, the Visitor concludes, the person saying *what is not* says nothing at all, or not even one thing (*pantapasi mēden*) (237 E 1–2). As Aubenque points out, the Visitor arrives at this conclusion only by ignoring the possibility that *something* could be the genus of two species: *what is* and *what is not*.¹⁴ This is the first challenge to Parmenides, then, to show that *something* and *what is* are not coextensive, so that *something* could include both *what is* and *what is not*. The consistency with which the Visitor equates *something* and *what is* rules out this alternative.

In the next phase of argument (238 A1–C 12) revealing “the source of the whole problem,” the Visitor emphasizes the impossibility that *what is* could belong to (be predicated of) *what is not*, and in particular that *what is not* could be counted or enumerated as one or many (i.e. have number predicated of it). This challenge is to show that *what is not* can be counted as one, i.e. to make *what is not* a veritable individual. Then, in “an even bigger problem” (238 D 1–239 B 10), the person refuting *what is not*—as the Visitor has been doing in denying that *what is not* can share in unity or plurality—says contradictory things, by saying that *it* (i.e. some *one* thing) is not one, or that it (*what is not*) is unutterable (*aphthegkton*), unsayable (*arrēton*), and irrational (*alogon*). This challenge is to show that *what is not* can be a proper object of thought and reference, that in saying anything at all about *what is not*, even negative things, we are saying *anything*. Thus we have three constraints to what Christine J. Thomas labels “the *tinós* requirement”: (1) to say how *what is not* can have *being*, (2) how it can be one, and (3) how it can be available for thought and discourse without contradiction, in sum to say that *what*

¹⁴ Aubenque “Occasion Manquée,” 373–5.

is not is something.¹⁵ Hence, the Visitor calls for a patricide: “to force on what is not that in a certain respect it is, and on what is, in turn again, that somehow it is not” (241 D 5–7).

The Presocratics

But, the Visitor goes on, it is not just *non-being* that will forever make us ridiculous—*being* is just as confused as *non-being*. It is here that the Presocratics are introduced, as “everyone who has ever in their judgment [about *what is*] rushed headlong into delimiting the things that are, how many and of what sort they are,” telling us a myth, as if we were children (242 C 4–6).¹⁶ For every posit that *what is* is one, two, or three, and hot or cold or dry or wet, the Visitor generates equally intractable puzzles concerning *being*, unity, and wholeness. For example, if all things are two, e.g. hot and cold, and both *are* and each is *one*, then either they are three and not two (since there is *being* in addition), or they are one and not two (since both are *being*) (243 D 8–244 A 2). So now the *Sophist* reveals concerns for unity and wholeness in cosmology, i.e. how it is possible to make one out of many. This is where the Battle of Gods and Giants, “a certain never-ending battle” (246 C 3), is introduced, to show from a different perspective that *what is* and *what is not* are equally confused.¹⁷

¹⁵ Thomas, “Speaking of Something,” offers a careful analysis of these puzzles, and argues that Plato is less permissive with his ontology than is often assumed, in particular that he accepts “the *tinous* requirement,” as she calls this metaphysical constraint that discourse always be of some one existing countable thing (or several), and that he recognizes the problems this requirement brings for a theory of content.

¹⁶ See Brown, “Innovation,” 185–9; Campbell, *Sophistes*, lxxiv–vi, 116, 122–3; Schleiermacher, *Dialogues of Plato*, 257–8; and Taylor, *Plato*, 383, for discussion of which Presocratics Plato has in mind. I agree with Cornford, *PTK*, 218 (following Campbell, *Sophistes*), that “Plato knew that the real contrast was not between many real beings and one, but between the physical philosophers, who derived a manifold world of Nature from one or more material principles, and Parmenides, whose One Being was not material and could not generate a natural world.”

¹⁷ This is Owen’s Parity Assumption, “Plato on Not-Being,” that *being* and *non-being* are on a par, contrary to the assumption of Parmenides that only *non-being* is problematic. There is debate about how the perspectives of the Presocratics and Giants on *being* differ from each other. Brown, “Innovation,” argues that the Presocratics are discussing how many *beings* there are, whereas the Giants are discussing what kind they are, or what they are like (and neither is asking, what is *being*?). Clarke, “Problem of Being,” argues against this interpretation of the distinction; his suggestion is that while the Presocratics of the previous discussion are trying to make precise determinations about what there is, the Gods and Giants are interested in “meta-ontological” questions about the nature of *being*; thanks to Tim for discussion and correspondence on this point. Cornford, *PTK*, 228–9, 242–8, suggests, following Campbell, *Sophistes*, 116–8, that the Gods and Giants are speaking with less exactness (in contrast to the precisifications of the Presocratics) and getting at the fundamental issue of the philosophic debate (materialism or idealism), and that the Battle is intended as a complete review of all philosophers’ views about “the real,” including Parmenides, other Presocratics, Plato’s followers, and maybe Plato himself. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, 202, suggests that the first group are those who hold there to be a definite number of “Entia” and the second are “those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia” but deal instead with what kinds of things are *beings*. I am

The Battle of Gods and Giants

In their first appearance, the earthborn Giants, representing the Presocratics,¹⁸ are characterized as fearsome (*deinos*) philosophical savages:

- A. Those who drag all things down to earth from the heavens and the invisible, inartfully grabbing stones and trees with their hands. For those who take hold of all such things avow only this to be: what has to it a certain impact (*prosbolēn*) and tangibility (*epaphēn*), those who define body and *being* as the same, but if any of the others should say that something that is not body has *being*, they are completely contemptuous and unwilling to hear anything else.

246 A 8–B 3¹⁹

The savagery of these Giants consists first in their simply asserting that *being* is body, and second in refusing to discuss the matter; they insist that *being* is body and are unwilling to hear anything else about it. Their uncivilized demeanor, in both regards, is later underscored by their description as “those who *drag* all things down into body *by force*” (246 C 10–D 1, my emphasis). So, the Visitor proposes to hypothesize a better (*beltious*), gentler (*hēmeroterōi*) breed of Giants, “willing to answer less wildly than they actually do” (246 D 4–7, trans. N. P. White).²⁰ It is in contrast to these hypothetically civilized Giants that a third aspect of the savagery of the original, untamed Giants is made explicit. Although the civilized Giants maintain that soul is a certain kind of body (perhaps tangible but not visible), they are too ashamed to say either that the virtues are body or that they are nothing at all.²¹

inclined to follow Cornford on this, and also agree with Clarke (and to an extent Grote) that the Gods and Giants are at least addressing the question of what *being* is, even if they are somewhat brutish in their efforts (as I think).

¹⁸ See Brown, “Innovation”; Cornford, *PTK*, 218–30, for arguments that the Giants represent the Presocratics of the previous discussion. Cornford also argues that Parmenides is grouped with the Gods in the Battle and Heraclitus with the Giants (242–9); M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*, 76–100, likewise argues that the Giants take the side of Heraclitus in particular, and the Gods of Parmenides.

¹⁹ It is in response to this description given by the Visitor that Theaetetus describes the Giants as fearsome and says he has already met with a good number of them. Taylor, *Plato*, 384, takes Theaetetus’ familiarity to signal that we are dealing with “the crass unthinking corporealism of the ‘average man’ rather than the doctrine of any particular ‘school’”; Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.*, takes the group to include philosophical materialists as well, though not any thinker in particular, so much as a tendency of thought. Campbell, *Sophistes*, lxxv and 127, takes the familiarity to be expressed by Plato, as opposed to the Visitor and to indicate that the Gods represent friendly but misguided members of the Academy. I agree with Cornford on this, particularly given that the Visitor has said at 245 E that they have not gone through all the detailed accounts, and that the objective of the current discussion is to have them *all* in view; this shows that the relevant group are neither ordinary people nor any particular thinker, but philosophical materialists generally.

²⁰ Plato, *Sophist*, N. P. White trans.

²¹ For arguments that Plato himself recognizes the soul as capable of contact, see Obdrzalek, “Platonic Dualism Reconsidered.”

In this they are contrasted with the original Giants, who contend that “everything which is unable to be squeezed by the hands is *absolutely nothing*” (247 C 5–7, my emphasis). Thus, although the option to corporealize the virtues is open to the untamed Giants, it is not the move they make; rather, they say that if the virtues are not tangible, then they are absolutely nothing.

This eliminative aspect of the original Giants’ savagery has been overlooked.²² Everyone agrees that the Stoics corporealize the virtues, and this is correct; but in corporealizing the virtues, it will not be correct to say that the Stoics are like the original, savage Giants. Nor, of course, will they be like the civilized Giants, who are too ashamed to corporealize the virtues. In that moment, admitting that the virtues *exist* but are not bodies, the civilized Giants fold altogether on their commitment to body as *being*, since *being* now includes incorporeals. They are also subject to a further challenge, to say what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common, what could be true of them both at one and the same time.

- B. For if they are willing to admit something incorporeal, even something small, among the beings, it is sufficient. For it is required of them to say this: what has come to be that is naturally united, at once, with these [sc. incorporeals] and with those inasmuch they have body, to which they look when they say that both are.

247 C 9–D 4

The admission of any incorporeal at all is sufficient for the Visitor to spring the trap closed on the Giants’ commitment to *being* as body, even in its attenuated form, and thus to show that *being* is just as confused as *non-being*. These Giants may be more civilized for their willingness to enter discussion, and even for their attempt at a more nuanced conception of body, but they are hardly sophisticated in their position, easily folding on their commitment to body and falling into the Visitor’s trap. The result is that these “civilized” Giants quickly and easily accept the Visitor’s famous *dunamis* proposal for *being*.²³

- C. What has any certain sort of capacity (*dunamis*) at all, that is of a nature either to do anything whatever to something else or to undergo even the smallest thing by the agency of the foulest, even if only once, all this really is

²² Brunschwig, *TGS*, 68, 72–3, takes the two options offered to the civilized Giants at 247 C to characterize the original Giants, which is to miss the eliminative aspect of their savagery and to conflate what the Visitor asks with what the original Giants say. Vogt, “Brutes,” equates the Stoics with the untamed Giants on the premise that the untamed Giants *do* corporealize.

²³ Note that it is because the Giants already agree that the virtues exist, since they are too ashamed to corporealize or eliminate them, that they agree to the *dunamis* proposal, and not that the *dunamis* proposal induces them to say the virtues exist, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, 149, argues.

(or has being); for I am laying down a definition of things that are that they are nothing other than a capacity.

247 D 8–E 4

Notice that the *dunamis* proposal, by design, is a thin criterial notion designed to cover two very different kinds of *being*; the *dunamis* proposal is ex hypothesi insensitive to different *ways of being*.²⁴ The discussion is not engaged with questions of fundamentality and dependence, or the relation between bodies and incorporeals. Indeed, the *dunamis* proposal could not function as it needs to, as what is common to contrary kinds, if it were meant to differentiate things in terms of fundamentality. So the *dunamis* proposal, “in situ,” is clearly an ontological criterion, rather than a metaphysical notion.

But this does not mean that the demand for the Giants to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common is an ontological demand, or that the Giants necessarily accept the *dunamis* proposal as an adequate response to the demand. In fact, it is explicit that the Giants accept the *dunamis* proposal provisionally, only absent a better alternative that could yet arise: “maybe something else will occur to them and to us later” (247 E 7–248 A 1). With this option conspicuously open, there is reason to think that Plato’s challenge to the civilized Giants is to go beyond a merely ontological criterion, to a metaphysical account of what entities as different as bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common insofar as they both *are*, or are *something*, i.e. to resist the two-worlds move. Lesley Brown describes Plato’s message to the Presocratics, in the guise of the earthborn Giants, along these lines, as a call to engage in both ontology and metaphysics:

[T]hose who pontificate about *onta* or *ousia*, enumerating basic principles, or declaring being to be confined to a certain kind of thing, owe us an account of their theorizing. They must give at least criteria for counting something in or out, or, better still, an account of what it is to be. Now it is highly likely that most of the theorists whom Plato takes to task did not in fact conceive of themselves as giving any sort of account of being. Parmenides, and Plato himself, are the two obvious exceptions to this. It is as if Plato’s message to the others is: nowadays we expect such thinkers to be more self-critical, to state and defend their criteria for being, even to say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings (*posa kai poia ta onta*). Metaphysics and ontology should replace cosmology.²⁵

My suggestion is that the Stoics could have understood the *Sophist* this way too, seeing themselves as akin to the earthborn Giants, both savage and civilized, and

²⁴ On the Quinean conception of being as “thin,” see van Inwagen, *Ontology, Identity, and Modality*, 4.

²⁵ Brown, “Innovation,” 204; cf. 192–3.

that they could have aimed to respond on the Giants' behalf, breathing new life into their corporealism both by stating their criteria for counting things in or out and by saying what it is to *be* before rolling out their cosmology.

Turning now to the Gods, their position "from some invisible aëry hold" is that only the Forms have *being* and everything else, including whatever meets the *dunamis* proposal, belongs to the realm of *becoming*.²⁶ The Gods' response to the Visitor's questioning is the move to two worlds, the contrary worlds of *being* and *becoming*. It is the stability of the Forms that earns them the status of *being*, in contrast to the flux of the material world, because this stability makes them fit to be the objects of knowledge (248 A 10–13). And it is this epistemological concern that the Visitor now turns on the Gods to force a parallel challenge to the one given to the Giants (248 B 2–4). While the Giants were handed a metaphysical challenge, to say what bodies and incorporeals could possibly have in common such that both have *being* (or are *something*), the Gods are handed an epistemological challenge, to say what sort of cognitive association (*koinōnia*) could possibly be common to perception (by the body) and reasoning (by the soul).²⁷ Again the *dunamis* proposal is offered, but the Gods are resistant to admitting that the Forms might be acted upon and hence changed by being known.

It is noteworthy that the Giants' metaphysical challenge follows from their brutish commitment to one world (the corporeal world of *being*), while the Gods' epistemological challenge follows from the high-mindedness of their move to two worlds (the incorporeal world of *being* and the corporeal world of *becoming*), which is immediately undermined by their own savage rejection of the *dunamis* proposal as common to both. It is not often noted that the Friends of the Forms are described as "insisting *violently* that true being is certain non-bodily Forms that can be thought about" (246 B 7–8, trans. N. P. White, my emphasis for *biazomenoi*).²⁸ Thus the Gods are just as contemptuous as the untamed Giants in their violent refusal to hear anything else about *being*, including even the *dunamis* proposal, and the sophistication of their two-worlds move is rather blunted by their own savagery. In fact, the Friends of the Forms never even concede the point; it is the Visitor who ultimately takes a stand against the Gods (at

²⁶ Campbell, *Sophistes*, 116.

²⁷ For discussion of *koinōnia*, see Irani, "Perfect Change."

²⁸ Or that they leave the discussion early on—once they reject the *dunamis* proposal and say that neither knowing nor being known is a case of either doing or undergoing (248 B 2–C 9), the Gods are no longer represented in the discussion; the ensuing conversation concerning change, life, soul, and mind that follows (248 E 7–249 C 9) is conducted in the first person, between Theaetetus and the Visitor, who reach agreement about what *we* will be convinced by (248 E 8), about what *we* will admit, say, deny, concede (249 A 2–B 3), and ultimately that *we* must use every argument we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, or intelligence as *they* do (249 C 6–8). I appreciate Michael Augustin pointing out this important detail in the text; see Augustin, *Self-Instantiation*, for arguments that the Battle has a tripartite structure (Giants-Gods-Visitor/Theaetetus), the third part being signaled in part by this switch to the first person. Campbell, *Sophistes*, *ad loc.*, does observe: "The Stranger's practiced ear discerns that from their serene height they reply with scorn."

248 E 7–249 C 9), and then calls on the philosopher “to refuse the claim that the all is at rest, either from those saying the one [sc. Parmenides] or those saying there are many forms [sc. the Gods], and to not listen at all to those, again, moving what is in every way [sc. the Giants, presumably], but like a children’s wish, so long as what is and the all is moving and unmoving, to say ‘both together’” (249 C 10–D 4).

The idea behind the children’s wish is that when faced with a choice between exclusive alternatives, only a child would make the irrational demand for both, ignoring that it is impossible to conjoin exclusive alternatives. Francis M. Cornford illustrates this point by the question “Which hand will you have?” and, quoting a letter from Mary Lamb, “Which do you like best?”²⁹ The children’s plea is phrased in terms of motion and rest, whereas the foregoing discussion takes place in terms of bodies and incorporeals with the Giants, and in terms of *becoming* and *being* with the Gods (as well as bodies and incorporeals).³⁰ Of course, the Gods maintain that bodies and *becoming* are in motion and subject to the *dunamis* proposal, while Forms are completely at rest and not subject to the *dunamis* proposal, so the connection is not far to find;³¹ and if the Giants are Heracliteans for whom all *being* is in motion (since *being* is body and there are no Forms), then the plea will apply equally to them.³² Here ends the Battle of Gods and Giants.

²⁹ Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.*

³⁰ Though when the Visitor moves to the first person at 248 E 7–8 he does include motion alongside life, soul, and wisdom. I would like to remain neutral on several interpretive questions here: (1) whether *for Plato* the *dunamis* proposal is a definition (Owen, “Plato on Not-Being”; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*) or a mark of being (Cornford, *PTK*; Brown, “Innovation”); (2) whether it survives *for Plato* (YES: Brown, “Innovation”; Brunschwig, *TGS*; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*; Irani, “Perfect Change”; F. Leigh, “Being and Power”; Moravcsik, “Being and Meaning”; Owen, “Plato on Not-Being”; Vlastos, “Ambiguity.” NO: Augustin, *Self-Instantiation*. MAYBE: Cornford, *PTK*, 239); and (3) whether the *dunamis* proposal is modified here by the children’s wish so that *being* is now defined in terms of both motion and rest as part of its nature (e.g. Brunschwig, *TGS*; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*; Irani, “Perfect Change”; Moravcsik, “Being and Meaning”; Owen, “Plato on Not-Being”), or the children’s wish is rather that *being* should include in its *extension* both corporeal and incorporeal things (e.g. Augustin, *Self-Instantiation*; Brown, “Innovation”; Cornford, *PTK*; Keyt, “Plato’s Paradox”). In other words, I do not wish to weigh in on whether Plato intends for the Forms to remain immutable or not. However, I will suggest that *for the Stoics* the challenge to be inclusive, so that the ontology includes both bodies and incorporeals in its extension, is distinct from the challenge of the children’s plea to make *being* (namely body) such that it has both motion and rest. To this extent, then, I do lean toward M. L. Gill et al. in taking the children’s plea to be about the *nature* of *being* rather than its extension; it is still possible that the Stoics saw it one way and Plato another, and to that extent I do remain agnostic about Plato.

³¹ I am skeptical that the Gods are refusing to call what is *becoming* body, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, 151, argues.

³² The Giants are never explicitly described as committed to all things being in motion, except in the children’s wish; it is perhaps an assumption about body that all parties agree to implicitly, or perhaps there really is a move to single out Heraclitus, who has been invoked earlier in the discussion, as M. L. Gill, *Philosophos*, argues (see n. 18 above). Another possibility is that the other materialists are also committed to their bodies being always in motion, albeit in different ways (either coming together or pulling apart through love and strife, or atoms in eternal motion, or however else the material principles change to produce the world of our experience).

The Late Learners

Before proceeding to give a positive account of *being* and *non-being*, the Visitor puts forth one last challenge: “let’s give an account of how we call the very same thing, whatever it may be, by many names” (251 A 5–6), how a thing can be both one and many, i.e. how a person can be one “even when we name him several things, that is when we apply colors to him, shapes, sizes, defects and virtues. In all these cases and countless others we say that he is not only a human but also is good and indefinitely many different things” (251 A 8–B 3). This challenge is personified by the Late Learners, who “grab hold of the handy idea that it’s impossible for that which is many to be one and for that which is one to be many. Apparently they enjoy forbidding us to say that a human is good, and only letting us say that what is good is good, or that a human is human” (251 B 7–C 2). The Visitor describes this line of questioning as a “feast for young people and old late learners” to signal that the challenge is rather more puerile than the children’s wish to see *being* both in motion and at rest. The children’s wish may seem impossible, but it is a noble goal posed by the philosopher in the spirit of progress on matters of substance. The challenge of the Late Learners, on the other hand, is merely childish, based not in philosophical wonder but in trouble-making, “because their understanding is so poor and they think they’ve discovered something prodigiously wise” (251 C 3–5); or, as Cornford vividly translates: “elderly men, who, being poorly endowed with intelligence, gape with wonder at these discoveries and fancy they have lighted here on the very treasure of complete wisdom.”³³ Although the Visitor is dismissive of their concerns, he makes it a point to include the challenge of the Late Learners in their response: “let’s direct our questions now both to these people and also to the others we were talking with before. That way our account will be addressed to everyone who’s ever said anything at all about being” (251 C 9–D 3). Thus the logical challenge of the Late Learners, to say how one thing can be called many or have many things predicated of it even while remaining one, stands as a bookend to the physical challenge of the Presocratics, to make one out of many with a completely corporeal cosmology.

Plato’s Challenges

I propose that we have now found eight distinct challenges that are likely to have been salient to the Stoics in the *Sophist*, each one represented below by a character or element in the text:

³³ Cornford, *PTK*, *ad loc.* Whether these old men are meant to be Antisthenes or, as Cornford suggests, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, it is clear that the theory is “here dismissed as trivial.”

- (i) Parmenides *Commit the patricide*: (1) Prise apart *something* from *being*, and show that *what is not* is still (2) a countable individual, and (3) a proper object of thought and discourse—state and defend your criteria for counting something in or out.
- (ii) Giants *Defend the Giants*: Say what it is to *be*, and deliver unity without Form in a completely corporealist cosmology—make one out of many.
- (iii) Gods *Reform the Giants*: Dare to say that soul and the virtues are bodies—corporealize, do not eliminate.
- (iv) Children *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*: Make *being* capable of both rest and change—hear the children’s wish.
- (v) Late Learners *Silence the Late Learners*: Deliver predication without plurality, show how one thing can be called many (colors, shapes, sizes, evils, virtues, et al.) even while remaining one—make many out of one.
- (vi) Battle *Be inclusive*: Do not “drag all things down from the heavens and the invisible to earth” (246 A 8–9)—recognize both bodies and incorporeals.
- (vii) Visitor *Be principled about your inclusivity*: Go beyond a thin ontological criterion to a one-world metaphysics—find the common ground.
- (viii) Sophist *Save the sophist*: Give a theory of meaning and be able to say something even when it does not represent the world as it is—say *what is not*.

Conclusions

Not only is there more to Plato’s challenges than previously recognized, there is more to the Stoic responses. In effect, the rest of the book is an elucidation of Stoic responses to these challenges. In Chapter 2, which is the rest of Section I, *Something*, I show how the Stoics (i) *Commit the patricide* of Parmenides by stating and defending two distinct criteria by which to count Something in or out of the ontology. In Chapters 3–6, I show how the Stoics (ii) *Defend the Giants* by delivering a completely corporealist cosmology where the Presocratics could not. Then, in Chapters 7 and 8 I show how the Stoics (iii) *Reform the Giants*, corporealizing the virtues and qualities generally; how they (iv) *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, making *being* capable of both motion and rest; and how they (v) *Silence the Late Learners*, making many out of one without falling into plurality. This completes Section II, *Bodies*. Then, in Section III, *Incorporeals* (Chapters 9–12), I show not only that the Stoics are (vi) *Inclusive* in counting in the incorporeals, but also how they are (vii) *Principled* about this inclusivity, grounding each of their incorporeals

in body to deliver a one-world metaphysics. And in Chapter 12 I also show how the incorporeal *lekta*, or sayables, meet the semantic challenge, (viii) *Say* what is not, by sketching a theory of meaning and an account of truth and falsity. Finally, in Section IV, *Neither Corporeal Nor Incorporeal*, I show that the Stoics are principled and inclusive even about creatures of fiction and idealized limits (also things that *are not*), and in Section V, *Everything*, that the tripartite ontology of Something set over bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is complete and comprehensive as it stands (without concepts or the need to posit Not-Somethings between Something and nothing at all). Thus the Stoics meet the last three challenges twice over, once with the incorporeals and again with what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal: counting *what is not* as Something, grounding *what is not* in body, and enabling us to speak of *what is not*.

2

Ontological Criteria

ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ τις ἐστίν
οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ τις ὁ κοινός¹

This chapter will reconstruct the Stoic response to the first of Plato's challenges that we saw in the *Sophist*, (i) *Commit the patricide* (Chapter 1). In regards to Parmenides and *non-being* specifically, the challenge is to (1) prise apart *something* from *being*, and show that *what is not* is still (2) a countable individual, and (3) a proper object of thought and discourse. More generally, it is to give an account of their theorizing, to state and defend their criteria for counting something in or out, as we saw Lesley Brown capture Plato's message. The Stoic response is to introduce two distinct ontological criteria for being Something (*ti*), one for *existence* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*) and one for *subsistence* (*hupostasis*, *huphestanai*). Further, in putting forth the criterion for *existence*, it is to take over the Visitor's *dunamis* proposal—and use it to admit only bodies. This is a simple and elegant turnabout on Plato. Still more innovative, though, is the second ontological criterion, for being Something *non-existent*, proposed by Jacques Brunschwig.² This criterion has been more difficult to reconstruct than the first. So the primary project of this chapter will be to shore up this “Something criterion” for *subsistence*, both in response to concerns of Brunschwig's own and in contrast to the seminal work of Victor Caston on Something.³ The result will be a criterion consisting of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being Something without corporeal *being* or *existence* but nevertheless real, a genuine constituent of the world.⁴ What this rehabilitated criterion will show is that the Stoics were pursuing an ontology of objective particulars, even for those things that are not bodies and hence do not *exist*.

¹ Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 105,14 (in 30E4, passage F4 below).

² Brunschwig, *TGS*.

³ Caston, “Something and Nothing”

⁴ In a sense like that of Fine, “Question,” 168, 171–2, 176; see Introduction, n. 4.

The *Existence* Criterion

For the Stoics, famously, all and only bodies *exist*, *are*, or have *being* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*) (Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 301,19–25 (27B, passage B below); SE, M. 10.3–4 (49B+, passage H/Chapter 10); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 302,29–32 (SVF 2.342); Stobaeus 1.138,14–9,4 (55A, passage T/Chapter 12)).⁵ In this commitment, they are like Plato's original earthborn Giants in the *Sophist*—but with the important difference that while these Giants savagely legislate that *being* is the same as body, the Stoics offer a criterion for *being* and construct an argument to the conclusion that only bodies *are*. Furthermore, in giving this criterion, we find the Stoics turning the famous *dunamis* proposal against Plato, and breathing life into the hypothetically civilized Giants, to admit only bodies as *beings*. The *dunamis* proposal, again, is that whatever can act or be acted upon *is*. Cicero testifies to this as an original Stoic commitment:

- A. Zeno also differed from the same philosophers [sc. Platonists and Peripatetics] in thinking that in no way is it possible for anything to be effected [caused] by that which is without body (to which genus Xenocrates and his predecessors too had said the mind belonged), nor indeed can anything that is not a body be either what acts or what is acted upon.

Cicero, *Acad.* 1.39 (45A)⁶

The Stoics start with the proposal that *being* is the capacity to act or be acted upon, to do or undergo; then they show that only bodies meet this criterion, and conclude that, therefore, only bodies *are*. As David Hahm observes, “we find [the argument for the existence of bodies] is essentially a simple syllogism: ‘Whatever exists either acts or is acted upon. Nothing can act or be acted upon without body. Therefore, only bodies exist.’”⁷ The reason only bodies meet the criterion for *being*

⁵ I will continue to use these terms interchangeably. I don't see any reason to prefer “hallmark of what is real” or “being causally real” for the *dunamis* proposal, as Bailey, “Structure,” 257, does in protest of “*existence*,” on which see Chapter 1, n. 3. I will typically say, for convenience, that “only” bodies *are* or *exist* instead of saying “all and only”; it is the commitment to only bodies *existing* that is at issue for the Giants anyway, since in being too ashamed to corporealize or eliminate they admit that some incorporeals have *being*, and no one argues that some bodies do not have *being*.

⁶ See also Aëtius 4.20.2 (SVF 2.387); Aristocles ap. Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.14.2 (45G, passage B/Chapter 5); Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,66–7, I.1,99–100 (Todd); Nemesius 78,7–79,2 (45C), 81,6–10 (45D, passage C/Chapter 9); Seneca, *Ep.* 106.5–6; SE, M. 8.263 (45B), 10.3–4 (49B+, passage H/Chapter 10); Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1073E (SVF 2.525); Plotinus, *Enn.* 2.4.1,7–15 (SVF 2.320); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 302,29–32 (SVF 2.342).

⁷ Hahm, *Origins*, 12; for agreement see Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals,” 726; cf. Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 13, who formulates the conclusion in terms of *being* as *coextensive* with the capacity to act or undergo, but also goes on to say, 16, that the *archai*, or principles, justify the commitment that only bodies can do or undergo. One might worry that Hahm's syllogism is not valid, but it is in fact a straightforward case of Barbara: All As (*existents*) are Bs (capable of action or passion); All Bs are Cs (bodies); therefore, All As are Cs. The second premise corresponds to Hahm's “nothing can act or be acted upon without body”; one can easily get from the double negative formulation No Bs are not Cs to the universal positive All Bs are Cs. The conclusion that All As (*existents*) are Cs (bodies) corresponds to Hahm's “only

or *existence* is that, first, doing and undergoing require contact (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 302,29–32 (SVF 2.342)); and, second, only body has the solidity and resistance required for contact (DL 7.135 (45E); Galen, *Qual. inc.* 19.483,13–6 (45F); Nemesius 78,7–79,2 (45C) and 81,6–10 (45D, passage C/Chapter 9); SE, M. 8.263 (45B) and 9.216–7). Thus what *exists* is what is capable of causal interaction in this strong sense of contact and resistance.

It should be noted that Brunschwig treats the *dunamis* proposal as a criterion for “corporeal existence,” taking corporeality and *existence* as equivalent; on this basis, he worries that the *dunamis* proposal is not sufficient to establish corporeality, since the doing and undergoing have to be established as corporeal.⁸ But if doing and undergoing require contact, as the Friends of the Forms presuppose in rejecting the *dunamis* proposal, then this worry does not seem to me to be well founded. True, the *dunamis* proposal is given to the Giants as a criterion meant to cover both bodies and incorporeals, and the Giants are too ashamed to say that the virtues are tangible, so for them acting and undergoing presumably cannot require contact; however, this is not a problem the civilized Giants recognize, nor does their concession that incorporeals *exist* constrain the Stoics to agree or prevent them from reintroducing this notion of doing and undergoing. Therefore, the Stoics do not require Brunschwig’s “graft of corporeality” (an additional premise testifying to the corporeality of what acts/undergoes) to infer from the *dunamis* proposal that only bodies *exist*.⁹

bodies exist,” so the argument is valid. Since the Stoics are also committed to acting or being acted upon entailing *existence*, we also have available the uncontroversial claim that all bodies *exist*; this direction of the biconditional is not typically treated, since there is no worry that for the Stoics some bodies do not *exist*. In the interest of hygiene, however, one could also formulate the syllogism All Bs (things capable of action or passion) are As (*existents*); All Cs (bodies) are Bs; therefore All Cs are As. It is, on the other hand, true that the action/passion criterion is only sufficient to establish that only bodies *exist* if the action or passion in question require contact, as Brunschwig, *TGS*, 88, observes. More on this momentarily. It would have been elegant to make this point using Stoic argument form instead, but the texts do not report a premise asserting the antecedent of the conditional and, indeed, the point is meant to be universal.

⁸ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 60, 72–3, 86–7.

⁹ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 87–90. I appreciate Bronowski bringing Brunschwig’s graft of corporeality to the fore, *Lekta*, 139–43, but do not endorse her analysis of the argument (as being what *makes* something corporeal as opposed to something from which we can merely *infer* that the other entity is also a body), or the use to which she puts it (as a response to charges brought by Sextus, *M.* 9.254, that agent and patient are indistinct). First, I do not see Sextus’ charges as a threat to the distinctness of Stoic agent and patient bodies (since the charge he levels is not that they are indistinct or homogeneous, but rather that *when* the cause coexists or is conjoined (*sunduazei*) with the matter (rather than being separate from it), and it *both* acts and undergoes, then the agent is no more active than the patient, and vice versa). Second, I think that the relevant conjunction of agent and patient for Sextus’ dilemma is not correctly understood in terms of the Stoic Categories, but in terms of blending (*krasis di’ holou*)—indeed, the reason that the Categories are not characterized as active and passive is not that the primary concept of body is active, but that the Categories are not a causal account; so while it is true that what *makes* a fist corporeal is that the hand constituting it is a body, the kind of graft that Brunschwig has in mind is one by which we *infer* that a distinct entity *y* is a body because of its relation to *x*, including for example that we can tell the soul is corporeal because it interacts causally with the body—and this is *not* the metaphysical claim that the soul is corporeal because it is constituted by body; Brunschwig’s argument requires only the weaker, epistemic claim that we can *infer* the corporeality of one thing from its relation to another, and not the stronger, metaphysical claim that we can explain *why* one thing is corporeal on the basis of its relation to another.

I am perhaps in agreement with Ada Bronowski, who says that acting or being acted upon is the “fundamental feature” of body that relies on the further characteristic of being what touches or is touched (contact), which is “the condition for a body to realize its fundamental feature” and “a back-up requirement for what is the main feature, which is the body’s acting or being acted upon.”¹⁰ I say “perhaps” because I agree that being able to act or be acted upon requires contact for the Stoics, but I am not sure how acting and being acted upon is a back-up requirement, or exactly what it means for this to be a fundamental feature of body. I also agree that body as such is capable of both action and passion, but not that body is first of all active and only secondly, as a point that needs corroboration, passive, or that the *dunamis* proposal is a criterion for body rather than *existence*. Rather, as I will argue in the next chapter, body is *defined* as solid three-dimensional extension with resistance, which makes it capable at once of *both* doing and undergoing; and this metaphysical account of what it is to be a body, or *how* body is, explains why all and only bodies meet the action/passion *criterion* for *existence*. This is part of the unity of Stoic metaphysics that I am arguing for, that they are both counting their entities by ontological criteria and grounding them in terms of fundamentality and dependence, and further, that the grounding story explains why each entity counts as Something.

So, again, perhaps I agree with Bronowski that the “physical structure thus comes to support the logical relation that bodies are framed in,” but probably not that the logic of agent and patient is what corroborates that “passivity is the correlated feature of body”;¹¹ rather, agent and patient are correlative terms, and (as a distinct point) body is capable of both acting and being acted upon because it is solid mass with resistance. Nor do I agree that, for the Stoics, “resistance corroborates the capacity for activity of bodies, since offering resistance is doing something, namely doing something to another body whose resistance is thus overpowered,” although I agree that resistance is a case of both doing and undergoing.¹² There is much to agree with and appreciate in Bronowski’s book, but there is also much that I either do not fully understand or do not endorse, e.g. here, the guiding narrative that body is first of all active (indeed corporeal *because* active), but also passive by a certain reading of Brunschwig’s “graft of corporeality” according to which the patient body is considered corporeal by participating in the acting, even though it is not itself active.

I prefer a simpler account according to which the *dunamis* proposal is taken over by the Stoics as the criterion for *being* or *existence*, and body is defined as solid three-dimensional extension. The definition of body explains why bodies meet the ontological criterion for *existence*, but corporeality and *existence* are not the

¹⁰ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 130.

¹¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 130.

¹² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 132.

same thing.¹³ As A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley observe, “It is essential to see that the capacity to act or be acted upon, though peculiar to bodies, is not advanced as a defining characteristic of body *per se*.”¹⁴ Further, if the *dunamis* proposal is a criterion for *existence* rather than a definition of body, we need not find the Stoics embracing two competing definitions of body, as Jaap Mansfeld does, or worry about attributing to the Stoics an odd and abstract conception of body, as Jean-Baptiste Gourinat and others do.¹⁵ Bronowski takes the *dunamis* proposal both as a definition of body (e.g. in section 3.1) and as a criterion for body (e.g. in section 3.2); but she does not in any event embrace it either as a definition or as a criterion for *being*, which she does not recognize as a technical term.¹⁶ Rather, she sees the Stoics as twisting the *dunamis* proposal into a criterion for corporeality, which turns out to be a criterion for existence, but only because for the Stoics, to exist is to exist as a body; therefore to exist is to satisfy the criterion for corporeality, to act or be acted upon.

Although D. T. J. Bailey proceeds with slightly different terminology, he seems to be in agreement that the Stoics are turning the *dunamis* proposal against Plato as a criterion for *being*: the hallmark of the real (*being*) is what is causally networked (*dunamis* proposal); only bodies are causally networked; therefore only bodies are fundamentally real (*beings*).¹⁷ Given Bailey’s lucid remarks about the difference between thin Quinean counting and the metaphysics of grounding, which deals in terms of fundamentality and dependence, I am surprised that he takes the *dunamis* proposal as establishing the *fundamentality* of *beings*.¹⁸ Certainly *being* has a special status for the Stoics, both historically, insofar as their predecessors’ never-ending battle was over *being*, and doctrinally within the school, insofar as incorporeals are dependent on bodies for their *subsistence* (as I will argue in Section III). But, while all bodies meet the *dunamis* proposal and all incorporeals depend on body for their *subsistence*, not all bodies are fundamental for the Stoics—only the two cosmic principles, or *archai* are fundamental (on which see Chapter 5). Thus *existence* and fundamentality are not the same thing. Now, it is part of my project to argue that the counting and grounding enterprises

¹³ Thus I also disagree with BS, 37–8; Reesor, *Nature of Man*, 13; Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 285; and Sellars, “Stoic Ontology,” 186, that the *dunamis* proposal is a definition of corporeality as opposed to a criterion for *existence*.

¹⁴ LS, 273; likewise, Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 56, who says that acting and being acted upon are a property rather than a definition of body (but cf. Gourinat, “Les stoïciens et le dualisme,” 179, where it is offered as a definition of body and the Stoics are equated with the Sons of the Earth); and Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 13, citing in support Castelli, “Note sulla nozione,” 429, who says that even in the *Sophist*, the *dunamis* proposal is a mark of *being* and not a definition.

¹⁵ Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division,” 160–1, “Zeno of Citium,” 158–67; Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter”; others, see Chapter 3, n. 15.

¹⁶ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–8, 153; see Chapter 1, n. 3, for my response to arguments that being is not a technical term (hence not italicized here).

¹⁷ Bailey, “Structure,” 257–9.

¹⁸ Bailey, “Structure,” 255–7. For more on Quinean counting, see Introduction.

are distinct, so the ontological criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* will be silent with respect to fundamentality and dependence. And it is part of Bailey's project to argue that Stoicism manifests the same philosophical project as Plato and Aristotle, namely the debate over whether bodies or incorporeals are fundamental, so the *dunamis* proposal for him cannot be silent with respect to fundamentality.

I rest here my case that the Stoics' first ontological innovation in response to Plato's challenge to state and defend their ontological criteria is their observation of the distinction between a criterion for *being* (the co-opted *dunamis* proposal) and what meets it (bodies). Instead of merely equating body with *being* and refusing further discussion, like the savage Giants, they engage in discussion and give a positive account of *being* as the capacity for causal interaction; and instead of folding on their commitment to body, as the hypothetically civilized Giants do, they use the *dunamis* proposal to underwrite their corporealism: all and only bodies have *being* because all and only bodies are capable of causal interaction.¹⁹ This co-opting of the *dunamis* proposal as a criterion for *being* that admits only bodies is already an artful and creative philosophical move in response to Plato, but even more so is the Stoic denial that "anything they can't squeeze in their hands is absolutely nothing" (247 C 5–7), to which I now turn.

The Subsistence Criterion

By saying that what does not *exist* can still be Something, the Stoics reject their predecessors' universally shared assumption that *existence* is all there is, i.e. that the dichotomy between *being* and nothing is exclusive and exhaustive. Thus the second part of the Stoic response to challenge (i) *Commit the patricide* is the introduction of a distinct ontological criterion for those things that are not bodies, and thus do not *exist* or have *being*, but are nevertheless Something (*ti*) that *subsists*, or has *hupostasis* (Galen, *Meth. med.* 10.155,1–8 (27G)). Recall that the patricide over *what is not* consists of three challenges: (1) to prise apart *something* from *being*, (2) to show that *something* without *being* is nevertheless a countable individual, and (3) to show that *something* without *being* is a coherent object of thought. Now,

¹⁹ Thus I disagree with Vogt, "Brutes," that the Stoics are to be equated with the untamed Giants in that they do not recognize the *dunamis* proposal as an answer to the question "What is *being*?" and that their focus is on causation to the exclusion of *being*. Of course the Stoics were concerned with causation in embracing the *dunamis* proposal—this had better be true—but concerns for causation do not exclude concerns for *being*, so much as inform them: *being* is the capacity for causal interaction, and this is as much about *being* as it is about causation. Nor does the move to causation exclude attention to explanation, as Vogt argues in "Unified Notion." I also disagree with Mattingly, "Early Stoicism," 276 (cf. 278), that the "intuitive conviction that everything which is real must be body (*σῶμα*)" is not even a doctrine, but "shows a rather close resemblance to a mystic's claim to insight into the nature of the world."

as we saw in Chapter 1, the path that allows *something* and *being* to come apart is conspicuously absent in the *Sophist*, and the Stoics clearly embrace this option:

- B. This is how you might show that not finely do the Stoics posit Something (*to ti*) as the genus of being (*to on*); for if it is something, then it is clear that also it is a being (*on*); but if it is a being, then it should submit to the account of being. But those people would escape the problem by legislating for themselves its [sc. being's] being said of bodies only; for through this they say that something is more generic than it [sc. being], being predicated not only of bodies, but also of incorporeals.

Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 301,19–25 (27B)²⁰

Just in making Something the highest ontological genus set over *being* and *non-being*, prising apart *something* from *being*, the Stoics are already striking a big blow in the patricide. But their moves are far more sophisticated and deeply engaged with the details of the *Sophist* than has been recognized. As I will now argue, in stating and defending a second criterion for counting Something in or out, the Stoics offer two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being Something, and these correspond to the second two challenges of the patricide: being (2) some one thing that can be counted and (3) a proper object of thought, coherently conceivable. I will begin with this second condition on being Something, availability for thought.²¹

Part 1: Availability for thought

That the Stoics were thinking along these lines, taking availability for thought as criterial for being Something, is attested by Sextus Empiricus:

²⁰ I take the article “*to*” appearing with “*ti*” to license capitalizing Something in the translation; absent the article, when sources are making general points about the word, I do not capitalize. Bronowski, *Lekta*, 127–8, takes this passage as evidence that the Stoics did not make a distinction between the *being* of bodies and that of incorporeals; on this view, it seems Alexander isn’t complaining about distinctions they *do* make between the *being* of bodies and incorporeals but, rather, correctly pointing out that the Stoics *fail* to make a clear distinction between their being. However, the testimony of Galen, *Meth. med.* 10.155,1–8 (27G), about the Stoics’ “linguistic quibbling” over the distinction between the *existent* (*to on*) and the *subsistent* (*to huphestos*) shows this reading cannot be correct, since the critics’ complaints are not about a failure to distinguish but, rather, incorrect or excessive distinctions; likewise Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1073B, *Adv. Col.* 1116B. Further, it is not correct to say that incorporeals are sometimes described as *being* just because the copula is sometimes used to say that they are such and such, e.g. that *axiōmata* are true and false (DL 7.65–6). See Chapter 1, n. 3 for further remarks and bibliography in support of the technical sense of the verb “*einai*,” et al. Alessandrelli, “Qualcosa,” 6–7, 13, takes this Alexander passage to show that Something is not yet operating as a genus; this seems unlikely for such a late report.

²¹ Thus I do not agree with Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 13–4, or Aubenque, “Occasion Manquée,” 377, that the *dunamis* proposal delivers two criteria for the Stoics, a positive one for bodies and a negative one for incorporeals.

- C. For if either what is not something (*to outi*) or what is something (*ti*) were to be taught, it would be something, inasmuch as it were taught. [...] And if, indeed, something is taught, either it will be taught through what are not something (*outina*) or through what are something (*tina*). But it is not possible for it to be taught through not what are not something; for these have no subsistence for the mind *anhupostata*. . . *tēi dianoia*, according to the Stoics.

SE, M. 1.15...1.17 (27C)²²

This passage reports that being *subsistent* (*hupostatos*) for the intellect or understanding, i.e. available to thought, is criterial for being Something for the Stoics.²³ What has no *subsistence* for the intellect is not Something; therefore, what is Something must be *subsistent* for the intellect. But what sort of availability for thought is this? My suggestion is that availability for thought is criterial of reality insofar as the relevant sense of availability lies with the world, not the mind; to be available for thought this way is to be an impressor (*phantaston*), something real. It is not because I think something that it must be real (let alone that my thinking makes it real), but because something is real that it is available to be thought about. I will explain.

Caston proposes that Sextus' lesson in this passage is that for the Stoics whatever can be thought is Something, and on this basis goes on to argue that for Zeno and Cleanthes concepts (*ennoēmata*) were considered Somethings.²⁴ Notice how permissive this criterion is, admitting as Something anything at all that is conceivable:

In accepting every instance of the following schema (where "x" is replaced by a singular noun phrase)

(TS') It is possible to think of x → x is something

the Stoics are thus making a radical claim. Substitutional quantification shows how capacious their highest genus is really meant to be.²⁵

²² See also SE, M. 1.29, 11.224.

²³ As Caston, "Something and Nothing," also argues. Note that my inferring from this passage that the Stoics take *subsistence* for thought as criterial for being Something does not suppose Sextus himself is saying this or making this inference in his polemic here. All that Sextus attributes to the Stoics is that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind, and that is all he needs to draw the conclusion that what is not Something cannot be taught; but this does not mean we cannot infer from the report that what is Something is *subsistent* for the mind.

²⁴ For the Stoics, concepts (*ennoēmata*) are the intentional objects of our conceptions (*ennoiai*); as mere figments or phantasms (*phantasmata*) corresponding to no real thing in the world, Stoic concepts are classed by the majority of scholars as Not-Somethings (*outina*) between Something and nothing at all, hence Caston's thesis that concepts are Something is highly unorthodox. I will address the topic of concepts in Chapter 15; nothing here relies on the ontological status of concepts.

²⁵ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 156.

I would like to temper Caston's permissiveness and argue that while being available for thought is indeed criterial for being Something, this is not to say that *anything* a mind can conjure thereby counts as Something. Nor is it to make a point about the provenance or mental nature of Somethings. Rather, this "thinkability criterion" (as I will sometimes call it) admits only those entities that are publicly available for thought such that anyone (i.e. any arbitrary individual) can think about them. The reason thinkability is criterial is that only what is real is available to be thought about this way. Keimpe Algra recognizes something like this line of thought in the Stoic use of our preconceptions to prove the existence of god: the genesis of the concept of god is itself the proof of existence, and it is because the world is as it is that we have the conceptions of it that we do; for example, we recognize that the cosmos is rational, providential, and alive because it is in fact that way.²⁶

Again, this order of explanation is central to the thinkability criterion as I understand it: being a proper object of thought and discourse is being objectively and publicly available to any thinker whatever, *not* being any intentional object whatever. This reading of the thinkability criterion is importantly different from a Meinongian interpretation like Caston's, which finds the Stoics motivated by concerns about intentionality and intentional objects: "Our thoughts, therefore, not only have a content on every occasion, but an object: even if a thought fails to correspond to an existent object, there still will be something of which it is a thought."²⁷ The Stoic appeal to availability to thought, as I will argue, is not motivated by concerns about meaning and reference; it is motivated, rather, by concerns about the objective features of the world as it really is. Over the next several pages I will argue for this reading of the thinkability criterion as screening for objective

²⁶ Algra, "Stoic Theology," 158–60.

²⁷ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 155. Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 92–6, first introduced Meinong and Russell to the conversation. By "Meinongian," Caston means a theory that rejects the presupposition that having an attribute entails having some kind of being; a Meinongian view can make attributions independent of questions of being, existence, and subsistence (154). Caston cites as evidence of the Stoics' Meinongianism Seneca, *Ep.* 58.13, which reports that "nature includes even those things that do not exist, things that enter the mind, such as centaurs, giants and whatever else falsely formed by thought takes on some image, despite not having substance." I will address this vexed passage at length in Chapter 14, but I will say now that I do not see there evidence of availability for thought, or thinkability, in line with Caston's permissive criterion (or with my less permissive criterion, for that matter), but in fact a point about provenance, how certain products of thought can become Something. What Seneca reports is that certain Stoics (i.e. those other than Seneca) are prepared to recognize certain products of thought as Something, namely those that take on a certain image despite lacking corporeal substance and being falsely formed by thought (i.e. corresponding to no impressor); this underlines my point that *not* just anything you can think of counts as Something, but only those things that are publicly available to *anyone* to be thought. Products of thought like centaurs and giants will be among those things publicly available for thought once they have taken on a certain image, i.e. a certain life of their own. But the first time someone conceives of a centaur it does not thereby become Something (nor was it waiting in another realm to be discovered). Rather, once centaurs have been illustrated and narrated a certain number of times, they become part of a common convention, and then the centaur becomes a bona fide Something about which we can say true and false things (like that it is half human, half horse). Thus I reject altogether the category of Not-Somethings, which is accepted by virtually every commentator except Caston, e.g. Aubenque, "Occasion Manquée"; BS,

features of the world rather than for intentional objects, first with a close reading of the Sextus passage on teachability just quoted (C) and then by reference to a later passage in the same work illustrating the difference between sensory and non-sensory impressors with the famous case of the drill sergeant (D). In both cases, with what is teachable and with the non-sensory impressor, what is available for thought is not a Meinongian non-existent but a feature of the world that we grasp by the mind. I will begin by situating passage C in its context, which will also set the stage for analyzing the drill sergeant passage that follows.

We are at the beginning of Sextus' work, *Against the Professors*, or as Richard Bett translates "*Pros Mathēmatikous*," *Against Those in the Disciplines*.²⁸ His stance is that if there is to be any subject of learning (*mathēma*), four things must be agreed upon: the thing taught (*to pragma didaskomenon*), the teacher, the learner, and the mode of learning; but none of these four things can be agreed upon, therefore there is no subject of learning (1.9). Our first target passage occurs in his general arguments against there being anything taught. He begins with the following dichotomy: if anything is taught, either *what is* (*to on*) is taught by or in respect of its *being* (*einai*), or *what is not* (*to mē on*) is taught in respect of its *non-being* (1.10). But *what is not* cannot be taught because (1) if it is taught (*didasketai*), it is teachable (*didakton*); and if it is teachable, it is a *being*; and therefore it would be both *what is* and *what is not*, which is impossible (1.10–1). It also cannot be taught because (2) *what is not* has no attributes or properties, nor therefore the property of being teachable (1.11).

Moreover, (3) what is taught becomes learning in us by exciting (Bury, for *kinoun*) or setting in motion (Bett) an impression (*phantasia*), but *what is not* cannot do this and therefore is not teachable (1.11–2).²⁹ Next, (4) neither is *what is not* teachable as true (for what is true is not a *non-being*, and neither is something true teachable as *what is not*, since it is among the *beings*), and therefore *what is not* is unteachable (1.12). And, finally, (5) if nothing true (i.e. *what is not*) is taught, then everything taught is false, which is irrational; so *what is not* is not teachable, since *what is not* is either true (and therefore an *existent*) or false (which is irrational) (1.13). Having dispensed with *what is not*, Sextus turns his attention to the teachability of *what is* in respect of its *being*, which he says is equally evident to all and thus not teachable, from which it follows that nothing can be taught (since everything has already been taught) (1.14). The structure of this first dichotomy will guide our understanding of the Stoic dichotomy, which Sextus presents next.

32–4; Bronowski, *Lekta*; Brunschwig, *TGS* and "Stoic Metaphysics"; Goldschmidt, *Système*; Hadot, "Porphyre"; Ju, "Geometrical Limits"; Mansfeld, "Substance, Being and Division"; Salles, "Roman Stoicism"; and Sedley, "Universals," "Physics and Metaphysics," and "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome."

²⁸ Bett, *Against Disciplines*, 4.

²⁹ Bury, *SE, M.* 1–6; Bett, *Against Disciplines*.

Sextus announces that the same mode of impasse (Bett, for *tropos tēs aporias*) will be used against those saying that either what is not Something (*to outi*) or Something (*to ti*) is taught (1.15). Thus it is explicit that this dichotomy is parallel to the first, between *what is not* and *what is*. Now notice straight away that in positing *what is not* for the second lemma in contrast to *what is*, we are not thereby encouraged to think that this first group of thinkers is recognizing a class of entities called *what-is-not* that are something more than nothing at all, between *being* and total *non-being*. There is no such line of thought (that I am aware of) about the first dichotomy, even with the ambiguity (and indeed, overdetermination) of *what is not* between nothing at all, what is not F, and what is not true. But there is such a line of thought about the Stoics; in fact it is an orthodoxy to find in this passage (and others that we will come to) evidence that the Stoics are committed to a group of entities in “metaphysical limbo” between Something and nothing at all, which are called Not-Somethings (note the hyphen and capitalization, which I use to signal this commitment).³⁰ Bronowski, most recently, takes it that with this dichotomy “S. E. thus draws up a basic map of Stoic ontology, since the items he systematically refutes are items distinctly belonging to Stoic ontology.”³¹

However, to take this dichotomy as a map of Stoic ontology, one must already think the Stoics recognize Not-Somethings (*outina*) as a class of entities between Something and nothing. But, by parity of reasoning (which Sextus explicitly invokes, *kata tēn autēn analogian* (1.16)), we should be willing to say that the first group is also recognizing a class of entities called *non-beings*, which are something more than nothing at all. Since we are presumably not willing to do that (since no one attributes such entities to those for whom *being* is the highest genus), and the reasoning is explicitly parallel, we should think twice before taking this as evidence of a Stoic commitment to Not-Somethings or treating the dichotomy as a map of Stoic ontology. Once Sextus puts out a dichotomy between two kinds of Something, bodies and incorporeals, then perhaps we are being given a map of the Stoic ontology (though this may be undermined by his including Plato’s Forms in the discussion) (1.19–29). But the contrast between Something and not Something is not a contrast between two kinds of entities that the Stoics do recognize; it is a contrast between those they do and those they do not recognize, no different in this respect from the *beings* and *non-beings* of the first group.

Furthermore, nothing in the arguments against this second group of thinkers suggests any such difference. Sextus straightforwardly repeats arguments (1) and (2), substituting in the Something vs. not Something distinction: (1) if it should be taught (*didasketai*), it is teachable (*didakton*); and if it is teachable, it is Something; and therefore it would be both Something and not Something, which

³⁰ The phrase “metaphysical limbo” is due to Sedley, “Universals,” but the view is widespread; see n. 27 above for bibliography.

³¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 161.

is impossible; (2) what is not Something has no attributes or properties, nor therefore the property of being taught (1.15). There is no suggestion that what is not Something has any different standing in the argument than *what is not* did above. And the arguments Sextus gives do not rely on taking not Something as something more than nothing. In fact this argument can perfectly well be rendered in terms of “Something and nothing,” e.g. by R. G. Bury. I am sticking with “not Something” instead of “nothing” so as not to prejudge the matter, but I resist the suggestion of Bronowski that “S. E. is bringing out here—however mockingly—the subtle and problematic distinction the Stoics are banking on with the peculiar notion of a not-something (*outi*).”³²

Perhaps Sextus’ use of the plural not Somethings (*outina*) might at first blush suggest that we are dealing with countable entities, and thus not merely nothing. However, the negative plural is not otherwise attested for the Stoics, and could just as well be Sextus’ own way of putting the ontological dichotomy, reflecting back to them for rhetorical effect the plural use they do make of *tina*, Somethings.³³ Thus I am not persuaded that the plural is a sufficient basis for saying that what is not Something (*outi*) is “still some sort of thing,” and that it is on these grounds that Sextus charges the Stoics with *outi* being Something.³⁴ Rather, the grounds of *outi* being Something are the same as they were in the arguments against the first group, namely that if it is teachable then it is Something (or, for the first group, a *being*). The charge does not trade, in either group, on *what is not* (or what is not Something) being more than nothing at all. Nor, therefore, is the problem of contradiction that arises (being Something and not Something) a special problem for *outina*. This charge of contradiction applies to both groups, and does not set us the special explanandum: how can the Stoic Not-Somethings also be Something?³⁵ This dichotomy does not introduce Not-Somethings to the ontology.

Sextus next repeats the argument he gave at 1.14, against the teachability of *what is*: if it is teachable because it is Something, nothing will be untaught, from which it follows that nothing can be taught (1.16). Moreover, he adds, if Something is taught it will be either through (*dia*) Somethings or through what are not Somethings, but it is not possible for Something to be taught through what are not Somethings, for these are not *subsistent* (*anhupostata*) for the mind (*dianoia*), according to the Stoics (1.17). This is the second half of our target passage. Now, the reason the mind is relevant here is that the discussion has switched to the possibility that Something is learned *through* or *by means of* (*dia*) Something; and if a candidate entity is not

³² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 161–2; see Alessandrelli, “Discussioni,” for reasons to resist Bronowski’s reading of this passage as evidence that *outina* are dependent and *subsistence* is independence.

³³ Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 165–8, suggests that the plural is merely emphatic, thus that it says they are not anything or nothing at all.

³⁴ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 162.

³⁵ Nor, therefore, is it necessary to invoke concepts as quasi-somethings to soften the contradiction, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, 162, does; more on quasi-somethings in Chapter 15 on concepts.

subsistent for the mind, it can't be the means of learning. This corresponds to argument (3) against the first group, that *what is not* cannot excite or set in motion an impression (*phantasia*). To say that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind, then, is to say that it is not the kind of thing that can make an impression on us; it is not an impressor (*phantaston*, in Stoic parlance).

We will return to the topic of impressors shortly, but what we are interested in here is the reason that not Somethings have no *subsistence* for the mind. The reason is not stated, but the context of the discussion certainly suggests that it is because not Somethings are not real, or that they are really nothing, that they are not available for thought. Both dichotomies are between what the thinkers do recognize as real and what they do not, what there is and what there is not, i.e. whatever an ontology *does* recognize and whatever it rejects. So, to the extent that we are dealing with a contrast between *being* and *non-being*, Something and nothing, the highest ontological genus and its negation, we can tell that this unavailability for thought is criterial of reality, or what there is. Only those things that are real are available to be thought about. So to say that not Somethings have no *subsistence* (are *anhupostata*) for the mind is to reject them from the ontology.

Contrast this position with Bronowski, who takes it that when *outina* are described as *anhupostata*, they are being called out as *not even subsisting*, but not, however, nothing at all. This "non-status," she says, is "the basis for the distinction between things and not-somethings," which comes to a distinction between mental and extra-mental entities; as mental entities Not-Somethings are not teachable, but they are not out of the picture.³⁶ To bring out the contrast between our positions: I agree that *outina* are reported here as not even *subsistent*, i.e. that they fall short of the status of being Something, but I disagree that there is some intermediate realm of Not-Somethings between Something and nothing. Setting aside the *outina* for now, I also agree with Bronowski that teachability is the mark of what there is, "for we are not taught things that we conjure ourselves in our minds."³⁷ Thus, returning to Caston's Meinongian interpretation, we can see that creatures of fiction and falsehoods are not the kind of thing we will expect to find, in any case, as teachable, and hence not the sort of thing to seek as Something in light of this piece of evidence. The concern is for things that can be taught, i.e. true and real things, so it is out of place to broaden this context to concerns for *non-existent* entities like centaurs and giants.³⁸ The context of teachability is thus at odds with the Meinongian concern to supply intentional objects even for non-existent objects.

I turn now to the other important piece of evidence for the kind of availability for thought the Stoics have in mind, the following famously perplexing passage from Sextus' *Against the Logicians* (which argues against the specific discipline of

³⁶ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 162.

³⁷ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 178.

³⁸ This does not mean that creatures of fiction cannot turn out to be Something, but that the context of teachability does not rely on or depart from false thought as the measure of reality.

logic, as books 7 and 8 of *Against the Professors*, which are a continuation of the schema introduced in book 1). It is offered in response to the challenge: how can the logician's demonstration (*apodeixis*, which is composed of incorporeal *lekta*) be the agent of an imprint (*tupōsis*) or an impression (*phantasia*), let alone a cataleptic impression, given that incorporeals cannot act or be acted upon?³⁹ This is an instance of argument (3) again, that *what is not* cannot excite an impression (1.12) and that what is not Something has no *subsistence* for the mind (1.17)—but this time we get the Stoic response.⁴⁰

- D. For just as, they [the Stoics] say, the trainer or drill sergeant sometimes imposes order (*rhuthmizein*) and teaches (*didaskein*) him to make certain motions sometimes by taking the boy's hands, and other times presents himself to the boy for imitation by standing at a distance and moving in an orderly way, so too some impressors (*phantasta*), as if they were touching and taking hold (*thigganonta*) of the commanding faculty (*hēgemonikon*), make their (*poieitai*) imprint in it, of the sort that white and black and body generally are, while other impressors have this sort of nature: with the commanding faculty being impressed (*phantasioumenon*) on the basis of (*epi*) them and not by (*hupo*) them, of the sort that incorporeal *lekta* are.

SE, M. 8.409–10 (27E)⁴¹

This example is given as a Stoic illustration of the way in which incorporeals can be impressors (*phantasta*), despite their being incapable of causal interaction, i.e. incapable of being the agent of an imprinting (*tuposis*).⁴² The local problem to which the drill sergeant example responds is this. Whatever the Stoics say an impression (*phantasia*) is, whether strictly an imprinting with hollows and projections (as Cleanthes says) or an alteration (*alloiosis* or *heteroiosis*, as Chrysippus says), how could there ever be an impression of a demonstration (8.400–1)? Even if the commanding faculty could be passive and printed upon, as the Stoics hold, how could a demonstration ever be active and make an imprint (8.402–3)? It will have to be either corporeal (which it isn't, being incorporeal) or it will have to be incorporeal, in which case it will be unable to act or (perforce) to make an imprint or an impression, let alone a cataleptic impression; therefore, taking the matter

³⁹ For evidence that incorporeals cannot act or be acted upon, see Cicero, *Acad.* 1.39 (45A, passage A above); Nemesius 78,7–79,2 (45C); SE, M. 8.263 (45B), 9.216–7.

⁴⁰ Arguments (4) and (5), which I will not pursue, are given in 1.29 and 1.30.

⁴¹ This translation is an amalgam of choices made by LS and Bett, *Against Logicians*. I forego Bury's addition of <ou> (SE, M. 7–8, followed by Bett), saying that other impressors do *not* have a nature like those just described, and take *toioutēn* as forward looking, which comes to the same in sense; I am agnostic about the lacuna after "nature," posited by Kochalski and endorsed by Mutschmann. For a close reading of this under-appreciated text, see Schwab, "Kataleptic Impressions"; I am sympathetic to much of Schwab's reading, particularly to the idea that there are non-sensory impressions of incorporeals, even though I do not follow him all the details.

⁴² For agreement on this point, see Papazian, "Stoic Ontology," 108.

back up to the objective stated at 8.396, by the Stoics' own lights, demonstration cannot be apprehended (*akatalepton*) (8.404–6). So the charge to which the Stoics are responding is that a demonstration cannot be the causal agent of an impression.

Sextus then rejects the Stoic response to this problem, which they illustrate by the drill sergeant case: "And in truth, it is not possible to say that incorporeals do not do something or make impressions on us, but (rather) that we are the ones who are impressed (*phantasioumenoi*) in relation to (*epi*) these," or "it is we who form presentations from them," as Bury translates (8.406). However we decide to render the preposition "*epi*,"⁴³ the Stoic response is that the agent of the imprint and the impressor (*phantaston*) need not be the same thing. To see that this is what the Stoics are saying, and to understand how the drill sergeant illustrates this response, it will be helpful to look at Sextus' refutation of the view in the intervening lines between the statement of the response and the drill sergeant case exemplifying it.

Sextus explains that where there is an end result or outcome (*apotelesma*), there must be an agent and a patient (8.406); so, given that they say the commanding faculty is the patient, one wants to learn from the Stoics what could possibly be the agent of an impression. "You still owe me an agent," we could paraphrase. Either the demonstration is what imprints the commanding faculty (which it cannot do, being incorporeal), or the commanding faculty imprints and impresses itself (8.407). In this latter case, either the thing imprinting (*to tupoun*) and the thing being imprinted (*ho tupos*) are the same in kind (*toiouto*) or they are different (*alloion*): the thing being imprinted (i.e. the patient) is one thing (*men ti ho tupos*), unlike (*anhomoion*) the other thing, its imprinter (*de ti toutou to tupon*) (the agent) (8.408).⁴⁴ The sense in which the imprinter and the imprinted are different is elusive; words like "*toiouto*," "*alloion*," and "*anomoion*" lead one to expect a qualitative difference, but the explication of being *anomoion*, that the imprinter is one thing and the imprinted another, seems to pull in the other direction, toward numerical distinctness. The context, whether the commanding faculty can impress itself, supports the idea that numerical distinctness is at issue, since if they were distinct the commanding faculty would not be impressing *itself*, presumably.

Unfortunately, what follows does not obviously clarify matters: "if they are unlike, being different realities or having different substrates (*allo hupokeimenon*), the

⁴³ Whether as in conformity with (Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 114–5), in relation to (LS), as a result of or from (Bury), on the basis of (Bett), or on the occasion of (Brunschwig, *TGS*). Bronowski, *Lekta*, 188, cites Schubert for "on the basis of" (auf Grund von) and rejects this translation as too concrete, "because it suggests an empathically artificial distinction" (I think this means that there is no distinction to be found here between ways of being impressed). At any rate, neither the translation nor these two prepositions themselves will bear the load here; it is the fact that the Stoics are introducing a distinction marked by two different prepositions that demands our notice.

⁴⁴ I take the *tupos* here to be the patient of the interaction rather than the impression or result of the interaction. This understanding of *tupos* as what is imprinted, i.e. the imprintee, is licensed by the immediate context, which deals in agent and patient and refers to the result as a *phantasia*; this sense of the term "*tupos*" is supported by the availability of the term "*tuposis*" for the resulting *phantasia*. I thank Simon Shogry for helpful discussion of this passage, and for pressing me on this point in particular.

resulting impressions will be of different things” (and therefore everything for the Stoics is ungraspable (*akatalēptos*)) (8.408).⁴⁵ The gloss of being unlike is obscure, and it is not immediately clear why this should result in the impressions being of different things. My hunch is that *allo hupokeimenon* signals the numerical distinctness of agent and patient, and that the reason Sextus takes this to result in the impressions being of different things is that he takes the agent and the impressor to be one and the same thing. So if the commanding faculty impresses itself, but the agent and the patient are (somehow) different, then the resulting impression will be of something different, i.e. of a different impressor; therefore the commanding faculty is not really impressing itself after all. The refutation of the other lemma, if the imprinter and the imprinted are alike, seems to confirm this reading: “since the commanding faculty imprints itself, it will grasp an impression, not of a demonstration, but of itself” (8.408). For the resulting impression to be of itself rather than of the demonstration, Sextus must again be equating the agent with the impressor.

Seeing through Sextus’ equivocation between these two senses of “what imprints or impresses” (the agent and the impressor) helps establish that the Stoic move is precisely the one he does not countenance, namely that sometimes the impressor is not the agent. With this idea in mind, let us now reconsider the drill sergeant case, which Sextus provides next (8.409), illustrating what the Stoics mean by saying that we are impressed not *by* (*hupo*) but *in relation to* or *on the basis of* (*epi*) certain impressors. The Stoics “try to make us comfortable with their claim,” as Bett puts it, by explaining that just as the drill sergeant might either impose order on the boy’s motions by taking hold of his hands, or present himself for imitation by standing at a distance and moving in a certain order, so too, there are two different kinds of impressor (*phantaston*).⁴⁶ There are those impressors that in a way take hold of the commanding faculty and make their imprint on it directly by touch, of the sort that white and black and body generally are—in these cases, the impressor is also the causal agent of the event: the drill sergeant causes the boy’s motions, and colors are the agents of sense-impressions (as if they were taking hold of the boy).

But there are also those impressors, Sextus goes on, that we are not impressed *by* (*hupo*, confirming the agency of the drill sergeant and sensory impressors generally), but rather in relation to (*epi*), of the sort that the incorporeal *lekta* are—in these cases, the impressor is not the causal agent of the impression: the drill sergeant presents himself to the boy for imitation, at a distance, and the commanding faculty is impressed (*phantasioumenon*) in relation to (*epi*) the incorporeal,

⁴⁵ I follow Bury here, over Bett, who translates: “if it is unlike, the underlying objects will be one thing and the things the appearances are of will be another,” taking *allōn...allōn* as coordinate; see Bett’s n. 118, for puzzlement about this passage.

⁴⁶ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 185, suggests “they even try to justify their views by way of an illustration,” and takes the illustration to be all there is to their justification of the view, for which they are to be reproached.

rather than causally by (*hupo*) it. We might even go so far as to say that the commanding faculty *impresses for itself* (bringing out the force of the middle voice of *phantasioumenon* over the passive) on the basis of incorporeals. Bury is already rendering the Greek in this spirit when he says “it is we who form presentations from them,” bringing out the idea that the commanding faculty is the agent of the impression, acting on itself. And, as Brunschwig observes, if the incorporeal is not the agent, it could only be the commanding faculty itself, and Sextus’ own criticisms (8.406–8) presuppose that the Stoics do accept that the commanding faculty acts on itself.⁴⁷

One does wish the comparison with the drill sergeant had been filled in a little more, but we can still make out the force of the case. First, what exactly is the impressor when the drill sergeant “stands off and goes through some kind of orderly motion, presenting himself for the boy to imitate” (as Bett translates)? I take it that what the boy is impressed in relation to (*epi*) is the order or rhythm of the drill sergeant’s motions, and that this order is the impressor. This point, that the order of the drill sergeant’s motions is the impressor, is not trivial to the extent that some, including Sextus himself at 8.410, take the impressor to be the drill sergeant himself, as a body.⁴⁸ However, this only follows on the presumption that all impressors are bodies, which is precisely what the Stoics are denying. But now a second question arises: what is the relevant similarity between the order of the drill sergeant’s motions and the *lekta*? Is it anything more than their both being incorporeal impressors? The immediate challenge put (at 8.404) was to show how an incorporeal incapable of agency can nevertheless be an impressor, so the order of the drill sergeant’s motions and the *lekta* need not be similar to each other except insofar as they are both incorporeal impressors. No more than this is called for by the analogy: just as there are two ways for the drill sergeant to impress the order of a drill, by hand and at a distance, so too there are two kinds of impressors, sensory (where the agent is also the impressor) and non-sensory (where the agent is the commanding faculty and the impressor is an incorporeal grasped by reason).

Sextus’ focus on whether the commanding faculty can imprint on itself confirms this reading, since it is precisely by *equating* agent and impressor that Sextus generates problems for each lemma and for the Stoic solution. With this governing presupposition suspended, we can see that it does not in fact follow from the Stoic solution—that the commanding faculty is the agent of our impressions when the impressor is incorporeal—either that our impression is of something other than a demonstration when the commanding faculty is the agent, or that the agent of the impression is not the commanding faculty when a demonstration is the impressor.

⁴⁷ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 74–5; for agreement, see BS, 35.

⁴⁸ See Bronowski, *Lekta*, 188–90, for helpful discussion resisting this move by Goldschmidt and Schubert, though I do not endorse her solution arguing against the causal force of the example. More on this shortly; in the meantime, note that the fact that Sextus makes this complaint himself gives us reason to think it is not what the Stoics think.

These troubles emerge only by suppressing the option to make the agent and the impressor distinct. And Sextus' closing complaint that the Stoics have failed to deliver an incorporeal impressor, since the drill sergeant makes an impression in virtue of being a body, confirms that this is the Stoic path (8.410). By saying that it is really the drill sergeant as a body that makes the impression (presumably since the boy is seeing him and thus being impressed by (*hupo*) him like white and black and color in general), Sextus rebuffs the Stoic candidate for the job of agent (the commanding faculty), bringing the agent back to the impressor all over again, and ignores the incorporeal pattern of the drill sergeant's motions as a candidate for the job of impressor.

So, the relevant similarity between the order of the drill sergeant's motions and the *lekta* is nothing more than their both being incorporeal impressors, distinct from the corporeal agent of their impressions. The *lekta* are only to be expected here as incorporeal impressors, since the larger argument is about the apprehensibility of demonstrations, which are composed of *lekta*. Just as white and black and body generally are given as examples of sensory impressors, so also the *lekta* are given as *examples* of non-sensory impressors; both clauses are introduced by the adjective "of the sort" (*hopoia*), and while black and white are classified as body generally (like taking hold of the boy's hands), the *lekta* are called out as incorporeal (like the order of the drill sergeant's motions). Thus it is not *lekta* exclusively that are non-sensory impressors, but *lekta* as the relevant case against the logicians. Furthermore, it is the *incorporeality* of the *lekta* that is their defeating factor, and which is the explicit target of the drill sergeant example.⁴⁹ So the governing concept of the drill sergeant case is that the *lekta* and the order of the drill sergeant's motions are both incorporeal impressors, not that they are both *lekta*. It is interesting to consider what it means for the order of the drill sergeant's motions to be an incorporeal with a nature *like* that of the *lekta* (which I will do in Chapter 9), but I do not think that the order of the drill sergeant's motions is itself intended to *be* a *lekton*, or that the rhythm and the *lekton* are being likened beyond their being non-sensory impressors, accessible by the mind rather than the senses.

I emphasize this point in response to Bronowski, who argues that the distinction in the drill sergeant passage is between two ways to receive the same *lekton*, two different capacities of the mind, rather than two paths to agency.⁵⁰ When we are impressed *hupo* something, as we are in sense-impression, the mind rationalizes the incoming sense data so that "the propositional articulation is internal to the

⁴⁹ A point confirmed by SE, PH 3.51–5, where the question is put whether something incorporeal (*ti asōmaton*) can be grasped.

⁵⁰ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 181–93. Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 67, 71, reads the passage as saying that non-sensory impressors are *lekta* and distinguishes between a strong reading of "impressor" (indicating a body) and a weak reading (indicating a real object of an impression); but cf. 101, where the objects of non-sensory impressions are either incorporeals that include *lekta* or bodies that do not fall under one of the five senses.

impression.”⁵¹ When we are impressed *epi* something, on the other hand, as when the boy grasps the rational order of the drill sergeant’s motions, there is no mental process of rationalizing—there is just the grasping of the *lekton*. According to this intriguing view, the drill sergeant standing at a distance has expressed the *lekton* using “the language of the body,” a language on par with mathematics, English, Greek, or painting. What these various languages express, hence *all there is to say* (the subtitle of Bronowski’s book), is the structure of reality—and the *lekta* are that structure (e.g. the order of the drill sergeant’s motions). As such, they are mind-independent, non-linguistic entities that are partly constitutive of reality, as states of affairs. At the same time, although they are not themselves linguistic entities, the *lekta* do take on the semantic labor of Plato’s Forms: “for constituting the reference of what gets said, the Stoics recognize and introduce into ontology, *lekta*, which are states of affairs, the content of speech and thought.”⁵²

With respect to the drill sergeant, Bronowski’s thesis is that being impressed *epi* and *hupo* are two ways for an impression to arise in the mind, two ways to account for content, and not two paths to passivity or a causal account of impression. She reasons that the “impression is a passive state regardless of what it is of (a body or an incorporeal). What it is of, therefore, is not the causal agent which has produced the passivity.”⁵³ The idea seems to be that since the *epi* case is not a causal interaction with the impressor (“what it is of”), therefore neither is the *hupo* case. However, I would caution, the context of our passage is unambiguously causal: the challenge put by Sextus is to show how an incorporeal could ever be the *agent* of an impression. And the Stoic response to this challenge is to agree that an incorporeal could never be the agent of an impression, and say in that case that the agent of the impression is the commanding faculty of soul, which makes the imprint for itself *in relation to* (*epi*) the incorporeal impressor. So, just because *sometimes* the impressor is not the agent, does not mean that it *never* is.

Furthermore, it is about agency and causation in both cases—even, indeed especially, when the impressor is incorporeal, it is incumbent on the Stoics to deliver a causal agent. We *are* being given two ways to explain the passivity of an impression: one in which the impressor is the agent, and one in which the commanding faculty, grasping the impressor by reason, is the agent. While *hupo* does capture the agency of the impressor, and *epi* captures that the impressor does *not* have that agency, *both* cases are delivering agency: being impressed *hupo* a corporeal impressor is one explanation of the passivity of impression, while being impressed *epi* an incorporeal impressor and *hupo* the commanding faculty that grasps it is the other. Both are sufficient for passivity, and neither is necessary, but this does not

⁵¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 190.

⁵² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 160.

⁵³ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 186; see Alessandrelli, “Discussion,” for discussion of this treatment of the drill sergeant passage.

mean that passivity is not at issue; indeed, the surrounding context of the passage guarantees that the case is causal.

So, returning to the question of what kind of availability for thought is criterial for being Something, I take the drill sergeant passage to tell us that the Stoics recognize two kinds of impressors, sensory and non-sensory, and that sensory impressors are the causal agents of the impression, making contact, whereas non-sensory impressors that cannot make contact are not the causal agents of the impression, but entities in relation to which (*epi*) the commanding faculty impresses itself. The order of the drill sergeant's motions is one such entity, in relation to which the boy is impressed, and it is incorporeal, like the *lekta* composing a demonstration. What I see in this passage, as well as the last about teachability, is that being a non-sensory impressor (being *subsistent* for thought) entails being objectively real, part of what there is, like the order of the drill sergeant's motions, and like *lekta* in a demonstration, and presumably like place, void, and time as well.⁵⁴ Being a proper object of thought and discourse, then, is being a non-sensory impressor in the way that the drill sergeant's motions are: as an objective feature of reality that we grasp by the mind rather than the senses.⁵⁵

Notice, also, that the non-sensory impressor contrasted with the sensory impressor is not a figment of the imagination corresponding to nothing in the world, but rather an incorporeal very much in the world. The order of the drill sergeant's motions is not a Meinongian entity beyond *being*, or any kind of fiction or falsehood like a centaur or giant. It is very much a real spatiotemporal phenomenon: the incorporeal pattern the drill sergeant makes in moving his arms.⁵⁶ Thus this passage tells us something about the status of incorporeal impressors, that they are objectively real, and this is what underwrites availability for thought as a criterion for being Something. The idea is that availability for thought is criterial for reality because impressors are real, and not (in a Meinongian way) because where there is thought there must be some impressor available.

There is supporting evidence available outside Sextus that impressors are real, in testimony about impressions (*phantasiai*), which are what impressors (*phantasta*) excite or move in us. Quoting the Stoic Diocles the Magnesians in the context of dialectic (i.e. epistemology), Diogenes Laertius reports that impressions (*phantasiai*) are explicitly distinguished from figments or apparitions (*phantasmata*) (7.49–50 (39A1–3)). Having set aside apparitions as distinct from impressions, he goes on to distinguish sensory from non-sensory impressions, the latter being described as

⁵⁴ Here I agree with Bronowski, *Lekta*, 163–4, that the incorporeals should be understood univocally, so that the status of *lekta* is no different from that of time, place, and void, although for different reasons.

⁵⁵ I do not want to put the point about objectivity in terms of being mental or extra-mental, as so many do, because I take the Stoics to recognize some entities that are both mind-dependent and objective, notably the *lekta*, but also those things that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, like creatures of fiction and limits (but not concepts).

⁵⁶ And the same will be true even for the *lekta*, which I will address in Chapter 12.

“those received through thought (*dia tēs dianoias*) just as those of the incorporeals and other things grasped by reason” (7.51 (39A4)). Examples of these, he goes on to say (7.52), include the conclusions of demonstrations, e.g. the existence of gods and their providence—about which the Stoics were certainly no fictionalists. Diogenes then goes on to give an account (7.53 (39D)) of how we come to conceive of various creatures of fiction, the Cyclops by analogy, the Pygmy by diminution, the Hippocentaur by combination, and these are *contrasted* with the mental operation by which we grasp the incorporeals such as *lekta* and place, namely by transition (*metabasis*). It is clear that when the Stoics speak of things grasped by thought and reason they do not have in mind the activities of the imagination (the *phantastikon*, Aëtius 4.12.1–5 (39B, passage F/Chapter 12)), but the rational ability (the *logistikon*, DL 7.157 (passage G/Chapter 12)) to grasp objective intelligible features of the world through the rational impression (*logikē phantasia*, SE, *M.* 8.70 (33C)), be it sensory or non-sensory.⁵⁷ Thus it is not just any sort of mental activity that serves as the thinkability criterion; in particular it does not include the activity of the imagination, which grasps unreal, private phantasms as its objects (nor will it include grasping concepts, which are also private phantasms, on which more in Chapter 15). Rather, it is the activity of reason (*dianoia*, the *logistikon*) and the rational impression in particular, grasping the objective features of the world as it is, that is criterial for being Something.

In response to any remaining doubts that availability for thought is an ontological criterion for the Stoics, or that the paradigm intelligible impressors are real features of the world, I offer one last passage, from Cicero:

- E. Those things I say exist (*esse*) can be distinguished by the eyes and touched, e.g. a piece of land, temple, wall, gutter, slave, ox, furniture, provisions, etc. [...] Those things, on the other hand, I say do not exist (*non esse*) cannot be pointed out or touched, but nevertheless can be distinguished by the soul, as if you were to define property rights, guardianship, race, being related on the father's side, none of which things is close to being a body, but which nevertheless is marked by speech and impresses on intelligence, which I call a notion.

⁵⁷ This kind of example, in which being discoverable by thought is a testament to what is real or what obtains and can yield knowledge of the physical world, is prevalent, e.g. SE, *PH* 2.140 (36B7); *M.* 8.145–6, 8.155; Alexander, *De mixt.* 217.2–9 (48C5–6); Cicero, *Acad.* 2.22 (42B, with thanks to Jean-Baptiste Gourinat for this example); and, generally, as in Philodemus, *Sign.* 1.2–4.13 (42G), and SE, *M.* 145–58, among many others, we can discern the principle that availability to thought is criterial for what is real, given the prominent place of signs (*sēmeia*) in Stoic dialectic; as Verbeke, “La philosophie du signe,” 261, observes: “The sign is thus a reality that, thanks to its ties with other objects, allows one to go beyond the boundaries of what it is, and to reveal to thought things that do not offer themselves directly to our awareness and that might never show themselves before our eyes.”

esse ea dico quae cerni tangique possunt, et fundum aedes, parietem stillicidium, mancipium pecudem, supellectilem penus et cetera. . . non esse rursus ea dico quae tangi demonstrarive non possunt, cerni tamen animo atque intellegi possunt, ut si usus capionem, si tutlam, si gentem, si agnationem definias, quarum rerum nullum subest quasi corpus, est tamen quaedam conformatio insignita et impressa intellegentia, quam notionem voco.

Cicero, *Top.* 27 (Hubbell)

To summarize, I take myself to have given reasons for embracing the thinkability criterion without the presumption of Meinongian motivations or results. I have argued that the criterion is not intended to provide a referent for any and all intentional content whatsoever. Intentional objects do not *as such* count as Something, and Stoic attention to thinkability is not motivated by concerns about securing reference for intentional content. Rather, the criterion screens for what there is, because only the real and objective features of the world *could* be available for thought as impressors. This is not the Meinongian intuition that even when I am thinking of something non-existent, what I am thinking must be *somewhere* to be thought about, but a realist commitment to the idea that the objective features of the world are of a sort to be grasped by thought or apprehended. The world is graspable by reason *because* it is real, so its being graspable tells us that Something is real (even if it is silent on *how* or *why* Something is real). Thus Caston's antecedent "If it is possible to think of *x*" is the condition that it be possible for someone to think of something (anything), and this is importantly different from the thinkability condition I now propose, TS*, that it be possible *for x* that *it* be thought about by someone (anyone, i.e. any arbitrary person).

(TS*) If there is an *x* that it is possible for anyone to think of, then *x* is Something.

The difference between TS' and TS* comes to this: possibly being someone's intentional object is *not* a sufficient condition for being Something; being publicly and objectively available for thought, so that it is possible to be *anyone's* intentional object, is a sufficient condition for being Something. Thus TS* can also be captured by saying "If *x* is an impressor, then *x* is Something." As we saw above with the drill sergeant, impressors (*phantasta*), in explicit contrast to the intentional objects of the imagination, apparitions (*phantasmata*), are real features of the world that give rise to impressions (*phantasiai*). Further, the Stoics recognize two kinds of impression: sensory and non-sensory (those received through thought), which Sextus confirms in the distinction between corporeal impressors *by which* (*hupo*) we are impressed, through contact, and those with a nature like the incorporeal *lekta in relation to which* (*epi*) we are impressed, like the pattern of the drill sergeant. The explicitly realist language of impressors and impressions, and of thought as opposed to imagination, is well suited to capture the sense in

which availability for thought is criterial for being Something real. Impressions, by definition, are responses to real impressors, and these are explicitly contrasted with those cases where there is no impressor (activities of the imagination, rather than reason). To be available to thought is thus to be a genuine impressor, i.e. a real constituent of the world. Therefore, thinkability is fit to do the ontological work of counting entities in or out, telling us *which* ones are Somethings, and (in contrast to the permissive Meinongian) which ones are not.

Part 2: Particularity

However, the thinkability criterion by itself still leaves room for entities like Plato's Forms to count as Something. Justice itself, the Friends of the Forms might yet respond, is intelligible and incorporeal and available to be thought about by anyone at all, and so counts as Something by TS*. But it is a hallmark of the Stoics that they reject Plato's Forms and embrace only particulars (Simplicius, *In. Ar. Cat.* 105,7–16 (30E, passage F below); Stobaeus 1.136,21–7,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15); Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 104,17–21 (30G)), so thinkability can only be a necessary condition of being Something, not sufficient by itself. In addition to whether a putative or candidate entity is available to thought, then, the Stoics also ask: is it, as Plato challenges (*Sophist* 237 D), some *one* thing that we can locate, refer to, and quantify over as an individual? Can we legitimately apply unity and plurality, so that *something* is always some *one* thing (and a *pair of somethings*, two, and *somethings*, several)? This is the second individually necessary and jointly sufficient condition for being Something: particularity. Brunschwig has suggested that the Stoics' famous Not Someone (*Outis*) argument against Platonic Forms is a test for being Something, one that screens for particularity.⁵⁸ It is reported by Simplicius as follows:

- F. (1) It is worthwhile to inquire of those who give being to forms and genera whether they will be said to be thises (*tade*). And in fact, Chrysippus puzzles about the form, whether it is to be called a “this something” (*tode ti*).

⁵⁸ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 84–6. Note that Brunschwig takes the paradox to show that Forms *are* Not-Somethings, which I do not; I take the test to be for whether Forms are Something or not; it's not that universals *are* Not-Somethings but that they are *not* Somethings. This is confirmed by Simplicius' diagnosis in F4 and his point about how the sophism gets its name: from the failure to be Someone. Brochard, “Sur la Logique des Stoïciens,” 449–50, cites the passage as evidence of Stoic nominalism. Sedley, “Universals,” 88, characterizes the sophism as showing that concepts “fail to conform to the elementary laws of logic.” I have avoided this way of putting it because it is not entirely clear to me what laws of logic are being violated—it's not bivalence, *modus ponens*, *modus tollens*, et al.; it is also not that the variable can't be bound, since its being bound is what makes the conclusion come out false; the point seems to be just that a proper referent will be an individual, in the sense of being non-repeating and fully particular (in contrast to the Forms). This commitment to particularity fits well with the primacy of *deixis* in Stoic logic, and the failure of the Forms to pass this test does not seem best described as a violation of the laws of logic. Forms are perhaps better described as *metaphysically* mis-behaved.

(2) One must also take into account the Stoics' custom concerning generically qualified things—how according to them cases (*ptōseis*) get expressed, in their school how universals (*ta koina*) are branded not somethings (*outina*), and how their ignorance of the fact that not every substance signifies a this something gives rise to the Not Someone (*Outis*) sophism, which relies on the form of expression. (3) Namely, “if someone is in Athens, he is not in Megara; <but humanity is in Athens; therefore humanity is not in Megara.>” (4) For, humanity is not someone (*ou tis*); for the universal is not someone (*ou . . . tis*); but we took him as something in the argument, and that is why the argument has this name, being called “the Not Someone argument.”

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 105,7–16 (30E)⁵⁹

Here, as with thinkability, the criterion is ontological but not metaphysical in that it screens for what counts as Something without seeking to explain *why* it does, without yet giving an account of what it is to be an entity of that kind, i.e. the metaphysics of *how* such entities are, whether grounded or ungrounded, and how they are related to others, if at all. Counting and grounding are distinct enterprises (even when they work together in reflective equilibrium to trim Plato's beard and shape the ontology, as I am arguing).⁶⁰ Thus, as we have just seen, our ability to think about something is not constitutive, causal, or even explanatory of its being Something, but it is criterial since only what is real is available for anyone to think about. Likewise, passing the Not Someone, or *Outis* test is not explanatory of an entity's particularity, but indicative of it and hence criterial. The test in question is found at F3: If someone (or something) is in Athens, then it is not in Megara; whatever makes the conditional come out true (when the antecedent is true and “it” in the consequent is anaphoric) passes the test. Given the assumption in F2 that Forms are universals, it is obviously false that if the Form of human is in Athens,

⁵⁹ As LS point out, Supplement in F3 by Kalbfleisch is attested by Philoponus, *In Ar. Cat.* 72, scholium, and Elias, *In Ar. Cat.* 178, 1–12; cf. DL 7.82, 7.187, 7.198 (37B5). I adopt “branded” from BS 4.4, who say “tildadas de.” Mansfeld, “Nobody,” offers a thorough review of the *variae lectiones* of this argument; see M. Frede, *Die Stoische Logik*, 56–8, for a widely accepted reconstruction; see LS vol. 2, 183–94 for salutary notes regarding Kalbfleisch's supplement in F3 and confirmation of the puzzle across sources; however, concerning the second sophism at 105,17–21, see de Haas & Fleet, *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories* 5–6, 77 n. 157, for an important correction to the LS commentary: de Haas & Fleet argue persuasively that the second sophism (not quoted above) is *not* different in form and force from the *Outis*, as LS suggest it is; see Sedley, “Universals,” 87–8, for a useful paraphrase of the puzzle and its lesson, although I disagree that concepts are in “logical and metaphysical limbo” as Not-Somethings, an ontological category between Something and nothing at all. Crivelli, “The Stoics on Definitions and Universals,” 103–4, argues that the argument can only be applied to men and self-instantiating universals, and Bobzien, “Horns,” 182, cites a variant of the argument (DL 7.187) as evidence that the Stoics were aware of problems with substituting indefinite expressions for definite or anaphoric pronouns. For arguments that the incorporeals are not particulars and do not pass the *Outis* test, see Alessandrelli, “Qualcosa,” 29–32.

⁶⁰ On which see Introduction.

then it is not also in Megara.⁶¹ That it is the particularity of an entity that is at issue in this use of the paradox is made clear by the reference in F1 and F2 to “thises” (*tade*) and to the Stoics’ *ignorance* in treating Form as a “this something” (*tode ti*), as well as by the diagnosis of the result in F4, namely that the Form of human was taken as someone, i.e. someone particular.⁶²

Syrianus testifies to this commitment as well, reporting that for the Stoics “only particulars exist” (*In Ar. Met.* 104,17–21 (30G)). Brunschwig argues that Chrysippus developed the Not Someone test by reflecting on a debate between Zeno and his teacher Stilpo over the effectiveness of Stilpo’s argument against Forms, which moves from the denial of every particular human (e.g. Socrates, Plato, Zeno) that it is the Form of Human to the affirmation that, because no one is the Form, there is no Form of Human;⁶³ what Chrysippus recognized is precisely the fact that Plato’s ante rem realism does not guarantee that in case there are no particular humans there is therefore no Form of Human. Zeno’s diagnosis, Brunschwig suggests, is that Plato’s Forms lack particularity, and Chrysippus’ contribution is the Not Someone test. This much I gratefully embrace as the true heart of what is often referred to, in passing and without precision, as “Stoic nominalism.”⁶⁴ However, Brunschwig undoes this good work by undermining the test with two counterexamples. This I will now resist so as to rehabilitate the *Outis* test for its eventual application to the incorporeals and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal (in Sections III and IV).

It is clear that individuals like Socrates pass the *Outis* test, especially in contrast to a universal that is in Megara and Athens at once as the argument takes it. Brunschwig, however, argues that Socrates’ corporeality is irrelevant to his passing the test, which he aims to establish by counterexamples demonstrating that corporeality is neither necessary nor sufficient for passing the test. The example of place, a bona fide incorporeal, does pass the test: if the place occupied by Socrates is in Athens, then it is not in Megara.⁶⁵ However, the example of water, a corporeal

⁶¹ Note that the possibility of Forms not being located is a non-starter for this argument, which begins with the antecedent that the Form is in Athens, and that the Forms are clearly considered universals or repeatable entities in this context; that one might interpret Plato’s Forms in other ways will not make a difference to the run of the argument as it is given here.

⁶² Brunschwig, *TGS*, 84, suggests we might reinterpret this non-Stoic terminology (i.e. *tode ti*) as a disjunction so that Chrysippus puzzles whether Forms are either this *or* something; I do not think it necessary to interpolate the “or” since it can stand as Simplicius’ diagnosis of the Stoic mistake, put in his own terms, and thus does not require putting the phrase in Chrysippus’ mouth to begin with.

⁶³ Brunschwig takes over from Rist, “Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic,” 394–5, the connection between Zeno and Stilpo (argued from DL 2.114, 2.119–20, 7.2, 7.24). See Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 200, for a helpful discussion of the “No One” argument, as he calls it, where he resists the affinity with Stilpo’s “revisionist” argument.

⁶⁴ Brochard, “Sur la Logique des Stoiciens,” is an exception to this rule, arguing (against Prantl and Zeller) that the Stoics developed a nominalist logic.

⁶⁵ Note that this does not invite a sophistic regress of places, since the idea is just that Socrates’ place, being somewhere, in this case in Athens, is straightforwardly somewhere other than the place of Stilpo in Megara. There is no intention to say that every place, qua place, itself has a further place; this will become clearer in Chapter 10.

designated by a mass term, does not pass the test: if there is some water in Athens, then there is no water in Megara. From these examples, Brunschwig concludes that it is *qua* Something that Socrates passes the test, not *qua* body.⁶⁶

Let me say, first, that Socrates' corporeality is not irrelevant to his passing the test. On the contrary, it is his very corporeality that makes him a particular unable to be in two places at once. Further, it is the particularity of both Socrates (a body) and his place (an incorporeal), as physical entities, that explains why they pass the *Outis* test. What I mean is that the dependence of the incorporeals on their underlying bodies—the fact that they inherit their physical properties from the bodies on which they *subsist*—is explanatory of why they meet the *subsistence* criterion. This dependence and inheritance will be developed in Section III, but it can be exemplified for now on the model of the flow of traffic. The flow of traffic is not reducible to, or nothing but the corporeal cars that we see (*by* which we are impressed); it is something distinct from, and yet clearly dependent on, the cars that underlie it, which is grasped by the mind (*in relation to* which we are impressed). The very existence (or in Stoic parlance, *subsistence*) of a certain flow of traffic depends on the cars, and so do the particular properties of the flow of traffic, e.g. its being fast or slow, smooth or stop-and-go, in Athens or Megara. So too, the order of the drill sergeant's motions is not reducible to or nothing but those motions.

What makes an intelligible incorporeal Something countable is its dependence on the particular body from which it inherits its positive physical characteristics, e.g. the place I park my car, which is here and not there. This inheriting of particularity explains why these entities pass the *Outis* test. Incorporeals count as Something (they meet both conditions of the criterion) *because* they are ontologically dependent on body. Thus, Socrates' corporeality is not beside the point; he passes the *Outis* test *because* his corporeality makes him a fully determinate, non-repeatable particular that is available for thought and reference. The fact that Socrates' place also passes the test does not show that his corporeality is beside the point but, rather, that his corporeality is precisely that in virtue of which the incorporeal place that he occupies *also* passes the test. These are not unrelated matters—the three-dimensional non-solid extension of Socrates' place depends for its *subsistence* on the solid three-dimensional extension of Socrates, inheriting its particularity from the underlying body. It is because Stoic incorporeals are ontologically dependent on body that they count as Something; if they were not grounded in body this way, they would not count as Something. Case in point: Plato's ante rem Forms.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ This point is related to Brunschwig's argumentative strategy, *TGS*, 26, to show that the Stoic response to the *Sophist* is principled because the ontological niche of *non-existent* Somethings was carved out a priori and independent of the particular incorporeals that would come to occupy the niche; in service of this strategy, he seeks discord among the incorporeals as confirmatory evidence that the genus Something was original with Zeno independent of its extension.

⁶⁷ And also, I would say, Meinongian entities and immaterial "offices" that subsist independent of the bodies that occupy them (in support of which see Bailey, "Structure").

Second, water and anything else designated by a mass term (e.g. void, time), does not in fact fail the test. This is a crucial error in Brunschwig's application of the *Outis* test.⁶⁸ The proper application of the test to something designated by a mass term, like water, is this: If a certain portion of water is in Athens, then it (that portion) is not in Megara. This is straightforwardly true, and unproblematic as an interpretation of the argument. The *Outis* test does not take "some water" as its input, yielding the false output that there is no water (i.e. *not some*, and therefore *not any* anywhere else); rather, the relevant *tis* (some) is "a certain water," i.e. a certain mass of water on the model of a blob of molasses—and that portion or blob or however we choose to describe the mass of stuff cannot, indeed, be in two places at once. A mass noun, e.g. "some molasses," is not incompatible with picking out a countable entity; e.g. "There is some molasses there" refers to an individual blob of molasses. As we will see in Section II, the Stoics' continuum physics and corporealist cosmology puts this principle to effective use in saying what it is to be a body, how body is metaphysically fundamental, and how their two corporeal principles (*archai*) can be continuous, unqualified, and amorphous per se, yet also distinct and definite individuals always with a certain shape and size (even if it is the somewhat indeterminate and changing shape and size of a blob). This principle, that body is such that it can be referred to at once by a mass term, being solid three-dimensional extension and hence *some* body, as well as by a count noun, being a finite amount of extension and hence *a certain* body, is central to Stoic corporealism.⁶⁹ Returning to the point at hand, the rehabilitation of the *Outis* test, we can see that as with the flow of traffic, and Socrates and his place, it is because an entity is particular that it passes the test, which screens out repeatable or universal entities. And what gives an entity the requisite particularity to pass the test is either its corporeality, or the particularity inherited from its corporeal host, the underlying body.

Conclusions

I have endeavored to show that the Stoics are stating and defending their criteria for counting things in or out, as Brown describes Plato's message in the Battle of Gods and Giants. First, they adopt (or, rather, co-opt) the *dunamis* proposal as the criterion for *being*, and they use it to uphold the thesis that only bodies *are*. They do so not by savagely equating *being* with body and refusing all further discussion,

⁶⁸ As Caston, "Something and Nothing," 158–9, has rightly worried. M. Frede, "Lekton," 124, understands the argument to confirm that cases (*ptōseis*) are Something because they are in both places at once; however, this is counter to the reading required for the argument to work against Forms. See Alessandrilli, "Qualcosa," 29–31, for arguments that the incorporeals do not pass the test.

⁶⁹ As we will see in Section II; the same point applies to place, void, room, and time, which are also continuous, so this point will come up in Section III on the incorporeals as well.

but by distinguishing between an ontological criterion for *being* or *existence* (action/passion) and what meets it (bodies). In addition, the Stoics introduce a second ontological criterion, this one for *subsistence* (*hupostasis*), and they use it to count intelligible and invisible individuals that, while *non-existent* and incapable of contact, are nevertheless not nothing at all. In this the Stoics are not only responding to the Battle of Gods and Giants, but reaching further back into the *Sophist* to strike a blow in the patricide of Parmenides and say of *what is not* that somehow it is (Something) and of *what is* (Something) that it somehow is not (a *being* or *existent*).

With the modified version of the criterion that I have proposed (less permissive than Caston's and more optimistic than Brunschwig's), the Stoics bring a sharp new razor to Plato's beard, as W. V. O. Quine calls the puzzle of *non-being*. According to this two-fold *subsistence* criterion, first of all, being a proper object of thought means being an intelligible impressor with a nature like that of the incorporeal *lekta*, something that we can be impressed in relation to (*epi*). This condition, I have argued, is less permissive than Caston's Meinongian criterion that admits intentional objects as such, because the relevant thinkability that is criterial for being Something lies with the object, not the thinker. Hence the Stoics do admit certain things on the basis of their availability to thought, but only those that are real features of the world such that they can be grasped by reason—namely non-sensory impressors (*phantasta*), and not all intentional objects just in virtue of being intentional objects. Secondly, being the referent of significant discourse means being a metaphysically well-behaved (non-repeatable) individual that passes the *Outis* test. This test, I argued, is not subject to the counter-examples Brunschwig proposes: finite masses are individuals, and it is as such (as a *certain* mass) that water and void will be the proper inputs of the *Outis* test.⁷⁰ It would be a shame if the Stoic commitment to continuum physics, a commitment so central to Stoicism that it would be disqualifying for a Stoic to deny it, were in tension with their ontological criteria in this way. Of course, that it would be a shame does not, by itself, tell against the possibility that the Stoics were tangled up in this way; but an alternative account that harmonizes the texts and yields a coherent picture of Stoic thought is, by my principle of maximal charity, to be preferred when available.⁷¹

And that is what I hope to have provided. The alternative account I have proposed is of two distinct ontological criteria for being Something, one for *existence* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*) and the other for *subsistence* (*hupostasis*, *huphestanai*), thereby

⁷⁰ Note, too, that by Brunschwig's own lights, *TGS*, 98–9, the problem ought to have applied to place as much as it does to water and void, since place is also a mass term insofar as it is three-dimensional non-solid extension and, according to Brunschwig, nothing but occupied void.

⁷¹ For the principle of maximal charity, see Introduction, "A Principle of Charity."

meeting Plato's challenge (i) *Commit the patricide*.⁷² The criterion for *existence*, as we have seen, is the *dunamis* proposal co-opted from the Battle of Gods and Giants to defend the Giants' thesis that only what can be squeezed in the hands, only what is capable of causal interaction, *is*.

The Existence Criterion: All and only those things that can act or be acted upon *exist, are, or have being* (*einai, to on, ousia*).⁷³

The criterion for *subsistence* is a two-fold criterion that recognizes as Something individuals that are incorporeal and intelligible.

The Subsistence Criterion: All and only those things that are both (1) a proper object of thought, i.e. (from TS*) an *x* that it is possible for anyone to think about, and (2) the referent of significant discourse, i.e. (from the *Outis* test) whatever is non-repeatable such that if it is in Athens, then it is not in Megara.

These criteria are not inter-defined, but it is true for the Stoics that what does not *exist* (what fails to meet the *existence* criterion) *can* nevertheless be Something that *subsists* (meeting the second criterion), so that "being Something" is typically elliptical for failing the *existence* criterion and meeting the *subsistence* criterion. It is also true that what *exists* (what does meet the *existence* criterion) is also Something (that meets the *subsistence* criterion), so that "*existing*" is elliptical for being both Something and *existent* (but not *subsistent*). There is no need to seek any formal order among the criteria, however, since each can screen independently for its own kind of Something. Something is the ontological genus set over *existents* and *subsistents*, and as such it is both the highest genus and comprehensive of everything there is.⁷⁴ I take all this to show that the Stoics are doing just as Brown's Plato demands: *at least* giving criteria for counting something in or out.

⁷² The term "*hupostasis*" and its cognates will be addressed in Chapter 12, including its relation to the vexed term "*huparxis*." The *subsistence* criterion does not distinguish between the *subsistence* of the incorporeals and the *subsistence* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; this cooperation between the counting and grounding functions of Stoic metaphysics is part of the unity of Stoic metaphysics that I describe in the Introduction.

⁷³ There is some debate over the nature of the disjunction *act or be acted upon*, whether both disjuncts must be met for it to be true (both for the Stoics and for Plato; see LS, 274; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 145–8; Brown, "Innovation and Continuity"; Brunschwig, *TGS*, 86–7, "Stoic Metaphysics," 210–1; and Reydams-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 58). I will argue in Chapter 5 that the Stoic *archai*, as bodies, are *both* capable of *both* action and passion, without running afoul of their distinctive active and passive natures, so this point will be moot (since all bodies are capable of both).

⁷⁴ Alessandrelli, "Qualcosa," suggests that initially (with Zeno) Something was restricted to the incorporeals, and later (with Chrysippus) it became a genus set over *existents* and *subsistents*, in response to being pressed about what is common to these *modi essendi*. Thus he pursues a developmental *via media*, between making Something a later innovation required to accommodate the incorporeals and Brunschwig's thesis that it is original to Zeno, making much of the fact that Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1116 B–C, says the incorporeals "while not being, are still Something." If I am right about what I say here, then this fact is easily explained as a piece of shorthand for being *merely* Something, not an indication that being Something is the proper contrast to *existence*.

I emphasize *at least*, because this attention to counting is not the full response to the *Sophist* or the whole of the demand. In addition to stating and defending their criteria for *being*, there is the demand as Brown puts it: “even to say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings.” This is a call for metaphysics to inform the ontology. The ontological criteria do not say what it is to be a thing of each kind or how the various entities counted in are related to each other (if indeed they are). The ontology at this point is sorted into two kinds, *existents* and *subsistents*, but the question of fundamentality and dependence, what it is to be a thing of each kind and how they are related to each other, has not been raised; so far this is just the Quinean project of counting things in or out. The turn to metaphysics, what it is to be a body, what it is to be an incorporeal, what it is to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal, comes next.

SECTION II

BODIES

σώματα
sōmata

This section offers an account of Stoic corporealism that takes us from the ontology of what *exists* to the metaphysics of body. It begins in Chapter 3 with the definition of body (*sōma*) as solid, three-dimensional extension, understood by the Stoics as fundamental (in contrast to hylomorphic conceptions of body as composed of matter and form), and as continuous (in contrast to atomistic conceptions of body as rigid and full). It continues in Chapter 4 with a rehabilitation of the Stoic theory of blending (*krasis di' holou*), the physical mechanism by which the Stoics build their cosmos out of two fundamental bodies, the principles (*archai*): divine, active reason (*logos*) and passive matter (*hulē*). Chapter 5 argues that these *archai* are indeed two distinct and independent bodies, and Chapter 6 shows how, nevertheless, the Stoics can deliver unity, make one out of many by the blending of agent and patient bodies. In addition to this cosmology, Stoic corporealism consists of an account of the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies—again in completely corporealist terms. Chapters 7 and 8 show that the Stoic Categories proceed not by the composition of one thing out of many, as in Stoic physics, but by the constitution of one thing out of one other, as a statue is constituted by clay, for example, or a fist by a hand. This is a self-consciously mereological analysis, which explains what makes something F in the various ways that it is; and this is not a part of physics, as scholars have thought, but of logic. The Stoics thus divide Plato's labor for the Forms between cosmology, making one thing out of many, and the mereology of the Categories, making many out of one.

3

Body as Such

τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας

The first two chapters argue that the Stoics respond to the first challenge of Plato's *Sophist*, *Commit the patricide*, by stating and defending their criteria for being Something (*ti*), the Stoics' highest ontological genus. The second challenge in the *Sophist*, *Defend the Giants*, is "to say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings," as Lesley Brown puts Plato's message (Chapter 1). On this picture, metaphysics and ontology replace the simplistic cosmology of the Presocratics, whose downfall was that they paid no attention to the nature of *being* before declaring all things to be one or two, or hot and cold, or whatever. This cautionary tale may not be lost on the Stoics; perhaps they see that *being* is indeed as confused as *non-being*—when cosmology is conducted without metaphysics and ontology.

The Stoics' *ontological* response to Plato, as argued in Chapter 2, is to state and defend two distinct criteria by which to count things in or out of what there is, one for entities that *exist* or have *being* (*einai*, *to on*, *ousia*) and another for those entities that, while *non-existent*, are nevertheless not nothing at all. Thus they reject the *being-nothing* dichotomy of their predecessors in favor of Something as the highest genus, set over *being* on the one hand, and *subsistence* (*hupostasis*), which is to say, *non-being*, on the other.¹ The *metaphysical* response, on the other hand, is to say *what it is to be* a thing of each kind, going beyond counting *which* things are Something to saying *how* those things are, or what they are *like* by giving a hierarchical account of reality that orders the members of the ontology according to their fundamentality and dependence relations to each other.² The unity of Stoic metaphysics consists in the reflective equilibrium of these counting and grounding enterprises, the ontological criteria and metaphysical principles that jointly shape the Stoic ontology into a subtle non-reductive physicalism.

¹ Vogt, "Brutes," 146–8, resists Inwood's inference, *Seneca*, 122, that because only bodies have *being* and incorporeals are not bodies, incorporeals are therefore *what is not*, or *non-being*, on the grounds that the Stoic reaction to Plato's lesson in the *Sophist* that *being* and *non-being* are equally confused was to turn away from questions of *being* and *non-being* altogether.

² For discussion of sorted vs. ordered ontologies as described by Schaffer, "Grounds," and for the kind of grounding relation I have in mind, following Koslicki, "Varieties," see Introduction.

The Stoics do not simply legislate that *being* or *existence* is the same as body (*sōma*, singular; *sōmata*, plural), like Plato's untamed Giants do, nor do they merely specify a criterion for *being* and stop at that. Rather, the Stoics go beyond their ontological criterion for *existence* (whatever can act or undergo) to a *definition* of body that captures the metaphysics of what it is to be a body. The Stoic account of body that I will present here will explain *why* only bodies *exist* for the Stoics, and *how* body can be fundamental; herein lies their most artful defense of the Giants' original thesis that only bodies *are*, or have *being*. First I will introduce the Stoic definition of body, explicating its commitments in contrast to their peers and predecessors, and then I will defend the account against hylomorphic critics, ancient and modern. With this preliminary overview of Stoic body in hand, I turn to a detailed examination of the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility at the foundation of their tantalizing continuum physics. I show that the Stoic continuum is not correctly assimilated to the contemporary mereological thesis of gunk, because infinite divisibility is not, for the Stoics, decomposition into parts—in fact, it is not a mereological thesis at all.

Body Defined

The Stoics define body (*sōma*) as solid, three-dimensional extension with resistance. We know this from the testimony of Diogenes Laertius that body is “what has three-fold extension—length, breadth and depth; this is also called solid (*stereon*) body” (DL 7.135 (45E)); also from Galen, who says it is “some resistant substance extended in three dimensions” (*Qual. inc.* 19.464,4–6; cf. 19.483,13–6 (45F)), from Sextus Empiricus, who reports the Stoic definition as “what has three-fold extension with resistance (*antitupia*)” (SE, *M.* 11.226; cf. 10.221–2); and from Plotinus, who confirms this account (*Enn.* 6.1.26,17–28 (passage A below), 6.1.28,20–1 (Armstrong)).³ This definition may seem unremarkable at first blush, like an account that is shared with their peers and predecessors and hence no evidence of Stoic innovation. However, in examining the Stoic conception of body, we will see just how much is in fact captured by this definition, and how it sets the Stoics apart in the field.

First of all, note that solidity is essential to the definition of body, since the Stoics also recognize the phenomenon of *non-solid* three-dimensional extension in the

³ See also Stobaeus 1.14, 1a (Aëtius 1.12.1–3; Diels 310) and 11 (Arius Didymus, Diels 457, fr.19, SVF 2.357). My claim is that this is the *only* definition of body, not an alternative or competing definition to the ability to act or undergo (which is the Stoic *criterion* of *existence* that is met only by bodies, see Chapter 2, n. 14 for further remarks on the criterion), as LS, 273, and Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 56, also hold, *pace* Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 160–2; Reesor, “Categories,” 81, “Quality,” 43, 57; and Sorabji, *MSM*, 37, 94. It would be nice if Galen's testimony were that “this is a definition of body *alone*” (as Dufour, *Chrysippe*, renders it), making it explicit that this is the only definition of body; however, as Mikeš, “Bodies?” points out, “*monou*” cannot be rendered this way. The context makes clear that Galen wants to know why the definition does not apply equally to the *attributes* of color, shape, and taste as well as to body, so the passage is mute on this issue. See Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk,” for the view that Stoic body is “extended causal powerfulness.”

case of place and void (Galen, *Qual. inc.* 19.464,10–4 (49E, passage F/Chapter 10); Themistius, *In Ar. Phys.* 104,9–19 (48F)); in fact, Galen's polemical move here is to begin with the complete definition of body as "three-dimensional resistant substance" but then use the incomplete description "what is three-dimensional" to pursue the charge that the Stoics have not given an adequate definition of body, since it is shared with place and void. Thus, while it is true that the Stoics recognize void and place as extended in three dimensions, it is not true that they fail to give body its own account. In this recognition of two kinds of three-dimensionality the Stoics are similar to the Epicureans. Secondly, the point of specifying that body is solid is not to give a mathematical or geometrical account of body, since its being three-dimensional already makes it a geometrical solid.⁴ Rather, the role of solidity is to establish that body is inherently capable of causal interaction—solidity is the capacity to make contact, i.e. touch (Nemesius 81,6–10 (45D, passage C/Chapter 9); SE, *M.* 8.409 (27E, passage D/Chapter 2)); in this too the Stoics are similar to the Epicureans. As Philo reports, "For body is by nature solid (*stereon*), insofar as it is also extended in three dimensions" (Philo, *De mundi opificio* I.11,9 (SVF 2.358)).

Thirdly, solidity is not an additional, external property to three-dimensionality, such that the two together compose body; solidity *just is* the kind of three-dimensionality that is unique to body, or (better) that body *is*. Solidity and three-dimensional extension are elements of the *definition* of body, but not components or ingredients of body itself. In this, the Stoics stand in contrast to the Epicureans; Sextus even makes this point explicit when he contrasts the Epicurean conception of body as a "collection (*athroismos*) of size, shape, and resistance" with the Stoic conception of extension *with* (*meta*) resistance, and of resistant mass (*ogkos antitupos*) (*M.* 1.21–2, 10.221–2, 11.226). What Sextus is conveying is that body for the Stoics is conceived of as a kind of extension, namely resistant extension, and hence as simple rather than composite. In virtue of being extended, body has shape and size, and in virtue of being *solid* extension, it has resistance.

The force of the preposition *meta*, particularly in contrast with the additive notion of *athroismos*, indicates how tight the relationship is, indeed that this is not, properly speaking, a relation between two things at all; it might best be rendered as

⁴ There is, thus, no reason to think that the definition of body is mathematical or misplaced in Diogenes 7.135, as do BS, 37; Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter," 55–8; Hahm, *Origins*, 10–1; Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium," 160. What is missing from that picture is precisely the *solidity* of body, something different from mere three-dimensionality, which establishes at once (to Gourinat's desiderata) (1) that the definitions given here are not merely mathematical, and (2) that the definition given by Diogenes does not in fact fit the incorporeals as well as bodies (since only bodies are solid). I also disagree with LS vol. 2, 270, that *stereon* implies nothing about solid mass, and with Bronowski, *Lekta*, n. 15, that we should think of this qualification as mathematical because it appears in Euclid's definition. Furthermore, Hermann omits *sōma* altogether from line 1096 (see the apparatus in Dorandi, DL, *ad loc.*) so that Diogenes reports that body is defined as what is extended in three dimensions, and then adds that this is also called solid (as opposed to solid body); thus body and solidity are equated in a way that cannot be simply three-dimensional extension.

in common with.⁵ And in saying that body is resistant mass, or as R. G. Bury translates “*antitupos*,” *solid* mass, there is now just the one thing and no suggestion of components (SE, M. 11.226). So the definition put by Galen, Sextus, and Plotinus in terms of resistance (*antitupia*) also does not introduce an *additional* property (in addition either to solidity or to three-dimensionality), nor does it say anything different from the definition put in terms of solidity. Solidity and resistance are one and the same thing: the ability to make contact and enter causal relations.⁶ This explains why it is that only bodies *exist*, namely because they are the only things capable of contact and interaction; the definition of body as solid three-dimensional extension with resistance (where “solid” and “with resistance” are redundant) captures this essential feature and explains *why* bodies meet the criterion for *existence*. This is a good example of the unity of Stoic metaphysics in which ontology and metaphysics work together—bodies count as *existents* because of what it is to be a body.

Fourth, in being subject to change or, literally, able to be affected (*pathētē*), the Stoic conception of solidity is not only contrasted with but crucially different from the Epicurean conception. While the Stoics and Epicureans both say that body is solid three-dimensional extension and that the solidity of body stands in contrast to the non-solid three-dimensional extension of void, this marks the end of their overlap concerning the nature of body. To begin with, the Epicureans are committed to an infinity of bodies, while the Stoics take body to be finite; as Calcidius explains, for the Stoics what is infinite could not be reduced to limit and order (*In Tim.* 295, 312 (Magee)). More importantly, Epicurean bodies *ex hypothesi* are atomic (uncuttable, indivisible) and unalterable (*ametablēta*), being full (*plerē*) by nature and incapable of dissolution in every way (Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 40–1 (8A)). This means that for the Epicureans, body is rigid absolutely (*necesse*, Lucretius 1.506 (8B1); “by nature,” above): not only completely indestructible, impenetrable, and indivisible (call this, generally, being “uncuttable”) but entirely unchangeable, subject to no deformation of any kind and impassive in every way (Lucretius 1.528–30, 592–8 (8B2, 8B4)). Weight, size, and shape are thus absolute properties of the infinitely many atoms in the infinite void (Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 68 (7B1)).

The Stoics, on the other hand, not only say that body (i.e. substance, *ousia*) is limited in extent, i.e. finite, they also deny that it is entirely impassive; on the contrary, in being *pathētē*, body is entirely divisible and changeable, which I will capture with the translation “malleable” (DL 7.150, passage E below).⁷ Again,

⁵ See Smyth 1691 for the local sense of in the midst of, or extension over the midst of, or throughout. For a similar use of “*meta*,” see Hierocles 6.3–10; for arguments in favor of this reading of Hierocles, see de Harven, “Rational Impressions.”

⁶ Stobaeus’ report at 1.14.1a perhaps confirms this identity when he glosses the generic definition of body as three-dimensional extension as “the barb of resistance, insofar as it is of itself” (Stobaeus 1.14.1–2 (Wachsmuth & Hense)), although its being generic rather than specific to the Stoics weakens it as evidence. Bury even glosses “resistance” as “solidity” at SE, M. 11.222.

⁷ This translation perhaps conjures too much the idea of shaping, to the exclusion of divisibility, but it captures well the idea of undergoing.

Calcidius confirms: “substance (*essentia*) is cohering body that is without quality, totally malleable (*patibile*) and changeable (*commutabile*)” (*In Tim.* 293 (44E, passage B/Chapter 6); cf. 292 (44D), which attests that substance is finite, divisible, and continuously subject to change). This conception of solid body as totally malleable stands in stark contrast to the Epicurean conception of body as rigid absolutely, impassive in every way; Stoic body is not only *cuttable* in being both divisible without being destroyed and penetrable, it is also entirely *changeable*, with no absolute shape, size, or density. And yet, despite the starkness of this contrast, the malleability of Stoic body has been underappreciated and even overlooked since antiquity. As we will see shortly, virtually all commentators, even those who are not atomists, take body to be rigid and raise problems for the Stoics according to these atomistic presuppositions.⁸ These problems, as I will argue, dissolve once it is appreciated that Stoic body is entirely changeable, with no absolute size or shape nor, therefore, any absolute density (although always of *some* non-zero degree of density).

Fifth, the Stoic conception of solidity, malleable as opposed to rigid, brings with it a correspondingly contrasted account of resistance (*antitupia*). The atomistic conception of solidity as absolute rigidity and fullness means that resistance *must* be understood as ricochet or rebuffing (*apopaltikōs*) (*SE, M.* 10.219–27 (7C4)); anything less would violate the rigid nature of body.⁹ However, the Stoic conception of body as malleable substance is not only compatible with, but in fact embraces, a weaker notion of resistance as pushback, reaction, or, in the most literal sense of “*antitupia*,” a mutual, responding blow, a *repercussion* rather than the complete rebuffing or ricochet required by atomism. This interactive conception of resistance means that any two bodies in contact with one another are *interacting*: they are sympathetic, in *sumpatheia*, vibrating together.¹⁰ When Stoic resistance takes place, it is a joint activity between two bodies, and so all action is reciprocal; wherever two bodies are in contact there is both action and passion in both.¹¹ This reciprocity does not imply that one body cannot be the agent and

⁸ I will use the word “atomistic” in reference to the widespread presupposition that body is rigid absolutely, shared by Epicurean, Peripatetic, and Platonist thinkers alike independent of their commitment to the existence of atoms.

⁹ Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 97–8, makes the point that the Stoics are not using the Epicurean notion of resistance but goes on to understand resistance as merely occupying space, which I consider too thin a notion of resistance for the Stoic concern for causation, and as one that makes space prior to body, which I argue against in Chapter 10.

¹⁰ As attested by Nemesius 78,7–79,2 (45C), where LS even translate “*sumpaschei*” as “interact”; cf. Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 420, 6–11 (SVF 2.339), who reports that for the Stoics every mover is moved. The Stoic notion of *sumpatheia* merits its own treatment, which I cannot give here; see Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*. I am neutral with respect to how far this is a Posidonian development as opposed to an original doctrine of Zeno’s, but I am certainly committed to the theoretical materials for *sumpatheia* being original to Zeno and part of Stoic orthodoxy. See LSJ συμπαθεια, A.2, for the sense of musical chords and bronze vessels vibrating together.

¹¹ As the *anti-* of *antitupia* conveys, in support of which see LSJ ἀντί, C3, in composition: against one another, mutually; see ἀντιτυπία, A1, for repercussion.

the other the patient, as when a knife cuts flesh or sculptor shapes clay, but it does imply that when two bodies are in contact they will push back and forth on each other and thus *interact* wherever they are in contact, resulting in a joint *pathos*, or *sumpatheia*.¹²

Body Defended

I have led with the negative, saying what the solidity and resistance of body are *not*—mathematical notions, distinct properties, impenetrability and ricochet—in order to signal and now take on certain ancient and enduring interpretive difficulties surrounding the definition of body and give a positive account of what it is to be (a) body. As we will soon discuss, the Stoics' two *archai*, or principles of the cosmos, are passive matter (*hulē*) and divine active reason (*logos*)—and they are themselves individual bodies. But as the principles of everything there is they are meant to be fundamental and therefore ontologically simple, so, as the charge goes, the principles cannot be bodies, if bodies have solidity and resistance, since those are qualities of a hylomorphic composite, i.e. something composed of matter and form as its ingredients or building blocks. For example, the Neoplatonist Plotinus, in a series of complaints about the Stoic commitment to *hulē* as one of the principles, says the following:

- A. (1) Next, how can matter, being a body, be a principle (*archē*)? For it is not a body unless it is many, i.e. every body is composed out of matter and quality. And if body be other than this [i.e. not hylomorphic], then they say that matter is a body homonymously. And if three-dimensional extension is the common characteristic of body, they speak mathematically; but if it is three-dimensional extension with resistance, then they do not speak of one thing. (2) Next, resistance is either a qualified thing or issuing from a quality. But whence resistance? And whence what is three-dimensional or what is extended? For matter is not in the definition of three-dimensional extension, nor is three-dimensional extension in the definition of matter. Now then,

¹² Thus I differ from Todd, *De Mixtione*, 33 ff., 43, 48, 82, *et passim*, that the passive principle cannot interact, and that the relation between the active and passive principles is non-reciprocal; from Marmodoro, "Stoic Gunk," 172, that *hulē* has "no powers or dispositions for causal interaction" and that matter is entirely changeless and indeed not what gets qualified except by association, as a "sharing subject"; and from Bronowski, *Lekta*, 132, that resistance is to be understood as a case of one body acting on another, overcoming the resistance of the other, and, 141, that resistance is not contact or an encounter at a surface, but rather "the expression of the activity of body." I take Alexander to be correct when he says that it follows for the Stoics that god is acted on by matter (226.30–3b). Hierocles 4.38–53 (53B5–9) illustrates this commitment nicely and in ample detail in his account of the relation between soul and body; for a close reading of this passage along these lines see de Harven, "Rational Impressions;" cf. Ramelli, *Hierocles*, and Helle, "Hierocles."

partaking of size it would no longer be simple. (3) Next, whence its unity? For it is certainly not itself one, but sharing in unity (itself).

(1) ἔπειτα πῶς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη σώμα οὐσα; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ σῶμα μὴ οὐ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος, εἰ δὲ ἄλλως τοῦτο σῶμα, ὁμωνύμως λέγουσι σῶμα τὴν ὕλην. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπὶ σώματος τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν, μαθηματικὸν λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῆ, οὐχ ἓν λέγουσιν. (2) ἔπειτα ἡ ἀντιτυπία ποιὸν ἢ παρὰ ποιότητος, καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀντιτυπία; πόθεν δὲ τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν ἢ τίς διέστησεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ τριχῆ διαστατοῦ ἡ ὕλη, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν, μετασχοῦσα τοῖνυν μεγέθους οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀπλοῦν εἶη. (3) ἔπειτα πόθεν ἡ ἔνωσις; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ ἓν, ἀλλὰ μετοχῆ ἐνότητος.

Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1.26,17–28 (SVF 2.315)

Plotinus' objection is that including resistance in the account of body as the Stoics do (hence, we can confirm, *not* speaking mathematically), they “do not speak of one thing,” i.e. they speak of something composed of matter and quality (two things). Further, he objects that resistance and three-dimensionality are either qualities or qualified entities, so that a principle with three dimensions and therefore size, i.e. a quality, would no longer be simple; and likewise for the unity of matter as a principle, which from Plotinus' hylomorphic perspective can only be due to its participating in the form of unity, never something that matter can have of itself.

Now, what I mean by “hylomorphic perspective” (whether Platonic, Aristotelian, Academic, or Neoplatonic) is the idea that all body is a composite of matter and form or quality, where these are entities of different (if not contrary) ontological orders: the one is material or corporeal, and the other is immaterial or incorporeal. If something is to be (a) body, tangible and bulky, then it must be due to the matter present in it (since form is incorporeal). And so, if Stoic *logos* (cast in the role of form) is to be a body, then it must be so because the other entity, matter, is present in it; for only matter is extended and (hence) corporeal—since, again, form is *incorporeal*. Notice that from this hylomorphic perspective, there is nothing surprising in using (in)corporeal and (im)material interchangeably this way, even while recognizing that strictly speaking body is a composite entity, with matter and form as its elements, or parts.

A second presupposition that defines the hylomorphic perspective is that body as such (understood as matter) is considered intrinsically inert, incapable of either agency or reason, thick and dumb. From this perspective, if Stoic body is to be rational, as they do indeed claim in making divine active *logos* a body, then it must be so because another entity, an incorporeal, is present in it; likewise, if matter or body is to have any qualities at all, even shape and size, it must be due to the presence of incorporeal form or quality. These twin suppositions—that

where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is incorporeal form—are axiomatic from what I am calling the hylomorphic perspective.¹³

For example, Plutarch complains in this hylomorphic vein that in making god (the active, rational principle, *logos*) corporeal, the Stoics run afoul of the commitment to principles as simple:

- B. And yet these Stoics, who make god, while being a principle (*archē*), an intellectual body and mind in matter, show him to be neither pure nor simple nor incomposite, but [composed] out of something else and because of something else. But matter, being of itself unreasoning and unqualified, has simplicity, i.e. the form of a principle; but god, if indeed he is not incorporeal and not immaterial, as far as he is a principle has a share of matter. For if, on the one hand, matter and reason are one and the same, they have not well rendered matter unreasoning; but if, on the other hand, they [sc. matter and reason] are different, then god would be a certain dispenser of both and would not be a simple, but a composite thing, with corporeality composed out of matter being added to intellect.

καὶ μὴν οὗτοι τὸν θεὸν ἀρχὴν ὄντα σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες οὐ καθαρὸν οὐδ' ἀπλοῦν οὐδ' ἀσύνθετον ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρου καὶ δι' ἑτερον ἀποφαίνουσιν· ἡ δ' ὕλη καθ' αὐτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀρχοειδές· ὁ θεὸς δὲ, εἴπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματος οὐδ' ἄυλος, ὡς ἀρχῆς μετέσχηκε τῆς ὕλης. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ λόγος, οὐκ εὖ τὴν ὕλην ἄλογον ἀποδεδώκασιν· εἰ δ' ἕτερα, † καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ταμίας ἂν τις ὁ θεὸς εἴη καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἀλλὰ σύνθετον πρᾶγμα τῷ νοερῷ τὸ σωματικὸν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης προσειληφώς.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1085B–C (Cherniss)

Plutarch makes it quite explicit that his criticisms are driven by the fact that, as he sees it, to be corporeal (a body) is to be imbued with matter, saying that if god is not incorporeal, then he has a share of matter, and that corporeality is composed out of matter. Now, the Stoics have a simple, but radical, response available to such criticisms: to reject hylomorphism. It is an important hylomorphic presupposition among Platonists and Peripatetics alike that for something to be a body is for it to have both matter and form (and thus for it to be composite, not simple), and an

¹³ It is also commonly supposed by the hylomorphic thinker that body is rigid along the atomistic lines described above, but these hylomorphic and atomistic presuppositions are technically distinct. For a similar statement of the complaints from Plotinus and Plutarch, and salutary discussion of hylomorphic presuppositions by Stoic critics, see Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 47; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 57, 90–100; and M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” 130. For helpful remarks about the difficulties of working with doxographical material due to the author’s own jargon sliding in to the report, see Schofield, “Ariston,” 86.

equally important presupposition on the Stoics' part that body is non-composite and fundamental, i.e. basic and ungrounded.¹⁴ It is essential to lay bare these countervailing commitments at the outset, as they carry over to modern interpreters who find incoherence in the Stoic notion of body, or, in an effort to avoid incoherence, posit an abstract or mathematical notion of body that is no longer clearly a physical notion.¹⁵ From the hylomorphic perspective, when the Stoics say that their principles are bodies, they are in immediate violation of the concept of principles as simple and ungrounded; further, three-dimensionality, resistance, and any kind of unity whatsoever are, on this conception, already predications and thus additions, violating again the simplicity constraint.¹⁶

However, again, the Stoics need not accept this hylomorphic analysis of body; they are free to posit body as fundamental, not itself composed out of matter and form (or anything else), but simply existing as ungrounded, or basic. Thus, they can reject Plotinus' statement that "every body is composed out of matter and quality."¹⁷ They can also reject his question, "Whence resistance and extension?" For the question "Whence?" presupposes an answer in terms of prior entities; but the Stoics can reject the assumption that there must be something prior, positing instead fundamental bodies that are eternal and ungenerated (as indeed the Stoic *archai* are). Accordingly, they can agree with Plotinus that matter is not in the definition of three-dimensionality (since the active principle *logos* is solid three-dimensional extension without being matter), but disagree that three-dimensional extension is not in the definition of matter (since matter *is* a body). Finally, to the question of size and unity, which Plotinus thinks must derive from participating in the forms of greatness and the one, the Stoics are free, again, to reject this hylomorphic analysis and maintain that these properties are nothing over and above their finite solid three-dimensional extension.

As we have just seen, to be (a) body is to be (a) finite malleable mass (solid three-dimensional extension) of a certain size and shape, without reference to matter and

¹⁴ Thus that they would reject the Simple Composition premise, that anything enmattered is a composite of matter and form, in Fine, "Compounds and aggregates," 15. I leave to the side more fine-grained distinctions and use "fundamental," "ungrounded," and "basic" interchangeably.

¹⁵ E.g. BS, 37–8; M. Frede, "Théologie," 215; Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter"; Mikeš, "Bodies?"; Rheins, "A Critical Problem"; Scade, "Limits, parts and wholes"; Sorabji, *MSM*, 94–8; Weil, "Remarques sur le 'matérialisme' des stoïciens," 563, 566–7, 570.

¹⁶ Which is why Plotinus explains that matter and three-dimensionality are not contained in each other's definitions; other places Stoics and their critics disagree over hylomorphism include Alexander, *Mixt.* 216,1–7,9 (48C part), 222,26–3,6, 223,30–4, 224,27–32, 225,5–6,24 (Todd); Calcidius, *In Tim.* 221 and 315 (Magee); Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1.26–7 (Armstrong).

¹⁷ Perhaps Plotinus anticipates this response, when he says that if body is something other than a composite of matter and quality, then they use "body" homonymously. See Hahm, *Origins*, 33, and M. J. White, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 130, for agreement on this point, that the Stoics need not agree to hylomorphic presuppositions of their critics. However, note that on my view it is not by means of the schema of the Categories that the Stoics reject hylomorphism, as White says (following Hahm); I will address this "category mistake" in Chapters 7 and 8, where I argue that the Categories have an entirely distinct explanatory enterprise from the cosmological enterprise of Stoic physics.

forms or incorporeals, indeed without being a composite of any kind. Nothing in the definition of body as solid three-dimensional extension invokes prior entities out of which it is composed (without begging the question by presupposing hylo-morphism). Thus it is open to the Stoics to treat body (bodies) as fundamental, with a certain shape and size just in virtue of being some finite three-dimensional extension, i.e. just qua body; in fact, Plotinus complains that body is unqualified (*apoios*) and yet of a size (*megethos*) (*Enn.* 2.4.1, 14–5 (Armstrong)). Much as some lump of wax will have a certain size and shape even when it is otherwise amorphous and malleable, so too Stoic body, qua body, is (an) amorphous malleable mass that is always of some shape and size or other. Some quantity of wax, even melted to liquid, will have a finite extension in three dimensions, and therefore some *definite* shape or boundary, even if it lacks the *determinate* shape of a tapered candle.¹⁸ I will continue to observe this distinction between being definite, which is having some particular shape and size or other but none per se, and being determinate, being a thing of a certain kind, whether a candle, stone, plant, or human.

Thus, the Stoics can think of body as definite per se and fundamentally, even if it is also indeterminate or quality-less in myriad further ways (in fact, all the ways allowed by the complete malleability of Stoic body). And this conception of body, qua body, as definite mass explains how the Stoics can use “body” both as a mass term—since it is always acceptable to speak of *some* body in a mass sense (*du* corps), and as a count noun—since it is also always acceptable to speak of *a* body (*un* corps), on the model of *a* blob of molasses (that is also *some* molasses); the ambiguity of the Greek “*tis*” or “*ti*” here is parallel to “some,” which can be some particular thing (or other), or a portion, or both. These mass and count senses of “body” are not exclusive (indeed Greek nouns famously do not require an article), hence my parenthetical articles above.¹⁹ All (every) body is *a* body.

Body Continuous

I turn now to the sixth and final point of note about the Stoic conception of body, which will show just how much the simple definition of body as solid three-dimensional extension captures and how far it sets the Stoics apart from their peers and predecessors, in just the sort of theoretical equipoise one might expect from a school of the dominance and duration enjoyed by the Stoics.²⁰ The Epicureans will

¹⁸ Koslicki, “Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology,” 136, makes the same point in saying that even a bit of glue has a principle of unity.

¹⁹ We saw in Chapter 2 that mass and count senses of a term need not conflict, in the rehabilitation of the *Outis* test in application to place and void. The present chapter now explains why this is true for bodies.

²⁰ As described in the Introduction, as part of the principle of maximal charity: other things being equal, an account that finds the Stoics in theoretical equipoise with their predecessors and neighbors is to be preferred.

agree with the Stoics in rejecting a hylomorphic account of body, of course, and presumably also in recognizing both the count and mass senses of body at once. But that marks the end of their slim common ground, because the Stoics not only eschew the notion of solid body as rigid and thus resistance as ricochet (as we have seen), they deny atomism altogether and embrace instead a continuum physics (which we will now explore). This rejection of atoms and commitment to the continuum is so central to Stoicism that it would be disqualifying for a Stoic to deny it, and unacceptable for it not to figure in the definition of body.

Fortunately, the definition of body understood in terms of malleable solidity and interactive resistance captures its continuous nature as well, as non-atomic mass that is infinitely divisible without reaching minima (DL 7.150–1 (passage E below); Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078E–1079C (50C1–3, passage H below); Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G below)). In fact, as we will see shortly, there is textual evidence that the infinite divisibility of body, into ever many bits and pieces, is understood to *follow from* its being finite, malleable substance. Now, the Stoic continuum is a tantalizing subject, raising deep and important questions about the status of the “parts” into which the continuum is divisible, and the relation between infinite divisibility and the much-contested theory of through and through blending (*krasis di’ holou*) by which the Stoics build their cosmos. A proper understanding of Stoic cosmology thus depends on a proper understanding of the infinite divisibility of the continuum, so I will take some time now to address these important questions (and explain my use of scare quotes for “parts” of the continuum).

One interpretive option is to understand the “parts” into which the continuum is divisible as potential in an Aristotelian sense, as A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley consider: “The main Stoic gambit in replying to both the Zenonian and the Epicurean challenge is to deny, rather as Aristotle had done, that the infinitely divisible contains an *actual* infinity of parts: [passages 50] A, B. That is not to say that it contains finitely many parts either, but just that there is no non-arbitrary answer to the question how many parts it has.”²¹ Another option, advanced by Daniel Nolan, is to see the Stoics as committed to the contemporary mereological thesis of gunk, “objects which are not composed of mereological indivisibles (mereological atoms), but which are such that all of their parts themselves have proper parts.”²² On this reading, the Stoics’ continuum physics is a mereological thesis concerned with the composition and building of wholes out of parts: “Consider the picture Chrysippus is working with: we have a body, which is made of sub-bodies, which are themselves made of sub-bodies, and so on without limit.”²³

²¹ LS, 303, my emphasis, to highlight the contrast with potential parts in this Aristotelian context.

²² Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 162; see Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk,” for criticisms of Nolan and an alternative account of the Stoics as gunk theorists who use the convergence of parts to zero extension to explain how the Stoics can account for colocation.

²³ Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 181.

I am going to argue that the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility does not involve parts of any kind, either potential or actual, and that it is, rather, the *absence* of parts that is the defining characteristic of the continuum (hence the scare quotes above). However, in order to make this negative point, that the Stoic continuum is not a mereological thesis concerned with the composition of bodies out of subparts, it will be necessary first to take a brief detour into the Stoics' formal commitments concerning parts and wholes, i.e. into Stoic mereology. This digression will pay dividends not only here, in the immediate analysis of infinite divisibility, but throughout the account of Stoic corporealism, in the analysis of blending, cosmology, and the Categories, as well as in the account of the incorporeal continua, space and time, and in addressing the status of limits.

Digression on Stoic Mereology

First, by "mereology" I mean, simply and generically, a theory of parthood, or an account of parts, wholes, and their relations to each other. I do not mean Classical Extensional Mereology, although many Stoic commitments can and will be described in contemporary terms.²⁴ For example, as Jonathan Barnes has shown, the ancient conception of parthood is asymmetrical (if x is a part of y , then y is not a part of x), irreflexive (nothing is a part of itself), and transitive (if x is a part of y and y is a part of z , then x is a part of z), which Mereology refers to as Proper Parthood (x is a Proper Part of y iff x is a part of y and $x \neq y$), or a Strict Partial Ordering.²⁵ However, these formal commitments can be held without the other axioms of Classical Extensional Mereology, notably Unrestricted Composition (the sum of any two or more individuals is itself an individual) and Supplementation (if x is a Proper Part of y , then there is a remainder, z , which does not Overlap with x).²⁶ So I ask the reader to withhold the assumptions of Classical Extensional Mereology that go beyond the Stoic mereology I describe; hereon I presuppose only that Stoic parts are Proper Parts. I begin, following

²⁴ Classical Extensional Mereology (hereon CEM, or Mereology) owes its birth to Leśniewski, *Foundations of the General Theory of Sets*, its rearing in English to Leonard & Goodman, "The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses," under the influence of Whitehead, and its mature state to Simons, *Parts*, and D. Lewis, *Parts of Classes*. I am indebted to Simons' critical treatment of CEM as "philosophically suspect," *Parts*, 45. Stoic mereology merits its own treatment, including an account of how the Stoics stand with respect to all the axioms of CEM. I cannot pursue that full account here, but do indicate where we find the Stoics agreeing and disagreeing with CEM.

²⁵ Barnes, "Bits and Pieces," 237–42; see his n. 57 for hostility to applying contemporary Mereology to ancient arguments.

²⁶ I am indebted to Harte's treatment of the term "mereology" as independent of the Classical Extensional Mereology of D. Lewis and Simons, in *Plato on Parts and Wholes*, 13–25; see also 25–32, 267–81 for salutary discussion of composition and identity, useful criticism of Lewis' ambivalence about the question of ontological innocence, and an illuminating Platonic alternative to the Lewisan project presupposing Unrestricted Composition.

Barnes, with the definition of parthood from Galen's *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*.²⁷

- C. (1) Just as every animal is said to be one because, having a certain individual circumscription (*idia perigraphē*), it is manifestly not joined to other animals at any point, so also its parts, the eye, nose, tongue, or encephalon, are said each to be one, because each clearly has a circumscription of its own. (2) But if it were not joined to the neighboring parts at some point, but were altogether separate, then it would not be a part at all, but simply one. (3) Therefore, all bodies that neither have a completely unique circumscription (*perigraphē*) nor are completely conjoined to others [i.e. nor lack a circumscription altogether] are called parts. And if this is true, animals will have many parts, some large, some small, and some also not divisible at all into another form [i.e. homogeneous parts].

trans. May²⁸

(1) ὥσπερ τῶν ζώων ἕκαστον ἐν εἶναι λέγεται τῷ φαίνεσθαι κατὰ τινα περιγραφὴν ἰδίαν μηδαμῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνημμένον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς, τὸ δὲ ῥίς, τὸ δὲ γλῶττα, τὸ δ' ἐγκέφαλος ἐν εἶναι λέγεται τῷ φαίνεσθαι περιγραφὴν ἰδίαν ἔχον. (2) εἰ δὲ μὴ ξυνήπτο κατὰ τι τοῖς πέλας, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ κεχώριστο, τότε ἂν οὐδὲ μόνιον ἦν ὅλως, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἐν. (3) ὥσθ' ὅσα σώματα μήτε πάντῃ περιγραφὴν ἰδίαν ἔχει μήτε πάντῃ συνήπται πρὸς ἕτερα, μόρια ταῦτα κέκληται. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πολλὰ τῶν ζώων ἔσται μόρια, τὰ μὲν μεῖζω, τὰ δ' ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ καὶ παντάπασιν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἄτμητα.

Galen, *De usu partium* I.1 (May)

Although the structure of the argument is not entirely transparent, or, at any rate, not valid as stated, the conditions on parthood are clear enough from the sense of the passage. Parts are conjoint unities: they are one (*hen*), i.e. unities or individuals, in virtue of having a certain individual circumscription, some unique compass or character (*idia perigraphē*) (C1); and if they were completely disjoint, they would no longer be parts but merely one; so all parts are conjoint (C2). What is meant here by “conjoint” is being connected or joined to neighboring parts, and so “disjoint” simply means not connected to neighboring parts, standing independently.²⁹ Therefore (*hōste*), any body that is not completely disjoint (in which case it would have a *completely* unique *perigraphē*, or circumscription), but is still one (insofar as it is not *completely* conjoint either, i.e. without any individuating *perigraphē* at all), is called a part; so parts are conjoint unities (C3). The idea

²⁷ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces.” See C. Gill, “Galen and the Stoics,” 91, for additional reasons to take Galen's testimony as evidence for Stoic thought; Gill identifies several conceptual affinities between Galen and the Stoics that make them more like “blood brothers” than “mortal enemies.”

²⁸ May, *Galen. On the Usefulness of the Parts*.

²⁹ Contemporary notions of Disjointness and Overlap need not apply here.

behind being neither completely disjoint nor completely conjoint is that being a part is intermediate between being an independently existing individual (not conjoined to any other body) and not being an individual at all (having no *perigraphē*).

One question that arises is how exactly to understand the notion of something being one in virtue of its own or unique circumscription, or its *idia perigraphē* as I will often transliterate. Margaret Tallmadge May's "circumscription" is a good literal translation, which invokes the idea of an outline, surface, or encompassing limit. However, it ignores the more qualitative aspects of the term, which prompt Barnes to render it as "character" to reflect "an extended and more abstract sense."³⁰ This may, in turn, seem a little too qualitative for what is clearly a counting notion: that in virtue of which something is a unit, counted as one. I take both characterizations to be apt: an *idia perigraphē* is a thing's boundary or limit in virtue of which we call it one thing, but this boundary can be either quantitative or qualitative. Notice, before I explain this distinction, that I did not say the *idia perigraphē* is what *causes* something to be an individual, but that it is in virtue of having an *idia perigraphē* that we *say* that it is one, or *call* it a unity. Things that are one have an *idia perigraphē*, a certain boundary or identity conditions, but this does not make the *idia perigraphē* an entity or the agent of the thing's unity; the *idia perigraphē* is criterial of being one, but not causal of a thing's unity.

Sometimes a thing's *idia perigraphē* is purely quantitative. For example, Stobaeus reports that "substance (*ousia*) neither grows nor diminishes by addition or subtraction, but only alters (*alloiousthai*), just as in the case of numbers and measures" (Stobaeus 1.177,21–9,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7); this means that for substance, which is body (DL 7.150, passage E below; Clement, *Strom* 2.436 (SVF 2.359)), constitution is identity. Body as such (as we have already seen) is just a certain portion of solid three-dimensional extension; a body that is one this way does not survive having body added to or taken away from it (growth or diminution), but it does persist through all manner of qualitative change (alteration). A certain lump of clay remains the same lump so long as no clay is added or removed, regardless of its shape or organization (even if it should come to constitute a statue). And a certain amount of sugar remains the same amount so long as no sugar is added or taken away, regardless of the order and position of the granules, whether they be in a measuring cup or stacked on top of each other to the sky. In such cases, the *idia perigraphē* is purely quantitative and is clearly not an additional ingredient or part of the entity, nor the agent of the thing's unity.

Sometimes, however, the *idia perigraphē* is purely qualitative, i.e. subject to all kinds of quantitative change, but surviving no qualitative change. For example, an individual like Socrates is capable of growth and diminution, but cannot remain Socrates if he does not remain unchanging in his quality of being Socrates. This does

³⁰ Barnes, "Bits and Pieces," 243.

not mean he cannot undergo other qualitative changes, e.g. running or sitting, becoming wise, etc. but that the qualitative uniqueness in virtue of which we call him Socrates (*this* guy, whose name is Socrates) cannot change, from life to death. Here, again, Socrates' uniqueness, his *perigraphē*, is not an entity in its own right, or the agent of his unity or persistence, but simply the criterion by which he is *called* one. We will encounter these distinctions between quantitative and qualitative identity conditions in detail in Chapter 8, where I offer a fresh start on the Stoic Categories and show how they respond to Plato's challenge (iv) *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, and make being capable of both rest and motion (among other challenges from the *Sophist*). For now, embracing the *idia perigraphē* generically as a limiting outline or boundary (whether quantitative or qualitative) and presupposing the findings of Barnes that Stoic parthood is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive, we can lay down the first commitment of Stoic mereology: **Something is a part iff it is both one (*hen*) in virtue of its own *perigraphē*, and conjoint.**

The second commitment of Stoic mereology is to the nature of wholes, which, as Barnes has also shown, the Stoics see as organized and structured entities, in contrast to mere aggregates, sums, or totalities that are amorphous and unordered.³¹ As Plutarch reports, "'whole' is predicated of what is ordered (*tetagmenou*) whereas as the all (*to pan*), because it is infinite, is indefinite and disorderly" (*Comm. not.* 1074B–C; likewise *SE, M.* 9.332–3). Wholes are not aggregates indifferent to their internal structure, as evidenced by the Stoic distinction between *the whole* (*to holon*), i.e. the cosmos, and *the all* (*to pan*), i.e. the cosmos plus the void around it, or as Barnes renders it, the lot, which is a mere sum or totality indifferent to ordering.³² The distinction here between the all and the whole is a distinction between the kind of sum that is one (if it even is one) by having a merely quantitative *perigraphē*, like a number or measure indifferent to internal order or differentiation, and the kind whose *perigraphē* is sensitive to order, organization, and differentiation, hence a qualitative boundary. This exclusion of mere aggregates or sums as wholes shows that the Stoics reject the Mereological axiom of Unrestricted Composition, and it raises the Special Composition question, when (since not always) do many things compose one, or when does unity arise from plurality?³³ Not just any many will be one; in fact, in the strictest sense, composition of one thing out of many is restricted to a single integrated whole, the cosmos.³⁴ Thus wholes are not the mere sum of their parts.

³¹ Contemporary Mereological notions of Ordering are not relevant here.

³² Barnes, "Bits and Pieces," 247–9.

³³ Named by van Inwagen, *Material Beings*, 30–1.

³⁴ See Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes*, 275–6, for an account of Plato's "holistic," or top-down theory in contrast to D. Lewis' "atomistic," or bottom-up approach to composition; see Schaffer, "Grounds," 374, for the observation that Mereology lacks the concept of an "integrated whole" that grounds its parts, in contrast to an "aggregate" whose parts are prior to the whole. More on integrated wholes ahead.

But does this mean that all wholes are composites, i.e. always a case of one thing composed out of many, or can there be a whole with only one part? Barnes argues that the Stoics do recognize, at least in principle, the possibility of such a one-to-one part-whole relation on the basis of his insight that “bits and pieces are not parts.” He argues as follows:

Consider a brick wall. Its parts are the bricks. But the bricks do not exhaust the wall, which is made of bricks and mortar. (Or is the mortar not also part of the wall? In a sense, perhaps it is. But it does not possess an *ιδία περιγραφή*, and it is not a part of the wall in any ordinary sense. Nor would we list the glue holding a table together as one of the parts of the table.) And if that is so, perhaps a wall containing only one brick, surrounded by mortar, would contain just one part?³⁵

Now, I am not convinced, even if there could be a one-brick wall, that the mortar is not also a part; it is at least a remainder. In fact, it seems to me that the mortar even has an *idia perigraphē*, namely the quantitative boundary of being a certain amount of mushy-then-hard stuff between the bricks; just as a drop of glue, for all its amorphousness, does have its own surface and is distinct from the wood, so too does the glue in the table count as a part. So, given that I see the mortar as a part, I do not think Barnes’ case of the one-brick wall establishes either that the Stoics are committed to a one-to-one relation of part to whole, or to the thesis that bits and pieces are not parts. But I *do*, for other reasons, think that the Stoics recognize *both* a one-to-one relation of parthood, and that bits and pieces are not parts.

First, bits and pieces, indiscriminately taken from a whole are, indeed, not parts; if I begin chipping away at a statue, or whittling a stick, the portions or partitions I take are not parts antecedently there.³⁶ Such things did not have their own *perigraphē* while they were completely conjoint; only now when they are disjoint, and thus no longer eligible to be parts, do they count as one with their own *perigraphē*.³⁷ Thus I appreciate Barnes’ slogan that bits and pieces are not parts, but disagree that mortar is not a part (since it does have its own *perigraphē*).

³⁵ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 244.

³⁶ As Barnes observes, “Bits and Pieces,” 248, and as Alexander confirms in wondering how blended ingredients can retain their surfaces (*Mixt.* 213,2–6 (Todd)). Thus I am resisting a view like Paul, “Logical Parts,” 582, who says: “And just as the objects we can identify by mentally subtracting away various spatial parts of the cup as a whole *really exist* as objects in their own right even if the spatial parts aren’t actually subtracted away, objects that we can conceive of by mentally subtracting away various logical parts of the cup—even if we cannot easily imagine them—*really exist* as objects in their own right, even if the logical parts aren’t actually subtracted away” (original emphasis).

³⁷ This is the account I will apply to argue that although the Stoic continuum *is* infinitely divisible without reaching minima, it is not divisible into pre-existing or actual parts; body, space, and time are divisible into aliquot portions or partitions (*moria*), but not into parts. Infinite divisibility is not decomposition. More on the denial of Stoic gunk coming up next and in Chapter 4 on blending, as well as in Chapter 11 on time.

Second, although I disagree that the one-brick wall (with mortar) is a case of one-to-one parthood, I do think that Stoics recognize this kind of parthood as a mereological relation of single part to non-composite whole, i.e. a whole with only one part, or Proper Parthood with no remainder. As I will argue in Chapter 8, the Stoic Categories are such a schema, proceeding not in terms of the *composition* of one thing out of many (so that every Proper Part does have a remainder), but in terms of the *constitution* of one thing, e.g. a statue, by only one other, its clay (so that there is a single Proper Part with no remainder). This distinction between Proper Parthood with and without a remainder corresponds to two kinds of whole, those that are composite and those that are not. And in both cases, the whole is not merely the sum of its parts. Thus the contrast between the whole (*to holon*) and the all (*to pan*) does not entail that all wholes are composites; it entails only that all wholes are ordered, organized, or internally differentiated in some way, whether there be many parts to the whole (as in the cosmology) or only one (as in the Categories). Proceeding generically, again, we now can lay down the second commitment of Stoic mereology: **Something is a whole_{Count} iff it is both one in virtue of its own *perigraphē*, and ordered.**³⁸

This countable sense of wholeness should not be confused with another, distinct sense of being whole, the sense of being in one piece and having no portion missing (Calcidius, *In Tim.* 293 (44E4)). Hence, to borrow Barnes' example, a Herm can cease to be a whole Herm when it loses its nose, but it does not thereby cease to be a whole.³⁹ One sense is a count noun that designates an individual, a whole_c (e.g. a Herm). The other sense is adjectival, describing a given individual as one from which nothing has been subtracted (e.g. a whole Herm, a lump of clay that remains intact). The second, predicative sense of wholeness, which I identify as wholeness_{Predicate}, is thus incomplete; a whole_p in this sense is always a whole *F*, and it is defined as follows: **Something that is one is a whole_{Predicate} iff it is intact (in one piece) and entire (with no portion missing).**⁴⁰

Nor should we ignore a further distinction in wholeness concerning the explanatory priority of whole to part. So far, we have been discussing composition from the standpoint of generation, proceeding upwards from metaphysically prior parts to a new, posterior whole composed out of them. I call this bottom-up perspective building.⁴¹ But it is also true for the Stoics that once composition takes place and a

³⁸ Thus something that is one only quantitatively will not be a whole_c, because it is not ordered; and so wholes_c are always one qualitatively.

³⁹ Barnes, "Bits and Pieces," 245–6.

⁴⁰ I do not define wholeness_p in terms of wholeness_c because a body can be one without being a whole_c, e.g. the *archai*, which are one but not ordered and hence not wholes_c, though they are always whole_p bodies (support for this in Chapter 5). Being intact and entire are intended as a single condition, not a conjunction, even though *either* being cut up into pieces (even if all pieces remain contiguous) or having some portion removed is a violation of that condition.

⁴¹ See Introduction, n. 18 for ways in which my conception of building differs from Bennett's, "Construction area."

new body is generated, a new kind of mereological relation emerges, a top-down one according to which the new whole_C is an integrated whole (whole_{Integrated}) that is prior to its parts. Thus, we might say that composition is neither metaphysically nor mereologically innocent. This priority of the whole cosmos to its parts is a well-known commitment of Stoic theory, which deserves some care in its exposition. On the one hand, insofar as the Stoics are committed to the two *archai* as the fundamental building blocks of the cosmos, existing before and after each cosmic cycle (more on this ahead in Chapter 5), the Stoics are not priority monists for whom the whole is prior to its parts.⁴² On the other hand, as Barnes has shown, the idea that we are all partial wholes has a long and illustrious history; it is no mere *façon de parler*, but “a substantive metaphysical thesis: I am a part of the universe, I stand to the universe in the relation in which my right hand stands to me. The κόσμος, the whole *par excellence*, is an organic unity, and we are among its organic parts.”⁴³ The thesis is substantive insofar as it renders parts of the cosmos incomplete, posterior to the whole and interdependent with each other, and this is priority monism.

However, one need not worry that this top-down priority of the integrated whole is at odds with bottom-up building enterprise of Stoic cosmology. These are, rather, complementary notions: it is only once a whole_C has been built from the bottom up that this additional top-down relation holds; these are not competing alternatives but compatible descriptions. As we will see in Chapter 6, when agent *pneuma* blends with passive matter, “tarring the ark inside and out,” one is created out of many.⁴⁴ At that moment of generation when a composite whole_C is created and the Special Composition question is answered, a new, top-down, “holistic” mereological analysis also becomes available.⁴⁵ We will see the evidence and some of the details of generation in Chapter 6, when the cosmogony is described; for now I simply note that there is a legitimate sense in which to be a part is to be a posterior part of some prior whole_C. As Plutarch puts it: “The world is a complete body, but the parts of the world are not complete because they are disposed in certain ways relative to the whole and are not *per se*” (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1054E–F (29D)). As such, these parts cannot be defined or described without reference to each other and the whole_C of which they are a part. I define this integrated whole as follows: **A whole_{Count} is a whole_{Integrated} iff it is explanatorily prior to its parts.** I will not make much use of the notion of an integrated whole, but I would be remiss to leave it out of account.

The third and final commitment of Stoic mereology is to the relation between parts and wholes_C, namely that they are neither the same nor different from each other, i.e. neither identical nor disjoint. As Barnes shows, this option goes back to

⁴² See Schaffer, “Monism.”

⁴³ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 227.

⁴⁴ Sambursky, *Physics*, 8–9, makes a similar point when he describes the parts of a unified whole as interdependent and coexistent rather than additive.

⁴⁵ “Holistic” in Harte’s sense (see n. 34 above).

Plato's *Parmenides*, and is attested for the Stoics by Sextus in application to ordinary parts like hands (*M.* 9.336 (passage D here), 11.24 (60G3)), by Stobaeus in application to the Categories (1.177,21–9,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7)), and by Seneca in application to the relation between me and my soul (*Ep.* 113.4–5 (Gummere)).⁴⁶ I begin with Sextus in elucidating the Stoic relation of part to whole_C.

- D. The Stoics say that the part is neither different (*heteron*) from the whole nor the same thing (*to auto*); for the hand is neither the same as the human (for it is not a human), nor is it different beyond (*para*) the human (for with it the human is conceived of as human).

οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος), οὔτε ἑτέρα παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον (σὺν αὐτῇ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος).

SE, *M.* 9.336 (Bury)

The Stoic commitment to a part as neither the same nor different from the whole_C is contrasted with the Epicurean conception, which takes the part to be simply different from the whole_C, and with the skeptic Anaesedemus, who argues that a part is *both* the same as *and* different from the whole_C. The idea of sameness in play is clearly that of identity; however, being other or different (*heteron*) is not immediately clear, particularly given Sextus' explanation in conceptual terms (echoed at *M.* 11.22–6 (60G)). Fortunately, we have other evidence that to be *heteron* is to be “separate in place and not be considered a part” (Stobaeus, 1.177,21–9,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7)), and that a thing “will be counted by itself only when it stands by itself [. . .] what is other ought to be distinctly its own, entire and complete within itself” (Seneca, *Ep.* 113.5, trans. Inwood); this is the same idea as having a completely unique *perigraphē*, as we saw Galen put it.⁴⁷ Here is how Barnes captures the relevant sense of *heteron* (ἕτερον):

My jacket is not identical with me, and my arm is not identical with me. But there is a clear difference between these two non-identities. Remove my jacket and

⁴⁶ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 262–7.

⁴⁷ See E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” 104, for arguments that being *heteron* is not the modal claim that two things are separable, but the claim that they are actually separate. I take *heteron* in non-modal terms as being disjoint, but what I mean by disjoint is that any two such bodies are separable from each other, even if they are in fact coextended. Thus I disagree with Lewis' second test for being *heteron*: “if A and B are both parts of C, A and B are *heteron* each other only if they are in completely separate places (not spatially overlapping)”; I take the principles, notably, to be disjoint because even though they are always as a matter of fact coextended, they are also always separable from each other because they are in a through and through blend (on which see Chapter 4). Thus two bodies that are disjoint in the Stoic sense could overlap completely.

I remain intact—my jacket is distinct and disjoint from me. Remove my arm and you ruin my integrity—my arm is not something distinct and disjoint from me. Thus, if X can be removed from Y and still leave Y intact, then X is ἕτερον from Y. My jacket, which is ἕτερον from me, is no part of me. My arm, which is not ἕτερον from me, is a part of me.⁴⁸

So, *heteron* is plausibly understood as disjoint in the sense of being a separate entity, not conjoined or connected to any neighboring parts; this would also explain the addition of “*para*” to say that the hand is not *heteron beyond* or *beside* or *aside from* the human. As to the justification of its not being disjoint, that humans are conceived as having hands, Barnes takes this to signal a distinction between real and conceptual parts, so that hands come out as merely conceptual parts.⁴⁹ I am not sure this distinction is apt or necessary here. The appeal to conceivability looks more like a way of saying simply that humans have hands as parts, and that their removal would not leave a person intact. Concepts (*ennoēmata*) are imprinted on us by the world, and the Stoics are confident in the human ability to grasp the features of reality, at least coarsely (they are deeply pessimistic about the average human ability to grasp of the world’s features in the maximally specific way that constitutes wisdom, but they do not worry that we cannot grasp the concept of a human, for example). So, the appeal to conceivability is not really a logical point or an appeal to conceptual parts, but an appeal to the ordinary intuition that parts don’t come apart from their wholes without destruction, like hands don’t come apart from people the way their jackets do (namely without harm to either). The relation between part and whole_C can now be captured as follows, concluding our detour into the principles of Stoic mereology: **A part is neither the same as (identical to) nor different (disjoint) from its whole_C.**

I will put these principles to immediate use in analyzing the continuous nature of body, but they will be relevant throughout Section II, in understanding the Stoic theory of through and through blending (*krasis di’ holou*) (Chapter 4), the Stoic principles (*archai*) (Chapter 5), the cosmogony (Chapter 6), and the Stoic Categories (Chapters 7 and 8). And they will be relevant again in the analysis of limits, both in connection with the incorporeals (Section III) and with what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal (Section IV). So I will frequently refer to this digression on Stoic mereology, as I put these principles to use.

⁴⁸ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 263–4.

⁴⁹ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 265–8; see Chapter 15 for further discussion of Stoic concepts (*ennoēmata*).

Continuous, Not Gunky

With these mereological commitments in hand, I can now argue that the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility does not presuppose parts of any kind, either potential or actual, and that it is, rather, the *absence* of parts that defines the continuum. This absence of parts explains my earlier use of scare quotes, when I said that the subject of the Stoic continuum raises deep questions about the status of the “parts” into which the continuum is divisible. I will begin my textual analysis of the continuum with a vexed passage of Diogenes Laertius.⁵⁰ Having just explained that in Stoic physics substance (*ousia*) plays the role of prime matter, where matter is defined as that out of which things come to be, Diogenes makes clear and explicit here that Stoic substance (*ousia*) is body (*sōma*) and that, *as such*, it is both infinitely divisible and subject to blending:

- E. (1) Substance (*ousia*) is, according to them, body (*sōma*), and it is limited, according to what Antipater says in the second book of *On substance* and Apollodorus in the *Physics*. And it is also malleable (*pathētē*), as that same one says; for if it were immutable (*atreptos*) the things that come out of it could not come about; (2) thence (*enthen*) that one <also says> divisibility (*hē te tomē*) is into infinity (*eis apeiron*) (which Chrysippus says is infinite (*apeiron*) <but not into infinity>; for there is not some infinity at which the division arrives, but it is unceasing (*akatalēktos*)). (3) And also (*kai*) blendings (*kraseis*) come about whole through whole (*di' holou*) according to what Chrysippus says in the third book of the *Physics*, not by surface contact and juxtaposition; for even a little wine cast into the sea will mutually coextend with its extent, and then will be blended.

(1) σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ πεπερασμένη καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν β' Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ. καὶ παθητὴ δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ αὐτός φησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἄτρεπτος, οὐκ ἂν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγίνετο· (2) ἔνθεν κακείνος ὡς ἡ τε τομὴ <μὴ> εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστιν (ἢν ἄπειρον <οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον> φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ τι ἄπειρον, εἰς ὃ γίνεται ἡ τομή. ἀλλ' ἀκατάληκτός ἐστι). (3) καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ δι' ὅλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ γ' τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται, εἴτα συκραθήσεται.

DL 7.150–1 (Dorandi)⁵¹

⁵⁰ I speak generically of the continuum even in the present context of body (as opposed to time, void, and place, which are also continuous) because I take these points to apply to all continuous entities irrespective of whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. To be continuous just is to be homogeneous and partless, as I will now argue.

⁵¹ E2 = 50B, E3 = 48A. I accept the suggestion of Rashed, “Division à l’Infini,” followed by Dorandi, DL, of κακείνος ὡς ἡ τε τομὴ <μὴ> εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, instead of von Arnim, SVF; Hicks, DL: *Lives*, and

According to this report, it follows (E2, “thence”) from the fact that substance is finite, malleable body (E1) both that it is infinitely divisible (E2) *and* that it is subject to through and through blending (E3).⁵² Given the scarcity of our texts, these two inferences are valuable evidence, requiring close attention and careful explication. What is it about corporeal substance being finite and malleable that licenses these inferences, if not, as the traditional account goes, the presence of potential or actual parts into which body is broken down and blends are composed? First of all, in response: the continuum is not a thesis advanced in terms of parts (though it is often challenged with the language of parts), nor is it concerned with what a body is composed of. Notice that Diogenes reports that “divisibility (*hē tomē*) is into infinity (*eis apeiron*),” not that there are infinitely many *parts* to body; the statement is not that there are infinitely many cuts or divisions already there, actually or potentially, or that it is already divided, but that cutting or cleaving could proceed into infinity.⁵³ So, the basic statement of the view makes no reference to parts.

Furthermore, the homogeneous nature of the continuum entails that it is *partless*. Plotinus testifies that no region of any bulk or mass has its own individuating quality or circumscription (*perigraphē*), and hence that bits and pieces (portions) are not parts:

H. S. Long, *DL: vitae, κάκ<ολουθ>εἶν ὡς ἡ τε τομὴ εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστιν*. I follow Rashed and Dorandi because I prefer the simpler emendation of <μῆ>, but I do not agree with Rashed’s objections that the von Arnim emendation produces a confused passage that is trivial, or contradictory, or has Chrysippus denying infinite divisibility; in fact, I think the senses of the emendations come to about the same with respect to doctrine, von Arnim’s with Chrysippus making a clarification, Rashed’s with Chrysippus being clarified upon by Apollodorus (which makes good sense as a matter of historical order), but in either case agreement about the nature of infinite divisibility. I also appreciate Rashed’s suggestion, 347, that the τε in ἡ τε τομὴ in E2 awaits the καὶ of καὶ τὰς κράσεις in E3, and that regardless of questions of emendation and manuscript disagreement over *κάκεῖνος* “one can deduce a strong doctrinal proximity” between infinite divisibility and blending, in which case *κάκ<ολουθ>εἶν* would be seductive but gratuitous (and a strange sort of mistake for a scribe to make). I accept von Arnim’s addition of <οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον> (with Hicks and H. S. Long, against LS, Dorandi, Rashed), and his punctuation of E1. In E3 I read δι’ ὅλου with LS instead of διόλου as in von Arnim, Dorandi, Hicks, and H. S. Long, and instead of δι’ ὅλων as in Todd, *De Mixtione*, 31 n. 45 (see Dorandi apparatus), but note there is nothing wrong with Todd’s reading that has two individual bodies blend, as LS seem to worry. I also go with LS against von Arnim, Dorandi, Hicks, H. S. Long, and Rashed in reading *συγκραθήσεται* for *συμφθαρήσεται* (although LS don’t emend the text in vol. 2, they translate *συγκραθήσεται*); I am open to the possibility that a single drop of wine could not really maintain its own *perigraphē* when so rarefied, in which case it would ultimately just be destroyed. I do not, however, think we should take this destruction as evidence of what happens in *all* cases of blending, as E. Lewis does, “DL and Mixture,” in arguing (to avoid the apparent paradox of colocation) that when blended substances are separated back out from each other the substances have been reconstituted and are thus non-spatiotemporally continuous individuals; cf. Sorabji, *MSM*, 102–4, for discussion of separation in contrast to reconstitution.

⁵² Taking *kai* in (3) to pick up on *te* in (2), as suggested by Rashed, “Division à l’Infini” (see n. 51 above).

⁵³ Pace Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk”; Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” on which more ahead.

- F. (1) The substrate (*hupokeimenon*) is one and is not differentiated, other than by being partitioned (*memeristhai*), just like a bulk or mass (*ogkos*) into parts—and yet, (2) in virtue of its continuity, substance cannot even be said to be partitioned.

(1) ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαφορὰν οὐκ ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μεμερίσθαι, ὥσπερ ὄγκον εἰς μέρη—καίτοι (2) οὐδὲ μεμερίσθαι τῷ συνεχῇ λέγειν τὴν οὐσίαν.

Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1.25,30–4 (Armstrong)

We see here that the substrate (*hupokeimenon*), which is corporeal substance (Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 94,11–5 (SVF 2.372); Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1083C–D (28A2–4, passage B/Chapter 7)) is not just described but defended as homogeneous and partless. First, we are told that the substrate is one, a single mass (but not thereby an ordered whole_c); then that the substrate has no differentiation, i.e. that it is a quality-less, homogeneous mass with no parts (the contrast with being partitioned into portions makes this latter point clear) (F1). Next, the absence of mereological commitment is laid bare and explained: it makes no sense to speak of parts in a continuum, because the minute the partitions become one and no longer continuous with the rest of the substance, they are disjoint and hence not parts—just like a bulk or mass from which we shave off bits and pieces, which do not rise to the level of parts (F2). Such portions or partitions are not there antecedently in any way (not even potentially). So, in fact, the infinite divisibility of body follows from the *denial* that the continuum has parts. Infinite divisibility is not decomposition into parts, because the Stoic continuum has no parts. It is the homogeneous and malleable nature of body (finite solid extension) that makes it infinitely divisible, not its being somehow composed out of potential or actual parts. Being malleable, recall, stands in contrast to the Epicurean conception of absolute rigidity; being completely malleable means that body has no absolute size or shape, and that it admits of penetration without destruction (cutting). This explains Diogenes' first inference, from body as finite and malleable to its being infinitely divisible.

With this in mind, we can see that Diogenes confirms the Stoics are not dealing in parts at E2, when he reports Chrysippus' clarification that divisibility is *infinite* (*apeiron*) rather than *into infinity* (*eis apeiron*) because there is no actual infinity for the division to reach; thus, he says, the divisibility is better described as unceasing, or unendable (*akatalēktos*). If there were actual parts, as a gunky analysis holds, then the infinity would be there already because the substance would be made of them as parts. However, further testimony from Stobaeus shows that this analysis cannot be right:

- G. Chrysippus said that bodies are divisible to infinity (*eis apeiron temnesthai*), as well as things comparable (*ta proseiokota*) to bodies, such as surface, line, place,

void, and time. Although these things are divided to infinity, a body is not composed of (*sunestēken ex*) infinitely many bodies, nor is surface, line, or place.

Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A)

It is clear and explicit here that infinite divisibility is not decomposition into component parts: we are told that the Stoics *are* committed to infinite divisibility, and this is *not* a thesis about what something is composed or made of.⁵⁴ Stobaeus is a reliable neutral doxographer, so the point stands as a clear warning to those who would conflate infinite divisibility with decomposition, or bring mereology to bear on the continuum. Plutarch, on the other hand, a hostile Neoplatonist with a bee in his bonnet about the Stoics, has the following complaints about infinite divisibility:

- H. (1) And, really, it is contrary to the common conception for there to be no extremity (*akron*) in the nature of bodies, neither any one (*mēthen*) first nor last (*eschaton*), in which the magnitude (*megethos*) of a body terminates, but for there to be always something showing up beyond what was taken, which casts the substrate (*hupokeimenon*) into infinity and indefiniteness. For it will not be possible to conceive of any one magnitude as greater or smaller than another, if the progression of parts (*merē*) as far as (*epi*) infinity is an attribute of both magnitudes this way [sc. as far as infinity], but the nature of inequality is destroyed [. . .] (2) And yet, how is it not clear that a human being is composed of (*sunestēkenai*) more parts (*moria*) than the human's finger, and again the cosmos more than a human being? For everyone knows and means this, lest they become Stoics; but on becoming Stoics, they say the opposite and opine that the human being is not (composed) out of more parts (*moria*) than a finger, nor the cosmos than a human being. For division as far as infinity pulverizes bodies, and among infinities there is no more or less [. . .] (3) For Chrysippus says that when we are asked if we have certain parts (*merē*), and how many, and of what and how many parts (*merē*) they consist, it is useful to make a distinction. To the rough question, we will reply that we are composed of head, trunk, and limbs; for that was all that the problem put to us amounted to. But if they extend the questioning to last parts (*eschata merē*), he says it is necessary to recognize no such things, but we must speak neither of which we consist, nor, likewise, of how many, either infinite or finite. I have, I think, quoted his actual words, so that you may see the way he preserved the common conceptions, urging us to think of each body as consisting neither of certain parts (*merē*) nor of some number of them, either infinite or finite.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078E–1079C (50C1–3 part)

⁵⁴ And according to the principle of maximal charity described in the Introduction, I am reluctant to dismiss otherwise reliable testimony as erroneous or to think that Chrysippus is not in control of his theoretical commitments, as Nolan is forced to do with this passage in "Stoic Gunk," 181.

If it were true that infinite divisibility is a thesis about component parts (*merē*), then Plutarch might be right to worry as he does in H1 that no two bodies could be measured or compared, and that magnitude itself would be done away with; if a body is something built of sub-bodies, and none of these has any particular size, then neither could the whole_c built out of them have any definite size. The substrate (*hupokeimenon*) of the cosmos, i.e. the totality of corporeal substance, might indeed be cast into indefiniteness. But the Stoics do not see things this way (since infinite divisibility is not decomposition into parts), so Plutarch misses his target.

Likewise, as in H2, it would be absurd for the Stoics to say that the human being consists of no more parts (*merē*) than a finger; but Plutarch shows us that what they really say is that the human body consists of no more *partitions* (*moria*) than the finger does. The Stoics can coherently claim that a single finger and single human body, insofar as both are infinitely divisible, are equally divisible into infinity. This is speculative, but I suggest that the Stoics may have used “*meros*” (and the plural “*merē*”) for parthood, but reserved “*morion*” (singular; “*moria*,” plural) for the bits and pieces, aliquot parts, or (as I will typically call them) partitions into which a malleable mass is infinitely divisible.⁵⁵ Plutarch uses both terms to press his point, and regardless of whether he conflates them purposefully or not, he perhaps gives evidence that the Stoics used such terminology, a point that is supported by the appearance of the technical term “*hupokeimenon*,” lifted from the context of the Categories.

Alexander corroborates the Stoic use of “*morion*” (and uses the term in the sense I am suggesting, since partitions are bits and pieces, but bits and pieces are not parts) when he says that for the Stoics there is no partition (*morion*) of a blend that does not contain both (or all) the ingredients (Alexander, *Mixt.* 213,2–5, 217,10–2 (48C7)), a point that Plutarch himself makes, using “*morion*,” just before passage H (*Comm. not.* 1078B (48E1)). In addition, shortly after passage H, now pressing problems for time as continuous, Plutarch again uses the language of partitions (*moria*) to argue that because “no partition (*morion*) of the present time corresponding to the now remains, if that which is said to be present is distributed into pasts and futures,” they destroy time altogether (1081C–D (51C3, passage K3/Chapter 11)).⁵⁶ Thus in our

⁵⁵ Cf. Alexander, *Mixt.* 213,2–4 (Todd), where he speaks of a chance partition (*to tuchon morion*). See Sedley, “Diachronic,” for *moria* as subparts, e.g. Dion’s substance, Dion himself, and Dion’s dispositions and relations.

⁵⁶ By contrast, Plutarch completes his point in the language of parts (*merē*); it would be crafty (or just careful) for Plutarch to do this on purpose, signaling that it is on the assumption that partitions are parts that the problem arises, but this cannot be established with much certainty (nor would Plutarch be likely to declare his own fallacious move). My claim is only the modest one, that Plutarch, in using both terms, gives evidence that both were in use (and that the use of “*hupokeimenon*” lends support to this idea). It is true that these terms are sometimes used interchangeably in ordinary Greek, so I am assuming that our context is sufficiently technical to rule that out. This point, again, is speculative without a full review of the uses of *merē* and *moria*, and each of these with reference to the practice of each author. Note that my argument does not, however, rely on whether the Stoics observed this verbal distinction and reserved “*moria*” for partitions; secure evidence of the linguistic distinction would be confirmatory, but the main work of my argument is in the dialectical structure of the passage.

target passage (H), Plutarch would be right in reporting that the Stoics say the finger and the human have equally many partitions (*moria*), but wrong to treat this as equivalent to saying they are composed of equally many parts (*merē*). It is perhaps ingenious word-play for Plutarch to exploit “body” as ambiguous between a human body (which does indeed have parts) and body as such (which does not).

This distinction is likely what stands behind Chrysippus’ response to the puzzle in H3. If we are asked a rough question about the parts (*merē*) of which a human body is composed, we can say that it is composed of head, trunk, and limbs. If our interlocutor puts the question anew, asking of what parts the head, trunk, and limbs are composed, we might say bones, blood, and sinew. But if our interlocutor should be terribly clever and invoke the infinite divisibility of body in putting the question yet anew, demanding a precise answer to the question of composition in *that* light, then we point out the distinction between parts (*merē*) and partitions (*moria*), i.e. between the human body and body as such. Parts are conjoint components of ordered wholes_C, with their own *perigraphē* that makes them each one; the human body is a whole_C. Partitions, however, have no *idia perigraphē* in advance of the division (which is why they are not parts), and once they do, upon division, they are disjoint and thus, again, not parts. Body qua body is homogeneous, which is to say partless, hence there is no answer to the interlocutor’s question of how many last or ultimate parts we consist, once the questioning is extended to the infinite divisibility of body as such.

Thus Chrysippus insists that a category mistake is being made. To the rough, or inexact question, we can recognize the perfectly ordinary sense in which we are composed of a certain number of parts and give an answer like *head, trunk, and limbs*—this is a matter of common sense or, ultimately, the student of anatomy. To the precise question, the demand for a complete accounting of parts in light of the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility, however, we cannot recognize any such things—this is no longer a composition question or a matter of common sense or even of anatomy, but a conflation of two different questions: what parts compose the human body as a whole_C (answer: head, trunk, and limbs) and what parts compose body as such, i.e. malleable homogeneous mass (answer: none, it is a partless continuum).⁵⁷

Now, there is some question about what exactly Chrysippus means when he says in response to the precise question that it is necessary to recognize “no such things,” referring back to first (*prōton*) and last (*eschaton*) extremities (*akra*). The gunk theorist sees Chrysippus as rejecting *ultimate* parts, which is to say the minima of atomism, but not the *actual* parts required by gunk. From this perspective, Chrysippus is working with a distinction between Proper Parts and ultimate

⁵⁷ This is perhaps like the response Chrysippus recommends to sophisms of equivocation, which is to be quiescent until the term can be disambiguated (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 24,9–21 (37S); cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.92–6 (37H), where Chrysippus recommends quiescence for the Sorites paradox). We will see this kind of response again in the context of time.

parts, so the response to the interlocutor looks to be something like this: you can ask me about Proper Parts all you want (e.g. head, trunk, and limbs, but also, ex hypothesi for the gunk theorist, any other subdivisions one cares to make, whether cutting at the natural joints or not), but if you want an answer about how many *ultimate* parts there are, then there is no answer because there are none of those.

However the “no such things” that Chrysippus warns against could just as well be, and in fact more naturally are, parts generally, rejecting the idea that the continuum consists of parts at all. The structure of Plutarch’s text supports this idea. First, (at H1) Plutarch states the Stoic thesis that there is no extremity (*akron*), neither any first (*prōton*) or last (*eschaton*) in which the magnitude of a body terminates, but “always something showing up beyond what was taken.” So far, no language of parts, just interminable cutting. Then he states the charge that the substrate (*hupokeimenon*) is cast into infinity and indefiniteness. Still no language of parts. Next, he *explains* the charge: “For it will not be possible to conceive of any one magnitude as greater or smaller than another, if the progression of parts (*merē*) as far as (*epi*) infinity is an attribute of both magnitudes this way.” Now and hereon the language of parts is present, which reveals how Plutarch gets from the Stoic denial of extremities (i.e. the commitment to the continuum, which is *not* a thesis put forward in the language of parts) to the charge that body is infinite and indefinite: namely, by treating infinite divisibility as a mereological thesis about (de)composition (and hence partitions as parts). Indeed, Plutarch is bringing an atomist challenge to the Stoics, which presupposes that bodies are composed of atoms as their parts.⁵⁸

Then, in response, Chrysippus would be saying that in the context of infinite divisibility, which is, after all, a thesis about the nature of body as solid, malleable, and homogeneous extension, we must not speak of components or parts at all, because there aren’t any: infinite divisibility is not decomposition. Hence the move from parts like head, trunk, and limbs to the “parts” of infinite divisibility (which is to say, partitions), is a category mistake. Chrysippus elaborates that we are to say neither *which* nor *how many*. The force of saying that a Stoic should deny that we consist of certain, or particular parts (*tina merē*) is to emphasize that there are *no* such parts to be had. Body qua body, i.e. solid extension, does not consist of parts because it is continuous, homogeneous, and undifferentiated (i.e. partless). Any portion or partition we take of a continuous mass will not have an *idia perigraphē* until it becomes disjoint; thus, it is not present in the body as one, nor, therefore, as a part (and the moment it comes to have its own *perigraphē*, having been shaved off, it is no longer a part). So, the denial that we consist of *certain parts* is more likely a reference to the fact that body qua body is altogether partless. Likewise, to say that we do not consist of some *number* of parts is to invoke the fact that

⁵⁸ Cf. Lucretius 1.615–27, as Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 814, notes.

there are no parts to be counted—hence neither some finite number nor infinitely many.⁵⁹ Thus, Chrysippus responds to the critic who demands a precise accounting of parts in the context of infinite divisibility, by pointing out that the critic is equivocating between body understood as a whole_c composed out of parts (head, trunk, and limbs), on the one hand, and body understood as solid three-dimensional extension, which has no parts, on the other. Therein lies the category mistake.⁶⁰

Conclusions

So, I maintain that to be continuous is to be partless, hence that body qua body is not composed of parts. I offer now one final piece of evidence from Sextus, who signals this commitment as well in pressing the paradoxes of motion (*M.* 10.121–6, 139–42 (50F)). Sextus begins this polemic about motion with a description of the Stoic position as a case of “being divided (*temnomenōn*) into infinitely many bodies.” This plural count noun, “bodies,” might be thought to raise worries for the idea that body is partless; indeed, Nolan takes the plural to signal a division into “real parts.”⁶¹ However, the Stoic solution to the paradox of motion that Sextus goes on to report does not fit this description. According to Sextus, the champions of infinite divisibility say that “the moving body completes the whole of a divisible (*meriston*) extension (*diastēma*) at one and the same time: it does not first cover the first part of the distance with its own first part and the second part in sequence, but traverses the whole of the divisible distance in one single go” (*M.* 10.123 (50F2, trans. LS)). In maintaining that motion is of whole_p bodies across whole_p distances, this response denies that motion involves division or parts at all, and affirms that it proceeds “*legato* and not in stages.”⁶² Thus, we have reason to doubt Sextus’ opening description of infinite divisibility as decomposition into bodies (as error or polemicizing), or (more charitably) reason to think that the language of cutting

⁵⁹ This analysis still fits the pattern of trichotomies that Nolan, “Stoic Trichotomies,” usefully develops (according to which apparent contradictories are only contraries), since the tertium quid is still not some number that is neither finite nor infinite, but rather none at all. However, this would conflict with Nolan “Stoic Gunk,” 165, where he rejects this gloss of Plutarch’s (as he must) in order to maintain that the continuum has actual parts.

⁶⁰ Plutarch goes on to press geometrical puzzles on the commitment to infinite divisibility. Here, too, there is a category mistake: between the nature of body and the nature of mathematical entities, between physics and math (logic). I will return to this in Chapter 14, where I argue in support of the ontological genus of Somethings that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. The same response will be given to those who seek to construe the left and right halves or top third and bottom two thirds as parts; there is no such *perigraphē*, therefore these are not parts or even partitions, but imagined partitions.

⁶¹ Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 167.

⁶² LS, 303; cf. M. J. White, “The Stoic Model,” 325. Note that covering a distance at one and the same time need not mean covering a distance at one and the same instant; rather, it is to say that a body moves across a distance in a single stretch of time, *legato* rather than *staccato*. Time is continuous as well; more on this in Chapter 11.

up into bodies reflects the Stoic commitment to what you *would* get if you were able to divide a mass into bits and pieces forever. Such bits and pieces are not antecedently there (since they have no *idia perigraphē*); but they result with each cut, each time the body is divided. So, again, we see that infinite divisibility is not decomposition or even, properly speaking, mereology.⁶³

If there is any sense in which the commitment to the continuum is a mereological thesis for the Stoics, it is only insofar as they *deny* that bits and pieces are parts (*merē*), perhaps calling them partitions (*moria*) instead. But Stoic continuum physics is not a mereological thesis that takes the reality of parts as its starting point. It is the Stoic critics (as well as modern apologists) who press the continuum into mereological terms, thereby creating problems where there are none. When the mereological lens is turned to the continuum this way (i.e. illegitimately), the Stoics can make their stance explicit by speaking of the divisions that take place as being into partitions (*moria*) rather than parts (*merē*)—partitions are bits and pieces, but bits and pieces are not parts.

Hence the Stoic continuum is quite simply the commitment to body as solid three-dimensional extension that is finite and completely malleable, into however so many different shapes and sizes, divisible into as many bits and pieces as one cares to make. This is what underlies Diogenes' first inference above (passage E), from body as finite and malleable to its being infinitely divisible. Now it remains to explore what licenses the second inference, from body qua body to its being subject to through and through blending (*krasis di' holou*), which is the topic of Chapter 4. With those two pieces in hand we will then be prepared to understand the Stoics' corporealist cosmology on its own terms: how the Stoic *archai* (divine active *logos* and passive matter) can be two distinct and independent bodies (Chapter 5) that compose a single, unified whole_c (Chapter 6).

⁶³ Of either potential or actual parts. Although I agree with Nolan, "Stoic Gunk," 168, 179–80, that the Stoics are not committed to potential parts, the fact that Sextus levies the "no first part" argument against the Peripatetic Strato but not the Stoics does not show that the Stoics embraced actual parts instead; it shows at most that the Stoics did not embrace the Aristotelian framework of potential and actual, which is true. Cf. Drozdek, "Infinity," for agreement that infinite divisibility is not into parts, that this is not Aristotle's potential infinity, and the view that such limits are only in the mind.

4

Bodies Blending

σωμάτων ὅλων δι' ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασις

The theory of through and through blending (*krasis di' holou*) is one of the most contentiously debated commitments of Stoic physics, because by the letter of the texts it commits the Stoics to the complete coextension of two (or more) bodies, which is to say colocation.¹ Scholars have resisted this result, on the basis of atomistic presuppositions about body as rigid and full absolutely, and have sought various alternatives to minimize either the corporeality or the literalness of the colocation involved. Stoic blending is indeed an unusual theory, and the Stoics are unique in holding it, but with atomistic presuppositions about solidity and resistance set to the side, there is no reason to think that they are incoherent in this commitment, or that the Stoics need saving from themselves. On the contrary, as we will see, the possibility of blending follows from their conception of body as finite, malleable, and continuous mass—the very inference that Diogenes reports (passage E/Chapter 3) and we have set as our second explanandum. The first was to understand why it follows from the malleability of Stoic body that it is infinitely divisible; the second is to see why this same malleability makes body capable of through and through blending.

Blending Laid Bare

The Stoics' predecessors and peers recognize only two kinds of combination or mixture² between bodies: juxtaposition (*parathesis*), according to which there is no unity but only contact at the surface, and fusion (*sugchusis*), according to which there is total unity but also the mutual destruction of the ingredients. Here the Stoics innovate boldly by introducing *krasis di' holou*, or through and through blending. It is distinct from juxtaposition in that the bodies interpenetrate and are in contact everywhere (rather than just at the surface), and distinct from fusion insofar as the ingredients are preserved as distinct bodies in the mixture. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his work *De Mixtione*, is an important source of information

¹ Much of de Harven, "Resistance," is incorporated in this chapter.

² *Mixis*, understood generically, e.g. Alexander, *Mixt.* 217,2 (Todd).

for the Stoic theory of blending. Although he is staunch in his commitment to Aristotle, openly hostile to the Stoics, and not always fair or, at any rate, successful in his criticisms, his opening description of blending is neutral and reliable:

- A. The opinion of Chrysippus about blending (*krasis*) is as follows: (1) he posits, on the one hand, that the entirety of substance (*ousia*) is unified, a certain breath pervading it all, by which the lot of it (*to pan*) holds together (*sunechein*), remains together (*summenein*), and is interactive (*sumpathes*) with itself, while, on the other hand, (2) he says that among the bodies mixed in it [sc. the entire substance],

(a) some mixtures come to be by juxtaposition (*parathesis*), two particular substances or more put together in the same place and put beside one another by junction, as he says, each of them in such a juxtaposition preserving its substance and qualities according to its own outline or circumscription (*perigraphē*), as in the case, one may say, of beans and wheat-grains in their placement beside one another;

(b) certain others come to be by fusion (*sugchusis*) through and through, with both the substances themselves and the qualities in them simultaneously destroying one another, as he says comes about in the case of medical drugs being mixed together according to simultaneous destruction, when some other body comes to be out of them;

(c) certain other mixtures come about, he says, when particular substances and their qualities are reciprocally interpenetrating or mutually coextended with (*antiparekteinomenōn*) one another through and through, with the preserving of the original substance and qualities in such a mixture—which among the mixtures he says is uniquely blending. For the interpenetration (*antiparektasis*) of two and even more particular bodies through and through one another in that way, such that each of them in such a mixture preserves both its own substance and the qualities in it, alone among the mixtures, he says, is blending. For it is unique to those things that have been blended to be capable of being again separate (*dunasthai chōrizesthai palin*) from one another, which only comes about by the blended entities preserving their own natures in the mixture.

Alexander, *Mixt.* 216,14–17,2 (48C1–4)

Stoic blending can be analyzed according to four distinctive properties or characteristics, as described in A2c. I will press a literal reading of the phenomenon and emphasize the letter of Alexander's text as I describe these four properties. Then, after giving an overview of blending, I will address the long-standing scholarly resistance to this literal reading, engage with the textual details, and diagnose the appearance

of paradox as it arises (from atomistic presuppositions about the nature of body). The first distinctive characteristic of *krasis di' holou* is that it is unambiguously a case of body going *through* body; as Alexander puts it here, bodies are “mutually interpenetrating or mutually coextended with one another through and through.” This reciprocal interpenetration (*antiparektasis*), in which body goes *through* (*dia*) body (*sōma dia sōmatos chōrein, diēnai, diatenein*), or admits another body *into* it (*to dechomenon soma en autō(i) allo sōma*), is very well attested for the Stoics by a range of sources (e.g. Alexander, *Mixt.* 220,3; 220,15; 220,23; 225,1 (Todd); DL 7.151; Philo, *De confus. ling.*, 185–6 (SVF 2.472); Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078A–E (Cherniss); Stobaeus 154,14–55,11 (Wachsmuth & Hense)).³ Plutarch even makes explicit that this is no case of “touching on top at the surface, but diffusing everywhere together (*homou*) through depth into breadth and length” (*Comm. not.* 1078E (Cherniss)). Thus, any two (or more) blended substances will be in contact *everywhere*, i.e. in all three dimensions of their shared volume—they are quite literally colocated, as Themistius makes explicit and mocks as a clear impossibility (*In Ar. Phys.* 104,9–19 (48F)).⁴

Themistius is hardly alone in finding the colocation of two bodies impossible.⁵ But, notice: this commitment to colocation is only impossible on the further, non-Stoic assumption that solid body must be absolutely full and rigid and, thus, that resistance must be total ricochet; from this atomistic perspective, contact *could* only be possible at the surface, and so the complete blending and colocation that the Stoics espouse *would* be paradoxical. However, the Stoic notions of solidity as malleable mass, and resistance as pushback or interaction (as described in Chapter 3), defuse this paradox. Two bodies are able to mutually interpenetrate

³ Helle, “Colocation,” argues that “*antiparektasis*” does not convey strict colocation on the grounds that the term is defined by LSJ in reference to the Stoics, and that “*antiparektasis*” must therefore be understood through the Stoic notion of participation (*metechein*), which he takes as qualitative modification by the interaction of bodies in loose colocation with each other. First, the term “*metechein*” is used in only one text of Alexander to describe the fact that no portion (*morion*) of the blended bodies fails to share or participate in all the other bodies blended, so it is not widespread in the theory of blending. Further, the texts cited by Helle in support of a technical Stoic notion of *metechein* (n. 40) occur either in the context of ethics, conveying the unity of the virtues, or in the context of concepts participating in each other, co-opting Plato’s language to do away with Forms, and do not seem to me to establish the notion of qualitative modification on which he relies. Finally, while “*antiparektasis*” may be defined by LSJ as mutual coextension by reference to the Stoics, “*parekteinesthai*” is not, and in the passive voice it does mean to be coextensive with; the addition of the prefix “*anti-*” only underscores that they are coextensive with each other.

⁴ Helle, “Colocation,” argues that Themistius and several others attesting to colocation may be reporting what they take to follow for the Stoics rather than what the Stoics are committed to; however, the commitment to colocation is characterized by Themistius as a *dogma* of Zeno and Chrysippus, and this certainly is an attribution; cf. LS, vol. 2, 291.

⁵ On the history of this very issue, i.e. scholarly resistance to colocation, from contemporary metaphysics through the modern era (Locke, Descartes, Leibniz) to the Stoics, Aristotle, Plato, and the Presocratics (Anaxagoras, Melissus, Xenophanes), see Betegh, “Colocation”; thanks to Justin Vlasits for discussion of these ideas, noticing the affinity between our views, and bringing this article to my attention. Perhaps Stoic blending understood as neither juxtaposition nor fusion is another Stoic trichotomy to add to Nolan’s collection (“Stoic Trichotomies”); here there is not even the appearance that fusion and juxtaposition are contradictories, but the dichotomy is clearly understood by critics as exhaustive.

and completely coextend because they are entirely malleable—both in being entirely changeable, with no absolute shape and size (nor, therefore an absolute density), and in being subject to penetration without dissection, or cutting up into pieces, i.e. without destruction of the whole,⁶ remaining intact.⁶ Hence Diogenes' second inference (passage E/Chapter 3): from body as finite and malleable to its being capable of through and through blending. Since Stoic body is neither full nor rigid absolutely (but rather completely malleable), it is capable of mutual infusion and colocation. And since body is not full absolutely, it admits of different degrees of rarity and density; thus the colocation of two rare bodies is not paradoxical. And since it is not rigid, body admits of penetration as a kind of infusion rather than dissection; thus, again, the interpenetration of two bodies is not paradoxical.

This brings us to the second distinctive characteristic of *krasis di' holou*. Because the ingredients of a blend are completely coextended, the blend is entirely homogeneous, or *homoiomerous* (Plotinus, *Enn.* 2.7.1,5–6 (Armstrong)). There is no partition (*morion*) of the blend that does not contain both (or all) the ingredients (Alexander, *Mixt.* 213,2–5; 217,10–2 (Todd)); indeed the blend, like its ingredients, is infinitely divisible. How does this work? If we accept that two bodies are literally coextended (more on the resistance to accepting this literal reading ahead), then it follows trivially that no portion of the blend fails to contain both ingredients, since they are both literally everywhere in the blend. If, however, one is resistant to the possibility of two bodies being literally colocated, then the homogeneity of Stoic blends becomes problematic: if bodies can't be colocated, then what can the Stoics possibly mean when they say that every portion of a blend contains *both* ingredients? Surely, there must be some parts that are just one ingredient or the other (since they can't be colocated). Here the view that infinite divisibility is decomposition into infinitely many real or actual parts becomes attractive, as a way to save the Stoics from themselves (i.e. from their untenable commitment to colocation). But if the atomistic presuppositions that stand in the way of colocation are suspended, then the complete coextension of two or more bodies is no longer incoherent, and the homogeneity of the resulting blend is to be expected. Of course no partition of a blend fails to contain all the ingredients! First, because the ingredients are coextended, and second, because partitions (*moria*) are bits and pieces, but bits and pieces are not parts—the infinite divisibility of a blend is not decomposition into its ingredient bodies.

The third distinctive characteristic of Stoic blends is that the ingredient bodies remain independent entities even while blended through and through—blended bodies, *while blended*, retain their identity (their own substance and nature) and are capable of being separated from one another (Alexander, *Mixt.* 216,32–17,2, 220,21–2 (Todd); DL 7.150–1 (passage E/Chapter 3; Stobaeus 155,5–11 (48D)). Alexander

⁶ For the notion of a whole Predicate as what is intact and entire see "Digression on Stoic Mereology," Chapter 3.

reports that “particular bodies, two or more, are able to be mutually coextended in all dimensions with each other and while being mixed through and through can both themselves be preserved, remaining as they were originally, and preserve their own qualities” (*Mixt.* 220,26–9 (Todd)).⁷ And Plutarch describes the Stoics as “those who blend (*kerannuntas*) whole bodies with whole bodies” (*Comm. not.* 1078A (Cherniss)). Thus, to press the face value of these testimonies, the Stoics are committed to two or more independent bodies interpenetrating to compose a homogeneous substance without thereby losing their identities.⁸ They remain whole, even while coextending with each other, and they can do so because they are entirely malleable and capable of interpenetration without dissection, i.e. while remaining intact.

Now, one might think that for two whole bodies to completely interpenetrate this way, they must, at the outset, already be of the same volume. However, pressing our conceptual boundaries once again, the fourth characteristic of Stoic blending is that the ingredients need not be of the same volume at the outset. In fact, the Stoics famously say that a drop of wine can coextend with the whole sea (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078E (48B); DL 7.151 (48A, passage E3/Chapter 3)).⁹ This is not necessarily to say that blending *must* take place between larger and smaller bodies, only that it *can*, and thus that blending is not constrained by the original size or volume of the ingredients. So, bodies must be able to preserve their identities while their volume changes—but this should no longer be surprising, once the malleability of Stoic body is appreciated and we see that shape and size are not absolute properties of body. Alexander makes this point explicit for the Stoics: “many bodies preserve their own qualities in manifestly smaller and larger masses (as can be seen in the case of incense, which being rarefied by being burnt, preserves its own quality over a very large expanse)” (*Mixt.* 217,14–7 (48C8)). This and various other examples that Alexander gives establish beyond doubt that bodies are capable of expanding with the help of other bodies; from this he explains:

- B. These things being so [sc. that bodies can expand with the help of other bodies], they say it is no wonder that also certain bodies helping each other should be unified through and through (*henousthai di' holōn*) in the following way: as wholes preserving themselves with their own qualities that mutually coextend (*antiparekteinesthai*) with one another through and through (*di' holōn*), even if certain (wholes) are smaller in bulk (*ogkos*) and unable of themselves to extend that far and preserve their own qualities; for in this way

⁷ τὸ σώματά τινα λέγειν, δύο ἢ καὶ πλείω, δύνασθαι πάντῃ παρεκτείνόμενα αὐτοῖς καὶ μινγνύμενα δι' ὅλων αὐτά τε σώζεσθαι τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μένοντα, καὶ σώζειν τὰς οἰκείας ποιότητας.

⁸ Which is to say, without addition to or subtraction from their mass, or solid extension—for body qua body (substance), constitution is identity (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1083A–1084A (28A, passage B/Chapter 7); Stobaeus 1.177,21–79,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7)).

⁹ See Chapter 3, n. 51, for interpretive debates about this claim, whether a drop of wine can really coextend with the whole sea.

also the cup of wine is mixed with a great amount of water and helped by it into such an extent (*ektasis*).

Alexander, *Mixt.* 217,26–32 (48C9)

I take the logic of Alexander's report to be as follows: having established that bodies can expand with the help of other bodies ("these things being so"), the way is clear ("it is no wonder") to say further ("also") that by helping each other expand, certain bodies can blend with each other as wholes, ("in the following way," *houtōs*, *hōs*); certainly the examples he goes on to give are meant to illustrate helping causes and are not cases of blending, e.g. holding hands to cross a river together. In other words, from the possibility of expansion by helping (independent of blending), the Stoics infer that blending is possible between bodies of unequal sizes (when the larger helps the smaller expand). Alexander confirms the point when he mocks this same inference later (*Mixt.* 220,13–23 (Todd)). We are then given examples of blending: soul, with its own substantiality (i.e. corporality, which is *pneuma*, or fiery breath, itself a mixture of air and fire), pervades the whole of the body, just as *pneuma* constituting nature (*phusis*) or tenor (*hexis*) pervades matter (composed of earth and water), in the lower forms of the *scala naturae*; fire passing through iron; fire and air (*pneuma*) pervading earth and water (matter), with each *pair* preserving its own nature and continuity; drugs and odors with their media; light with air (217,32–18,10); and, of course, the principles (*archai*) (224,14–7, 23–6 (471); 224,32–5,2; 225,19; 226,11; 226,24–33 (Todd)).¹⁰

It is not clear what principle (if any) governs which bodies can blend with which. One might think it is always a case of active with passive, as with the *archai* and with *pneuma* pervading matter. Perhaps fire and iron could even be cast this way, with fire as the agent of the iron's being hot. However, there is no reason to think of the wine and water as standing in a clear agent-patient relation, nor air and incense, light and air, or the additional examples given by Stobaeus of "wine, honey, water, vinegar, and the like" (1.154,14–5,11 (Wachsmuth & Hense)). Most importantly, there is also no reason to think that heat, incense, et al. play the unifying role that *pneuma* does as the sustaining cause of a thing's unity; the pan is not *one* because of the heat. I think it is most likely (and safest at this juncture) to say that just as blending *can* but need not be between bodies of different sizes, so too blending *can* but need not be between an active and a passive body—which leaves open that when a blend *is* between an agent and patient, the resulting entity will be more strongly unified, even strongly unified enough to be a case of generation (answering the Special Composition question described in the Introduction, when do many things become one?); in this case, the agent is the sustaining cause of the new body. More on generation and Stoic cosmogony ahead in Chapter 6.

¹⁰ For arguments that the Stoic principles are in fact blended, and that this supports their being separable from each other, see Hensley, "Separability and Inseparability," 198–201; cf. Helle, "Colocation."

In the meantime, to summarize Alexander's testimony and complete our initial overview of Stoic blending, there are three kinds of mixture for the Stoics: juxtaposition (where contact is only at the surface), fusion (in which contact is through and through but the ingredients are destroyed), and blending (in which contact is through and through, but the ingredients persist as wholes_p such that no portion of the blend fails to contain both ingredients). I will turn now to the details of through and through blending, working closely with the textual evidence in its context to reveal the atomistic presuppositions at work in our sources, and hence to bring the Stoic alternative into sharper focus. The scarcity of our resources puts us in this methodological position, having to discern Stoic theory by studying its reflection in the "mirrors" held up by critics and commentators; we have to move from what critics find *wrong* to a positive account of what is *right* with Stoic theory.

Objections to Blending

As with the notion of body as solid three-dimensional extension in its own right, scholars ancient and modern have resisted a literal, face value reading of Stoic blending as the complete interpenetration of two bodies, primarily because it results in the apparently paradoxical commitment to two bodies being in the same place.¹¹ My suggestion, as should be clear by now, is that the colocation of two bodies is only paradoxical on the same atomistic assumptions that require resistance to be a case of total ricochet and body to be full and rigid absolutely. There is nothing in the Stoic conception of body as solid three-dimensional extension that requires understanding resistance (i.e. solidity) as ricochet rather than as

¹¹ Todd, "Monism and Immanence," 140, in pursuing an aspects view of the principles says: "Otherwise the Stoics would have no safeguard against the criticism that they believed two bodies could occupy the same place." LS, 294, admit that the principles are bodies, but then deflate the commitment (see quotation ahead). E. Lewis, "DL and Stoic Mixture," argues that the ingredients are in fact destroyed during a blend, preserving their qualities but not persisting as wholes, so that if two blended ingredients should be pulled apart again they would then be considered the same bodies as before, but they would be non-spatiotemporally continuous in virtue of the time they spend destroyed in the blend. Nolan, "Stoic Gunk," so that "we are not forced to say the mixed substances are in the same place" (174), argues the Stoics had a gunky conception of body according to which two bodies can be blended only because it is infinitely divisible to actual parts, each of which has further parts, and that when substances blend those parts are said to be weakly or loosely located in the same place, but not strictly or exactly colocated. Marmodoro, "Stoic Gunk," argues that, in order to avoid "an account for the coextension of bodies that would not defy any laws of physics" (163), the Stoics embrace the convergence of the parts to zero extension in their theory of gunk, but not the weak and exact location of Nolan's interpretation; see Leonard, "Locating Gunky Water and Wine," for developed concerns about Nolan's account of weak and exact colocation (in "Stoic Gunk"); and see Parsons, "Theories of Location," 208, for the suspicion that Nolan's Stoic blending collapses into juxtaposition; cf. Alexander, *Mixt.* 221,25–2,26 (Todd); for arguments against such a view, as Sorabji, *MSM*, 102, has pointed out. Helle, "Colocation," does not voice the allergy but argues at length that strict colocation is not part of the definition of blending, even going so far as to embrace the idea that blending is really a case of juxtaposition (*parathesis*) of whole through whole ("Colocation," 438–4, and "Self-Causation," 27–8); see nn. 3 and 4 above for more on Helle's arguments.

interactive *sumpatheia*; thus, there is nothing in the concept of blending as the interpenetration of two distinct bodies that violates the concept of resistance. Nor do the Stoics understand body as rigid absolutely, so there is nothing in the concept of blending as interpenetration that entails the destruction or dissection of blended bodies. Nor, again, do the Stoics understand body as full absolutely, so there is nothing in the concept of colocation that runs afoul of the solidity of body. Still, the scholarly aversion to colocation is strong, so let us consider now some of the objections that ancient critics have made (and modern commentators pick up).

First, in addition to the fundamental objection to the very possibility of interpenetration based on the atomistic conception of resistance as ricochet, there is another, distinct but related, objection based on the idea that there must be *room* in each body, or at least one of the bodies, for the other body to occupy. Even if resistance is not ricochet, the argument goes, there is nowhere to “put” the other body because body is already full. Here is how Alexander makes the point.

- C. For body spreading through body, whole coextending with whole not only does not fall in line with common conceptions, but is even impossible to be preconceived. For it is a natural conception that what is full is no longer able to admit anything into itself. For it is clear that what has room in itself and is capable of admitting something else like it [sc. a body] cannot yet be full, on account of which natural and common conception it already seems reasonable to some that there be something capable of receiving bodies, which we call place. For how could someone not wishing to make empty sounds conceive that body as something full of itself and having no void extension in itself, could admit into itself another body likewise full of itself?

τό τε γὰρ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν ὅλον ὅλῳ παρεκτεινόμενον οὐ μόνον <οὐ> προσπίπτει κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι προεῖληπται. φυσικὴ γὰρ ἐννοία τὸ πλήρες μηκέτ' ἐν αὐτῷ δύνασθαι δέχεσθαι τι. μὴ γὰρ ἔτι πλήρες εἶναι δύνασθαι τὸ χώραν ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ δεκτικὴν ὁμοίου τινός σαφήνειαν ἔχει, δι' ἣν φυσικὴν τε καὶ κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἤδη δοκεῖ τισιν εὐλογον, εἶναί τι τῶν σωμάτων δεκτικόν, ὃ καλοῦμεν τόπον. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις μὴ φωνὰς κενὰς βουλόμενος λέγειν ἐπινοήσαι σῶμά τι πλήρες αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ κενὸν διάστημα, δεχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλλο σῶμα ὁμοίως πλήρες αὐτοῦ;

Alexander, *Mixt.* 218,15–24 (Todd)¹²

According to this complaint (leveled by Plutarch as well, *Comm. not.* 1077E (2803)), body is by definition *full*—this is unambiguously the atomistic language

¹² Accepting Diels' ὡφθησαν ἔχειν δεῖ ἣν over Todd's σαφήνειαν ἔχει, δι' ἣν, on which see Todd, *De Mixtione*, apparatus.

used by Alexander's master Aristotle (*Met.* 985 b 4–20; DK67A6) but also legitimate to press on the Stoics, who are committed to an intra-cosmic plenum. If body is full, Alexander reasons, then it must be unable to admit anything into itself; and if a body *can* admit another body, then it is not full after all. If, in response, the Stoics retain their commitment to an intra-cosmic plenum in which there is no empty space, then blending is impossible; and if they retain blending, then there is void in the cosmos after all.¹³ This dilemma does not consider the very possibility that the Stoics countenance, namely that there could be variations in density that allow for colocation and make sense of the notion of a plenum that is not empty, to be sure, but also not full, or maximally dense. As Gabor Betegh also notes: "What Alexander does not consider is a third option, namely that fullness is not an absolute characteristic, but can come in degrees. He does not even entertain the question whether a body which is not full, or not a composite of full and empty, but rather rare, can or cannot receive another rare body."¹⁴ Thus the Stoics have the live option to deny that body qua body is full, in the sense of being maximally and absolutely dense. Certainly nothing in the definition of body as three-dimensional extension requires it, as the last chapter established.

One might yet continue to object, as Alexander and Plotinus do, that insofar as body is penetrated, it is divided, or cut into distinct segments so that there *is*, after all, room *between* the ingredients and thus there is no true case of blending, but rather juxtaposition (Alexander, *Mixt.* 219,32–20,2; 221,25–2.26 (Todd), *Mant.* 124,18–20 (Sharples); Plotinus, *Enn.* 2.7.1,4–6 (Armstrong)). But the Stoics need not accept that penetration is always cutting; in particular, *interpenetration*, which is a reciprocal and symmetrical coextension between wholes,^p is not a case of cutting, but of what is better thought of as a mutual infusion (Stobaeus 1.153,24 (SVF 2.471)). Plotinus acknowledges this point directly: "but those, again, who accept the blending through wholes might also be able to say of the coming about of blending through wholes that it is not cutting and destruction into fragments" (*Enn.* 2.7.1,32–4 (Armstrong)). Although he decides, ultimately, that penetration without cutting is too difficult to conceive and goes on to make trouble by using "cutting" for "penetration," Plotinus is honest about the disagreement. Here we find a clear and simple disagreement over a substantive matter—whether there can be penetration without cutting—which is a rare find in Stoic criticism; too often the debates are polemical, trading more in misunderstandings than in real disagreements. In this spirit, Sambursky remarks that "Plotin alone, in his endeavour to give the Stoic ideas a fair trial, attempts to reconcile their views with the facts."¹⁵

¹³ Many scholars do in fact think of intra-cosmic places as portions of the void that happen to be occupied, but presumably do not think this is what licenses blending.

¹⁴ Betegh, "Colocation," 403; cf. 396–8, 401–9. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 75–6, recognizes this point as well, that blending is strange to us because we conceive of matter as atomic rather than continuous, and that the Stoics can be (and are) perfectly at ease with colocation. See M. J. White, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 149, for arguments that there is no a priori reason to reject the possibility of Stoic blending.

¹⁵ Sambursky, *Physics*, 15.

Now, with this objection from cutting out of the picture, the Stoics can point out that although a blend is always infinitely divisible into ever smaller portions that contain both ingredients, it does not follow from this fact that the blend is effected *by means of* infinite division. What makes the blend homogeneous is the mutual coextension of the ingredient wholes_p, which would not really remain whole_p if the process involved division or cutting (as the intended collapse into juxtaposition requires). And this preservation of their continuity as wholes_p is precisely what makes the blend infinitely divisible into aliquot parts—not their being either potentially or actually divided. Commentators ancient and modern have taken this turn time and again, understanding blending as a function of its infinite division into “parts” (again, my scare quotes). Alexander, for example, presses the point polemically in order to collapse blending into juxtaposition and thus deny the possibility of *krasis di’ holou* (*Mixt.* 221,25–2,25 (Todd)), and some contemporary writers have followed critics in this;¹⁶ others, aiming to defend Stoic blending, have assumed that the point is correct, and then pressed contemporary gunk theory into service to underwrite an actual infinity of parts and avoid a literal, face value reading of colocation.¹⁷ But, again, the Stoics need not accept that blending requires any cutting at all, let alone an infinite division. Nor is this a mereological commitment, just as the commitment to the continuum is not a mereological thesis (except insofar as they would deny that parts are involved). Rather, one whole_p body can coextend through and through with another whole_p body without there being any division at all. Naturally, this invites the opposite objection, that blending collapses into fusion (Alexander, *Mixt.* 220,29–1,24 (Todd)). But, again, the Stoics need not agree to this collapse, and so can continue to maintain the possibility of mutual coextension without ricochet, cutting, or mutual destruction—all thanks to the complete malleability of body. Hence, again, Diogenes Laertius’ second inference, from the nature of Stoic body to blending (passage E/Chapter 3).

Another objection (or cluster of objections) is that Stoic blending violates the concepts of place and surface, or of what it means for one thing to be in another.¹⁸ For example, Plutarch complains that “by stuffing bodies into body,” the Stoics make encompassment, i.e. one thing being in another, inconceivable, because if one body contains, or is the receptacle of the other, then it is no longer a case of blending but of contact between the contiguous surfaces of the smaller body inside the larger one (*Comm. not.* 1078B (Cherniss)). But if blending is not mere contact between surfaces, and the ingredients *are* mixed in each other as the Stoics suppose, then

¹⁶ Rheins, “A Critical Problem”; Mikeš, “Bodies?”

¹⁷ Whether by points, as in Goldschmidt, *Système*, 45; Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I.73; or by gunk, as in Nolan, “Stoic Gunk”; Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk”; Leonard, “Locating Gunky Water and Wine” (technically, Leonard raises problems for Nolan, but he seems to accept the objective of avoiding colocation).

¹⁸ I take what I say in response to this objection to respond to the arguments of Helle, “Colocation,” from place and surface. For more about surfaces being colocated or two bodies sharing one surface, see my Chapter 10, n. 94.

each body will be at once *encompassed* by being in the other, and *encompassing* by admitting the other; but then it follows that *neither* encompassing nor being encompassed is possible, since blending constrains both bodies to extend through one another such that no partition (*morion*) is lacking in either ingredient, but is completely full of both, i.e. completely homogeneous (1078D). So, as Plutarch sees it, by making bodies coextend such that each is in the other, they violate the concept of *being in*, which conflicts with the homogeneity of blending: if one thing is *in* another, then it is not *everywhere* the other is. However, the Stoics can deny that either of the ingredients is *in* the other at all; rather, ingredients of a blend are mutually interpenetrating, which is a reciprocal and symmetrical relation (in contrast to containment). So, it is correct to say that if each contains the other, the asymmetry of the *being in* relation is violated, but incorrect to say that blending is containment.

Perhaps with this kind of move in mind, Alexander asks: “how could one grant that in such a blend each of the constituents is able to guard its own surface, so that of what is joint (*homou*) [sc. the blend], on the one hand no chance partition (*morion*) is separated by itself (*kechōrismenos kath’ hautō*) from the other, while, on the other hand, of what is joint each of them [sc. the constituents] guards its own surface, which it had even before the blend?” (*Mixt.* 213,2–6; cf. 213,6–12; 219,22–7; 220,37–21,6 (Todd)). If blending is not a case of containment, with contact between two contiguous surfaces, he argues, what does it even mean to say that two bodies share one and the same surface? This is a substantive question from Alexander, not a mere quibble; it is genuinely perplexing how two surfaces can be one (as is the alternative, for that matter: how two bodies can retain their identities without retaining their surfaces). The Stoics have an answer to this question, which comes from their theory of incorporeals. As I will argue in Section III, all incorporeals depend for their subsistence (*hupostasis*), i.e. are ontologically dependent, on underlying body: to be body-less (*asōmaton*) and to have incorporeal subsistence (*hupostasis*) is to inherit positive physical characteristics from underlying body, much as the flow of traffic inherits its characteristics, e.g. being fast or slow, from the cars that underlie it. This inheritance will be a sort of lack or privation of body, akin to the Feature Dependence Kathrin Koslicki finds in entities like holes or boundaries, which depend on features of their host bodies. Stoic place, for example, is defined as three-dimensional non-solid extension that is determined by its occupying (or delimiting) body; in the case of surface, the same principle applies, only in two dimensions instead of three. The plane surface of the table depends for its *subsistence* on the table.

Thus, because of the dependence of surface on body, the Stoics have the resources to preserve the surfaces of their blended ingredients while blended: because the two bodies in question are independent and mutually coextended, i.e. entirely colocated, and because the surface of a body depends for its three dimensions on the body whose surface it is, it follows that the surfaces of the blended

wholes_p must themselves be colocated (just as it follows from bodies being colocated that no portion of the blend fails to contain every ingredient; indeed, how could it be otherwise?). One might well wonder what sense there is in proposing that two surfaces are colocated and yet still two, particularly while the blended substance is itself one and presumably has equal or even greater claim to be the host of the surface. Interestingly, the Stoics can be sensitive to this worry and even be willing to say that there is a single surface shared by two or even three entities (i.e. the two ingredients or the two ingredients and the blended substance), thus agreeing that in some sense the ingredients “lose” their surface while blended. However, these are metaphysical questions about the emergence of incorporeals from their underlying bodies, not objections to the continued independence of the ingredients in a blend. If two (or more) bodies are completely coextended, they are colocated, from which it follows trivially that their surfaces are also colocated. Is that a problem for the possibility of blending?

Arguably not: if this is a case of several surfaces in the same place, and one worries about the coherence of recognizing colocated surfaces, it should be no more surprising a thesis than the collocation of bodies that underwrites it. On the other hand, if it were understood as a case of one surface shared by several bodies, that would be merely a reflection of the facts about incorporeal *subsistence* (which would on this account be indifferent to how many bodies compose the three-dimensional extension on which it *subsists*)—not evidence that the blended bodies have lost their identities by sharing one surface while blended, so that blending collapses into fusion (Alexander, *Mixt.* 220,29–1,24 (Todd)). To the extent that the evidence says the Stoics are committed to each blended ingredient preserving its own surface, we should prefer the reading that says the surfaces are colocated; but the possibility that there is only one surface while the bodies are colocated does not threaten incoherence unless one supposes, wrongly for the Stoics, that the surface is an external, limiting entity that gives the body its perigraphē. But, as we have seen, all (every) body is finite and thus always of *some* definite shape and size without reference to anything other than its solid three-dimensional extension. Limits are not unifying or individuating entities for the Stoics, as we will see in the next chapter, as well as Chapter 10.

A similar concern can be run in terms of place as well: if bodies and their surfaces are colocated by being in the same place, what sense is there to the notion of place? This kind of worry would be especially pressing for a peripatetic like Alexander, for whom place is reduced to body. But the Stoic response will be the same: place is non-solid three-dimensional extension that depends for its *subsistence* on the delimiting body or bodies whose place it is; the colocated bodies will completely coextend with the place of the bodies, but this does not make the bodies, their surfaces, or their places any less distinct. Indeed, ex hypothesi body and place overlap completely, while surface overlaps with the outside limit of body and place, but this does not undermine the distinctness of these phenomena. Place

is only destroyed by colocation if place is somehow defined in terms of what can be occupied by a single body, or if body is defined in terms of place. But the Stoics make neither of these moves: body is three-dimensional extension (without reference to place), and place is defined in terms of bodies in the plural (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 361,10–2, 15–7 (passage M/Chapter 10); Stobaeus 1.161,8–26 (49A, passage G/Chapter 10)).

The Stoics are therefore coherently and unabashedly committed to colocation; we see that here, in the first instance, when we take the textual evidence for blending at face value. Mutual coextension through and through, according to the letter of the textual evidence, is to be understood literally as two whole_p bodies being in the same place at the same time—that is what coextension means. Themistius attributes this much to Zeno and Chrysippus explicitly: “For one body will pass through another body through and through, and two bodies will occupy the same place” (*In Ar. Phys.* 104,15–6 (48F part)). Thus, I am resistant to weaker readings that minimize the literalness of the colocation thesis by various means, e.g. hylomorphic analysis (matter and form are not two *bodies*), by going mathematical (body is not *really* a physical notion for the Stoics after all), or geometrical (substance is just a field of points unified by tension, corporeal *only* in the sense of not being an abstraction, hence without dimension and compatible with superposition), or with contemporary mereological analyses (gunk shows the parts are only *weakly* colocated).¹⁹

But with atomistic and hylomorphic assumptions about body set to the side, there is nothing incoherent about the mutual coextension of two bodies, and no reason to resist the letter of the texts in this way. Certainly the Stoics are pressing the conceptual boundaries of body, place, surface, being in, et al. and may even relish the air of paradox that surrounds their innovative commitment to a tertium quid, but for all that, the view is not formally paradoxical and thus not in need of the kind of “help” it receives from deflationary readings.²⁰ To reiterate, then, I stand firmly in support of a literal, face value reading of the ample texts that testify the Stoics were committed to the colocation of distinct bodies, whole_p with whole_p. Jaap Mansfeld does take a literal reading of blending and clearly identifies the Stoics’ theoretical departures from Aristotle:

[I]n any case, what occurs when mixing takes place is that “*body* goes through *body*,” not that quality meets quality. This is the difference between Zeno’s materialism, or rather corporealism, and Aristotle’s approach by means of the formal cause. It also becomes much clearer that Zeno’s theory of *total blending*, or body going through body *as a whole*, is new, and that it is inextricably bound up with

¹⁹ Respectively: LS; Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter”; M. Frede, “Théologie,” 223; Sedley, “Origins”; Rashed, “Division à l’Infini”; Nolan, “Stoic Gunk.”

²⁰ For thoughts about why the Stoics might have chosen to produce the appearance of paradox, see Nolan, “Stoic Trichotomies.”

his corporealism. The comparison of his account with Aristotle's not only reveals what he wanted to preserve, but also indicates the precise point where he was forced to break loose, and brings out what he had to invent in order to save his corporealism.²¹

This literal stance opposes a longstanding and ongoing tradition of "sanitizing" the Stoics' views of apparent paradox. Robert B. Todd, to give another prominent example of this widespread practice, defends the Stoics against their ancient critics (who, it should be noted, *did* take a literal reading of blending and colocation), by dismantling the scope and force of the theory to avoid what he takes to be a just criticism of a literal theory of colocation.

If the conception of a small volume of liquid extending through a much larger one had referred to an actual process, critics like Plutarch could have justifiably extracted it from its context and ridiculed it as a highly paradoxical notion. However, it seems clear that this process should be thought of as having only conceptual status; that is, it is a fiction, and not a conception representing an actual state of affairs [. . .] It does not offend common sense because as a mental conception it does not involve a relation between three-dimensional solids; nor on the other hand does it assert a relation between peculiarly fluid bodies, because it is not a part of a physical theory.²²

This endorsement of the problem of colocation as legitimately paradoxical is, I urge, a false problem, which is only pressing on the atomistic assumption that body is rigid and full absolutely. But if body is not conceived atomistically but instead is entirely malleable, as the textual evidence shows, then colocation need not be not presumed impossible, and there is no reason to write off blending as metaphor or fiction, nor any reason to impose contemporary mereology and gunk on blending or infinite divisibility, nor (as we will soon see) any reason to bring in the schema of the Stoic Categories in an effort to minimize the distinctness of blended bodies. The complete malleability of Stoic body means that it is subject to penetration without dissection and destruction, that resistance (*antitupia*) can be interaction rather than ricochet, and that neither shape, nor size, nor (therefore) density is an absolute characteristic body.

I will address now one final objection that critics make to the possibility of *krasis di' holou*, which will establish that Stoic body does indeed come in degrees of rarity

²¹ Mansfeld, "Zeno and Aristotle on Mixture," 308. I lament that Mansfeld sees the Stoics as forced into their views about blending in a defensive effort to save their corporealism. The testimony attributes the view to Zeno, the founder of the school, so there is no reason to seek a response to academic criticisms. In fact, the defensive coloring can be set aside altogether without loss of insight.

²² Todd, *De Mixtione*, 45; cf. 33, 44–9, 71–3.

and density.²³ As though with the foregoing defenses of the coherence of colocation in mind, Plotinus, Plutarch, and Alexander all argue against the Stoics from considerations of volume.²⁴ As before, the criticisms are driven by atomistic assumptions of ricochet and fullness, which the Stoics can reject. Thus, seen aright, this testimony is crucial evidence that the Stoics are working in terms of rarity and density in conscious contrast to the absolute fullness that entails ricochet or cutting. The first line of objection asks, how can the resulting volume of a blend *fail* to be additive, given the very nature of body as full?

- D. If they do not say that bodies admit one another in this way [sc. by cutting], but say that, insofar as they are themselves full, they spread through one another, someone might inquire, first, why ever a given body does not increase in all [dimensions] with a similar body? For the quantities according to the synthesis with each other are such that they make what is [composed] out of them greater than each of the components [. . .] And if those who say that some body spreads through body and makes that out of both [sc. the compound] somehow lesser and equal, they destroy this [sc. the proprium of bodies to increase the size of another body when compounded with it], as they would be destroying the nature of body.

εἰ δ' οὕτω μὲν οὐ φασὶ τὰ σώματα ἀλλήλα δέχεσθαι, καθὸ δὲ μεστὰ ἐστὶ αὐτά, χωρεῖν δι' ἀλλήλων αὐτά φασιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιζητήσαι τις ἄν, τί δήποτε οὐ τὸ τυχόν σῶμα [τὸ τυχόν] πάντῃ συναυξητικόν τοῦ ὁμοίου. τὰ γὰρ ποσὰ [τὰ] κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλα σύνθεσιν τὴν τοιαύτην τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν μείζον ἑκατέρου ποιεῖ τῶν συγκεimenών. [. . .] οἱ δὲ λέγοντες σῶμα τι διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν καὶ ἑλαττόν ποτε καὶ ἴσον τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ποιεῖν ἀναιροῦσι τοῦτο, ἀναιροῖεν ἂν τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν.

Alexander, *Mixt.* 219,9–13. . . 18–20 (Todd)

²³ For agreement that bodies come in degrees of density, see BS, 462.

²⁴ It is tempting to work in terms of weight, however the Stoics take air and fire to be weightless and so it will not technically do to say that blended bodies always increase in weight (since they don't). Here again the Stoics may be dancing at the edges of our conceptual resources, separating density (mass) from weight; alternatively, they could hold that qua body, which is solid, there is always *some* weight, but that in the case of air and fire it is so negligible, given the rarity of the two substances, that it is practically weightless. See Denyer, "Token Reflexivity," n. 5, for the suggestion that fire and air are not weightless but, rather, "positively buoyant," thus counteracting the weightiness of water and earth, so that the cosmos has no net weight. At any rate, I take the Stoics to be committed to saying that when two bodies blend without an increase in volume, the resulting body is fuller than either one was before. See M. J. White, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 149, for a distinction between two senses of "quantity," a mass sense and a volume sense, the suggestion that the ability to change volume makes blending possible, and helpful empirical responses to empirical doubts that blending can take place without an increase in volume. Sorabji, *MSM*, 98 (orig. emphasis), says "it would help if the things alleged to be bodies added to the *volume* or *density* of what they were in," citing Alexander, *Mant.* 124,13–4, 16–20, and 140,31–41,8. Note, however, that Alexander does not complain about *two* things, that *neither* volume *nor* density increases; rather, he complains that either there should be an increase in volume because body is full, or body should be broken (this is the objection from cutting).

Notice that the only alternative to penetration as cutting or dissection that Alexander countenances is the interpenetration of two *full* bodies, which is to ignore—and thus, crucially, to establish—the Stoic alternative according to which bodies that are not *full* (i.e. maximally dense), but rather *rare*, can interpenetrate. The Stoics would agree that two full bodies cannot blend, but *full* and *whole_p* are not the same thing for the Stoics; thus Alexander does not do his opponents justice. In fact, his argument is circular: if body is full, then blending cannot fail to be additive; body is full; therefore, blending is additive (contra the Stoics' claims). But, of course, what is at issue is precisely whether body is full such that composites must increase in size; this argument is only moving to someone who already believes that body is full.

What is challenging about this debate, and explains its persistence I think, is that for those who conceive body along these atomistic lines, it is all but analytic that body is full. This charge of circularity is offered as an informative diagnosis of the heart of the debate, not an accusation of eristic by Stoic critics. Insofar as Alexander confirms the Stoics did *not* take blending to entail an increase in size or volume, he thereby confirms that the Stoics (on pain of incoherence) also did not take body to be full, and thus that they *did* take body to admit of varying degrees of rarity and density. Plotinus confirms this same point, in the same order, and operating in terms of the same examples: having said that penetration without cutting is too difficult to conceive, he moves on to press puzzles about volume and, in the process, confirms the Stoic commitment to blending without augmentation (*Enn.* 2.7.1,43–58 (Armstrong)). He even says explicitly that “size is as permanent as any other property” (49–50), thereby evincing his commitment to body as full absolutely (with the attendant notion of ricochet), and to a similarly circular line of reasoning: size is only a permanent property of a body if it is always maximally dense, or full, which the Stoics deny.

The second line of questioning asks not how can blending *fail* to be additive, but how could it succeed in being additive? “In general, a body that receives another body in itself must become no greater; for that is what ‘to receive something in itself’ means” (Alexander, *Mixt.* 200,3–5 (Todd)). Yet a further line of questioning proceeds by generating various mathematical absurdities from blending as the equalization of two (or more) volumes regardless of their original and resulting sizes. For example, Plutarch says:

- E. “That three are four.” For while others use this expression in hyperbole as a paradigm of things that are inconceivable, for these people it turns out that a single ladleful of wine blended with two of water, if it is to not fall short but equalize, when it disperses into all [the water] and commingles through, although it is one [ladleful], they make two by the equalization of blending it with two [ladlesful]. For to remain one [ladleful] and extend through and make itself equal to two <would be to make the half equal> to the double;

but if in order to arrive at two by blending, it takes on a measure of two in the diffusion, this measure is at once both three and four, on the one hand three because it has mixed into those two, and on the other hand four because, having been mixed with the two, it has become equal in size to those with which it is mixed.

τὸ “τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι.” τουτὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι λέγουσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ παράδειγμα τῶν ἀδιανοήτων· τούτοις δὲ συμβαίνει τὸν ἓνα κύαθον τοῦ οἴνου πρὸς δύο κεραννύμενον ὕδατος, εἰ μέλλει μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἀλλ’ ἐξισοῦσθαι, παράγοντας ἐπὶ πᾶν καὶ διασυγχέοντας ἐν’ ὄντα δύο ποιεῖν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς δύο τῆς κράσεως ἐξισώσει· τὸ γὰρ μένειν ἓνα καὶ δυεῖν παρεκτείνειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἴσον <ἴσον> τῷ διπλασίῳ. εἰ δέ, ὅπως ἐξίκεται τῇ κράσει πρὸς τοὺς δύο, δυεῖν λαμβάνει[ν] μέτρον ἐν τῇ διαχύσει, τοῦτο μέτρον ἅμα καὶ τριῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τεσσάρων, τριῶν μὲν, ὅτι τοῖς δύο εἰς μέμικται, τεσσάρων δέ, ὅτι δυοὶ μεμιγμένος ἴσον ἔσχηκε πλῆθος οἷς μίγνυται.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1078A (Cherniss)²⁵

Plutarch generates the puzzles by holding fixed the volume of the component bodies in a rather clever way. By continuing to refer to the body in terms of its original identifying description given in terms of volume, i.e. by calling it *one* ladleful that mixes with *two*, he bypasses the Stoic option to say that a body, i.e. a certain three-dimensional mass with its own circumscription, can retain its identity although it increases (or decreases) well beyond its original size (thus no longer being one ladleful, or two). In this case the original identifying description in terms of volume (one ladleful) acts like a rigid designator.²⁶ Likewise, Plotinus bypasses the Stoic option to say that size is not a permanent property of a body; Alexander bypasses the option to say that body is not necessarily full, but admits of degrees of rarity and density; and, finally, Calcidius that one place can have the capacity for two bodies (*In Tim.* 221 (Magee)).

Conclusions

Since antiquity, Stoic critics and defenders alike have seen these criticisms as decisive, which has led to interpretations that minimize face value readings of colocation, or that treat the Stoic concept of body as somehow abstract or

²⁵ For more worries along the same lines, see Alexander, *Mant.* 141.9–16; SE, *PH* 3.59–61; Simplicius, *In Ar. Phys.* 530 (Diels). I take what I say about the objections from fullness and volume to respond to Helle, “Colocation,” 487–9, who rejects several texts as evidence of Stoic doctrine on the grounds that the author is hostile or the text corrupt.

²⁶ Kripke, “Identity and Necessity.”

non-physical to avoid these apparent absurdities. I have been arguing that when the Stoic notion of body is seen aright, as malleable—setting aside atomistic presuppositions of body as rigid and full absolutely, and of resistance as ricochet—the face value readings of blending and colocation fall into place and present no incoherence after all. And with hylomorphic presuppositions (that where there is body there is matter, and where there is reason or quality there is incorporeal form) set to the side as well, the way is now clear for us to understand the Stoics' innovative corporealist cosmology on their own terms. As Cherniss observes, “all the Stoic physics was held to depend” on the theory of blending.²⁷

²⁷ Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 645.

5

Basic Bodies

δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο

This chapter and the next will argue that Stoic cosmogony proceeds entirely from two corporeal principles, or (as I will often transliterate) *archai*: one body that is divine, rational, and active (*logos*), and another body that is slack and passive (*hulē*). Out of these two *archai* alone, without reference to Platonic Forms or anything incorporeal, the Stoics build their cosmos in entirely corporeal, indeed causal, terms. As we saw in Chapter 1, Plato's second challenge in the *Sophist* is to *Defend the Giants*, and maintain that only bodies *are*, saying what it is to be a body before plunging into “extravagant cosmological theorizing,” as Lesley Brown hears Plato describing the Presocratics in the guise of the Giants. In short, it is the challenge to deliver a corporealist cosmology without reference to Form. Chapter 2 showed that (all and) only bodies meet the ontological criterion for *existence*, whatever can act or be acted upon, and to that extent that only bodies *are*. And Chapter 3 gave metaphysical depth to this commitment, no longer simply counting bodies in or out of the ontology, but saying what it is to be a body such that it can be fundamental: solid three-dimensional extension understood in non-hylomorphic terms, as finite malleable mass rather than a composite of matter and form, or substance and quality as distinct entities of distinct ontological orders. This definition of body is the foundation of Stoic corporealism, licensing not only a commitment to body as ungrounded, basic, or fundamental, but also the controversial Stoic commitment to through and through blending, as we saw in Chapter 4.

Now, having said what it is to be a body, we turn to the Stoics' “extravagant cosmological theorizing” about the number and nature of *beings*. The number of *beings* is two—the Stoics posit two fundamental bodies as the principles of the cosmos: divine active *logos* and passive *hulē*. The nature of these *beings* is causal—both are bodies capable of contact and hence causal interaction, to be sure, but beyond that they are cast in explicitly causal terms, as agent and patient. Finally, in Chapter 6, we will put all these pieces together to show how the Stoics deliver a completely corporealist cosmology that makes one out of many, not by the ontological complexity of matter and form, but by the causal complexity of agent and patient bodies in a through and through blend.

Ἀρχή (Archē)

Before proceeding to the details, it is worth dwelling for a moment on the idea of an *archē* (singular; *archai*, plural) as a rich historical concept whose precise sense and translation is rather nuanced. To elucidate the enriched concept of an *archē* that I have in mind for the Stoics, I lean on Malcolm Schofield, who traces the development of the term from its original use by Anaximander as the origin or source in a secular creation narrative, telling where and what the cosmos is from, to the post-Parmenidean pluralists' formal distinction between what is basic or fundamental (Empedocles' four roots, Democritean atoms) and the mixtures or compounds they form.¹ In all this, Schofield argues, there was no attention either to the notion of a substrate (*pace* Aristotle's complaints about the Presocratics) or to the explanatory structure of their theories, which would license treating their concept of *archē* as a principle. Only with the Pythagorean Philolaus does the role of explanation enter the meaning of *archē*, when it takes what Schofield calls a reflexive turn in which theory itself is evaluated for its ability to explain how we know things about the cosmos. Thus, it is when *archē* is used both as the starting point and primordial idea governing explanation that the translation "principle" first fits. Schofield shows that this reflexive turn to epistemological concerns persists in the medical and mathematical texts of the day: the *archē* of medicine is an experimental *method*, and of mathematics the hypothetical *method*; and in this competitive intellectual climate, there is now explicit discourse about methodological differences between schools.

The next development in the sense of *archē* comes with Plato, whose self-conscious use of the hypothetical method in *Meno* and *Phaedo* takes yet another reflexive turn in the *Republic*, where he asks what a starting point for explanation must itself be like. Through reflection on reflexive discourse, Plato takes us from epistemology to metaphysics: he asks about the status necessary for the *archai* themselves to be genuinely explanatory of the world around us, and argues that they must be primitive and eternal entities—for if a principle came to be, it would have to be from something that is not a principle, but nothing can come to be from what is not a principle (*Phaedrus* 245 D 1–3). Finally, Aristotle takes over this now mature and philosophically commonplace conception of *archai* as primary, unchangeable realities and develops them as causal origins: entities out of or from which (*ek*) things first come to be and be known. Aristotle's explanatory enterprise is famously four-fold, requiring the material, moving, formal, and, most importantly, final causes of the *Physics* (et al. the works on nature) in contrast to Plato's singular Form of the Good. It is also famously founded in the *Posterior Analytics* on premises that are true, primary, and unmediated, and yet, for all that, not grasped

¹ Schofield, "ARXH."

purely by the intellect but by induction through the senses, in contrast to Plato's strong rationalism. Schofield concludes his account of the development of the concept of an *archē* with Aristotle:

Preoccupation with explanation and the principles of explanation was not the dominating concern of either Stoicism or Epicureanism . . . So the philosophical impulse which led Aristotle to devote his exceptional powers of analysis to explanation of the idea of an *ἀρχή*, and to exploring its role in explanation and its epistemological status, was not to be recaptured by any later thinker. With Aristotle, accordingly, our story may come to an end.²

It is certainly true that Stoic philosophy is not structured by the concept of an *archē* the way Aristotle's is, and that they were not exercised about the nature of explanation as an epistemological matter; indeed, the Stoic *archai* are not premises in a demonstration or, for that matter, axioms or propositions of any kind.³ Rather, they are bodies. This move to corporeal *archai* may seem like an abdication of the rich history of the *archē* that Schofield captures, but it is quite the opposite—for the Stoics' *archai* are in fact fit to play all the roles demanded by their predecessors.⁴ They do not add any *new* meaning to the term, perhaps, nor are they especially self-conscious about their use of the term, but the Stoics advance the state of the art, so to speak, by introducing corporeal *archai* that meet all their predecessors' desiderata at once. As we will see, the Stoic *archai* are (i) the material origins and starting points of the cosmos, as the Milesian monists used the term; and (ii) like Empedocles and the atomists, the Stoics make their *archai* fundamental and basic, in contrast to the posterior compounds made from them. Further, (iii) the Stoic principles quite literally embody the explanatory structure sought by Philolaus in his reflexive turn: they are both the starting point and the governing principle of all explanation—namely, agent and patient; thus for the Stoics, causation is the governing principle of the cosmos. The Stoic principles are also (iv) ontologically primitive and eternal entities, as Plato requires, and even (v) fit to play the roles of all four of Aristotle's causes at once.⁵ However, the Stoics are also overturning their predecessors: in making their principles corporeal and imbuing body with reason and agency, the Stoics reject the hylomorphic world view altogether, and set off on a genuinely new and artful path that has no use for forms. As we will now see, they

² Schofield, "ARXH," 234–5.

³ Galen makes this point with characteristic derision at *Plac.* 2.3.20–7.

⁴ In resisting Schofield's suggestion that the Stoics were not concerned with explanation, I also depart from Vogt, "Unified Notion," 68, who takes his suggestion as a central datum for the Stoic theory of causes.

⁵ For support that Stoic *archai* are explanatory, see S. White, "Posidonius," 38. For reasons to see the Stoic *archai* as embodying Aristotle's causes, see Hahm, *Origins*, 30–56, and Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 45–9. I am not certain that the Stoics make efficient causality primary, as Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 17, says.

imbue body with the reason, forethought, and agency the Presocratics could not, and, at the same time, give reason the causal powers that Plato and Aristotle could not.⁶ The Stoics are thus certainly worthy of a place in the history of the *archē* in ancient thought.

Interpretive Landscape

The central controversy concerns how the *archai* can really be two distinct bodies—as the texts attest. The texts are not unclear in their reports that *logos* and *hulē* are both bodies, but scholars have assumed that if the *archai* are to blend and if blending involves colocation (as the texts also clearly attest), then the *archai* had better not be two distinct bodies. This resistance is again a function of taking the Stoics to be proceeding along hylomorphic lines, both in taking all body to be a composite of matter and form and in taking body (understood as matter) to be full and thus not subject to the colocation of blending. The standard approach to the *archai* has thus been to minimize their corporeality in one way or another.

One leading view of the *archai* is that they are aspects of a single body, or merely conceptual, or at any rate somehow not *really* two distinct bodies.⁷ Ian Hensley has usefully labelled this view the “old orthodoxy,” and he contrasts it with the “new orthodoxy” that the *archai* are in fact bodies.⁸ Those whom Hensley cites as members of the new orthodoxy emphasize the textual evidence that the *archai* are bodies (or, more benignly, *corporeal*), decisively rejecting the variant reading of the *Suda* that has Diogenes report the principles as *incorporeal*. This is a welcome development in the literature, to have closed the door on the possibility that the Stoic *archai* are incorporeal. However, as I will now argue, most in this new orthodoxy do not really embrace the corporeality of the two *archai*, or the distinctness of these two bodies. Although they rightly insist that the *archai* are corporeal (as opposed to incorporeal), the members of this new orthodoxy nevertheless deflate that commitment so that the *archai* are scarcely more than aspects after all. Thus, from my perspective, the new orthodoxy risks collapsing into the old orthodoxy. For example, A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, although they emphasize that the principles are corporeal rather than incorporeal or mere aspects, nevertheless minimize their distinctness and corporeality in the context of blending:

⁶ In this I take the Stoics to have a response to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Z.17 demands of Presocratics (and Plato), to make their corporeal *archai* into full-fledged unifying principles, as argued by Mann, “Elements, Causes, and Principles.”

⁷ Baltzly, “Stoic Pantheism,” 10; Christensen, *Unity*, 11 (taking them to be *lekta*, 13); M. Frede, “Théologie,” 222–3; Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 18–25; Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” and “ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα”; Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 204; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 72–5; Todd, “Monism and Immanence,” 139, and *De Mixtione*, 33–49, 71–3; M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” 136.

⁸ Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability.” See n. 25 below for bibliography of new and old orthodoxy.

The active principle of the world is a different kind of body from the passive principle (44–5). In the form of “breath” the active principle constitutes the shape and structure of matter (the passive principle), and a body’s shape and structure do occupy the same place as its bulk. . . In order to do justice to Stoic intuitions, we should regard the two things that occupy the same place not as two determinate and independently existing bodies, but as the two bodily functions (breath and matter) which jointly constitute every determinate and independently existing body.⁹

Likewise, Michael Frede argues that when the Stoics say that god is a body, “they mean that God cannot exist independently from body or the matter in which it is found, and nothing more,” and that the *archai* are bodies only in a very weak sense of “body,” extended without being of any particular extension, without even the capacity for resistance.¹⁰ And in the face of blending, also likewise, Frede assimilates the coextension of two bodies to the sense in which color is extended throughout a surface.¹¹ Along the same lines, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat argues forcefully that the two *archai* are bodies, but then adds that the principles “cannot be seen, they cannot be touched, they are not three-dimensional visible and tangible bodies.”¹² It is not clear what this corporeality comes to, but Gourinat concludes that we should think of the Stoic *archai* along vitalistic rather than materialist lines, on a biological model rather than a mechanistic one that operates by contact and touch.

M. J. White, although he emphasizes that the *archai* cannot do their work without making contact through and through, makes a similar move to Gourinat by deflating contact to a biological rather than a mechanical notion (“contact in a sense”).¹³ And John Cooper, who strongly emphasizes the corporeality of the principles, also minimizes the commitment when he says that reason is not a material thing, and matter is not a material body or substance (which is a compound of matter and reason); they are, rather, “non-material bodies” that are extended in three dimensions and whose resistance is to be understood as simply occupying space, taking up room.¹⁴ Richard Sorabji, invoking the Stoic Categories in a

⁹ LS, 274 (but see also 245); Johnson, “Commentary on Collette-Dučić,” follows Long & Sedley in their account but also speaks in the manner of M. Frede, “Théologie,” and takes the *archai* to be separable only conceptually and in words, perhaps in the manner of Sedley (coming up).

¹⁰ M. Frede, “Théologie,” 222. He takes this weak sense of body to be sufficient for meeting the action-passion criterion, but it is not clear how that could be, if body has been stripped of resistance.

¹¹ M. Frede, “Théologie,” 223.

¹² Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 63–8, quotation at 68.

¹³ M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” 130–3. I appreciate White’s contrast of the Stoics against “the corporeal world of inert matter of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural philosophy, aptly described by Randall as a world consisting solely of ‘solid, hard, massy particles, of substances connected by mechanical causation’” (128–9). However, I do not think that a robust conception of contact between bodies excludes a biological or vitalistic model.

¹⁴ Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 97–9.

reductionist spirit, argues that the *archai* are not in fact two distinct bodies in one place; rather, god is just matter disposed in a certain way.¹⁵ Again we see that the colocation involved in blending is the motivating factor for the reductive interpretation. But if the colocation involved in blending is no longer problematic, as I argued in the last chapter, then these deflationary moves serve no end, just as the move to gunk serves no end. These are twin strategies for resisting colocation: minimize the corporeality of the blended bodies, or minimize the blendedness of the bodies.

In a distinct but nearby move, others take the *archai* to be merely theoretical, e.g. Jacques Brunschwig describes the *archai* as “theoretical borderline entities” in contrast to “ordinary bodies” that can act and be acted upon.¹⁶ David Hahm, though he emphasizes the corporeality of matter, also describes it as having a logical character reached by abstraction.¹⁷ And David Sedley says “Matter is thus a purely theoretical construct, with no properties of its own to contribute beyond its mere passivity”;¹⁸ or, again, he characterizes the Stoic principle *hulē* as “static” prime matter that is “not, other than in a very attenuated sense, a building material, understood dynamically. Rather, it is that which permanently underlies the world, providing the locus of change without changing its own properties, since it does not in fact have any properties.”¹⁹

Yet another deflationary approach to the corporeality of the principles is to think of the active principle as a power or force rather than something bulky or distinct. For example, Jaap Mansfeld, “in response to the familiar and scandalizing problem that in Stoicism God and matter, the active and the passive, are one and yet different,” has Calcidius explain that “they are ‘really’ one in so far as they are (one) body, though different in power (*virtute*).”²⁰ So there is only one body, but the *archai* can be considered two in virtue of the one being an active and the other a passive capacity or power of the one body. Hensley, too, in advocating for the new

¹⁵ Sorabji, *MSM*, 94–7; this move secures the corporeality of the principles at the price of making god dependent on matter and, hence, only *causally* fundamental but not ontologically simple as required of an *archē* (a bullet Sorabji expressly bites). I will address the Categories in Chapters 7 and 8, and argue that the thesis is neither reductive nor a part of Stoic physics.

¹⁶ Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 210–1.

¹⁷ Hahm, *Origins*, 32.

¹⁸ Sedley, “Foundations of Physics”; he calls them theoretical constructs again, but now as functional distinctions in “Physics and Metaphysics,” 386–7, but also emphasizes their role as Presocratic-type stuffs; and in “Origins,” 59–60, says again that the interaction of the principles is a purely theoretical construct not open to empirical study, and that matter is completely unqualified, offering no resistance to the active principle construed as a force (42), though he emphasizes that the *archai* are bodily insofar as they can act or be acted upon (81); it is true, of course, that we cannot study the principles directly, being in the middle of a world order as we are, but this does not make the principles theoretical constructs; nor, as I will argue, does being *apoios* mean being altogether without properties in a way that could only be theoretical.

¹⁹ Sedley, “Matter,” 62; despite emphasizing that the *archai* are both bodies, 60, the *archai* are still characterized as theoretical entities, 58.

²⁰ Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 174. See also Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 15; Duncombe, *Ancient Relativity*, 202–6; Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 25, 32–44; Sedley, “Origins,” 42; Zeller, *Outlines*, 215–6.

orthodoxy is deflationary of the commitment in arguing at length that god should not be considered a component of body, but instead (rather than *also*) an immanent efficient cause: “God non-compositionally contributes toward the continued existence of objects, like a conscious and corporeal strong nuclear force.”²¹ Here again there is an avowal that the *archai* are bodies, but in the final analysis god is more of a force than a body, coextended but not as a component, everywhere but not taking up room (or maybe, as with Cooper, taking up room but not resisting).

Anna Marmodoro argues that the *archai* are “each body in a special sense of being somehow interdependent and thus each one incomplete without the other” and strips the passive principle of its distinctness, corporeality, and causal role by making it *receptive* in a sense akin to Plato’s receptacle, but not strictly a patient that *undergoes* anything.²² Being active and passive signals, for Marmodoro, an *ontological* asymmetry rather than any literal sense of one body doing something to another; indeed her conception of body as “extended causal powerfulness” is already a highly attenuated sense of body, and the conception of passive *hulē* as a “sharing subject” that is never itself qualified or endowed with properties (even when the active is acting on it) is a highly attenuated sense of passivity. So, again, we have acting and undergoing, but not really, and the *archai* are bodies, but only in a sense.

Finally, there are those who give strong support for the new orthodoxy that the *archai* are bodies, but also embrace the resistance to colocation that sees blending as incoherent. For example, Gretchen Reydam-Schils gives the strongest arguments I have found that the Stoic *archai* are indeed bodies, but she also endorses (and does not go on to solve) the following problem: “if both principles are bodies, and the active principle totally permeates and is coextensive with the passive one, then an absurd conclusion follows—that of two bodies occupying one and the same space.”²³

I have surveyed extensively to impress the extent of the orthodoxy that the two principles cannot *really* be two distinct bodies in causal interaction (since, if they are, then the theory of blending must be incoherent). I am arguing against this deep-rooted deflationary attitude in favor of a literal reading of the texts that embraces the principles as two distinct and independent bodies—solid malleable masses—capable of through and through blending. I have already said what it is to be (a) Stoic body (Chapter 3), and how solid bodies are capable of blending (Chapter 4). In particular, I have argued that with hylomorphic presuppositions set to the side, Stoic body can be fundamental, and with atomistic presuppositions set to the side, Stoic bodies can completely interpenetrate and be strictly colocated. Now (in this chapter and the next) I am applying that understanding of body to

²¹ Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability,” 192; cf. M. Frede, “Origins,” 42.

²² Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk,” 169; “Stoic Blends,” 11–2.

²³ Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 57; cf. Furley, “Cosmology.”

our evidence about Stoic cosmology in pursuit of a thoroughgoing corporealism that can meet Plato's second challenge, *Defend the Giants*, and deliver unity without form.

Ἀρχαί (Archai)—Plural

The two Stoic *archai* are, first of all, bodies, which is to say finite, malleable masses subject to infinite divisibility and blending. Notice that to understand the content and implications of the claim that the *archai* are bodies, it is necessary to understand, first, what it is to be a Stoic body. Thus we might see why the first topic in Stoic physics is bodies, even before the *archai* (DL 7.132 (43B, passage A/Chapter 9)), because before they can plunge into extravagant cosmological theorizing about the number and nature of *beings*, the Stoics have to say what it is to be (a) body.²⁴ That the *archai* are two bodies is attested by Diogenes Laertius for Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius, i.e. for the Stoics as a school:

- A. (1) It seems to them [sc. the Stoics] that there are two principles (*archai*) of wholes, the active (*to poioun*) and the passive (*to paschon*). (2) Now, the passive is unqualified substance (*apoios ousia*), matter (*hulē*), while the active is reason (*logos*) in it [sc. matter], god; for the latter, being everlasting and through the whole of matter, crafts each and every thing that is [. . .] (3) They say the principles and the elements (*stoicheia*) differ; for the former are ungenerated and indestructible, while the elements are destroyed at the conflagration. (4) But also, the principles are bodies and without form (*amorphous*), while the others [sc. the elements] have been endowed with form (*memorphōsthai*).

DL 7.134 (44B)²⁵

²⁴ The parenthetical article indicates that body for the Stoics is at once a mass noun and a count noun; to be some body is also to be some particular quantity of body. For defense of this view that all (every) body is a body see Chapter 3.

²⁵ See also Origen, *Cels.* 6.7 (SVF 2.1051); for evidence that god, in particular, is corporeal see SVF 1.153 (Hyppolitus and Galen). For additional bibliography, see Hahm, *Origins*, n. 12, p. 49; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 42–60, 89–100. This translation is an amalgam of contributions from LS, IG, and Kidd, *Posidonius, Vol. II*; the ellipsis contains reference to Stoics named above. There is some difficulty concerning the report in A4 that the principles are bodies: there is a variant reading of this passage transmitted in the *Suda*, which has *asōmata* (incorporeals) for *sōmata*. There was a time when scholars favored this reading, e.g. von Arnim, SVF, prints *asōmata* at 2.299, as do Dorandi, DL; H. S. Long, *DL: vitae*; and Hicks, *DL: Lives*; the following offer arguments for the principles as incorporeal: Christensen, *Unity*, 11–22; Graeser, *Zenon von Kition*; Isnardi Parente, “Incorporel,” 184–5; Kahn, “Logic and LOGOS,” 168; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 73–4; Todd, “Monism and Immanence,” 139–43, following Kahn, goes so far as to take the *archai* as analytical concepts to be *lekta*. However, this view has been firmly overturned by Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals,” 725; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 138; Brunschwig, *TGS*, n. 96; Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 97–8; Duhot, *Causalité*, 87–8; M. Frede, “Théologie,” 215–6; Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 55, and “Disparition et reconstruction,” n. 33; Kidd, *Posidonius, Vol. III*, 103–7; LS, 273–4; Lapidge, “ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα” and “Stoic Cosmology,” Mansfeld, “Zeno of

First of all there are *two* principles of the cosmos or whole of things,²⁶ and *both* are bodies, as the plural count noun signals. Already, in making their two principles corporeal and hence able to meet the action-passion criterion for *existence* (the *dunamis* proposal we saw co-opted from Plato), the Stoics artfully uphold the Giants' commitment to bodies as the only things that *are* (Chapters 1–2). But even more artfully, the Stoics thereby make causation fundamental and explain *why* bodies meet the causal criterion for *existence*—if the fundamental entities just are solid bodies with resistance, where resistance is the capacity to act or undergo, then the capacity for causal interaction is fundamental.²⁷ Further, with corporeal principles at the foundation of the whole of things, the Stoics capture both the original Presocratic commitment to *archai* as origins or sources of the cosmos, and the post-Parmenidean notion of *archai* as fundamental in contrast to the composites made from them. Lest there be any doubt, Aristocles makes it explicit that the Stoic principles are two, that each is a body, and that they serve as fundamental origins or elements:

- B. He [Zeno] says that fire is the element of the things that are, like Heraclitus, and that fire has as its principles god and matter, like Plato. But Zeno says that they are both bodies, both that which acts and that which is acted upon, whereas Plato says that the first active cause is incorporeal.

Aristocles ap. Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.14.1 (45G)

The first point of note about our target passage from Diogenes (A), then, is that the Stoic *archai* are *two* and each is a body. The second point of note is that, in defining the two principles as the active (*to poioun*) and the passive (*to paschon*), i.e. the agent and the patient, the Stoics make causation fundamental in yet another way. The first way was in co-opting Plato's *dunamis* proposal to restrict *being* to what is capable of doing or undergoing; the second was in making the fundamental *archai* bodies, and as such already capable of causal interaction; the third way, now,

Citium," 162, 168–70; Mattingly, "Early Stoicism," 281–2; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 56–60; Salles, "Elementos," 30–1; Sorabji, *MSM*, 93–7; Todd, *De Mixtione*, 35. Marcovich, *Diogenes Laertii Vitae philosophorum* prints *sōmata*. The most elementary and inescapable reason the principles cannot be incorporeal is that they would thereby be unable either to act or to be acted upon, i.e. unable to perform their essential active and passive functions (SE, *M.* 8.263 (45B), Nemesius 78,7–9,2 (45C)), as LS, 273, point out. See also nn. 33–4 below.

²⁶ I render "wholes" as *cosmos* or *whole of things* for efficiency; technically, the plural indicates both the cosmos itself, which is the one true whole_c and whole, (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1052D (Cherniss); Alexander, *Fat.* 191,30–2,28 (47N)), and all the individuals in it, which are the partial wholes_c and wholes, that compose it. See Hensley, "Separability and Inseparability," for helpful remarks about the plural; see Cooper, "Physical Elements," 97, for "the whole of things."

²⁷ Thus, there is no threat of regress that requires for the principles to be non-causal in order to explain causation, as Marmodoro worries, "Stoic Gunk," 172; nor need we reject the idea of an agent and a patient interacting, with the patient undergoing change.

is in casting the *archai* in unambiguously causal roles.²⁸ In fact, by making the one *archē* agent and the other patient, the Stoics make causation the primordial idea governing explanation both a starting point and an explanatory guiding principle as Philolaus required of the *archē*.²⁹ But this is not merely (or even primarily) a dialectical enterprise: the Stoic *archai* are quite literally the physical agent and patient of all things, so they are explanatory in a much more robust sense, also fit to play the role of the moving or efficient cause, as Aristotle requires, but without being something external or additional to body (Alexander, *Mixt.* 225,28–6,10 (Todd)).

For the Stoics, the active principle is indeed the moving cause; but it is not *merely* an efficient cause or force without *also* being a solid body—indeed, because all body is solid, and both principles are bodies, it follows that both principles together play the role of Aristotle’s material cause.³⁰ Further, because the active principle is divine reason, i.e. god, “crafting each and every thing that is,” it is not just the immanent moving cause, but plays the roles of formal and final causes as well. *Logos* is the rational agent body that creates order in the world, making it the best world it can be. Thus, the Stoics give body the reason and agency that their Presocratic predecessors did not; and, at the same time, they give form the causal properties that hylomorphism cannot.³¹ By embracing causation at the ground floor this way, the Stoics imbue their principles with everything needed to account for the unity and order of the natural world, to deliver a completely corporealist cosmology without Form.

Crucially, the agent-patient distinction is not to be assimilated to the Aristotelian distinction between actual and potential, or to a hylomorphic distinction between

²⁸ Why, by rights, one should be active and the other passive I am afraid I cannot say. Metaphysically, I take it as a brute posit (reaching the limits of their commitment to the principle of sufficient reason, on which see de Harven, “PSR in the Hellenistic Era”); and while there may be more to say about why the Stoics wished to separate agent and patient this way, I doubt that there is any deductive argument for this posit. However, it is clear that Stoics do posit an active and a passive principle, and I take this as a datum.

²⁹ Hence, the Stoics are *of course* concerned with causation, but not to the exclusion of metaphysics and the nature of *being*, as Vogt, “Brutes,” argues; on the contrary, the Stoics are carefully and explicitly building causation into *being*, first by way of the criterion for *existence*, secondly by their interactive conception of solidity and resistance, and now again by casting their *archai* in the explicitly causal terms of agent and patient. Nor does the move to causation exclude attention to explanation, as Vogt argues in “Unified Notion.”

³⁰ This point goes hand in hand with my insistence on a literal reading of the *archai* as two distinct bodies, and will be similarly controversial from a hylomorphic perspective. Those who seek to minimize the corporeality or distinctness of the *archai* (as described above) will want only *hulē* to play the role of material cause. I argue here that the *archai* are two distinct and independent bodies, and in the next chapter on the cosmogony show how both the *archai* and (later in the cosmogony) both *pneuma* and matter *together* play the role of material cause; then, in Chapters 7 and 8 on the Stoic Categories I argue that both the *pneuma* and the matter together are the *hupokeimenon*, or corporeal substrate of the individual, and not just the *hulē*, as the hylomorphic tradition has seen it. These points go hand in hand, further, with my insistence that *ousia* for the Stoics is body, and not matter; this point merits its own separate treatment, but I do give some evidence and arguments for it here, as well as in Chapter 3 and especially Chapter 8; see Chapter 8, n. 2 for bibliography on the question of *ousia* as matter.

³¹ See Hahm, *Origins*, 30–56, and Reydams-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 42–60, for discussion of the Stoic principles as playing the role of Aristotle’s four causes.

matter and form. This latter point is especially tricky because the active principle *is* responsible for imbuing the world with its form or arrangement, and the passive principle *is* identified as matter. In a Platonic or Aristotelian hylomorphic analysis, however, matter and corporeality are the same thing: for something to be corporeal just is for it to have material substance (and for something to be *a* substance, i.e. an individual body, is for it to be a hylomorphic composite of material body and immaterial form); we saw Plutarch make this explicit in passage B/Chapter 3. For the Stoics, on the other hand, matter and *logos* are *both* bodies, as Aristocles states explicitly (passage B above), and it is in this bold move that they take up the mantle of their predecessors, Plato's Sons of the Earth, and forge a new path to corporealism: on the one hand, turning the bodily elements (i.e. basic entities) of the Presocratics into genuine principles, and on the other hand, turning the formal element into a genuine cause, so that the substance they jointly compose when blended is capable of generating (and thus explaining) the organic unity of the natural world. Hence the Stoic principles are not just matter and form all over again, or potential and actual, but rather agent and patient capable together of being the formal, final, efficient, and material causes of the cosmos. Indeed, as agent and patient, the principles are not just the fundamental origins, but maximally explanatory of the cosmos. I will continue to develop and argue for this idea as we make our way through the textual analysis.

The third point of note in our target passage is that Diogenes tells us that the two principles are eternal and ungenerated, answering Plato's question: What must the starting points for explanation themselves be like? In being ungenerated and indestructible the principles also answer Plotinus' question (passage A/Chapter 3): whence resistance and three-dimensionality? There is no whence because they are ungenerated. In this the principles are importantly different from what the Stoics call elements (earth, air, fire, water), which are not basic, but rather downstream entities that are made from the principles and come into being and pass away with each world cycle (I will describe this cosmogony briefly in the next chapter).³² One of the Stoics' most intriguing commitments is to an everlasting recurrence of world cycles (*diakosmēseis*): for the Stoics there is no beginning or end to the world's motion, just an everlasting recurrence of cosmic cycles punctuated by periods of conflagration when the world turns into a primordial fiery blend of matter and *logos*, and then starts over. So, while the principles themselves are eternal, the cosmos is not. This form of explanation is familiar from the post-Parmenidean pluralists, who agree with Parmenides that *what is* cannot be either generated or destroyed, but disagree that change and plurality are impossible; so, they make their elements (i.e. basic entities) eternal and *what is*, and then account

³² See Salles, "Elementos," 29–31, for the view that the *archai* are not elements because elements must be separable, which the *archai* are not; more on separability ahead.

for the appearance of generation and corruption in terms of change and rearrangement of their basic entities (Calcidius, *In Tim.* 292, 293, 308 (Magee)).

Now, fourth, the most difficult knot to untangle in the Diogenes passage is what it means for the principles to be *formless* bodies (a point that is confirmed by Sextus, *M.* 9.75–6 (44C)). Note that while the passive principle, matter, is characterized as unqualified substance (*apoios ousia*), and the active principle is defined as reason (*logos*) in it (i.e. in the matter), it is both principles that are described as bodies *and* formless (*amorphos*). In the spirit of taking our textual evidence at face value, I want to embrace this conjunction and its application to both *archai*. As bodies, i.e. solid masses, *both* will be capable of acting and being acted upon, and this is compatible with one being a divine, active, and rational body while the other is a slack and dumb body.³³ And, *both* are also formless; although there is some difficulty with the text here, the contrast of principles to the elements generated from them, which have a determinate character in having been enformed (*memorphesthai*), shows that it is both principles that are meant to be formless, in contrast to the elements.³⁴ So now the question at hand concerning passage A4 is what it means for the principles to be bodies that are formless.

The passive principle, *hulē*, is defined as unqualified substance (*apoios ousia*), i.e. continuous, solid, three-dimensional extension that is of a nature to undergo (and hence to receive shape or form). It is here, in the amorphousness of *hulē*, that commentators (from the hylomorphic perspective) assimilate Stoic matter to Plato's receptacle in the *Timaeus*, and struggle to see the passive principle as itself an individual body with three dimensions and resistance: either matter is unqualified (in which case it is not a body and does not have three dimensions, size, or resistance), or it is not unqualified (in which case it is a composite and thus not merely matter).³⁵ Then, in an effort to reconcile the textual evidence that says

³³ Thus I disagree with Todd, "Monism and Immanence," 140, that Alexander, *Mixt.* 224,32–5,10 (SVF 2.310), who characterizes the *archai* as separately identifiable bodies, "clearly misrepresents the Stoics, and is probably itself the basis of the claim the *archai* are bodies rather than derived from it. In general, then, the interdependence of the *archai* seems to require that they be incorporeal, for the Stoics can give no sense to the notion of separate bodies that just act, or are just acted on." I also disagree with Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 74–5, that passage B serves as evidence that the Stoics are Platonizing, leaving off as he does the crucial qualification that matter and god are both bodies for the Stoics.

³⁴ The description of the principles as *amorphos* is related to the textual debate over whether Diogenes reports that the principles are incorporeal; thus, the *Suda* reading makes them *asōmatos kai amorphos*, whereas the DL MSS read *sōmata kai amorphos*. Because the text goes on to characterize "the others," i.e. elements, as "having been formed," *memorphosthai*, we can be sure that *amorphos* contrasts with what precedes (and is thus correct as it stands), but some have proposed reading *amorphos* to agree with *sōmata*; it is possible that *amorphos* may have gotten into the text to parallel the incorrect *asōmatos*, which could then have been mistakenly retained while its correlate *sōmata* was correct; see the apparatus in Dorandi, DL, for MSS readings and bibliography. I am grateful to Tony Long for conversation and correspondence on this point.

³⁵ For *hulē* as the receptacle, see Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 14; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 132–8; Brunschwig, "Stoic Metaphysics," 211; M. Frede, "Théologie," 216–9; Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter"; Hahm, *Origins*, 39–40; Marmodoro, "Stoic Gunk," 169–73; Menn, "Categories," 216, 221, 229, 385; Moreau, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 42–60; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 74; and Sedley, "Origins," 71–3; "Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy," 58, 62; and "Physics and Metaphysics," 385.

explicitly that the *archai* are both bodies, commentators try to redefine body in ways that minimize its physicality.³⁶ But just as the Stoics take their inspiration and desiderata from the Battle of Gods and Giants in the *Sophist* without brutishly assimilating themselves to the Sons of the Earth, so too can the Stoics respond to the *Timaeus* without saddling themselves wholesale with the receptacle.³⁷

As we have seen already in the account of what it is to be (a) body, it is open to the Stoics to embrace body (and hence *hulē*, a body) as unqualified (*apoios*) and formless (*amorphos*) insofar as it lacks the further, determinate qualities of the elements and bodies made out of it.³⁸ Being unqualified is not being altogether property-less. On the contrary, to be a body is already to be a solid, continuous three-dimensional mass of a certain shape and size, however unstable and indeterminate that shape and size may be. The image of some wax is apt, again, in showing that the shape and volume of a body can vary without rendering it infinite or literally unbounded; it will always be of *some* definite shape and size, even if it is not structured or organized into a determinate form, e.g. water, a stone, or even Socrates.³⁹ The unity and limitedness of both principles consists in the fact that for the Stoics the cosmos (and hence, what is made from it) is finite, in contrast to the Epicureans for whom there are infinitely many atoms. Thus, in being solid three-dimensional extension, *hulē* is not just corporeal, but in fact an individual body; as a finite corporeal mass, no matter how rare or slack the body (i.e. how melted the wax), its extension will have some boundary—not because it is limited by some external container or additional entity called a limit, but because it is substance, a finite body that cannot extend infinitely (DL 7.150, passage E/Chapter 3; Stobaeus 2.7.5a (IG II–95)). The 4th-century Christian commentator Calcidius, known for his translation of Plato's *Timaeus* into Latin with extensive commentary on the dialogue, is a valuable source of information here, spelling out clearly both the Stoic commitment to principles as individual bodies and the hylomorphic response to this posit:

³⁶ Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter"; M. Frede, "Théologie"; Mikeš, "Bodies?"; Scade, "Cosmological Limits," 147–54; Sorabji, *MSM*, 94 ff.; Weil, "Remarques sur le 'matérialisme' des stoïciens."

³⁷ In fact, Calcidius, *In Tim.* 321 (Magee), explicitly distinguishes Stoic matter and substance from the receptacle. The *Timaeus* is clearly an important influence in the Stoics, so important that I have left it completely out of account, preferring to say nothing than to say only a little bit without the right support. See n. 35 above and Chapter 6, n. 1, for bibliography on the influence of *Timaeus* on the Stoics.

³⁸ For agreement on this point see Cooper, "Physical Elements," 100–1; Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter," 57–8; for disagreement, see Sedley, "Physics and Metaphysics," 385. Todd, "Monism and Immanence," 140–1, suggests that "*apoios*" should be understood as inert or not acting, rather than unqualified; Algra, "Stoic Theology," 166, takes God's being formless "to be a slightly garbled version of either the claim that he is not of human form [...] or to represent the claim that he 'assumes' a form as soon as he interacts with matter and thus gives rise to the cosmos and its parts."

³⁹ Obviously wax is determinate in ways that the *archai* are not, which marks the limits of this image; my goal is to illustrate how something passive and malleable with no per se shape and size will nevertheless always be of some shape and size or other.

- C. Finally, the Stoics say that matter is definite and limited by its own nature, but Pythagoras says it is infinite and without limit, and that while they [sc. the Stoics] think that what is by nature boundless cannot be reduced to limit and order, Pythagoras asserts that this will be the excellence and power that belongs to god alone. . .

denique Stoicos definitam et limitatam silvam esse natura propria, Pythagoram vero infinitam et sine limite dicere, cumque illi quod natura sit immensum non posse ad modum atque ordinem redigi censeant, Pythagoram solius hanc dei fore virtutem ac potentiam asserere. . .

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 295 (Magee)

- D. They [sc. those who make matter ungenerated] are equally in agreement about the eternity of matter as well, maintaining that it will be in perpetuity since it is the pinnacle and origin of things; but whether it is limited, i.e. delimited or defined, they nowise agree since it is necessary that the determinate likewise have magnitude; moreover magnitude is either line or surface or body, all of which have their own shapes, whether they be plane or solid, and, further, shape is a kind of quality. Wherefore if matter is limited, it will be possessed of quality and sharing in shape by its very own self, which evidently is shown to be formless and lacking quality; therefore it is infinite besides and in no way bounded.

nihilo minus de aeternitate etiam silvae consentiunt perpetuam fore censentes, quando sit arx et origo rerum; sed utrum limitata, id est determinata, nequaquam consentiunt, quando determinatum quoque magnitudinem habeat necesse est, magnitudo autem est vel lineae vel superficiei vel corporis, quae cuncta proprias figuras habent, sive plana sint seu solida, figura porro species qualitatis est. quare si est limitata silva, qualitate praedita et figurae compos erit per semet ipsam, quae informis et qualitate carens evidenter ostensa est, ergo infinita quoque et minime terminata.

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 312 (Magee)

Calcidius is clear and explicit in passage C that for the Stoics matter (*silva*) must be definite and limited of its own nature (*natura propria*), because if it were completely indefinite and lacking in all boundaries, it could not even be god's clay to mold; it would be incapable of its essential function of receiving limit and order, being the patient to the active principle.⁴⁰ Calcidius confirms this as Stoic doctrine

⁴⁰ See Scade, "Cosmological Limits," 143–83, for arguments that *natura propria* should be understood as nature generally, i.e. not specific to matter, maintaining that the passive principle is not itself definite or limited, and only said to be so in virtue of being limited by the active principle. See Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium," 170, for agreement that Calcidius "has no qualms about speaking of primal matter as cohaerens. . . corpus (!) sine qualitate," original emphasis.

in passage D, when he criticizes their view from the hylomorphic perspective: to be limited, delimited, or defined is to have a certain size and shape, both of which are qualities, he says; from this it follows that if matter is limited of its own nature, then of its own nature it is a hylomorphic composite—contrary to the claim that matter is formless and quality-less. But the Stoics can agree that what is definite has magnitude and shape, and that this is either line (extension in one dimension), surface (extension in two dimensions), or body (*solid* extension in three dimensions), without assimilating those properties to the further determinate qualities of elements and qualified individuals. Matter is shapeless and quality-less, but (for all that) not entirely devoid of properties, just as wax is receptive and patient by nature, but (for all that) still solid, definite, of a certain density, etc.⁴¹ This much seems clear when Posidonius says that “the substance, i.e. matter of the whole, is unqualified and shapeless inasmuch as it has no determinate shape or quality unique to it per se” (Stobaeus, 1.133.18–20 (LS28q, EK fr. 20)). John Cooper captures the point as follows:

What is denied to it [sc. matter] is only any further qualification. And, in particular, of course, it is denied to have any colours or shapes or textures or consistencies or any other members of the traditional category of quality, not to mention that it lacks being so qualified as to constitute a plant or animal, with any of its various possible qualities. Thus, Stoic prime matter differs quite notably from the prime matter that late Aristotelians attributed to Aristotle: that version of prime matter (a mistaken attribution to Aristotle, and in itself an incoherent idea) is of something that has no characteristics at all. Stoic prime matter does have actual properties, it simply lacks qualities and other qualifications added onto that primitive base. God or reason, of course, adds all those additional qualities to whatever materials have them, through specific, differential thoughts about how those particular materials are to be; so, prime matter necessarily lacks them. Understood the Stoics’ way, prime matter is not an incoherent notion.⁴²

I add to Cooper’s point that the divine active principle, *logos*, must also be formless (as Diogenes reports) in advance of the forms it is to engender. Here, again, I emphasize the full force of the corporealist doctrine that *both* principles

⁴¹ Perhaps Plutarch confirms this point for us in reporting the Stoic view that in calling substance unqualified, they do not mean that it lacks any and every quality, but that it has them all (*Comm. not.* 1086A (Cherniss)). See Mattingly, “Early Stoicism,” 283–4, for the view that matter’s having all qualities means having them all in succession, whereas *logos*, in contrast, is all things at once. See Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 67, for the suggestion that having all qualities makes substance prime matter because it comes to a null sum. See Hahm, *Origins*, 34, for the remark that “the absence of quality in matter is irrelevant, if not actually embarrassing”; I am sympathetic to the idea that something completely *apoios*, devoid of any properties at all, is incoherent and hope that my account shows the qualityless-ness of Stoic *hulē* is not embarrassing.

⁴² Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 99–100; cf. M. Frede, “Théologie,” 221; Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 59; Mattingly, “Early Stoicism,” 282–3. See also Calcidius 292 (44D), 290 (SVF 1.86).

are formless bodies. Divine reason is the intelligent corporeal agent that gives the cosmos form by acting on passive matter, also a body. Let's consider for a moment how this works, in order to put a finer point on what it means to say that god is the efficient or moving cause of the cosmos *and* that god is a body acting on another body. It must, first of all, be in *contact* with matter that reason engenders form or shape. So, while it is true, as Cooper says, that god's thoughts give the cosmos their additional qualities, it is equally true that god's thoughts are corporeal and will engender form, shape, or arrangement in matter by causal interaction. How precisely god does this is unclear; a range of alternatives is compatible with the corporeality of this agency. It could be that god itself takes on a certain shape or form, and in being blended through and through with matter moves the matter to take on that same shape or form with it; this would be a literalist, or analog reading.⁴³ On the other hand, it could be that god is more like DNA, carrying instructions, which although the corporeal agent of our development, does not do its job as a homunculus taking on the shapes itself; call this a metaphorical, or digital reading.⁴⁴ I am inclined to the homunculus reading, wherein the active principle is more like the drill sergeant who "takes hold of the boy's hands to drill him and to teach him to make certain motions" (SE, M. 8.409 (27E, passage D/Chapter 2)); some additional reasons for this will emerge in the remaining discussion of the principles and review of Stoic cosmogony, but nothing I am arguing relies on it. I do however take it that the idea that a body must lack the shape or quality it comes to have (or, for the digital reading, the idea that body is not yet in the state of generating instructions for the matter to enform) is equally applicable to *hulē* and to *logos*, as bodies, so the textual evidence that the active principle is also a formless body stands.

But what does it mean to say that *logos* is a body, one might still wonder? From the hylomorphic perspective, *logos* is not viewed as a body of its own, but as getting its corporeality from the matter with which it is combined. But, of course, if both matter and *logos* are bodies, this cannot be what the Stoics are saying: *logos* is not body *because* it is blended with matter. Rather, the Stoics posit two principles that are individual masses whose union is *not* to be conceived as a conjoining of material with immaterial to yield a single Aristotelian substance, but instead as

⁴³ As I observe at the beginning of Chapter 6, often I use "he," "his," and "him" for god, as a reflection of the masculine gender of the nouns "*theos*" and "*logos*," and because god is sometimes referred to as Zeus, but it is in many ways better to use the neuter "it" to capture the non-anthropomorphic role of god in Stoicism, as I do here. And because the texts do not capitalize "*theos*" (in contrast to "*Dia*" for Zeus), I do not capitalize "god."

⁴⁴ I take it that god understood as a force or immanent efficient cause is on the digital end of the spectrum at best. See Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 27–9, for the digital view that *logos* is the divine force that must follow the "formula for the correct maintenance of the universe"; and 38 for the comparison to "modern geneticists who hold that in one tiny cell are contained all the instructions necessary for the development of the animal destined to be formed from it [. . .] As the activating force this might be said to act in a way similar to that in which modern biochemists have discovered the nucleic acids to act when, brought into contact with protein, they cause the formation of living cells."

a through and through blending of two independent bodies—one agent and the other patient—to yield a composite body. The hylomorphic lens distorts the Stoic position here by taking *logos* as immaterial, assimilating it to the form of the matter, and then rendering *logos* otiose as a distinct principle in virtue of matter already being imbued with reason/form. Thus, the hylomorphic critic will recognize (correctly) that *logos* is a body for the Stoics, but then (incorrectly) take that corporeality to derive from its combination with matter (thus not really recognizing it as a body in its own right); at the same time, in (correctly) recognizing the blend of *logos* with matter, the critic (incorrectly) will see matter itself as having been imbued with reason, rendering *logos* as a distinct principle superfluous. Here, along these lines, is how Calcidius puts it:

- E. And so, if the reason of forms and qualities is latent inside matter, as it is seen by the Stoics, then the government of the artisan is superfluous, but I suppose an artisan is necessary for matter, as even the Stoics decree. The artisan then, will impress forms on matter as on unformed bronze or wax, and so much will be agreed according to the necessary reason of their doctrine.

quare si intra silvam ratio formarum et qualitatum latet, ut Stoicis videtur, abundat opificis moderatio, sed opinor silvae opificem necessarium, sicut ipsi etiam Stoici sanciant. opifex igitur silvae ut aeris informitati ceraeve formas insigniet atque ita constabit ob necessarium dogmatis rationem.

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 311 (Magee)

It is true that for the Stoics *logos* is blended through and through with matter, and to that extent accurate to say that *logos* is in matter (as Diogenes also puts it, in 7.134 (A2)). However, it is not true that form and qualities are *latent* in the properties of matter (since reason and matter are distinct entities). To say that reason is *in* matter is not to say that matter itself has reason; and to say that reason is a body is not to say that its corporeality derives from matter, or that matter has reason. This, again, is one of the Stoics' boldest moves: to reject hylomorphism and make body and causation fundamental. In response to Plutarch, who argues that god is composite because it is "an intellectual body and mind in matter" (passage B/Chapter 3), the Stoics can reply that god's being an intellectual body is one thing, a fundamental thing, and god's being mind in matter is another thing, namely its being blended with matter. Being an intellectual body is not correctly glossed as being mind in matter, although the Stoics *are* committed to both those things; being a body is not the same as being material, and being mind in matter is not what makes *logos* a body.⁴⁵ So, to say that *logos* is a body is simply to say that it is

⁴⁵ Cooper, "Physical Elements," 100, thus calls the principles "non-material bodies," in contrast to those composed from the two principles together, which in having matter as an ingredient become "material bodies."

solid three-dimensional extension, a single homogeneous mass; it is not to say anything, either explicitly or implicitly, about matter.

Separable and Independent

I will now make one final point about the Stoic *archai* before turning to the cosmogony. It is that the Stoic principles are independent both in being ungenerated, and also in being distinct and independent from one another—each is fundamental, i.e. independently existing, and together as separate ingredients they compose the substance of the cosmos. Calcidius makes the distinctness of the principles explicit in this useful synopsis of the Stoic position:

- F. The Stoics too reject an origin of matter, and assume instead this [sc. matter] and god as the two principles (*initia*) of the whole thing, god as artisan and matter as the patient of action; (2) in fact, these things endowed (*praeditus*) with one substance, making both agent and patient be body, nevertheless are distinct (*diversa*) in virtue of their powers (*virtūtēs*): since it fashions (*faciat*), the one will be god; since it is fashioned (*fiat*), the other will be matter (*silva*).

Stoici quoque ortum silvae reiciunt, quin potius ipsam et deum duo totius rei sumunt initia, deum ut opificem, silvam ut quae operationi subiciatur; una quidem essentia praeditos, facientem et quod fit ac patitur, corpus esse, diversa vero virtute, quia faciat, deum, quia fiat, silvam fore.

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 289 (Magee)

Calcidius explains that matter is ungenerated because it is one of the two principles, which together compose the whole, and cautions that although they are made of the same substance, i.e. both are body, nevertheless they are distinct in having different powers, characters, or (most literally) virtues. Notice that this need not convey the deflationary thesis that the *archai* are really one, and only distinct in virtue of their capacity, as Mansfeld sees it.⁴⁶ For the *archai* to be “endowed with one substance” is not for them to *compose* a single Aristotelean substance, but for them both (each) to be (a) body, i.e. to be of the same kind, to have one kind of *being*, even if they are different in other ways; this point is confirmed by the following clause, which explains that the Stoics make *both* the agent *and* the patient to be body. Nevertheless (i.e. although both are body), the report continues, the agent and patient are different, distinct, or even separate (for *diversus*), the one being a divine, active, and rational kind of body, while the other is passive. The suppressed

⁴⁶ Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 174.

challenge to which “nevertheless” responds is this: if each is body, then in virtue of what is one of them god and the other matter (now that a hylomorphic analysis has been rejected)? The spirit is not reductive of the *archai* to a single body, but rather explanatory of the difference between the two bodies, given that they are of a single kind.⁴⁷

Further, the fact that the principles are always as a matter of fact blended does not entail either that they are inseparable, or that they are dependent on each other for their existence (as cautioned in the Introduction, a modal-existential analysis neither confirms nor denies ontological dependence).⁴⁸ I will explain. It is true that the principles are never found apart, even during the conflagration between world orders. However, this does not entail that the principles *couldn't* separate from each other in principle or that they are ontologically dependent on each other; indeed, as we saw, it is characteristic of blended bodies that they remain independent and be capable of separation from each other. Since the *archai* are blended, they must be separable, even if they are never as a matter of fact separated. Notice that there is nothing incoherent to the idea that something is both separable and yet not in fact separated. In fact, this is something that the Stoics not only recognize but embrace in their modal theory: that something which neither is nor will be is nevertheless possible (Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 183,34–84,10 (38B), *Fat.* 176,14–24 (38H); Cicero, *Fat.* 12–5 (38E); *Epictetus, Diss.* 2.19.1–5 (38A)).⁴⁹ For example, wood at the bottom of the sea remains combustible because it is of a nature to burn, regardless of whether external circumstances prevent its burning; similarly, a shell at the bottom of the sea is perceptible, even if circumstances prevent its being perceived. Thus the Stoics agree with Philo in locating possibility in something's bare fitness or intrinsic nature (call this “metaphysical possibility”), but disagree insofar as they also recognize a further sense of possibility as opportunity (call this “providential possibility”). This distinction explains the appearance of conflict in the testimony about Stoic possibility, and solves what Susanne Bobzien calls “the

⁴⁷ Thus the Stoics are best described as kind monists, committed to there being one kind of substance (body), not monists committed to there being only one thing at the metaphysical ground level. This is compatible with there being integrated wholes, but not with the ontological priority of that whole, as described in the digression on Stoic mereology (Chapter 3). Cf. Bronowski, *Lekta*, 139–40 for agreement that ontological status does not settle whether something is active or passive.

⁴⁸ Thus, I disagree with Marmodoro, “Stoic Gunk” and “Stoic Blends,” that the principles must be interdependent and that they must be related in some way other than and in addition to blending because they cannot come apart (I argue that they can (or could) come apart, but do not, i.e. that a modal-existential analysis is silent on the question of dependence); cf. Mikeš, “Bodies?” for the argument that accepting the principles as ontologically dependent aspects of body yields a “more directly understandable concept of body but we lose the two principles (as principles)”; likewise Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals”; Salles, “Elementos.” It should be clear I do not think that this makes the concept of body more understandable, nor that we need to cleanse the Stoic account of body of its bulk, dimensions, or resistance.

⁴⁹ For arguments to this effect, see de Harven, “Necessity, Possibility.” For arguments that to be *heteron* is to be separate rather separable, see E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” 104; cf. Sedley, “Diachronic,” where he presses a conflict between *heteron* as separate and the Stoic commitment to blending (which I will address in Chapter 8 on the Stoic Categories).

Philonian Paradox,” that possibility defined in terms of bare fitness leaves no reasonable room for responsibility.⁵⁰

According to this schema, then, the principles are separable as a matter of metaphysical possibility, even if they are providentially inseparable once the cosmos is underway. I add this last clause about the world order being underway to allow that the divine active principle, *logos*, could choose to separate from the passive principle during the conflagration when it is blended with but not yet acting upon matter to create the cosmos. Thus it is both metaphysically and providentially possible for the *archai* to separate during the conflagration, and god is *responsible* for the fact that they do not separate (since the passive principle could not undertake or initiate a separation, it being of a passive nature and thus undertaking nothing). Once god begins to act on matter, engendering the next world order, it is no longer providentially possible for them to separate because they are then united in composing and sustaining the cosmos; it is too late for them to separate (until the next conflagration, of course). Thus the fact that the *archai* are never in fact separated is no evidence of their metaphysical inseparability nor, therefore, of their ontological dependence on each other.

Hensley has emphasized the requirement that blended bodies (and hence the *archai*) be separable, and developed an interpretive problem in connection with evidence of their inseparability: “If they are inseparable, the principles would need to be anomalous bodies, quite unlike the separable bodies we observe every day.”⁵¹ His concern is that the inseparability of the principles makes them a different kind of body from those composed out of them. I share this concern, and trust it is clear by now that I do not consider the corporeality of the principles to be any different from the corporeality of Stoic elements or the stones, plants, and animals made out of them. However, while I share the concern for a univocal sense of “body,” I do not endorse either the problem or the solution that Hensley proposes. First, to the problem: the fact that the *archai* are never in fact separated does not make them inseparable. Further, the evidence for inseparability that Hensley builds his case around does not seem to me to establish that the principles are inseparable, nor therefore to generate the problem for his solution:

- G. It is in this way that the Stoics arrived at the impious opinion that god is what matter is, or that god is even an inseparable quality of matter, and that he goes through matter just as semen goes through the genitals, and that he is the source and cause of everything that arises—not only of bad things, but also of disgraceful and immoral things. The deformity of this opinion is the more evidently revealed once Plato’s view has been expounded.⁵²

⁵⁰ Bobzien, “Chrysippus’ modal logic,” 75.

⁵¹ Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability,” 189.

⁵² I work here with Hensley’s own translation, plus the last line of the passage as rendered by Magee.

proptereaque factum ut opiniones incurrerent impias, deum scilicet hoc esse quod silva sit vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem deum silvae, eundemque per silvam meare velut semen per membra genitalia, et omnium quae nascuntur tam originem quam etiam causam fore, non malorum modo sed turpitudinis quoque et obscenitatis, omniaque agere et pati, vel pudenda. cuius opinionis deformitas evidentius detegitur exposita Platonis sententia.

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 294 (SVF 1.87, IG II–56)

It is true that Calcidius here attributes to the Stoics the view that god is inseparable from matter; however, it is also true that he attributes to the Stoics the view that god is what matter is, or the same as matter. Hensley rightly resists the latter attribution, rewriting it as the view that god and matter are the same *type* of thing, but he embraces the other attribution that god and matter are inseparable. It is not clear what drives this interpretive asymmetry, but it seems to me that both attributions are equally weak and thus neither should be taken without a big grain of salt. In this context, Calcidius is going after the Stoics for rejecting Plato's Forms, and recounting that because of this failure to recognize anything beyond the corporeal they incur these impious opinions. So the grain of hylomorphic salt with which Hensley takes the attribution that god is matter (which is correct for the Stoics insofar as god is a body, but incorrect insofar as god is thereby identified with matter) should be applied to the second attribution as well. In that case, we should say that Calcidius' attribution that god is inseparable from matter is correct insofar as god is always in fact blended with matter (and even insofar as it is providentially inseparable during any given world order once god is imbuing the world with qualities), but it is incorrect insofar as it says god is inseparable from matter as a case of metaphysical necessity. It is an interesting question, how the Stoics can say that the *archai* are separable and yet never separate, but that is different from the question how they are both separable and inseparable. The textual evidence does not establish the inseparability of the *archai* in any metaphysically robust or problematic sense that contradicts the separability entailed by their blending; it shows only that they are never as a matter of fact separated, and hence inseparable only in the sense that wood at the bottom of the sea is not combustible.

Let us take a look at the passages cited by Hahm as evidence that the principles are "in actuality inseparable from each other."⁵³ Notice that Hahm does not seem to have a robust sense of separability in mind either, given the qualification that they are separable *in actuality*, which implies that things *could* be otherwise and hence that they are in fact capable of separation:

⁵³ Hahm, *Origins*, 32.

- H. But if there is also some per se cause beyond matter, i.e. something else, he [sc. Aristotle] says it is necessary to consider whether this is separate (*kechorismenos*) from matter and subsists itself by itself or rather in matter, what sort of thing the enmattered form is; now, according to the Stoics it seems that god, i.e. the creative (*poiētikon*) cause, is in the matter.

ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἔστι τι καθ' αὐτὸ αἴτιον παρὰ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ ἄλλο τί φησι δεῖν ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον τοῦτό ἐστι κεχωρισμένον ὕλης καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑστῶς, ἢ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος, καὶ ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι.

Alexander, *In Ar. Meta.* 178,15–9 (SVF 2.306)

As Alexander (and Aristotle) see things, for something to be separate (or separated to capture the perfect of *kechorismenos*) is for it to subsist itself by itself, i.e. independently and fundamentally, and the contrast case (i.e. not separate) is for something to be in matter; in that case, when something is in matter, one must inquire into what sort of thing enmattered form is. Notice that Alexander prejudges for the Stoics that insofar as they say that god is in matter (which they do say insofar as the principles are blended), they embrace enmattered form. But the sense in which god is *in* matter for the Stoics, as one of two independent bodies that retain their identities even while mutually coextended, is not at all the sense in which form is *in* matter from a hylomorphic perspective. Thus the relevant sense of inseparability that Alexander invokes does not apply either, and this text is not evidence that the Stoic *archai* are metaphysically inseparable from each other—only evidence that enmattered form is inseparable.

In fact, the Stoic *archai* are separable in the sense that Alexander specifies, each existing itself by itself, independently and fundamentally. And the fact that Stoic god can be legitimately described as being in matter (insofar as the two bodies are blended) does not entail that god is an enmattered form, and hence metaphysically inseparable—except on the question-begging assumption that being in matter must be understood along hylomorphic lines. In fact, although it is acceptable to say that god is in matter for the Stoics, it is not entirely felicitous because blending is a symmetrical relation, where being *in* is not (we saw Stoic critics exploit this difference for polemical purposes in Chapter 4). Thus this first passage does not give any further evidence that the principles are inseparable (or, for that matter, that they are never found apart). The other two passages Hahn cites do indicate that the principles are not as a matter of fact separated, but they do not say that they are inseparable. I begin with the Neoplatonist Proclus:

- I. Some people puzzle how Plato could take it to be suitable for the demiurge of all things to be among the paradigms he sees; for the demiurge does not hold according to the same things that he sees. For many of the ancients also put

forth this account, the Epicureans on the one hand also saying the complete cause of all things not to be [i.e. they deny the demiurge], and on the other hand the Stoics saying that it [sc. the complete cause] is, but that it subsists unseparated (*achōriston*) from matter.

ἀποροῦσι δέ τινες, ὅπως ὁ Πλάτων ἔλαβεν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον τὸ δημιουργὸν εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς εἰς παράδειγμα βλέποντα· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι δημιουργὸν εἰς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον ὁρῶντα· πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτου προεστᾶσι τοῦ λόγου τῶν παλαιῶν· οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ πάντη τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον οὐκ εἶναι φασιν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς εἶναι μέν, ἀχώριστον δὲ ὑφεστάναι τῆς ὕλης.

Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* 1.266,21–8 (Diehl; SVF 2.307)

The question at hand is how Plato can posit a demiurge apart from the world that he creates, i.e. elsewhere than the cosmos; the Epicureans move directly to eliminate any such artisan, while the Stoics recognize one but make it immanent in the world, i.e. not elsewhere. The point is that the Stoic demiurge is not separate in the sense that Plato's demiurge is separate from the world he crafts; the passage is thus silent on the question of the principles' separability from each other. Even allowing it to speak, the adjective "*achōriston*" is just as naturally translated "unseparated" as "inseparable" (in contrast to Calcidius' "*inseparibile*"); it need not carry any modal force. This rendering, as unseparated rather than inseparable, is perhaps affirmed by Hans von Arnim who completes his entry (2.307) with another passage of Proclus' invoking blending to explain the nature of their union. Finally, Syrianus, another Neoplatonist commentator, testifies that the Stoics "recognize a creative cause also [in addition to the elements], but this is unseparated (*achōriston*) from matter" (*In Ar. Met.* 8,2–5 (Kroll; SVF 8.308)). Here again the context indicates a question about whether the creative cause is here or elsewhere, not whether the two *archai* are separable from each other in principle; and even accepting it as evidence about the *archai*, the terminology need not have any modal force on its own.

Thus it is well attested that the *archai* are never in fact found apart, and this is sufficient to generate the interesting question how they can be both separable and never actually separate; but neither the passage from Calcidius nor any of the others I have reviewed here establishes that the *archai* are both separable and inseparable in any genuinely contradictory way that requires any further metaphysical apparatus. As independent bodies in a through and through blend, they are always separable from each other in the sense that they could exist apart from each other (as a matter of Philonian bare fitness or metaphysical possibility); and they are inseparable in the sense that once the world order is underway and god is acting on matter, the opportunity to separate is no longer there (as a matter of providential possibility).

Hensley's solution to the problem, how the *archai* can be both separable and inseparable, is to say that when the principles are understood *de re*, as bodies, they

are separable; but that when they are understood *de dicto*, in their roles as agent and patient, the *archai* are inseparable. The idea is that “principles” understood *de re* refers to the bodies that happen to “realize the role” or “occupy the office” of agent and patient, and as such, i.e. as bodies, they are indeed separable; understood *de dicto*, however, “principles” refers to the functional roles or offices of agent and patient, and as such they are inseparable from each other. This notion of a role is not innocent; indeed it imputes to the Stoics a significant metaphysical apparatus of entities that *subsist* as incorporeal descriptions of bodies (the roles) in contrast to the bodies that occupy or realize those roles.⁵⁴ Thus Hensley’s suggestion is that the term “principle” is ambiguous between incorporeal “offices” (*de dicto*), and the bodies that “realize” them (*de re*).

While I enthusiastically embrace Hensley’s point that the principles are separable because they are bodies, I firmly reject that this is a matter of semantic ambiguity between roles and realizers or *de re* and *de dicto* reference. The principles are simply two independent and separable bodies that are always as a matter of fact blended with each other, i.e. “principles” always refers to the two fundamental *archai*, divine active *logos* and passive *hulē*. Put another way: a *de re* reference to the principles is a reference to two fundamental bodies, one agent and the other patient, not to the corporeal realizers of roles understood only *qua* bodies, abstracting away their other properties (hence not especially *de re*). It is true that we may think of the principles *de dicto*, as bodies, or as agent and patient, etc.; but a *de dicto* reference to the principles is still a reference to the principles, not a reference to a role. Note that I am not denying that the Stoics recognize semantic ambiguity according to functional roles in general; as we will see in the cosmology, next, the Stoics give the names of “matter” and “god” not only to the principles (strictly) but also to posterior entities composed out of them, insofar as they play the role of passive and active at that stage of the cosmogony. What I am saying is that there is no such ambiguity here, and that we should beware of inflationary Platonizing when simpler explanations are at hand.

For example, Hensley says that when “two bodies are carrying out the roles of the principles, those two bodies must be in contact,” and that this is why it is correct to say that the principles are *de dicto* inseparable even though *de re*, as blended bodies, they are also separable.⁵⁵ It is absolutely true that for the active and passive principles to act and undergo they must be in contact, and that agent and patient are correlative terms; but this insight does not require the introduction of incorporeal roles that *subsist* independent of their realizers that *exist*, or *de re-de dicto* distinctions, in order to be true.⁵⁶ So, the simpler explanation at hand is that the

⁵⁴ Hensley borrows this apparatus from Bailey, “Structure,” who argues that the incorporeals are roles or offices that subsist independently of the bodies that may or may not occupy them. I will address this view in Chapter 9 on the incorporeals as a class.

⁵⁵ Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability,” 207.

⁵⁶ Nor do we need to invoke the modal concept of an external hindrance to make this point; further, to the extent that modal considerations do come into play in answering the question how can the *archai*

archai are not metaphysically inseparable from each other (nor, therefore, ontologically dependent on one another), though they are never in fact separated and it is not possible for them to separate while they are unified in the creation of the cosmos. There is thus no explanatory benefit to introducing a semantic ambiguity for “principle,” nor to introducing the metaphysical apparatus of roles and their occupiers; indeed, there is a high cost to Platonizing this way, given the Stoics’ strong resistance to universals and their emphasis on a one-world metaphysics.

So, to summarize where we stand: the Stoic *archai* are two distinct bodies, one active and one passive, on the causal model of agent and patient (not actual and potential, nor form and matter). As bodies, they are limited and definite three-dimensional extension with resistance, i.e. continuous masses of a certain shape and size able to make contact and thus enter causal relations—but for all that they are formless (*amorphos*). These are not contradictory properties, as illustrated by our working image of the wax and bronze, which have definite properties of their own and yet are also formless in being mere masses of a nature to become determinately shaped; this is as true for *logos* as it is for matter—*logos* cannot already be of a certain form (or, for the weak literalist, be in its enforming state) if it is to be what imbues the world with form. Indeed, from the Stoic perspective, how could matter ever receive qualities except by contact with another body, and how could *logos* ever be agent except by corporeal contact? Thus, from all angles so far, body for the Stoics is fundamental. As individual bodies capable of entering causal relations, the principles are not just basic in the sense of being at the ground floor, but also in the sense of being independently existing entities (at the ground floor). The fact that the principles are each ungenerated and indestructible underlines this ontological independence (Calcidius 293 (44E5, passage J below); DL 7.134 (44B, passage A above); Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.18.2 (46K)). And as principles of the whole of things (*to holon*), the Stoic *archai* are fundamental not only in being independently existing and ungrounded, but also in being the foundation or grounds of everything else. Calcidius, again, brings the point out nicely:

- J. And therefore, birth is fashioned out of existing things and leaves off into what exists, because it [sc. what exists] is bounded by things which abide as immortals, i.e. that by which and likewise that from which what comes to be [comes to be].

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 293 (44E5)

be separable even though they never will be separated, the relevant external hindrance is not one that falls outside the concept (as Hensley argues), but the external hindrance of the world order already being under way; it is the hindrance of circumstance and opportunity that makes it legitimate to say that the *archai* are inseparable during the world order—once the *diakosmēsis* is underway, it is too late to separate. Finally, talk of roles need not imply any ontological inflation; see, for example, Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” for successful talk of roles without the hypostatization.

Causal Unity

As we turn to the Stoic cosmogony, next, we will see just how these two entities, independent and distinct as I have argued they are, account for the unity and structure of the cosmos in entirely corporeal, indeed causal, terms. Not only are the Stoics challenged to conduct their “extravagant cosmological theorizing” without Form, but now, with *two* bodies as the foundational principles, Plato’s challenge to say when and how it is possible for many things to compose one (a whole_C) is pressing.⁵⁷ The Special Composition question, when do many things compose one, is upon us. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of matter and form, the wax and its shape?

The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient bodies that are completely coextended in a through and through blend (*krasis di’ holou*). Blending of agent and patient is the principle of unity. In the first place, every case of blending yields a new substance whose ingredients are interacting in *sumpatheia*, or reciprocal action and passion, and this by itself is a certain unifying causal relation; as Alexander mentions, “it is no wonder that also certain bodies helping each other should be unified through and through” (*Mixt.* 217,26–32 (48C9, passage B/Chapter 4)). So, all blended bodies form some kind of unity, stronger than juxtaposition and weaker than fusion. But not all blended bodies will have the same degree of unity; a blend of water and wine, or incense and air, is not unified in the same way or to the same degree as a blend of agent and patient, e.g. soul and body, and *pneuma* and matter generally.

When this kind of blending takes place, in which a designing agent gives form and structure to the thick, slack patient with which it is coextended, there is a different kind of interaction between the bodies, one in which the agent is the sustaining cause (*sunektikon aition*) of a newly generated whole_C.⁵⁸ Alexander reports (*Mixt.* 216,14–6, (48C1, passage A1/Chapter 4)) that the whole of corporeal substance is unified (*hēnōsthai*), because it is totally pervaded by *pneuma*, which is the agent by which (*huph’ hou*) the whole_C holds together or coheres (*sunechetai*), remains together (*summenei*), and is interactive (*sumpathes*) with itself.⁵⁹ Likewise, Plutarch reports that when air and fire (i.e. *pneuma*, in the role of agent) blend with earth and water (in the role of passive matter) they provide tension, stability, and

⁵⁷ See Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes*, for an account of this concern in Plato. See “Digression on Mereology,” Chapter 3; a whole_{Count} = *def.* a body that is both one in virtue of its own *perigraphē* and ordered.

⁵⁸ See Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 157–8, for helpful discussion of *pneuma* as synectic cause of the cosmos.

⁵⁹ I cannot do it here, but it would be interesting in this context to pursue the question raised above concerning the mechanism by which the agent enforms the patient, whether in a strongly literal or analog way, by taking on the shape itself and bringing the matter with it, or in a weaker way that involves corporeal contact but is, rather, digital. If we were able to identify the mechanism, we might find there an explanation for this stronger kind of unity.

substantiality (*Comm. not.* 1085C–D (47G)). This is how (and when) the Stoics are able to make one thing out of many, unity out of plurality—not trivially, innocently, or permissively by Mereological Fusion or Unrestricted Composition, but, rather, significantly and selectively by the through and through blending of agent with patient bodies to compose a new whole_C.

This unifying principle, the *krasis di' holou* of agent and patient, does not have the ontological complexity of a hylomorphic account, since both are bodies.⁶⁰ Instead, the Stoic theory has what I will call causal complexity. The cosmos is composed of two fundamental entities that are on an ontological par, but not on a causal par: reason is the agent, while matter is the patient. There is a special unity to the agent-patient relation, in which the agent's doing and the patient's undergoing are two sides of the same coin, i.e. the two bodies *together* are the cause of a single event or effect, e.g. knife and flesh together are the cause of a joint effect, the cutting (Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.30.1–3 (55D, passage R/Chapter 12); SE, *M.* 9.254 (Bury); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 333,36–8 (Klabfleisch)).⁶¹ Where agent and patient meet, they are in *sumpatheia*, not just in the way that *any* two bodies share in a joint *pathos* where they are in contact, but also in the further, *causally* complex way that the agent is creating something new together with (by acting on) the patient. This is a different kind of *sumpatheia*, one that is productive of a new attribute or event, e.g. cutting, in virtue of the agent's creative nature acting on the patient's receptive nature. Add to this causal complexity the complete coextension of agent and patient by *krasis di' holou*, and the resulting *sumpatheia* is not merely a new effect like cutting, but the generation of a new *entity* altogether. In a total blend of agent and patient, the creative, rational agent unifies and sustains the compound as a whole_C, so that a new individual is generated (answering the Special Composition question). The Stoics thereby deliver unity out of plurality, making

⁶⁰ See Mann, "Elements, Causes, and Principles," and Koslicki, *Structure*, who embrace and emphasize the ontological complexity of a hylomorphic analysis.

⁶¹ I do not mean anything special by the word "event," indeed I resist the idea that the Stoics have any special theory or ontology of events. I will address events and the language of cause and effect in Chapter 12, where I address the *lekta*. As incorporeals, the *lekta* are not capable of causal interaction, and so they can be bypassed in this discussion. See Bronowski, *Lekta*, 138–48, for an alternative take on the force of the SE passage just cited, as showing that what is passive also acts because it is acting together with (*sun-*) the agent, and likewise what acts is also acted upon, but with the divergent conclusion that they are therefore indistinct, i.e. because of the ontological homogeneity conveyed by their being conjoined. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 295 (passage C above), testifies against this when he says that although both principles are bodies, nevertheless they are distinct because they have different powers; but this does not rise to the level of a logical imperative to distinguish bodies only in terms of agent and patient, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, 141, argues. Further, I would argue that the problem SE is pressing in 9.252–4 is not that the bodies are *indistinct* but that insofar as both are acting and undergoing, each is no more agent than patient, so that on this lemma the agent wouldn't be a cause any more. See Marmodoro, "Stoic Gunk," for the thesis that causation is always blending.

one out of many—not with ontological complexity, but with the causal complexity of a through and through blend between agent and patient. Thus we see, in principle at least, how two entirely independent bodies could account for the unity and structure of a new entity in entirely corporeal terms. In the next chapter I will show how they do so in practice, starting from the basic blend of these two fundamental principles and proceeding to the composition of the cosmos as a whole_c and all the individual (partial) wholes_c in it.

Conclusions

With that forecast in view, I will conclude with the observation that the Stoic *archai* are principles in the fullest sense of the term outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The Stoic *archai* are, at once, (i) the corporeal origins and starting points of the cosmos, as the Milesian monists thought of their *archai*. Further, (ii) like Empedocles and the atomists, the Stoics make their *archai* fundamental and prior to the compounds built from them. They are also (iii) the explanatory starting points and governing principles of the cosmos, as Philolaus' reflexive turn to epistemology requires: by casting their principles as agent and patient, the Stoics make causation the governing principle of explanation for everything that exists. It is clear that *logos* and *hulē* are also (iv) ontologically primitive and eternal, in line with Plato's vision for the *archai*, once hylomorphic objections to body as primitive (and thus simple) are warded off. And, finally, (v) the Stoic *archai* are fit to play the role of all four of Aristotle's causes at once.⁶² By making the divine active principle (*logos*) corporeal, the Stoics imbue body with the reason, forethought, and agency the Presocratics could not, and, at the same time, they give reason the

⁶² Hahm, *Origins*, 44, says: "Obviously what the Stoics have done is not to recognize the existence of only two of Aristotle's four causes but to distribute his four causes between two entities, assigning the material cause to one entity, and the motive, final, and formal to the other." I agree that the active principle plays the roles of motive, final, and formal cause, but not that the role of the material cause is assigned to the passive principle, or at any rate not to the passive principle alone. On my view, it is corporeal substance, and hence the two principles together, that play the role of material cause. I am agnostic with respect to how far the Stoics were in fact responding to Aristotle directly. Nothing about the Stoic *archai* being fit to do the labor of Aristotle's four causes requires the *archai* to have been developed in response to that four-fold schema, nor is there any reason to think that such desiderata could only have come from Aristotle. For additional arguments that the Stoics were indeed responding to Aristotle, see Christensen, *Unity*; Hahm, *Origins*, 30–56; Mansfeld, "Providence and Destruction"; Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 42–60; Solmsen, "Nature as Craftsman." For caution about the idea of influence from Aristotle, see Barnes, "Aristotle and Stoic Logic"; Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics*; and Sedley, "Origins" and "Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy." Note, finally, that denying "the Stoics" were responding to Aristotle does not mean that later Stoics, e.g. Athenodorus and Cornutus, were not engaged with Aristotle once the edition of Andronicus was available in the first century, on which see Dillon, *Dexippus*.

causal powers that Plato could not.⁶³ The Stoic *archai*, agent and patient, have everything required for a corporealist cosmology; they are the complete origins, principles, and causes of everything there is, as a brief review of Stoic cosmogony will now confirm.

⁶³ Thus I resist the claims of Vogt, "Unified Notion," 72–4, that the *archai* can't be considered as governors of the cosmos, or beginnings and origins, because only *logos* is active. I agree, of course, that the *archai* are not axioms, but disagree that they are not explanatory of the cosmos and that the Stoics were actively separating cause from explanation in contrast to Aristotle. I also very much agree that they are fundamental and hence metaphysically prior, but do not see any reason to deny they are also temporally and causally prior; although *hulē* is passive, it is very much a part of the casual nexus, so the fact that it is passive and hence not an agent or maker need not be disqualifying in the various ways that Vogt considers. Finally, I am also in strong agreement that the Stoics are making *nous* (*logos*) a cause, but I am agnostic as to whether that was in response to Socrates' intellectual autobiography in the *Phaedo*, and resistant to the idea that the Stoics are on a quest to find a single cause that applies equally to cosmos and human agency (as Vogt also argues in "Brutes").

6

Building Bodies

ὁ τόνος τοῦ πνεύματος ὑφ' οὗ συνδούμενα
τὴν συνέχειαν ἔχει

It is time now to build the Stoic cosmos, putting the foregoing explication of the Stoic principles (*archai*, plural; *archē*, singular) to work. Although the *archai* are eternal, the cosmos itself is not. In fact, the Stoics are famous for their commitment to an everlasting recurrence of cosmic cycles punctuated by periods of conflagration when the world turns into fire and then starts over (as reported by Eusebius, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Philo, Nemesius, et al. in LS 44, 46, and 52). So, the Stoics agree with the post-Parmenidean pluralists that what is fundamental and basic does not come to be or pass away, and that generation and destruction are in a sense just change. As Eusebius reports: “On the world’s periodic destruction into fire at very long intervals ‘destruction’ is not used in an unqualified sense by those who hold that the whole world is dissolved into fire, which they call conflagration. They use the term destruction in place of natural change” (*Praep. ev.* 15.18.2 (46K, trans. LS); cf. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 293 (44E)). My goal in this chapter is to sketch, just in outline, the Stoic cosmogony to show that they have the resources to account for the unity of the cosmos in purely corporeal terms, out of nothing more than their two *archai*, active *logos* and passive *hulē*. The details of Stoic cosmogony are beyond the scope of this project; but, although the details would certainly be instructive, they are not necessary for the coarse-grained account of Stoic metaphysics that I am arguing for.¹

¹ For an entry into these details I refer the reader to Salles, *God and Cosmos*, “Two Stoic Theories,” and *The Stoic Cosmos*; M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy.” It is an important aspect of Stoic theory that they take the cosmos to be a living being, and pursue their cosmogony in biological terms. I don’t wish to deny or suppress this aspect of Stoicism, but cannot engage with it in the scope of this project; see Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter”; Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 35, for the suggestion that the Stoics be considered “vitalists” rather than “materialists”; for the view that the Stoics carry Plato’s biological viewpoint in the *Timaeus* to its fullest consequences, see Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, 70–9; for skepticism about the influence of the *Timaeus* in favor of the view that the Stoics follow Aristotle in carrying the notion of matter to its ultimate conclusion as the substrate of the elements,” see Hahm, *Origins*, 46–7.

Ἀρχαὶ καθ' Αὐτά (*Archai kath' Hauta*)

We will begin at the conflagration, when the two principles are blended through and through, but the process of cosmogony has not yet begun. At this stage, the corporeal substance (i.e. the blend of both *archai*) is a primordial fiery stuff (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1053B (46F); Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.18.2 (46K)); following John Cooper I will call this the originary substance.² It is a fiery blend from which, as the only source and cause, the cosmos will emerge. This original and originary substance is dynamic, since the *archai* are in *sumpatheia*, i.e. in reciprocal interaction with one another throughout (since they are blended through and through), but not yet in directed motion, nor yet of a determinate form or shape (though always of some definite shape and size or other). At this stage, the principles remain quality-less, as amorphous masses in an amorphous fiery blend;³ this originary fire is the element (*stoicheion*, singular; *stoicheia*, plural) par excellence, out of which the canonical elements (earth, water, air, and fire) are composed when the cosmos is generated and into which they are resolved when the cosmos is destroyed (Stobaeus 1.129,2–30,13 (47A)).⁴ Since nothing is really happening during the conflagration and the *archai* are never found apart from each other, I call this Step 0. Step 1 in the Stoic cosmogony is for god to turn corporeal substance, i.e. the originary fire, into water, and Step 2 is to generate the four canonical elements, as Diogenes attests:

- A. Now then, in the beginning, when it [sc. god] was being in its own fashion (*kath' hauton onta*), it turned all of substance (*ousia*) through air into water; and just as the seed is encompassed in the seminal fluid, so too this, being the seminal reason (*spermatikon logon*) of the cosmos, remains as such in the fluid, making matter serviceable to itself for the generation of those things that will be next; then it produces first the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. And Zeno speaks about these in *On the Whole*, and Chrysippus in the first book of the *Physics*, and Archedemus in *On the Elements*. And an element is that first thing (*proton*) from which the things that come to be come to be, and that last thing (*eschaton*) into which they are dissolved.

² Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 96 *et passim*. I am in substantial agreement with Cooper’s analysis and take what I say here to be compatible with his insights, even when I disagree or remain agnostic on some of the details. For example, one point of difference is that I take resistance as push-back to be a stronger notion than Cooper’s, which is that of merely occupying space (97–8). I also think that there is a certain material recalcitrance even to passive *hulē* (cf. Cooper’s n. 12 in particular); a point on which I am agnostic is whether the conflagration is an instantaneous flash or not and whether the originary substance is to be identified with that flash (104–5).

³ The *archai* are not individually fiery, only jointly. See Helle, “Self-Causation,” for an illuminating account of how the properties of a blend differ from those of the ingredients in virtue of their interaction, though I do not follow him in the details of blending or attributes.

⁴ See Cooper, “Physical Elements,” for a close reading of this passage, explaining the three senses of “element” that Stobaeus reports for the Stoics.

κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' ἄερος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδ' ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, εὐεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξῆς γένεσιν· εἴτ' ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἄερα, γῆν. λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων τ' ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀρχέδημος ἐν τινὶ Περὶ στοιχείων. ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται.

DL 7.136 (Dorandi)

I will not pursue the details of the stages by which the various elements are generated (and destroyed), although there is much interesting work here. I do, however, want to be precise about the relationship between god (*logos*), matter (*hulē*), and the substance (*ousia*) that god turns into water and then into the elements. Sometimes I use masculine pronouns for god, as a reflection of the gender of the nouns “*theos*” and “*logos*” and because god is sometimes referred to as Zeus (on the other hand, also Athena, DL 7.147 (54A)), but it is in many ways better to use the neuter “it” to capture the non-anthropomorphic role of god in Stoicism, as I do here. And because the texts do not capitalize “*theos*” (in contrast to “*Dia*” for Zeus), I do not capitalize “god.” I have translated *kath' hauto onta* as “was being or existing in its own fashion,” in contrast to the usual translation, “was by himself.”⁵ One reason I do so is that it does not make sense to think of god as being by himself (or itself) since, as everyone recognizes, god is never found apart from matter; so, there is something dissonant about saying that in the beginning god was alone. Instead, I suggest we see this as indicating that during the conflagration, god *is* or *exists* just in the fashion of its per se *being* as a principle: as a quality-less body capable (as body) of causal interaction, and (as the active principle) imbued with the power of reason and agency. Matter *exists* per se as well, as a quality-less body capable of causal interaction, and (as the passive principle) imbued with passivity and receptiveness. So, the other reason I translate “*kath' hauto*” this way (“in its own fashion” or “per se”), is that I take Diogenes to be signaling that in the beginning the principles are blended, but god has not yet begun acting on matter to create the next world cycle.⁶

⁵ E.g. Hicks, *DL: Lives*; IG; LS; Mensch & Miller, *Lives*; Salles, “Two Stoic Theories.” For support for the alternative sense I propose, see LSJ IV.3. See Todd, “Monism and Immanence,” 144, for *kath' hauto* as independent.

⁶ Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.5, 128–34 (SVF 2.455) may support this: “the solidity of bodies is capable of being shaped and in the case of pneumatic and fiery substance, whenever it should be *kath' hauto*, such a thing allows nothing to come about.” See Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 102–3, for agreement on this point. M. Frede’s account in “Théologie,” although it is deflationary about the sense in which god is a body, recognizes the distinction between primordial god *kath' hauto* in the sense of being in its own formless, fiery state, and god in the more determinate state of elementary fire, and the *pneuma* that makes maximally determinate entities like human beings. See Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 59, for the view that matter never exists unqualified (on the basis of Calcidius, *In Tim.* 292 (Magee)). See Bronowski, *Lekta*, 138, for the view that the active principle is “not corporeal because it is a body [. . .] but corporeal because it is active—and in the case of the active principle, it is, by its very nature and definition, constantly active.”

Now, when Diogenes reports that god turns all of substance into water (via air) I propose to understand “all of substance” as the whole blend of *hulē* and *logos*.⁷ So, to say that god turns all of corporeal substance into water is not to say that *logos* turns all of *hulē* into water but not itself; rather, it as agent turns the whole originary substance, *including* itself, into water. The mechanism by which god acts is causal and corporeal; it is by contact that god effects this change. Now, god does indeed act on matter as patient, and makes matter serviceable to itself, so the question (as raised above) is: how? Given the through and through nature of blending, there is no reason to think of the agent, i.e. the efficient cause, as external in the sense that it is not itself undergoing change with its patient. On the contrary, there is good reason to think that the point of through and through blending is to explain just how the agent *can* act on its patient in this immanent, transformative way—something a hylomorphic conception struggles to do. A strongly literal, homunculus reading of this interaction according to which the agent itself takes on the form that it imparts to the patient makes maximal use of the theory of blending and the causal analysis.

The idea is that the agent imparts form by taking on that shape itself, thereby bringing along the patient with which it is blended (like a ghost pervading and animating a coat from within, perhaps); indeed, if agent and patient are to remain coextended, the one *couldn't* take on a shape or form without the other following suit. So, to say that god transforms all of substance into water is to say that it turns itself *and* matter, i.e. the blend, into water.⁸ Galen even reports that when *pneuma* (air and fire), which is the divine agent once the cosmic cycle is underway, blends with matter (earth and water), it “changes them *along with itself*” (*Caus. cont.* 1.1–2.4 (55F), my emphasis). Although the precise nature of the changes remains unclear, it seems safe to say that it is not matter alone, but matter and *logos* together (as the totality of substance) that are changing, and that this fact is perfectly compatible with their respective roles as agent and patient. Reason is the agent of all change; it effects its changes by changing itself, and insofar as it is blended through and through with matter, whose nature is passive, it thereby changes the patient as well.

What then, one might ask in reply, does it mean to say that god remains behind *as such*, encompassed in the fluid, making matter serviceable *to itself*? Does this not sound like matter is the only thing being changed into water, and thus that “all substance” should be understood as “all matter?” One might even cite further

⁷ Mansfeld, “Zeno and Aristotle on Mixture,” opts for “turns the whole substance”; Mensch & Miller, *Lives*, “all of substance”; Hicks, *DL: Lives*, “the whole of substance”; IG, “all substance.”

⁸ Which is not to say that god becomes water and therefore so does the matter, as if either one without the other could be water, but that by taking on a certain shape or form itself, god is responsible for turning the whole blended substance into water. I appreciate the account Helle, “Self-Causation,” gives of the mechanics of *pneuma* as self-moving, however, I take *logos* itself, the *archē*, to be inherently agential, capable of moving itself and matter with it.

evidence from Calcidius in support of this view, that substance (*ousia*) for the Stoics is matter rather than body:

- B. Therefore, the body of the cosmos, according to the Stoics, is determinate (*determinatum*), one (*unum*), whole (*totum*), and substance (*essentia*): indeed, it is whole since no part of it is missing, whereas it is one since its parts are inseparable and reciprocally cohering; really, it is substance since it is the prime matter of all bodies, through which they say reason runs, solid and universal, just like seed through the genital organs. Indeed, they want for this reason to be as (*quam*) an artisan, but matter (*silva*) or (*sive*) substance (*essentia*) to be cohering body that is without quality (*sine qualitate*), totally malleable (*patibile*) and changeable (*commutabile*).

Calcidius, *In Tim.* 293 (44E1–3)

Calcidius does say here that substance is the matter of all bodies, with reason running through it, and this might look decisive, especially from a hylomorphic perspective. But a closer look, in tandem with *In Tim.* 289 (passage F/Chapter 5), and the intervening context (Magee, *In Tim.*), reveals that Calcidius does not equate substance with matter to the exclusion of reason. At 289 Calcidius turns to the Stoics for their version of the commitment to matter as ungenerated (introduced at 279), shared with the Presocratics and Aristotle (280–8). He opens by telling us first that god is to be conceived of as the artisan, i.e. the rational agent, and matter as the patient. This is to identify the principles in terms of their causal roles as agent and patient (speaking to Philolaus' sense of *archē* as the governing explanatory principle of a theory, Chapter 5). Calcidius tells us, next, that the two principles are “endowed with one substance, making both agent and patient body,” in order to underline the fact that their corporeality is not what distinguishes the two principles, but rather that they are “distinct in virtue of their powers (*virtute*), since it acts (the one) will be god, since it is made (the other) will be matter” (passage F/Chapter 5). The term “substance” (*essentia*) is clearly not restricted to Stoic *hulē* in this context; in fact, matter or (*sive*) substance (reading *sive* inclusively, e.g. Spinoza, *deus sive natura*) is clearly equated with body, which is unambiguously attributed to *both* principles.

Then, in 290, we are told that the Stoics distinguish matter from substance in that *matter* is what underlies all things having qualities, while *substance* is their prime matter in the sense of being their “most ancient foundation, of its own nature without appearance or form.”⁹ And as we have seen, both principles answer to this latter description; at their most ancient, i.e. most primordial, the principles are

⁹ I agree with Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter,” 58, that the distinction here is between proximate matter and foundational substance, but I disagree that this shows that proximate matter is not substance. Rather, this is a terminological distinction according to which “matter” means whatever plays the functional role of *ex hou*, and “substance” means what is most primordial.

the corporeal source of all things, in the original sense of *archē* as source. So, when Calcidius describes substance as prime matter, he is not equating it with Stoic *hulē*, but rather with *all* of body qua body, the foundation of all *existence*. Hence bronze is the matter but not the substance of a statue because it is the proximate body that is the artisan's patient, and it is not originary or foundational in being "the cause of existence for both them and all other things"; Calcidius confirms these points in order, in 291 and 292, so that he can begin drawing conclusions at 293, including our target report that body is substance because it is the prime matter of all bodies, with reason running through it. Given the preceding context, it is clear that for substance to be characterized as "prime matter" is for it to be body considered as the foundational substance, i.e. all of body qua body, which is to say both principles together in their per se state of formlessness.

Further, for substance to have reason running through it is not to say that substance is the patient, *hulē*, blended with the agent, *logos*; rather, reason is everywhere in all of body, either because it *is* reason or because it is blended with it. Consider: cake is batter with flour running through it, which correctly captures the relation between substance (cake), body (batter), and *logos* (flour)—substance is body with *logos* everywhere in it. Now consider: batter (substance) is batter (matter) with flour (reason) running through it, which incorrectly equates substance with matter to the exclusion of *logos*.¹⁰ This latter reading makes the passage uninformative and, more importantly, presupposes that substance is matter. My suggestion is that matter in this context is not the Stoic principle *hulē*, but *all* of corporeal substance, i.e. body, and this totality of corporeal substance is what god turns into water via air in the first stage of cosmogony. There is no surprise in a hylomorphic commentator referring to body as "matter" or "prime matter," only confusion if we fail to correct for the distortion.¹¹

In fact, Calcidius goes on to make this point explicit at the end of passage B just quoted when he says that the Stoics want to see reason in the role of artisan, and that "matter or substance is cohering body that is without quality, totally malleable (*patibile*) and changeable (*commutabile*)."¹² When matter is glossed here as substance and then defined as cohering body that is malleable and changeable, it answers to the totality of body, i.e. both principles, understood from the agent's

¹⁰ On this picture, milk could be the *hulē* and then we would also say that substance (cake) is body (batter) with milk (*hulē*) running through it. I have not put it this way above, in order to preserve the form of the original passage, which works in terms of *logos* running through substance. For the image to work it should be supposed that milk and flour are the only two ingredients of our batter and cake, and recalled that the ingredients are blended rather than fused (as they would be in a real cake).

¹¹ As argued in Chapter 3, from the hylomorphic perspective it is axiomatic that where there is body there is matter and where there is form or reason there is an incorporeal. Thus, when the Stoics say that substance is body, this is understood as the claim that substance is matter; what is missing from this picture is precisely the Stoic option, to recognize two kinds of body, *logos* and *hulē*, so that body does not entail matter.

¹² For the interesting suggestion, with deep bibliography, that substance differs from matter only conceptually, or *kat' epinoian*, but are the same in reality (*hupostasis*), see S. White, "Posidonius," 45–9.

perspective as what will underlie the qualities it comes to engender. Further confirmation follows in 294, when Calcidius reports that god is *both* the origin and the cause of all things, and that god *both* acts and undergoes all things; these statements evince awareness that the Stoic god is not incorporeal, or weakly corporeal, or otherwise reducible to form (and supports the homunculus reading, I would say).¹³ And so when Diogenes reports in passage A that god makes matter serviceable to itself, we have good reason to think of god as the artisan, making all of body into the proximate matter required to proceed to the next step of cosmogony.¹⁴ Thus it is correct that god is everywhere in substance *because* god is blended with matter, but incorrect to take these two statements as equivalent: god's being everywhere in body is not equivalent, or even reducible, to god's being blended with matter (but blending with matter is the reason that god is in *all* of body, as opposed to only half of it). So, to be precise, the relationship between god, matter, and substance is that god (*logos*) and matter (*hulē*) together are the totality of substance (*ousia*, i.e. body (DL 7.150, passage E/Chapter 3; Clement, *Strom* 2.436 (SVF 2.359)). And a closer look at textual evidence that from a hylomorphic perspective seems to equate substance with the Stoic principle *hulē* shows a different sense of "matter" in play, one that in fact picks out all of body in a certain functional role and thus not Stoic *hulē* to the exclusion of *logos*.

The Cosmogony

So, with this important technicality about the relationship between god (the active principle), matter (the passive principle), and substance (the totality of body, i.e. both principles together) in hand, we can see that what Diogenes reports is that the first step in Stoic cosmogony is for *logos*, as agent, to turn all of substance (itself and *hulē*, the patient it is blended with) into water (via air). Stobaeus calls this process "composition by alteration" (*sunistasthai kata metabolē*), and explains that it happens by condensation; we can imagine that god as the agent makes itself smaller and of a determinate shape, bringing along the matter with which it is coextended and thereby condensing the whole blend from fire through air into water. The second step Diogenes reports is for god to turn that water into the four canonical elements: earth, water, air, and fire; hence, the Stoic elements are not

¹³ M. Frede, "Théologie," 225, argues that the evidence of Calcidius, *In Tim.* 294 (passage G/Chapter 5), that god is matter or an inseparable quality illustrates the Stoics' reductive spirit according to which god is a body only in a weak sense that has no definite extension, it being matter only in the sense of matter in a certain state; he also argues that *In Tim.* 289 (passage F/Chapter 5), which reports that the principles are "one in substance," is evidence that the Stoics take matter and god to be just one body, as opposed to both being body. See Sedley, "Matter," for an extended discussion of Calcidius from the orthodox perspective that Stoic *ousia* is *hulē*.

¹⁴ Perhaps corresponding to Stobaeus' third sense of element (47A); this analysis is also in accord with Stobaeus 1.132,27–133,11; 133,18–23 (28q).

strictly elementary in the sense of being basic, nor are they eternal as the *archai* are.¹⁵ They are, however, that out of which everything else is composed and into which it is dissolved, “plants, the whole world, and its contents” (Stobaeus 1.129,2–30,13 (47A)). I will not seek to analyze this transformation of the elements further, nor will I explore the details of how or in what order God transforms this new substance into the four elements. It need only be remembered that these elements are themselves composed of the two fundamental principles, *logos* and *hulē*. Further, no new ingredients are being added as the cosmogony unfolds; everything proceeds exclusively from these two principles in entirely corporeal terms. Hence, whatever the precise details of the unfolding of the elements, it is established that Stoic cosmogony proceeds by composition out of two fundamental bodies. If the originary substance is a composite, then so is the rest.¹⁶

The next step in the cosmogony, once the four elements are generated, Step 3, is that fire and air combine to compose *pneuma*, or fiery breath, which will take on the role of divine, unifying agent in the cosmos, while earth and water compose the matter of the cosmos (Alexander, *Mixt.* 224,14a–21 (47I1+), 225,6–8 (Todd), *Mant.* 26,13 (SVF 2.786); Galen, *Caus. cont.* 1.1–2.4 (55F), *Plac.* 5.3.8 (47H); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 217,36–218,1 (28L3, passage B3/Chapter 9); LS 47A–M). Hence *pneuma* will be called god and the blend of earth and water will be called matter, after the active and passive roles that each will play in this stage of the cosmogony. Every qualified body, every individual for the Stoics is a blend of matter and *pneuma*, wherein the *pneuma*, as tensile agent, unifies the compound. There is some debate as to whether fire and air are blended, as opposed to mixed in some other way that is also a many-to-one composition relation.¹⁷ However, again, the

¹⁵ On which see Salles, “Elementos.”

¹⁶ In this I differ from Cooper, “Physical Elements,” 105, who says that the *archai* do compose the originary substance, but are not that *out of which* the rest of the cosmos comes to be and are thus not elements of the cosmos; I agree that the Stoic *archai* are not the same as the elements (earth, water, air, fire), but disagree that the cosmos is not made out of the *archai* as its ultimate components. I also agree that the *archai* are never in fact found apart, but disagree that this means that they are not that into which all things are reduced, as the broadest definition of “element” requires.

¹⁷ Technically, only Alexander, *Mixt.* 224,14a–21 (47I1), and Galen, *Plac.* 5.3.8 (47H), state that they are *blended*, as opposed to mixed; while it is possible that they are mixed in some way other than blending, this seems unlikely and unproductive. To the present point, the texts may be unclear about whether these elements are blended, but they are quite clear that *pneuma* is a composite of air and fire; thus I resist Sorabji, *MSM*, 86–93, whose reading of these texts aims to show that *pneuma* is not made out of air and fire at all. For example: “if *pneuma*, composed out (*ek*) of air and fire, has gone to and fro through all bodies by being blended (*kekrasthai*) everywhere in them, and the being of each of these [sc. bodies] depends on these [sc. air and fire], how could it ever be a body that is still something simple?” (Alexander, *Mixt.* 224,14a–21 (47I1)); Alexander goes on to raise problems of priority and posteriority, conflating *logos* with *pneuma*, since both are divine and called god, all of which turns on *pneuma* being a composite of air and fire. The resolution to this problem is not to equate *pneuma* with fire (or with air), but to recognize that the divine active principle, *logos*, is not the same thing as divine active *pneuma*; both are active, and both are called god, but that is not to equate *pneuma* with the divine *archē*, it is merely to say that *pneuma* gets to be called god because it plays the active role at this later stage of the cosmogony. *Mixt.* 225,6–8 (Todd) reports that the fact that *pneuma* is a *sugkrima* of air and fire is a consequence they must accept since they say *pneuma* has the substance (*ousia*) of air and fire,

details of that debate need not concern us here; whether fire and air mix or blend to compose *pneuma* will not matter to this analysis.¹⁸

Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that *pneuma* is a blend of fire and air rather than a case of juxtaposition or fusion, both because of its role as cosmic agent, which one would expect to have the maximal unity of an agent-patient blend, and because of the tension generated by the hot fire and cold air in combination, which one would also expect to possess the maximal interactive, or sympathetic, unity of blending. In fact, blending seems like the best response to Alexander's question: "what is the simultaneous movement of breath in opposite directions, by which it sustains everything in which it is present, since, in their own words, it is a breath which moves simultaneously out of itself and into itself?" (*Mixt.* 224,23–6 (47I2, trans. LS)). By blending cold air and hot fire so that each literally retains its substance and qualities while coextended, the Stoics have the theoretical resources to explain how breath can move simultaneously in opposite directions: each ingredient in a blend remains the same individual with its own powers, which explains the opposition of *pneuma*, while their being completely coextended explains the simultaneity of the opposition. This simultaneous opposition that the Stoics call tension (*tonos*) is the unifying force of the cosmos and its individual parts (Alexander, *Mixt.* 223,25–36 (47L); Nemesius 70,6–1,4 (47J)). It is by having *pneuma* of a certain rarity and tension that the Stoics explain the *scala naturae*: inanimate objects like stones, logs, and our bones are individual bodies unified by *pneuma* of the form the Stoics call tenor (*hexis*); the more rarefied *pneuma* of plants, hair, and fingernails is tenor in motion, and termed *phusis*; and the most rarefied *pneuma*, found in animals, is soul, or *psychē* (DL 7.138–9 (47O); Galen, *Intr.* 14.726.7–11 (47N); Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.22–3 (47P), *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 35–6 (47Q), *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* 2.4 (47R)).¹⁹ When this dynamic *pneuma* is blended with matter, as tensile agent to slack patient, it unifies the compound, acting as the glue that "forces" the components into a natural union, tarring the ark inside and out (as Philo puts it, *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* 2.4 (47R)). In the terms of Stoic causal theory, *pneuma* is the sustaining cause (*sunektikon aition*) of every individual body. Here we see in practice what I argued above in principle: that the

but this does not show that *pneuma* is not a mixture of some kind, as Sorabji, *MSM*, 86, sees it; likewise, in *Mant.* 26,13 (SVF 2.786), Alexander says *pneuma* is a *sugkeimenon pōs* out of fire and air, as do Galen, *Plac.* 5.3.8 (47H), and Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 218,1 (28L3, passage B3/Chapter 9). In support of *pneuma* as a blend of air and fire, see Helle, "Self-Causation," 23–4; for doubts that *pneuma* is air and fire, and the possibility that it is *aithēr*, see Todd, "Monism and Immanence," 149–54.

¹⁸ Perhaps it was even a matter of contention within the school, but that will not affect the coarse-grained commitment to cosmogony as composition. This is a good example of the way in which my pursuit of a Stoic orthodoxy is, I hope, uncontroversial; the agreement I find is at the level of doctrinal background, which is presupposed by the debates there were.

¹⁹ Technically god, or god's *hēgemonikon* in the aether, is the most rarefied *pneuma*.

blending of agent and patient is the principle of cosmic unity. Galen attests to the role of *pneuma* as sustaining cause:

- C. (1) The first philosophers of my acquaintance to speak of a sustaining cause (*contentivam causam*) were the Stoics. Their view is that from the four elements are produced those bodies that Aristotle calls homogeneous and that are described by Plato as “the first to be generated,” while all other bodies are simply compounds of these. (2) Of the elements themselves, some they call material and some active and dynamic. They maintain that the material elements are held together by those that are dynamic, fire and air being dynamic in their view, while earth and water are material. They say that in compounds the dynamic elements pervade the material through and through, that is to say, air and fire penetrate water and earth. Air is cold and fire is hot. The natural effect of air is to consolidate and thicken substance, whereas fire naturally causes expansion, loosening and widening. The two active elements have fine parts and the other two thick parts. All the substance with the fine parts the Stoics call breath, and they think that the function of this breath is to sustain natural and animal bodies. By natural bodies I mean those produced by nature and not by human skill, like copper, stones, gold, wood and those parts of the animal body that are called the primary and homogeneous parts, that is, nerves, arteries, veins, cartilages, bones and everything else of the same sort.

Galen, *Caus. cont.* 1.1–3 (55F1 part, trans. LS with changes)

Galen’s report is useful for reconstructing the later stages of Stoic cosmology, from the formation of the elements at Step 3 to the composition of individual bodies and their parts at Step 4. Air and fire are confirmed to be the active and dynamic elements that bind the passive and material elements, earth and water (C2). Galen adds in C3 that for something to be a unified composite, the active and passive must be blended, and then in C4 describes the mechanics of such a blend that explain its unifying tension: air and fire, being cold and hot, act against each other. Then, in C5, Galen introduces the idea of rarity and density, explaining that *pneuma* is all the corporeal substance that is fine or rare, i.e. the active elements, and, further, that *pneuma* is the sustaining cause of all bodies composed by its blending with matter, i.e. all corporeal substance that is thick, or dense. The sustaining cause makes a thing what it is, e.g. this individual stone, that tree, or Socrates; as such, *pneuma* is responsible for the unity and persistence of all things, including the cosmos itself considered as a unified composite of matter and *pneuma*. It is no surprise, then, that in the role of agent *pneuma* is referred to as god. In fact, anything in the role of cosmic agent will be god for the Stoics, as Aëtius reports:

- D. The Stoics made god out to be (1) intelligent (*noeros*), a designing fire (*pur technikon*) which proceeds methodically towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal principles (*spermatikoi logoi*) according to which everything comes about according to fate, and (2) a breath (*pneuma*) pervading the whole world, which (3) takes on different names owing to the alterations of the matter through which it passes.

Aëtius 1.7.33 (46A)

- E. Posidonius [said that God is] intelligent and fiery breath (*pneuma*), not having a form but transforming into what it wishes and co-assimilating itself to all things.

Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

Aëtius 1.7.10 (EK F101, trans. S. White)

We see in D1 that in addition to the active principle, *logos*, the Stoics give the name of god to the originary substance—or whatever is the precise account of what goes on at the first step(s) of cosmogony when god turns all of substance into water via air and remains behind as seed. Further, in D2 and E, that god is formless *pneuma* that pervades the whole world, i.e. is everywhere in the role of agent. And, finally, in D3 that this breath takes on different names according to what it does to the matter with which it is blended, something that we saw above in the *scala naturae* of *hexis*, *phusis*, and *psyche*, which is determined according to the rarity and tension of the *pneuma* that acts on the matter to make a stone, plant, or animal (respectively).

Diogenes also reports that god is “called by many descriptions according to his powers. For they call him Zeus as the cause of all things; Zēn insofar as he is responsible for, or pervades, life; Athena because his commanding faculty stretches into the aether. . .[etc.]” (DL 7.147 (54A)). And Cicero gives a long list of what god is for the Stoics: the cosmos itself and the whole, the commanding faculty of the cosmos and the aether, the common nature of all things, fate and necessity, fire, and immortal men (*Nat. deor.* 1.39 (54B)). There are also several senses of “matter” in play, one referring originally and most properly to the passive principle, but also one referring to the four elements as a whole (DL 7.137), and another to the combination of earth and water (LS 47A–M). I stress this point, that the Stoics use “god” and “matter” in several senses, in order to respond to ancient and enduring objections that the Stoics are making god and matter both prior and posterior.²⁰

²⁰ As we will see in the context of the Stoic Categories, “*hupokeimenon*” is also a term like this, which picks out a functional role. Support for the idea that the Stoics operated in terms of roles, calling different entities by the same name insofar as they play the same functional roles, can be found in Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter”; Sedley, “Matter”; Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability”;

Alexander, for example, argues that if *pneuma* is a product of air and fire then it cannot also be an uncompounded body, as required for it to be god; further, that god would be secondary to matter if *pneuma* is both god and a compound of air and fire (*Mixt.* 224,14a–21, 225,10–7 (Todd)). Richard Sorabji takes this charge very seriously and argues not only that *pneuma* is not itself a compound, but that the two *archai* are not to be considered *ingredients* at all, let alone the “embarrassingly strange” view that they blend “like so many interpenetrating billiard balls;” he is also moved by the charge that for god both to *be pneuma* and to *produce* it is for god to be self-creating and self-acting.²¹

However, there is no real worry to be had that the Stoic god is acting *on* itself, or creating itself. God is, first and most fundamentally, the active principle, *logos*; it is self-moving but does not thereby act on itself as its own patient. Once the cosmogony is underway and of a certain complexity, this active role is played by the more complex body, *pneuma*, that the active principle has created; therefore, it also is called god. The fact that *pneuma* is characterized as formless and transforming itself into whatever it wishes, just like the active principle, *logos*, does not mean that *logos* and *pneuma* are the same body.²² Rather, it evinces the fact that *logos* and *pneuma* are both called god because they both play a divine, active role; both *logos* and *pneuma* are formless bodies (although *pneuma* is certainly of a much more determinate form than *logos* is at the conflagration) that blend with matter to turn the whole of corporeal substance into the cosmos. There is no question of god self-creating or self-acting, because “god” is ambiguous between the entities that play the role of agent. Likewise, for “matter.” The term refers first and most precisely to the passive principle, *hulē*; once the cosmogony reaches a certain level of complexity, however, the combination of earth and air takes over the role of patient to the agent *pneuma*, and is thus rightly called matter as well.²³ With these misunderstandings out of the way, the distinct entities and the composition relations between them, in the sense of ontological dependence on prior, more fundamental entities, can now be illustrated in the following grounding map for the Stoic cosmos (see Fig. 6.1)

note, however, that there is no need to hypostatize these roles as Hensley does. See Sedley’s n. 28 for debate with Gourinat over whether DL 7.137 should be read as reporting that matter is qualified (*poios*) or unqualified (*apoios*).

²¹ Sorabji, *MSM*, 88–9, 95–8, 103; in the next section Sorabji takes seriously the puzzles of Plotinus, Plutarch, and Alexander that show the Stoic conception of body is itself threatened; for sympathetic accounts see Collette-Dučić & Delcomminette, “Mélange”; Sedley, “Origins”; Mikeš, “Bodies?” For a defense of self-action see Todd, “Monism and Immanence,” 141.

²² Notice that this position does not require but, rather, underwrites the internal debates over the status of *pneuma*, fire, and aether, which are fruitfully described in S. White, “Posidonius,” 43–4.

²³ For helpful arguments that god and matter both have two senses, unqualified and qualified, corresponding to the principles and downstream, complex entities with the same active/passive properties, see Gourinat, “Matter and Prime Matter.”




Fig. 6.1 Grounding Map for the Stoic Cosmos

The point of specifying that this is a grounding map is to make clear that the figure illustrates the hierarchical relation of these entities to each other, which ones are fundamental and how the others depend on them. Thus in illustrating the *archai* separately at the bottom, I am not saying that the *archai* are ever as a matter of fact separated from one another, but that as a matter of metaphysics, each is a fundamental, ungrounded body independent of the other. The *archai* are represented as the ungrounded grounds (or “root nodes”) of the cosmos, out of which all other bodies are composed; this map tells us in terms of fundamentality what it is to be a body of each kind, from the ground(s) up. The originary substance is the simple blended state of *logos* and *hulē* at the conflagration, Step 0; they are in *sumpatheia* but god is not yet acting or creating (nor therefore is matter undergoing that action), hence god is described as being *kath’ hautō* (DL 7.134 (44B, passage A/Chapter 5)). The blend is formless yet of some definite shape and size. Step 1 in the cosmogony is the path from the originary substance to water of some kind (here, again, the precise number and nature of stages is rough, intended as a placeholder for the precise worked-out account of how the substance passes through air to water). Step 2 is for god as agent to turn that water, which is the whole of corporeal substance, into the four distinct elements. Step 3 is for fire and air to combine to compose *pneuma* while earth and water combine to compose matter; and Step 4 is for *pneuma* and matter to blend to generate individual bodies and the cosmos as a whole (and again, the picture is coarse, intended to include the various steps of building a body, including the intermediate homogeneous bodies described by Galen in passage C and the rest of the anatomy generated from them). Step 4 answers the Special Composition question: many become one when agent *pneuma* blends with its patient matter, “tarring the ark inside and out” and

acting as a sustaining cause.²⁴ My description of Step 4 is coarse not only vertically in covering many subsidiary steps but also horizontally, in its breadth, covering composition for all animals, plants, and the rest of the objects we find in the natural world as well as the cosmos itself. Thus the label “(a) body” at the top of the grounding map is neutral in all these respects, covering all bodies that are wholes.

All individual bodies in the cosmos (stones, trees, people), as well as the cosmos itself, are composite entities unified by the agency of *pneuma* (Alexander, *Mixt.* 223,25–36 (47L); Stobaeus 1.166,4–22 (49J); LS, 288–9). They are composites of agent and patient, bodies on an *ontological* par that are nevertheless maximally unified and even inseparable—while remaining two—by the kind of interaction that is unique to agent-patient blends, i.e. those with the causal complexity required to “tar the ark inside and out.” The tension of the *pneuma* from the opposite motions of the component elements, air and fire, does two things: it gives the fine or rare body the brute strength and resistance to work the thicker matter, to change itself (like the ghost in a coat) and bring along, or push, the matter coextended with it (rather than cease to be blended); and, secondly, it makes *pneuma* a unifying and self-limiting force. As Nemesius reports for the Stoics: “there exists in bodies a kind of tensile movement which moves simultaneously inwards and outwards, the outward movement producing quantities and qualities and in the inward one unity and substance” (Nemesius 70,6–1,4 (47J, trans. LS)).

An individual body does not consist either of some matter plus a form that gives it structure and unity, nor of matter plus a limit that contains it.²⁵ Rather, an individual body generated at Step 4 is composed of *pneuma* and *matter*, which are unified by the sympathetic tenor of the through and through blend of agent and patient. This kind of causal unity achieved by the agency of *pneuma* is uniquely self-limiting and self-unifying; as a result, the Stoics have no need to individuate bodies by forms or place or any other kind of external limits in building their cosmos. The fact that the majority of our textual evidence concerning Stoic limits comes in the context of geometry and infinite divisibility underscores this point.²⁶ Simplicius also testifies to the self-sustaining nature of Stoic bodies in his commentary on the category of *where*, when he explicitly contrasts the Stoic position that “if, as the Stoics say, place subsists [merely] as an appendage (*paruphistatai*)

²⁴ We can also put this point by saying that the Stoics will agree with Plato about the ontological import of unifying relations, as described by Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes*; they will agree with the spirit of saying that weaving is generation, and ascribe that role to blending. Or by saying they are “believers” in composition in the sense given by Bennett, “Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology,” 45–6.

²⁵ See M. J. White, “The Stoic Model,” and Scade, “Cosmological Limits,” for arguments that the Stoics remove limit entities from their physics.

²⁶ Thus, I am not entirely sympathetic to Scade’s thesis in “Cosmological Limits” that limits have an important cosmological role to play, the importance of tension and ratio notwithstanding; his account turns on a rather specific, and perhaps strained, reading of “limited” as “being determined,” by which he seeks what, to my mind, is an artificial affinity between Plato and the Stoics (and a violation of the principle of equipoise as described in the principle of maximal charity described in the Introduction).

to bodies, then it will also adopt its definition from them, to the extent that it is completed by the bodies [sc. on which it depends],” with the Pythagorean position of Archytas that “if, on the other hand, place has being (*ousia*) per se. . . then place defines bodies and delimits them in itself” (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 361,10–5, trans. Gaskin). That bodies are internally self-unifying, without any appeal to limits, is another important aspect of the Stoic departure from hylomorphism.

Conclusions

Thus, we can conclude that the Stoic cosmogony is indeed completed out of nothing more than two independent bodies, *logos* and *hulē*, the one divine, rational, and creative, the other passive and slack; out of these two *archai* alone the Stoics offer a completely corporealist cosmology without form, embracing causal complexity in their principles instead of ontological complexity. This commitment to the corporeality and distinctness of the principles goes well beyond the new orthodoxy, leaving it behind along with the old orthodoxy that the *archai* are in some sense or other not really two distinct and solid bodies. I rest here my case for the Stoic response to Plato’s challenge (ii) *Defend the Giants*, and maintain that only bodies *are* and deliver a completely corporealist cosmology. The Stoics achieve this, I have argued, by crafting their principles, *logos* and *hulē*, to be *archai* in the fullest sense of the term; but, to recognize this possibility requires a paradigm shift away from hylomorphic and atomistic assumptions about body and toward the Stoics on their own terms. The Stoic *archai* are fundamental and simple bodies, in contrast to the hylomorphic conception of body that takes all bodies to be composites of matter and form. And in contrast to the atomistic assumption that body is *full*, the Stoic *archai* are completely malleable, continuous, finite masses that admit of varying degrees of rarity and density and, therewith, the possibility of through and through blending. When a blend takes place between agent and patient bodies, i.e. with causal complexity, they compose a new entity that is completely unified—two independent bodies with complementary capacities come together in complete interactive *sumpatheia* to make (i.e. generate) and sustain a single unified whole_{Count} (which is also a whole_{Integrated}), the cosmos itself (and all its individual parts). That is how the Stoics account for cosmic unity with causal complexity rather than ontological complexity.²⁷ They do indeed say what it is to be (a) body—solid three-dimensional extension that is finite and malleable, hence continuous and subject to through and through blending—before plunging into their “extravagant cosmological theorizing.”

²⁷ Thus, Harte’s structure-content distinction in *Plato on Parts and Wholes* picked up by Koslicki in *Structure* cuts across Stoic conceptions, with structure imbued by the active body, and content provided by both bodies together. See Chapter 3, “Digression on Mereology,” for different kinds of whole.

The Categories, State of the Debate

ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιά καὶ πῶς ἔχοντα
καὶ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα

The corporealist cosmology described in the preceding chapters is only one part of Stoic corporealism. As argued in Chapter 1, Plato's third challenge in the *Sophist* is to *Reform the Giants*, and dare to corporealize the soul and even the virtues. The uncivilized Giants, recall, are shamelessly eliminative about the virtues, while the civilized Giants are too ashamed either to eliminate or to corporealize them. The challenge is put in terms of justice and wisdom, because as qualities of soul they are the most recalcitrant case for the Sons of the Earth (so much so that the option to corporealize them is never even taken up by the Visitor). It is clear, though, that the challenge applies to the full scope of the theory of the Forms; whatever that may be exactly, it is certainly not restricted to the virtues. The Visitor confirms just how broad the scope of the task is, when he introduces the Late Learners:

Surely we're speaking of a man even when we name him several things, that is, when we apply colors to him and shapes, sizes, defects, and virtues. In these cases and a million others we say that he's not only a man but also is good and indefinitely many different things. And similarly on the same account we take a thing to be one, and at the same time we speak of it as many, by using many names for it.

(251 A 8–B 3, trans. N. P. White)

Thus, the focus on virtues should not distract us from recognizing that Plato's third challenge concerns not just qualities of soul, but all qualities generally. The challenge is to give a corporealist account of what makes something F in all the ways that it is, e.g. human, Socrates, wise, southwest of the agora, and "a million others." How can a corporealist system account for the identity conditions, kinds, and all qualities of a body without invoking Form? How, further, can it meet Plato's fourth challenge, *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, and make *being* capable of both rest and change, granting the children's wish ("Both!")? And can they meet the fifth challenge, *Silence the Late Learners*, and show that one thing can be called many even while remaining one thing?

The Stoic response to all three of these challenges can be found in the four-fold schema called the Categories, which Jacques Brunschwig has dubbed their

“inflationist somatology,” and A. A. Long describes as the Stoics’ “seizing the nettle” that their materialist predecessors would not.¹ This explanatory schema makes each of us four: substrate (*hupokeimenon*), qualified individual (*poion*),² individual disposed (*pōs echon*), and individual relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*), as attested by Plotinus (*Enn.* 6.1.25,1–3 (Armstrong)) and Simplicius:

- A. The Stoics deem it right to reduce the number of primary genera into fewer, and they admit certain little changes in those few. For they make the cut into four: into substrates (*hupokeimena*), qualified individuals (*poia*), individuals disposed (*pōs echonta*), and individuals relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echonta*).

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 66,32–7,2 (27F)

The qualified individual is itself of two kinds, the commonly qualified (*koinōs poion*) and the uniquely, or peculiarly qualified individual (*idiōs poion*) (Dexippus, *In Ar. Cat.* 23,25–4,4 (SVF 2.374); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 48,11–6 (28E); Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 28,18–9 (28G); Simplicius, *In Ar. De an.* 217,36–8,2 (28I)). Now, the first thing to note about this report is that while Simplicius does contrast the Stoics’ four-fold cut with Aristotle’s ten Categories, he does not portray the Stoics as criticizing or even engaging with Aristotle’s taxonomy, so much as giving their own division of *being* into four kinds. It is important to keep in mind that the Stoics themselves do not refer to these four genera as “categories” or as “genera” for that matter; this label has been imposed by the sources and sustained by the scholarship.³ I remain agnostic as to how far the Stoics were aware of and responding to Aristotle with their Categories, but irrespective of the answer to this question, I do not think that the Stoic Categories are much like Aristotle’s at all; indeed, I think this subject-inherence or substance-attribute model has obscured the Stoic picture for centuries.⁴ I will nevertheless continue to refer to this schema as “the Categories” for the sake of convenience and convention, but always with this caveat in mind.

Because there is no scholarly consensus about the Categories, and the existing strains of interpretation are not engaged with each other, I will begin with an

¹ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 72; A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 153.

² I render “*poion*” as “qualified individual” to capture the fact that the second Category is the qualified, or a qualified thing, or something qualified, in contrast to a quality (*poiotēs*), in support of which see Sedley, “Criterion”; LS, 172–6. I consistently call the second Category the *poion*, in the neuter, even though it is sometimes given as *poios*, to capture that this category covers all manner of individuals; Sedley, “Criterion,” n. 16, opts for *poios* in support of his developmental thesis that Chrysippus introduced the Categories in response to Academic attacks tailored to the Stoics for whom growth on a human model is central to cosmology. However, note that *P. Oxy.* (28C) gives Plato as an example of a *poion*. Supporting arguments for “*hupokeimenon*” as “substrate” (as LS; Sorabji, *MSM*; and Sedley, “Criterion” and “Diachronic,” render it) in Chapter 8.

³ For helpful remarks about the use of this term for this Stoic schema, see Graeser, “Categories,” 349–51. But note that I do not agree with Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, 88, that the Stoic Categories “had certainly been developed from a very critical reply to Aristotle’s approach.”

⁴ For references to those on either side of the question of Aristotle’s influence, see Introduction, n. 62.

overview of the interpretive landscape. Then I will present the textual evidence and lay out the interpretive debates in greater detail, surveying the existing interpretations alongside each other. In the following chapter, with this analysis of the state of the debate in hand, I will propose my own account of the Categories, resolving the interpretive difficulties we encounter here, and showing how the Stoics complete their corporealism to *Reform the Giants*, *Silence the Late Learners*, and *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*.

Interpretive Landscape

The gamut of interpretations of these Stoic Categories runs rather wide, from semantic readings to ontological, metaphysical, and even physical readings. I will lay out this spectrum of views, and then introduce the interpretive bias that sees the Categories along hylomorphic lines or on a subject-inherence model as well as the developmentalist strain of interpretation that sees the schema as an evolving theory. These latter two perspectives, though strictly independent, run through the interpretive spectrum, resulting in a variety of interpretive options. As I introduce the interpretive landscape, I will transliterate the names of the Categories rather than translate, in an effort to remain neutral at this stage of the analysis.

On one end of the interpretive spectrum, there are those who see the Categories in semantic terms, either as *lekta* (sayables, roughly, the meanings of our words), or reference classes, or grammatical distinctions. Johnny Christensen, for example, takes the Categories to be general reference classes of objects insofar as they are the “denotata of meanings of basic types.”⁵ Thus, as he sees it, the *hupokeimenon* is the denotation of a deictic sign that means existence (*ousia*); the *poion*, in turn, denotes an individual quale and means an individual or peculiar quality (the peculiar quality is the meaning of a proper name); the *pōs echon* is a predicate denoting an object in some state, and the *pros ti pōs echon* is an incomplete predicate denoting an object in some state relative to something else. A. C. Lloyd takes the Categories to be *lekta*, or things meant, but corresponding to grammatical categories; thus the *hupokeimenon* is what is denoted by the subject of a sentence, i.e. what is claimed to exist by the use of a personal pronoun; the *poion* is what is connoted (rather than denoted) either by a name (in the case of the peculiar quality) or an appellation, e.g. human (in the case of a common quality); the *pōs echon* is the disposition attributed to a quality, connoted by verbs; and the *pros ti pōs echon* is the relative disposition connoted by conjunctions and prepositions.⁶

⁵ Christensen, *Unity*, 48–52.

⁶ Lloyd, “Grammar and Metaphysics.” Menn, “Categories,” 226–7, agrees that pronouns signify *hupokeimena* and nouns signify *poia*, but takes participles rather than verbs to signify *pōs echonta*.

Andreas Graeser pursues a similar line as well, taking the Categories to indicate general reference classes, which he understands as categories of meaning that indicate different aspects of an entity whose existence is attested deictically.⁷ Thus, as Graeser sees it, the *hupokeimenon* is the subject (*ptōsis*) denoted by demonstrative reference, the *poion* is a qualification denoted by a common or proper name, the *pōs echon* is a disposition denoted by a complete *lekton* (i.e. a whole proposition), and the *pros ti pōs echon* is a relative disposition denoted by an incomplete *lekton* (i.e. a predicate). Graeser also argues that the Stoics cannot have entities that are both linguistic and extra-linguistic as Aristotle does, and therefore in addition to the *linguistic* reference classes above, they recognize a second set of categories, or *natural* classes, which are the basic types of existents that themselves fall under the various categories of reference class. This classification of the ontological constituents of reality (i.e. the extra-linguistic items), as Graeser reads Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 166,15–29 (29C), falls into non-relational (*kath' hauta*) and relational beings (*pros ti*), i.e. bearers of attributes or Aristotelian substantial particulars, and their attributes or qualities; attributes themselves are then further subdivided into two kinds, intrinsically formed properties (*kata diaphoran*) and those that are not genuine properties because they have no real physical counterparts and are thus *lekta* overlapping with the other set of categories (*pros ti pōs echon*).

Margaret Reesor, departing from a semantic analysis, argues that the Categories should be understood rather as ontological distinctions corresponding to genus and species (*differentiae*); for Reesor, Stoic ontology is the dialectical activity of definition and division (*diairesis*), according to which the genus serves as ontological substratum (*hupokeimenon*) for its more specific *differentiae*.⁸ Thus she argues that the *hupokeimenon*, or substance, is to be identified with the common quality (*koinōs poion*) as an unqualified (i.e. generic) substratum, e.g. human; and the *poion* is to be identified with the peculiarly qualified entity (*idiōs poion*), which is a particular (rather than generic) kind of substratum, e.g. Socrates. These two substrata are then subject to additional differentiation corresponding to the *pōs echon* and the *pros ti pōs echon*. Further, she sees *poion* (qualified) as a wider concept that is itself a substrate for the narrower *poiotēs* (quality), e.g. the *poion*, lives, is substrate for the more highly differentiated *poiotēs*, soul. In sum, so far as I understand the view, Reesor takes the Categories as ontological distinctions that correspond to dialectical divisions, and the relation between them to be that of more generic serving as substrate (*hupokeimenon*) for more specific or differentiated.⁹

⁷ Graeser, "Categories." Graeser takes himself to be following Lloyd and does not cite Christensen, but his view strikes me as more akin to Christensen's than to Lloyd's.

⁸ Reesor, "Quality," "Categories," and "Poion and Poiotes." Reesor's view is endorsed by Rist, "Categories and their Uses"; Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 49–51.

⁹ I leave aside (but would place here in the gamut of interpretations) De Lacy, "Categories," who makes the creative but, to my mind, misguided suggestion that the Stoic Categories are "methodological principles" that cut across logic, physics, and ethics to unify Stoic philosophy, a thesis built on questionable evidence of Roman Stoicism (Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Cicero), questionable not only because

Reesor is not the only one to find ontological import in the Categories. Some relate the Categories to the highest ontological genus Something (*ti*), e.g. Benson Mates takes “the indefinite something” to be set over the four Categories directly (which he renders as substratum, quality, state, and relation); while J. M. Rist aligns the first Category, *hupokeimenon*, with *what is* and Something (if something exists, he says, it is a substance or material object in the first Category).¹⁰ Eduard Zeller, having set the stage with something of all these views, takes the Categories to be incomplete *lekta* “so related that each gives a closer definition of the one which precedes and contains this in it.”¹¹ He renders them as substrate, essential constitution (sc. *logos*), accidental constitution, and relative accidental constitution, and takes them to have fallen under the generic concept of Being for Zeno and of Something, set over Being and Not-being, for Chrysippus. Pierre Hadot takes the genus Something to cover both *to on* (*what is*) and *to mē on* (*what is not*), and (correctly) places the four Categories under *to on*, with the canonical incorporeals (place, void, time, *lekta*) under *to mē on*;¹² and A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley likewise locate the Categories under body in their ontological stemma, in contrast to the canonical incorporeals.¹³

More substantively, Long & Sedley take the Categories to be metaphysical aspects of individual bodies rather than semantic entities or ontological classification corresponding to dialectical definition and division; they fall under bodies because every body can be viewed under all four of these aspects, not because they are coordinate species of body, or related as genus and differentia.¹⁴ The idea of a metaphysical aspect is somewhat elusive, but those proposing this view have made it clear enough. David Sedley, for example, says “the Stoics distinguished four ‘kinds of existing thing’—what I shall be referring to as the four ‘levels’ of existence—so related to each other that every individual can be described under

of its distance from the early Stoa but also, and primarily, because the connections to the Categories that De Lacy finds there are shaky.

¹⁰ Rist, “Categories and their Uses,” 152–9; Rist’s view is hard to classify, as he takes the Categories to be incorporeal, more specifically he takes them to be incomplete *lekta* (or predicates) (154), and he follows Reesor in various regards (158–9, 165–8), yet he also takes the substance and quality to be discrete corporeal components of a substance and recognizes the corporeality of the Categories. Also hard to classify are hybrid views that take the first two Categories as bodies, and the second two as incorporeals, e.g. Pasquino, “Incorporeals,” 341–3, endorsing Goldschmidt, *Système*, who follows Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, 132–3.

¹¹ Zeller, *Outlines*, 214.

¹² Hadot, *Porphyre*, 161.

¹³ LS, 163; Long & Sedley also posit a third kind of Something that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, which they take to include figments and limits. I argue in favor of this controversial posit, though with some important differences, in Section IV.

¹⁴ LS, 165. The figure of the tripartite ontology, 163, is thus a little misleading, as it suggests that the Categories are coordinate species like the incorporeals; see Chapter 8, Fig. 8.1, and Chapter 16, Fig. 16.8, for the alternative I propose.

all four headings.”¹⁵ Sedley captures these four levels of description, existence, or analysis with the “qua” locution: qua lump of matter, Socrates is not subject to growth and diminution, but qua uniquely qualified individual he is. Most helpfully, Sedley assimilates the Stoic relation between the *hupokeimenon* and the *poion* to what David Wiggins calls “the ‘is’ of constitution,” e.g. the relation between us and our flesh and bones, or between a tree and its molecules, in contrast to the “is” of identity.¹⁶ Jacques Brunschwig also understands the Categories, or “first genera” as he calls them, as ontological aspects of bodies; in particular, he describes this as a stratificatory theory, in contrast to the classificatory enterprise of Stoic ontology which yields a taxonomic tree of Somethings.¹⁷ In making this contrast, Brunschwig emphasizes that the Categories are inclusive of each other, rather than exclusive as the branches of a taxonomic tree are: if Something is an incorporeal, then it is not a body; but a qualified individual (*poion*) is also an individual disposed (*pōs echon*); each Category under which a given being can be described is “more concrete, that is complex and complete” than the last.¹⁸

This interpretation, which takes the Categories to be metaphysical aspects of an individual body, neighbors and gives way to a physical interpretation, according to which the Categories are understood to explain the unity and generation of an individual body. I am calling this a physical rather than a metaphysical interpretation not because there isn’t plenty of metaphysics in the analysis, but because according to this interpretation the job of the Categories (the *idiōs poion* in particular) is to make a body *one*, i.e. to give an account of the generation and unity of the cosmos and all the individuals in it. This analysis does not take the Categories to be four successive metaphysical aspects of a single body, but instead takes body to be *composed* out of the first two Categories. The physical interpretation takes the Stoics to be building bodies out of *hupokeimenon* and *poion* in the roles of matter and form, as their components or ingredients. This concern for building and the physical unity of individual bodies is the reason I describe this view as physical rather than metaphysical.

¹⁵ Sedley, “Criterion,” 259; Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, n. 3 on 133, may also endorse the idea that the Categories are points of view. Johnson, “Commentary on Collette-Dučić,” 226, also endorses the aspects view.

¹⁶ Sedley, “Criterion,” n. 24; Wiggins, *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity*, 10–1 *et passim*, and “Same Place Same Time.” In a more recent article revisiting the subject, Sedley, “Diachronic,” 32, does not invoke Wiggins, and says instead that Dion (the *poion*) “supervenes on” his substance (the *hupokeimenon*) “in the pre-theoretical sense that the addition of an extra ontological layer to the substance generates a new individual, one who did not pre-exist the addition.” I find the language of supervenience and the notion of an extra ontological layer less perspicuous (and not pre-theoretical), and so I leave it to the side in favor of Sedley’s earlier suggestion in “Criterion,” which I will be developing.

¹⁷ Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 227–32; see *TGS*, n. 3, where Brunschwig cites Reith, Goldschmidt, and LS as holding the aspects view.

¹⁸ Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 228.

For example, as Terence Irwin sees it: “peculiar qualities are fundamentally principles of unity, and derivatively principles of distinctness and principles of persistence”; thus the Stoics’ primary concern in the Categories is for “what makes Socrates a single organism rather than a mere collection.”¹⁹ In a similar spirit, Stephen Menn says the following, referring to the *hupokeimenon* as *ousia* (οὐσία) and the *poion* as *poiotes* (ποιότης) and taking each as a portion of the passive and active *archē* (ἀρχή) respectively:

For the Stoics, following the *Timaeus* against Aristotle, the οὐσία of a thing is its matter: the matter is purely passive, a portion of the passive ἀρχή and the thing can only become Socrates or human if there is a portion of the active ἀρχή present in it and causing it to be Socrates or human; this portion of the active ἀρχή is then the ποιότης Socrateity or humanity. The οὐσία and the ποιότης are thus two parts of the thing, a passive and an active body blended into a whole.²⁰

Likewise, Emile Bréhier identifies the *hupokeimenon* with the passive principle and the *poion* with the active principle, and takes these together to compose a body.²¹ This idea, that the Categories are principles of physical unity, is rather more assumed than argued in the literature, as I will emphasize in the textual analysis below. In fact, in a recent article, Tamer Nawar takes the unifying role for granted as a desideratum on the account.²² Irwin and Nawar both acknowledge that the textual evidence does not establish this role, but seek to forge the connection through the role of qualities as described in a series of texts from Simplicius, which I will address below.

Another vein of the physical interpretation, as I am labeling it, is the view that the Categories are intended as a reductionist thesis underwriting their cosmology. Richard Sorabji presses this view in order to avoid attributing any literal sense of colocation or interpenetration to the Stoics in their theory of through and through blending (*krasis di’ holou*).²³ “I believe they reduce *pneuma* to fire and to air, reduce a body’s qualities to the body itself, and possibly reduce God to matter. These reductions do not involve putting two bodies in the same place, because the reductionist view is that there are not two distinct bodies in question.”²⁴ On this account, when air or fire is disposed (*pōs echon*) in appropriate ways, then it is considered *pneuma*, so that “it now appears untrue that *pneuma* needs air and fire as its *ingredients*; it is not so distinct from them as that.”²⁵ Likewise, to avoid the

¹⁹ Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 469–70 and n. 24.

²⁰ Menn, “Categories,” 221–2, cf. 228–9; followed by Johnson, “Commentary on Collette-Dučić,” 231, 235 (n. 24); see also Bronowski, *Lekta*, 311–2.

²¹ Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, 132–4.

²² Nawar, “Identity, Identification,” 114 (desideratum δ).

²³ Sorabji, *MSM*, 85–105.

²⁴ Sorabji, *MSM*, 85.

²⁵ Sorabji, *MSM*, 88, original emphasis.

“embarrassingly strange” view that “bodies and their qualities are arranged like so many interpenetrating billiard balls,” Sorabji argues that qualities are nothing but matter qualified and then disposed in certain ways.²⁶ And, finally, that god is *pneuma* disposed in a certain way (*pōs echon*) and, thus, nothing but matter, hence reducible to the first Category; god and matter are just different categorial levels of a single body.²⁷ Sorabji’s account is a physical interpretation insofar as he takes the Categories to be a part of Stoic cosmology, applicable as a reductive thesis at the ground level (to god and matter) and indeed all the way up, so that all bodies in the end are nothing but matter. Like the other physical interpretation, which takes the Categories to account for the unity and persistence of all individual bodies, both assign important cosmological labor to this schema; though both interpretations are plenty metaphysical in spirit, it is for their focus on building and cosmology that I have labeled them physical. Thus the gamut we have seen so far ranges from semantic to metaphysical to physical interpretations of the Categories.

As we are about to see, however, this does not exhaust the interpretive options. Related to the assumption that the second Category is a quality meant to provide physical unity—and perhaps the motivation for thinking that it does—is a strong hylomorphic bias present since antiquity. What I mean by this is that sources, commentators, and scholars since antiquity approach Stoic theory as a variation on hylomorphism. I will say what I mean by the term “hylomorphism” in a moment, but first I want to emphasize that I am not making any claims about hylomorphic theory, or identifying hylomorphism with any one thinker. I am identifying a set of presuppositions about the Stoics, which I am calling the hylomorphic bias. So it remains an important caveat that when I am critical of this hylomorphic bias, I am not saying that hylomorphism is incorrect or, really, making any claims at all about hylomorphism as a theory; I am simply saying that it is incorrect to assume that *the Stoics* are proceeding along hylomorphic lines. There are ways that scholars see the Stoics which are colored by hylomorphic presuppositions, and when I call these out, I mean that they are hylomorphic presuppositions *about* the Stoics, not that these are commitments of hylomorphism either generally or of anyone in particular.

What I mean by “hylomorphism” is the idea that all body is a composite of matter and form, or of quality inhering in a subject. These two formulations are not equivalent, since one could (as Aristotle in the *Categories* does) give a subject-inherence or substance-quality account without taking the subject or substance to be a composite of matter and form. However, to the extent that what inheres in the subject or substance is an incorporeal form or quality, the approaches are

²⁶ Quotations from Sorabji, *MSM*, 88; reduction of qualities to matter, 88–93.

²⁷ Sorabji, *MSM*, 95; Sorabji allows, as he must, that god is therefore only causally fundamental but not simple, a point that he takes to be corroborated by the critical remarks of Plutarch 1085B–C, discussed and rejected above in Chapter 3.

closely related; all the more so if the quality inhering is doing the job of unifying or generating the individual (as in Plato and the Neoplatonists), and yet more if the substance is matter. I mean for this idea to apply broadly to Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic theories, so I will refer to both formulations as “hylomorphic” in this spirit.

And by “the hylomorphic bias” I mean the assumption that the Stoics are pursuing some version of hylomorphism, albeit a corporeal version. We have seen the hylomorphic bias many times by now, in the context of body defined as solid three-dimensional extension, body as fundamental, the principles (*archai*) as simple bodies, blending as the complete coextension of two or more independent bodies, and building the cosmos by the causal complexity of agent and patient (rather than the ontological complexity of matter and form). So, it is no surprise that hylomorphic presuppositions surface here and complicate matters in this context as well, in particular in understanding the first two Categories as matter and form, subject and attribute, or substance and quality.

For example, Menn’s analysis opens with the governing assumption that “the comparison with the Aristotelian list of categories must be at least partly justified, since the Stoics and Aristotle both take the Platonic distinction between substance and quality as the starting-point for their list of genera.” This is to presume from the outset a hylomorphic schema, and then wonder at why it does not fit the corporealist model: “The Stoics, however, because of their corporealism, find explanation through presence problematic.”²⁸ This presupposition of a subject-inherence model, in which quality is “present in” substance, governs the whole of Menn’s argument that the Categories are developed over generations of the school to patch up a failed corporealist account of abstract entities; when they realize they can’t come up with a corporeal F-ness for qualities like sitting, they make their way, circuitously, to dispositions (*pōs echonta*) instead. Menn reasons as follows: since it is obvious to both Aristotle and the Stoics that knowledge is a quality, it follows that knowers are knowers by having a quality present in them; and since knowledge is a matter of containing some *epistēmē*, a quality, the Stoics (Chrysippus) can then eventually make the “less obvious discovery” that the knower is after all qualified, a *poion*, rather than merely related to something (*pros ti*) as they (Aristo) had been doing.²⁹ Then, finally, whatever they cannot find corporeal qualities for gets categorized according to a different model, no longer a matter of inherence or the presence of some being

²⁸ Menn, “Categories,” 215 and 218 respectively; cf. 221 where the Stoics are said to “expand the Platonic substance-quality distinction” beyond the *hupokeimenon* and *poion* to cases where there is no F-ness to be *in* the substance. Johnson, “Commentary on Collette-Dučić,” defends Menn’s thesis. Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” follows Menn’s subject-inherence account of the Categories in support of a Stoic theory of events as property exemplifications. Duncombe, *Ancient Relativity*, 206–25, also follows Menn in his reading.

²⁹ Menn, “Categories,” 229–31.

in a subject, but a new schema devised to handle that failing, namely disposition (*pōs echon*).

Thus Menn finds the Stoics on their heels, operating ad hoc, with no univocal account of the four-fold schema, and failing to give a coherent subject-inherence account. Now, I agree that the explanandum what makes something F (or why “A is F” as Menn puts it) is shared with the hylomorphic tradition; this is indeed the labor assigned to the Categories, to reform the earthborn Giants and corporealize rather than eliminate the virtues, i.e. qualities generally. However, I strongly resist the idea that the Stoic solution should be conceived along hylomorphic lines, as the pursuit of a subject-inherence model according to which qualities are in a subject like so many pebbles in an urn (to use Menn’s evocative image).³⁰ So I disagree that “when the Stoics reject Platonic and Aristotelian beings, they are confronted by many cases where they cannot explain the predicate F through the presence of a corporeal F-ness.”³¹ It is true that the Stoic account fails as an account of abstract entities inhering in subjects, but that is because they are not offering an account of qualities as abstract entities inhering in subjects. This hylomorphic perspective is the proverbial square peg to the Stoics’ round hole.

I have emphasized Menn’s account because it is prominent in the field, but the presumption of a hylomorphic analysis is widespread, manifesting itself in the nearly universal understanding of the first Category (*hupokeimenon*) as matter (*hulē*) to the exclusion of *pneuma*, and the second Category (*poion*, the thing that is qualified) as pneumatic quality (*poiotēs*) to the exclusion of matter. Thus, as we have seen with Irwin et al., the first two Categories together are taken to compose a single body as its ingredients, as a building enterprise that explains the physical unity of an individual. In this spirit, sometimes “*poion*” is simply translated as “quality,”³² other times the distinction between the *poion* and *poiotēs* is acknowledged, or even emphasized, but the second Category is nevertheless assimilated to quality.³³ I will call out and address the details of these various interpretations in the next section

³⁰ Menn, “Categories,” 239.

³¹ Menn, “Categories,” 215.

³² Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 12–3; Christensen, *Unity*, 48–52; De Lacy, “Categories,” 247 *et passim*; Durand, “Deixis,” section 7; Graeser, “Categories and their Uses,” 40; IG, II–45; Lloyd, “Grammar and Metaphysics,” 69; Mates, *Stoic Logic*, 18; Reesor, “Categories,” 81, and “Quality,” 49; Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 154–5, 158–60; Schofield, “Ariston,” 87, 29; Sorabji, *MSM*, 87; Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 49–51.

³³ Bréhier, *Chrysippe*, 132–4; Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 170: “each qualified thing is analysed as a total blending of qualities with existence”; Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 799: *idiōs poios* as “qualitative individuation of substance or matter”; Goldschmidt, *Système*, 20; Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 13–6; Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, 28; Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” *passim* but e.g. 469: “When something is fully qualified, and has a genuine quality, it is unified, and the quality makes it unified, by being the source of cohesion among its parts”; Johnson, “Commentary on Collette-Dučić,” 224–8, 231; E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” 100; LS, 174; Nawar, “Identity, Identification,” *passim* but especially 114, 124, 132; Zeller, *Outlines*, 214. Engaging with the distinction, Collette-Dučić, “Virtues are *Poia*,” 196, 200, calls out the common conflation of *poion* and *poiotēs*, but goes on to argue for qualities (*poiotētes*) of qualities (*poia*), equated with things that are *kata diaphoran*, and “havable in themselves”; LS, 172, say the “second genus is not strictly ‘quality’, but ‘the qualified’ that is usually [. . .] a substance viewed as ‘having’ (containing as parts) certain qualities”; Menn, “Categories,” 221–34, assimilates the second

as I introduce the textual evidence, but it is worth noting this interpretive bent here at the outset, because the point I am pressing is that the Stoics are *dividing* the labor of Plato's Forms between their corporealist cosmology on the one hand, which accounts for the unity and composition of individual bodies, and the Categories on the other, which accounts for the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies once unified. Failure to recognize this division of Plato's labor is a crucial category mistake that scholars have made in interpreting this piece of Stoic theory.

Finally, there is a strong developmental narrative that pervades the literature as well. In his seminal paper on this topic, Sedley argues that the Categories were developed by Chrysippus in response to Academic challenges from Arcesilaus, and that a follow-up response from Carneades in turn is discernible in the textual evidence. It is a governing principle of Sedley's account that "Stoic theories were constantly designed and redesigned to circumvent the attacks" from the Academy.³⁴ More recently Sedley has argued that five phases of the Academic-Stoic debate are discernible, including three distinct versions of the theory developed with Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Mnesarchus.³⁵ Part of what fuels the developmental narrative is the idea that the Stoics are on their heels, ever in a defensive position trying to mitigate damage from their critics, who land blows that force them to revise their theory, often at the cost of internal conflict with some other Stoic tenet. Menn, as I have mentioned, proposes that the Stoics developed the third and fourth Categories because their corporealism could not do the job on a substance-quality inherence model. And even that development is arrived at in a rather awkward manner: while Zeno had the first two Categories, it was Aristo who first introduced the fourth Category, what is relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*), and then Chrysippus eventually devised the third Category of *pōs echon*, having first tried to make the virtues *poia* and then "making the less obvious discovery" that some non-relative terms are not F through a corporeal F-ness (a *poiōtēs*).

The developmental narrative is fueled by the scarcity of our textual resources, which leads scholars to find evidence and build bridges on tenuous grounds. As I will argue, it is tempting but misleading to read "refinements of Stoic ontology" into ethics and physics, as Menn puts it.³⁶ Our evidence is too thin to support these developmental conjectures, particularly when there is an alternative account

Category to quality by taking "*poiōtēs*" to be the abstract noun for the *poion* and takes "*ousia*" to be the abstract noun of the *hupokeimenon*, thus facilitating a strongly hylomorphic account according to which the first two Categories together compose the individual; and Sedley, "Diachronic," 29–30, considers the terminological distinction an ambiguity in the account that is later resolved by Posidonius with the introduction of mereology (at the fatal cost of undoing the possibility of colocation demanded by the theory of blending). More on all these issues ahead.

³⁴ Sedley, "Criterion," 256; cf. Schofield, "Ariston," 89.

³⁵ Sedley, "Diachronic."

³⁶ Menn, "Categories," 228 as well as 235, 239, 242, 246–7.

available that does not find the Stoics backing their way into the Categories, or at odds with one another about basic doctrinal commitments. This is not to say that there is no internal debate or that the Stoics are never at odds with each other internally, but that the debates reported by our sources do not support these developmental narratives about the Categories. Nor do I wish to say that there is no ongoing debate between the Stoa and the Academy, but that the evidence does not support the conjecture that the Categories were invented or even retooled in response to their critics. The debate with the Academy was certainly robust, and reports do give some indication of the course of the dialectic between the two schools, but the interpretive move from dialectical exchange to doctrinal development is not well founded. I urge instead a more modest approach to the textual evidence, which finds active debate and disagreement between the Stoics and their critics without presuming that the Stoics were developing the Categories *ad hoc* in response to fatal blows. The modest approach resists the urge to see every mention of a particular Stoic as a historical report of doctrinal development.

The Central Texts

It is time now to turn to the texts and dig deeper into the interpretive debates. There are two primary texts that attest to the Stoic schema of the Categories, and although they are long, they are worth quoting in full. The first is from the Platonist Plutarch, who is definitely hostile to the Stoics, but also reliable—he is sarcastic and disdainful but not underhanded in his complaints, and thus an important source of evidence.³⁷

- B. (1) Now then, the argument about growth is certainly old; for, as Chrysippus says, it was put by Epicharmus. But with those in the Academy supposing that the puzzle is not altogether easy or straightforward, <these people> [sc. the Stoics] have accused them of many things and decried that they destroy the preconceptions and <philosophize against [common] conceptions>; yet not only do they not guard the conceptions themselves, but they also distort sense-perception. (2) For the argument is indeed a simple one and these people grant its premises:
- (a) All particular substances (*ousiai*) are in flux and motion, releasing some things from themselves and receiving others arriving from elsewhere;
 - (b) The numbers or quantities to which these are arriving and departing do not remain the same but become different as the aforementioned arrivals <and departures> cause the substance to be transformed;

³⁷ See Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, for an extended rehabilitation of Plutarch as a respectable source of information on the Stoics.

- (c) The prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: rather they should be called generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it is into something else, whereas growing and diminishing are affections of a body which serves as substrate and persists.

(3) When it is stated and proposed in some such way, what is the judgement of these champions of the evident, these yardsticks of our conceptions? That each of us is a pair of twins, of a double nature and two-fold—not in the way the poets think of the Molionidae [legendary Siamese twins], unified in some parts but in others distinct, but two bodies sharing the same color, the same shape, the same weight and place, <the same but nevertheless double even though> heretofore seen by no person. (4) But these [sc. the Stoics] alone have seen this composition (*sunthesin*), this duality and ambiguity, that each of us is two substrates (*hupokeimena*), the one substance (*ousia*), the other <a uniquely qualified individual> (*idiōs poios*); and that the one is always in flux and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as it is at all, while the other remains, and grows and diminishes and undergoes all the opposites of the other, while being naturally united (*sumpephukos*), fitted together (*sunērmomenon*) and commingled (*sugkechumenon*) with it, and nowhere giving sense-perception a grasp of the difference. . . (5) And this distinction and <dif>ference in us no one has marked off or discriminated, nor have we perceived that we are born double, and always in flux with one part of ourselves, while remaining the same from birth to death.

(6) I am simplifying their account, since they make four substrates (*hupokeimena*) in every individual; or rather (*mallon de*), they make each of us four. But even the two are sufficient to expose the absurdity. (7) If when we hear Pentheus in the tragedy say that he sees two suns and a double Thebes we say he is not seeing but mis-seeing, going crazy in his arithmetic, then when these people propose that, not one city, but all people, animals, trees, furniture, implements and clothes are double and two-natured, shall we not reject them as forcing us to mis-think rather than to think? (8) Here, actually, they can perhaps be excused for inventing different kinds of substrates, for there seems no other device available to people determined to save and protect the processes of growth.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1083A–1084A (28A, trans. LS with some changes)³⁸

There is much important evidence about the Stoic position here, some of which is uncontroversial. First, it is clear that the Stoics are responding to the ancient Growing Argument (B2, B8) and their response is to agree that if constitution is

³⁸ For apparatus see LS vol. 2 and Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*.

identity, then growth and diminution are impossible. Any addition to or subtraction from a certain mass, or bodily substance as such, is not a case of change, but rather transformation, i.e. the destruction of one mass, bundle, aggregate, or sum, and the generation of another. The Stoic solution to the puzzle (B3–5) how can a substance be said to grow if it is in such quantitative flux is to make a distinction between the substance of an individual (the *ousia*), on the one hand, which does not persist through addition and subtraction, and the uniquely qualified individual (*idiōs poion*), on the other, which the corporeal substance underlies, and which does persist through growth and diminution, identical and unchanging from birth to death. In other words, they deny that constitution is identity for qualified individuals. Socrates remains the same individual despite the fact that his corporeal substance is constantly changing, because the *hupokeimenon* and the *idiōs poion* are not identical, and in fact undergo “all the opposites of the other” (B4), which is to say that the *hupokeimenon* is in constant flux, and does not retain its identity through any addition or subtraction of substance, whereas the *idiōs poion* is altogether unchanging from generation to destruction, and does retain its identity through growth and diminution of its constituent substance (B5).

Plutarch then clarifies that the Stoic account is that we are each in fact four, not just two; it is therefore clear, in case there were any doubt, that he is describing the same four-fold schema as Plotinus and Simplicius (B6). Next, he reports the scope of the theory, making clear that it is intended to cover all kinds of bodies, natural and artificial alike (B7). Only the first two Categories are required in response to the Growing Argument and, by Plutarch’s lights, to demonstrate the absurdity of the view, but the schema is fourfold. He intends the reader to see it as absurd that there could be two bodies that are distinct but somehow colocated and indiscernible by perception, opposite in their persistence conditions and yet physically identical (B3, B5). It should seem outlandish for the Stoics to say that each of us is really two (or rather, four) bodies in the face of all sensory evidence and common sense to the contrary (B5, B7), though he sees no other option for a corporealist to save the process of growth (B8). Plutarch is snarky throughout, but it is clear what the complaint is, and we can take this as a legitimate explanandum, to give sense to the idea that four bodies could be distinct and yet share all the same physical properties, e.g. color, shape, weight, and place. Another explanandum is what the Stoics mean by saying that we are several *substrates* (*hupokeimena*, B4, B8). Irwin presses this question to the fore, wondering why the Stoics would need to recognize two subjects (as he translates “*hupokeimenon*”)—there must be some problem motivating this move to the “doctrine of two subjects,” as he calls it.

Sedley’s focus in this passage is on the dialectical exchange with the Academy, where he finds evidence of Stoic (and Academic) development.³⁹ He takes Plutarch

³⁹ I summarize here Sedley, “Criterion,” which is supported and extended by Sedley, “Diachronic,” which I will summarize in connection with the second central text.

to report (B2) that the Academy under Arcesilaus posed the Growing Argument to the Stoics *ad hominem*, arguing that there would have been a special sting to this tail because of a Stoic focus on growth in cosmology, since the cosmos is treated in biological terms as a living being; then (B1, B3), that Chrysippus responded by introducing the Categories, to which the skeptical Carneadean Academy in turn pressed charges of incoherent dualism (B4–6).⁴⁰ In addition to responding to the Growing Argument, Sedley takes Chrysippus to offer the first defense of Zeno's commitment to *katalēpsis*, or infallible perception, with the uniqueness of the *idiōs poion*, which entails that there is no individual qualitatively indistinguishable from Socrates, no grain of rice qualitatively identical to any other, no hair perfectly like another (Cicero, *Acad.* 2.83–5 (40J)). Thus Chrysippus kills two Academic birds with one stone by introducing the schema of the Categories: with the metaphysics of diachronic identity, he responds at once to the Growing Argument and to epistemological challenges to *katalēpsis*.⁴¹ Sedley continues this developmental narrative with his analysis of the other of our central texts, this one from Stobaeus, a neutral and reliable anthologist:

- C. (1) Posidonius says there are four kinds of generation and corruption out of things that are into things that are. For they recognized that there is no generation out of things that are not, or corruption into things that are not, as we said earlier. (2) And among those changes coming about into things that are, one is by division (*diairesis*), another according to alteration (*alloiōsis*), another is fusion (*sugchusis*), and another an out-and-out change, which is called resolution (*analysis*). (3) Among these, that by alteration comes about in the case of substance (*ousia*), while the other three come about in the case of the so-called qualified individuals (*poia*) that come to be in substance (*ta epi tēs ousias gignomena*).

(4) Substance neither grows nor diminishes by addition or subtraction, but only alters (*alloiousthai*), just as in the case of numbers and measures. (5) And it follows that it is in the case of uniquely qualified individuals (*idiōs poia*) like Dion and Theon that growth and diminution come about. (6) Wherefore too the quality of each [uniquely qualified individual] remains from its generation to its destruction, in the case of things admitting of destruction, animals and plants and the like. (7) And in the

⁴⁰ Collette-Dučić, 194, also takes Chrysippus' "enthusiasm for difference and multiplicity" to invite many problems.

⁴¹ Sedley, "Criterion," 267, takes the *idiōs poion* to account for diachronic identity, but not synchronic identity, which he says (in hylomorphic spirit) is accounted for by individuals having different matter. However, the uniqueness of each individual obviates the individuating role of matter, since there are no qualitatively identical bodies for the Stoics; in fact, there is evidence that from the Stoic perspective if there were (per impossibile) two qualitatively identical bodies, they would have to count as a single uniquely qualified individual in two substances (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1077C–E (28O)).

case of uniquely qualified individuals, they say the receptive parts (*ta dektika moria*) are two, the one is something (*ti*) according to the nature (*hupostasis*) of substance, the other according to the nature of the qualified individual. For this, as we have often said, is what admits of growth and diminution.

(8) But the uniquely qualified individual and the substance out of which that [individual] is [constituted], are not the same thing (*auton*), nor, mind you, are they different (*heteron*) either, but merely not the same, because of the fact that the substance both is a part (*meros*) and occupies the same place, while those things called different must be both separate (*kechōristhai*) in place and not conceived of as a part. (9) And that what is according to the uniquely qualified individual and what is according to the substance are not the same, Mnesarchus says is clear; for it is necessary that things that are the same have the same properties.

(10) For if someone who molded a horse, for the sake of argument, were to smash it, then produce a dog, it would be reasonable for us seeing this to say that this back then did not exist, but now it exists; so, what is said in the case of the qualified individual is different.

(11) And also, generally, in the case of substance, to think we are the same as our substances seems unconvincing; for it often happens that the substance exists before generation, before Socrates' generation, say, when Socrates does not yet exist, and after the destruction, the substance on the one hand remains, but he no longer exists.

Stobaeus 1.177,2–9,17 (28D)⁴²

In this passage we find confirmation that substance, i.e. the *hupokeimenon*, does not admit of growth and diminution (since addition or subtraction would be generation and destruction, on the model of numbers and measures), but only alteration. It is not immediately clear what is meant by alteration, but it can be determined by the context. The passage opens with a list of four kinds of generation and corruption (C1–2), and then we are told that generation and corruption by alteration comes about in the case of substance (*ousia*) whereas division, fusion, and resolution come about in the case of the *idiōs pion* that comes about in *ousia* (C3). The case of substance is then elucidated by reference to its persistence conditions, when we are told that for substance constitution is identity, just as in the case of numbers and measures

⁴² The text follows LS, but not always; refer to LS vol. 2 and EK for apparatus. In (4) I follow EK and Heeren with γὰρ in the place of δέ (LS, codd.); see Sedley, "Criterion," n. 24, for further words of caution in favor of τὴν οὐσίαν. At the start of (5) I follow LS' addition of καὶ συμβαίνειν before ἐπὶ τῶν (instead of EK's ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν). In (6) I follow LS against EK in omitting <ὥς> before ἐπὶ. In (7) I follow EK with the plural φύσις instead of φύσι. See LSJ B.III.3 for *hupostasis* as essential nature.

(C4). What we are being told is that when substance, i.e. body as such, changes qualitatively so that a uniquely qualified individual comes about (or ceases to be) in it, then that is a case of generation (or destruction). For example, some clay being molded into a statue is a case of generation by alteration. Sedley sees here a puzzle concerning the idea that an individual like Dion comes to be in (*genesthai epi*) substance, or as he renders it “comes to occupy a substance.” Here is how he puts the point:

This comes as a surprise. Surely the proper reference of the term *ιδιῶς ποιός*, as the adjectival form of the term encourages us to suppose, is the qualified individual, Dion himself, viewed as a combination of the first two categories; that is, Dion’s matter *combined with* (i.e. qualified by) the unique quality that makes him enduringly who he is. If so, Dion already includes his own substance or matter, and cannot coherently be said to occupy it.⁴³

Sedley takes this talk of the *poios* (qualified individual) coming to occupy substance, where one would expect a *poiotēs* (quality), as an ambiguity in Stoic parlance, and as an explanandum for any account. His explanation is that since the constituent matter is too transient to be what grows, it was natural for Chrysippus in the polemical context against the Academy to say that it was properly speaking the qualified individual *excluding* his matter that is the subject of growth, and that this move led to the strange talk of Dion coming to occupy his own substance. The resolution to this unclarity in Chrysippus, Sedley argues, is introduced by Posidonius in a fourth phase of the debate between the Stoa and the Academy. Posidonius rescues Chrysippus from the *poios-poiotēs* ambiguity and, at once, from Academic charges of absurd redundancy by treating substance as a *part* of the composite *poios* that grows. This mereological innovation mitigates the absurdity of taking the two bodies as “two different items crammed into the same place” since they are really just a whole plus one of its subparts; in that case, he says, the idea of “coming to occupy” can be understood as Dion “supervening” on his own substance “in the pre-theoretical sense that the addition of an extra ontological layer to the substance generates a new individual.”⁴⁴ Thus both the *hupokeimenon* and the *poion* are legitimate subjects of predication, though only one is a legitimate subject of growth; and both are legitimate subparts of a distinct composite being, since substance (*hupokeimenon*) is a part of Dion (*poios*) and Dion is a part of Dion’s dispositions and relations (the third and fourth Categories) (C5–8).

Then, in a fifth phase of the debate, the Philonian Academy charges the Stoics with monism, arguing that the bodies are not genuinely distinct, a move that we can

⁴³ Sedley, “Diachronic,” 29 (original emphasis; note the hylomorphic bias); other instances of the “*genesthai epi*” locution that Sedley cites in support of this puzzle are in Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1077C–E (28O, passage K/Chapter 8); Philo, *Aet. mundi* 48 (28P).

⁴⁴ Sedley, “Diachronic,” 32.

discern from the response of Mnesarchus, in a sixth phase, that a thing and its matter have different histories and thus are genuinely distinct even if they are not separate in place (C9–11). Sedley appreciates the ingenuity of each successive innovation in Stoic theory, but finds a fatal flaw in the Posidonian appeal to mereology: Posidonius' appeal to the idea that a thing and its matter are not different because they are not separate in place conflicts with the standard Stoic commitment to *krasis di' holou* (through and through blending), which is committed to the colocation of two or more different bodies. Thus, while "we would at least have a plausible context for the introduction of this surprising doctrine" (that being different requires being in distinct places), "we would be no nearer to understanding how Posidonius, as a Stoic, could advocate it. This latter is, as far as I know, an unrecognised problem, on which more work seems to be needed."⁴⁵ It is understandable why Posidonius made the mereological move (to rescue Chrysippus from cramming two bodies in one place), but he did so at the cost of denying blending—a cost too high for any Stoic to pay.

To summarize, Sedley's developmental account argues that the Categories were introduced defensively, in response to Academic criticisms, which were hitting their mark and forcing the Stoics into uncomfortable spots in order to save their corporealist cosmology. Accordingly, he treats the texts as strongly historical reports, with each mention of a particular Stoic attesting to developments in Stoic theory, rather than treating them as strongly philosophical reports about the nature of the dialectical exchange between the schools. The idea is that a "strongly philosophical" approach to the texts does not see them as reporting a constant revision of Stoic theory or internal discord among the Stoics, but sees, rather, the dialectical structure of an ongoing debate between the Stoa and their critics. On this view, the critics are not necessarily striking fatal blows that require workarounds and revisions, and the contributions of individual Stoics are not necessarily indicative of defensive innovations. Thus the texts are not to be read as reporting historical developments in Stoic doctrine, but rather as limning the dialectical structure of their debates. This is to resist the presumption that every mention of a particular Stoic should be treated as evidence of doctrinal development and that our sources are reporting missteps, disagreements, and workarounds; it is to exercise the principle of maximal charity for the Stoics and their critics alike (as described in the Introduction).

Sedley is hardly alone in this strongly historical approach. For example, Irwin discerns in our Stobaeus text a problematic conflict between Posidonius and Mnesarchus.⁴⁶ He takes Posidonius to be committed to the *hupokeimenon* as an extreme Lockean mass (for which constitution is identity), which he takes to explain why the Stoics would need to be committed to "the doctrine of two subjects"—there must be a second subject that persists through growth. But he takes Mnesarchus to be committed to the "more reasonable" view that the *hupokeimenon* is a weakly

⁴⁵ Sedley, "Diachronic," 36–7.

⁴⁶ Irwin, "Stoic Individuals."

persistent heap, more like a compost pile than a number or measure; so in that case one wonders what on earth motivates the doctrine of two subjects. Irwin finds evidence that Mnesarchus is committed to the *hupokeimenon* as minimally unified and hence somewhat persistent in the report that the clay molded now into a horse, now into a dog persists through this change (C10), because “it is difficult to suppose that the particular substance neither loses nor gains any constituents during this period”; at the same time, he takes Socrates’ substance to be a stable continuant during the phase of its existence when it is Socrates, since it is said to pre-exist and survive Socrates (C11).⁴⁷ Thus Posidonius and Mnesarchus disagree about the persistence of material subjects, and the Stoics are faced with a dilemma: either follow Posidonius (by taking the *hupokeimenon* to be an extreme Lockean mass) and overlook the obvious objection that there are things like compost heaps, or answer this objection as Mnesarchus does (by taking the *hupokeimenon* to be a relatively stable continuant) and undermine their argument for two subjects, namely that a second subject is needed in order to be the subject of growth. Irwin’s solution for the Stoics is to make a distinction between “merely qualified subjects” like compost heaps whose persistence depends on their remaining in a certain place or having a roughly continuous shape, and “fully qualified subjects” whose persistence as subjects in their own right (which heaps are not) depends on the persistence of a peculiar quality.

Dexippus

This brings us to another central text and another wrinkle that scholars have found deeply problematic for Stoic theory. It is from Dexippus, an Aristotelian commentator, and it concerns the peculiarly qualified individual, the *idiōs poion*, about which our evidence is slim, even by the standards of Stoic scholarship. It is a good thing, then, that Dexippus is reliable. As John Dillon remarks: “Certainly he is no amateur philosopher. His work shows a thorough acquaintance with technical terminology, and a good understanding of the philosophical issues, at least by the standards of his time.”⁴⁸ I will quote the passage a little more fully than is usual to capture the relevant context.

- D. (1) But if form is what is predicated of many things that are also numerically distinct in the category of what is, how will an individual differ from an individual, which is also one; for this one is numerically one and so is that one? (2) Now certainly, those solving this puzzle by the uniquely qualified individual (*idiōs poion*), this is that one is distinguished by, say, a certain crookedness of nose, or blondness, or some other confluence (*sundromē*) of qualities,

⁴⁷ Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 465.

⁴⁸ Dillon, *Dexippus*, 7.

and another snubness or baldness or greyness of the eyes, and again another (individual) by other (qualities), do not seem to me to solve it well; for it is not the confluence of qualities that makes them differ numerically, but if indeed anything does, then it is quality. (3) Therefore it is necessary to reply rather as follows, that things that are numerically distinct do not differ from one another in nature and substance, but distinctness holds in virtue of being countable [...] with the result that we may take distinctness as separateness (*diestēkenai*).

Dexippus, *In Ar. Cat.* 30,20–9...33–4 (Dillon; 28J+)

As we have seen (B5, C6), the *idiōs poion* remains the same from birth to death even while the *hupokeimenon* is in flux, and it is unique so that no body is perfectly like or qualitatively identical to any other. These two jobs, diachronic identity or persistence, and synchronic distinctness or uniqueness, have almost universally been found in tension with one another. The dominant question in the literature is: what sort of quality, or collection of qualities (as *sundromē* has been understood), could be sufficiently specific to individuate a person at a certain time *and* be a life-long quality? Certainly having a certain shape to the nose or hair color is neither necessary nor sufficient for Socrates to remain Socrates, scholars rightly observe; and the idea that a single quality like eye color could never be shared is equally implausible as a measure of distinctness. Furthermore, the uniqueness of such properties could easily be undone by mere Cambridge change, e.g. if Socrates ceases to be the only person bald in certain way because someone else acquires that property. The more specific the quality that individuates a person, the less likely it is to be an enduring quality; and the more likely a quality is to endure, the less likely it is to be unique to the individual. Thus, as Irwin says: “it turns out that any conception of peculiar qualities that gives better answers to questions about individuation gives worse answers to questions about persistence.”⁴⁹ Or, as Eric Lewis puts it:

[S]uch a view may allow us to individuate one individual from another, but such lists of common qualities are ill-suited to play the role of the criterion of identity. Surely I could lose some of my (common) qualities, and remain me. Which ones? Wouldn't these privileged qualities (those I cannot lose and remain me) be in fact my peculiar qualities? Yet why couldn't another individual share these qualities, since they do not exhaust the list of my common qualities?⁵⁰

Or, again, Nawar:

Even if a sufficiently complex combination of physiological attributes of the sort Dexippus describes might be found so as to satisfy the uniqueness requirement

⁴⁹ Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 467.

⁵⁰ E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” 95.

(and even if this could be done, it would be a highly contingent fact), it seems silly to suppose that the same complex combination would be lifelong and even more absurd to suppose that it might serve to unify an individual and ground their identity.⁵¹

So the lingering question about the *idiōs poion* is, first of all, what is it? Secondly, how could it possibly be responsible for both identity and individuation, let alone for unifying an organism and being infallibly accessible as required by *katalēpsis*?

Simplicius

This brings me to the final layer of evidence and interpretive debate that I will address. The evidence consists of three texts from Simplicius, which are at the center of Menn's strongly developmental analysis (and strongly historical approach to the evidence). Again the texts are worth quoting in full so that we can appreciate the debates and work through them in some detail. Simplicius is a Platonist and an Aristotelian commentator, and he too is a reliable source of information about Stoic philosophy (even if he is not always as expert as he takes himself to be). His focus is on Aristotle here, in this commentary on the *Categories*, so while he is critical of Stoic theory, he is not actively hostile or sarcastic; his interest in discussing the Stoics is to review the opinions of others, and he is genuinely informative in these reports. The first two appear in the commentary on *Categories* 8, *Concerning Quality*, specifically in the commentary on the first line, 8b25: "I mean by 'quality' that by which people are said to be qualified somehow." The question on the table is whether it is circular for Aristotle to define quality in terms of the qualified; Simplicius defends Aristotle against the charges of circularity, arguing that the quality and the qualified thing in us are one and the same. Then he describes the Stoic view according to which the quality and the qualified are not treated as one and the same:

- E. (1) Some Stoics who define "qualified" (*to poion*) in three ways say that two meanings (*sēmainomena*) are broader than the quality (*poiotes*), while the one, or rather part of one they say is coextensive (*sunapartizein*) with it.

⁵¹ Nawar, "Identity, Identification," 137, original emphasis; Sedley, "Criterion," 261–2, expresses similar difficulties. Solutions vary. Irwin, "Stoic Individuals," 475, ultimately dismisses Dexippus' testimony as unreliable and takes the soul as the individuating quality. E. Lewis, "Identity and Individuation," 107–8, also takes the soul to be the individuating quality and grounds its uniqueness in the first-personal perspective of the soul. Nawar, "Identity, Identification," 151–9, argues that later Stoics solved the problem by reference to impure properties that would be sufficiently specific to account for uniqueness. Sedley, "Criterion," 267, assigns only persistence and not uniqueness to the peculiar quality, but considers the possibility that something like fingerprints could do the job.

(2) For according to one meaning they call qualified everything that is differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), whether it should be a process (*kinoumenos*) or a state (*ischomenos*), and whether it be hard to undo or easy to undo; according to this meaning, not only the person of practical wisdom (*phronimōs*) and the person holding out a fist, but also the person running are qualified individuals (*poioi*).

(3) According to another meaning, which no longer encompasses processes, but only states (*scheseis*), which in fact is even defined as what is in a differentiated state (*to ischomenon kata diaphoran*), as is the person of practical wisdom and the person on guard.

(4) They introduced a third, most specific (*eidikōtatos*) meaning of “qualified” according to which they would no longer include those not in an enduring (*emmonōs*) state, and the person holding out a fist and the one on guard would not be qualified individuals, according to them;

(5) and among these that are differentiated and in an enduring state, some are such as to correspond precisely (*apartizein*) to the thought (*epinoia*) and expression (*ekphora*) of them, while others do not correspond completely, and these, on the one hand, they reject, while those that correspond precisely and are enduring and differentiated, they recognize as qualified individuals.

(6) By corresponding precisely to the expression they mean those equalized (*sunexisoumenoi*) to the quality (*poiotēs*), e.g. the grammatical person and the wise person; for each of these is neither broader nor narrower than the quality; likewise for both the food-lover and the wine-lover. But not those that are such as to be so called in combination with the activity, like the glutton and the tippler, having such parts through which they have the enjoyment. Wherefore too if someone is altogether a gourmet or a tippler (they are a food-lover or a wine-lover); but if someone is a food-lover, they are not altogether a glutton; for when the parts through which he enjoys food (gluttonizes) leave off, he leaves off being a glutton, but the food-loving state (*hexis*) does not leave off.

(7) Therefore, “qualified” being spoken of in three ways, the quality is coextensive with (*sunapartizein*) the qualified according to the last meaning of “qualified.”

(8) Wherefore, too, whenever the quality is defined as a state of the qualified individual, it is necessary to hear the definition as understanding the third meaning of qualified; for “quality” is spoken of in only one way, according to the Stoics themselves, but “qualified” in three.

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 212,12–3,1 (28N)

What this passage reports, uncontroversially, is that some Stoics take there to be three senses of the term “qualified” (“*poion*”), a broad sense that includes whatever is differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), including both those things that are in a process (e.g. running) and those in a state (e.g. holding out a fist, being wise), a narrower sense that includes states but not processes (being wise, being on guard), and a third sense that includes only stable states (being wise) (E1–4).⁵² Those things that are differentiated in this third way, in a stable state, are then further subdivided (E5) into those that do and those that do not “correspond precisely (*apartizein*) to their thought and expression,”⁵³ and only those that do correspond precisely count as qualified individuals (*poia*) in this narrowest sense (QED, as forecasted in E1, when we are told that part of one sense of *poion* will be coextensive (*sunapartizein*) with the quality). For a *poion* to correspond precisely to its thought and expression (E6) is then defined as the *poion* being “equalized (*sunexisoumenos*) to the *poiōtēs*.”⁵⁴ This sense of “*poion*” always and only makes reference to a stable differentiated state, and not also to its exercise: the activity of tippling is not what makes you a wine-lover, but rather the state (*hexis*) of loving wine—whether fate gives you the opportunity to tipple or not, you are a wine-lover.⁵⁵ So when the *poiōtēs* is said to be equalized to the *poion*, this is to be understood as being coextensive with the quality alone, because one does not leave off being qualified just because the activity ceases.

With these distinctions in hand, Simplicius concludes that it is the third and narrowest sense of “qualified,” which is equalized to the stable state without the activity, that is forecasted in E1 as being coextensive with the quality (E7). Therefore too, returning to the question of circularity in definition, whenever a Stoic quality is defined as a state of a qualified individual, the qualified individual must be thought of only in this third sense; in other words, when the definition of a *poiōtēs* makes reference to a *poion*, it is only the narrowest sense of “*poion*” that is meant (E8).

⁵² I follow LS with *kinoumenos* as process, *ischomenos* as state, and *emmonos* as enduring; Fleet, *In Ar. Cat.*, *ad loc.*, offers changes and (abiding) conditions, abidingly in a certain state; I would be happy with being in motion and holding (in an enduring way), but I appreciate states and processes as more natural English. I take the person holding out a fist to be in a state rather than a process because the *phronimōs* and the person holding out a fist are given together (*ou monon . . . kai*), and the person running is taken separately (*alla kai*). I take being wise to be the stable state because being on guard and sticking out a fist are both explicitly excluded and we have independent evidence that wisdom and the virtues are stable states (DL 7.89 (61A), 7.127 (61I); Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1050D (Cherniss)). I resist the argument of Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 22, that because movements and qualitative states (as she renders *kinēseis* and *scheseis*) are caused by bodies, they are therefore incorporeal effects, which is to say predicates or *lekta*; I will argue against this understanding of the “effects” of causes (my scare quotes) in Chapter 12.

⁵³ Alt. “in full keeping with their expression and conception” (Fleet, *In Ar. Cat.*), or “matches the expression and notion of them” (LS).

⁵⁴ Alt. “equally present with the quality” (Fleet, *In Ar. Cat.*), or “commensurate with the corresponding quality” (LS).

⁵⁵ And whether an archer hits the mark or not, she is a good archer for what she selects, for doing well what is in her power (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1070F–1071E (64C)).

Why? Presumably because there is no *poiotēs* corresponding to the other senses of “*poion*.”

This brings us to the second in this batch of Simplicius texts. In the intervening pages, Simplicius has given a brief criticism of the Stoic need to posit three senses of “qualified,” then engaged with a series of objections to equating the qualified and the quality. After this back-and-forth, he turns to the Stoics as potential objectors to Aristotle’s equating the qualified with the quality:⁵⁶

- F. (1) The Stoics too, according to their own assumptions, could raise the same difficulty against the principle under discussion, that all qualified things (*poia*) are so called with reference to a quality (*poiotēs*). (2) For they call qualities “havable” (*hekta*), and allow what is havable to exist only in the case of unified things; whereas in the case of things which exist by contact, like a ship, or by separation, like an army, they rule out there being anything havable, or there being found in their case any single thing consisting of breath (*pneuma*) or possessing a single principle (*logos*), such as to achieve a realization of a single tenor (*hexis*). (3) The qualified, however, is seen even in things whose components are in contact or separated; for just as a single grammarian is enduringly differentiated (*emmonōs echei kata diaphoran*) as a result of a qualified study and education, likewise the chorus is enduringly differentiated as a result of qualified training. (4) Wherefore they are qualified individuals on account of their organization and their co-operation towards the fulfillment of a single function, but they are qualified things without a quality; for there is no tenor in them, since a quality or a tenor is never found in separated substances which have no inherent union with each other.

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 214,24–37 (28M, trans. LS w/changes)

This passage confirms that the Stoics restrict qualities to a subset of qualified things—only some *poia* are coextensive with a *poiotēs*—and adds that qualities are “havables” that exist only in those things that are unified by a single breath, *logos*, or tenor. Things that are one merely by contact or even in separation, like a ship or an army, are nevertheless qualified individuals (*poia*) because they are enduringly differentiated (*emmonōs echei kata diaphoran*) by their qualified training. Since by Stoic lights there are qualified things without a quality, they too could object to Aristotle that *poion* and *poiotēs* are not coextensive and that the quality cannot be defined through what is qualified. Simplicius then goes on (215,3–18) to reject the Stoic view on the grounds that form does not require contact in order to unify, and that their own solution fails, before offering his own objections to Aristotle’s definition of quality.

⁵⁶ It is interesting that he speaks of what the Stoics *could* say rather than what they do say, underscoring that we should proceed with caution in taking the Stoics to engage with Aristotle.

These passages testifying that the Stoics recognize qualified individuals without a quality are central to Menn's developmental account because he sees in them evidence that the Stoics struggled to deliver a subject-inherence model in corporeal terms—recognizing *poia* without a *poiotes* is a concession, an unwelcome result for their corporealism. Once the Stoics recognize they cannot come up with a viable body, e.g. fistiness or sittingness, to be present in Socrates as a quality, they are forced to admit there are *poia* without a *poiotes* and seek an alternative way to make them bodies. In fumbling for that alternative, the rest of the Categories are invented. According to Menn, Zeno recognized the first two Categories as a Platonic substance-quality scheme, taking over the notions of *ousia* and *poiotes* from his Academic background, and unwittingly giving rise to the third and fourth Categories by assuming that every *poion* must be so through a *poiotes*. When this latter assumption is undermined by their inability to deliver a corporeal *poiotes* for every *poion*, the Stoics move first to the relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*) and then eventually to the individual disposed (*pōs echon*). As Menn puts it, the “Stoics come to recognize different kinds of πως ἔχοντα, slowly and reluctantly distinguishing them from ποιά, as they discover different kinds of predicates that cannot be explained by the presence of some body in the subject.”⁵⁷

Menn's evidence for this story is complex. He takes the broad sense of “*poion*” in passage E to cover everything not in the fourth Category, everything not *pros ti pōs echon*, and thus to include both the second and third Categories, in contrast to the narrowest sense of “*poion*” that includes only the second Category (and is the proper contrast to the *pōs echon*).⁵⁸ He takes these distinctions among senses of “*poion*” to be a result of a historical development in the theory, since it would not make sense to think the four Categories already existed and then the Stoics introduced a broad sense of the second Category to also include the third. The developmental narrative Menn proposes is that the Stoics were navigating between the Scylla of not being able to come up with qualities for every qualified thing, and the Charybdis of recognizing that some *pros ti* are *poia*, only to crash again on the same spot, there not being any quality for these *poia*; the natural passage between these evils that Chrysippus finally arrives at is the *pōs echon*, a reductive thesis that does not raise the specter of having to find a quality to inhere in the qualified, since the *pōs echon* is nothing but the qualified thing.⁵⁹

This brings us to the third and final Simplicius text (*In Ar. Cat.* 165,32–6,29 (29c)), which I will summarize rather than quote. This passage appears in the commentary on *Categories* 7, *Concerning what is relative*, specifically on 6a36–b14,

⁵⁷ Menn, “Categories,” 229.

⁵⁸ Menn, *Categories*, 229, n. 12.

⁵⁹ Scylla and Charybdis are my description; Menn does not put his point this way.

where Aristotle defines relatives as “those things that are in any way at all relative to something else.” Simplicius canvasses the objections and views of various thinkers, including Platonists, Archytas, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Boethus, offers some clarification and defense of the Aristotelian position, and then turns to the Stoic account of the relative. He reports first (165,33–6,1) that the Stoics recognized two kinds of relative, or *pros ti*: those that are *relative* (*pros ti*), defined as the contradictory of per se (*kath’ hauto*), e.g. sweet, bitter; and those that are *relatively disposed* (*pros ti pōs echon*), defined as the contradictory of what is differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), e.g. on the right, father. So, just as there is one conception of what is per se and another of what is *kata diaphoran*, so too relatives are one thing and the relatively disposed are another.

Next (166,1–15) he reports that the consequence of the pairings, or yokings, is reversed (*antestrammenē*).⁶⁰ This idea that the relation between the two pairs of terms (per se-*kata diaphoran* and relative-relatively disposed) is reversed is notoriously tricky to understand, and scholars disagree about the entailments being reported.⁶¹ Simplicius explains the reversal as follows: differentiated things (*kata diaphoran*) extend as far as (*sunuparchein*) what is per se, because those things that are per se have certain differences, e.g. white and black; but what is per se does not extend as far as what is differentiated, because sweet and bitter are differentiated, but not per se. I take it that for differentiated things to extend as far as what is per se is for being per se to entail being differentiated, and that the case of sweet and bitter shows the entailment does not go the other way.⁶² This conditional is then contrasted with the other: being relatively disposed entails being relative (as one would expect), but there are relatives like sweet and bitter that are differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), and hence not relatively disposed (since what is relatively disposed, depending solely on its relationship to something else, is contradictory both to being per se and to being differentiated). The reversal of the consequence of the yokings, then, is the reverse entailment between the pairs on the left and right sides of the dichotomy. As the following illustrates, the two kinds of relative go in one direction, and their contradictories in the other:

	<i>pros ti</i>	
relative (<i>pros ti</i>)	←	relatively disposed (<i>pros ti pōs echon</i>)
contradictory of		contradictory of
per se (<i>kath’ hauto</i>)	→	differentiated (<i>kata diaphoran</i>)

⁶⁰ ἀντεστραμμένη δέ ἐστιν τῶν συζυγιῶν ἡ ἀκολουθία.

⁶¹ See Fleet, *Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories* 7–8, n. 70, for useful commentary and references; LS, commentary to 29c (vol. 2), understand *antestrammenē* as reciprocal, and infer from the examples’ not being reciprocally related that a negative should be inserted; cf. Menn, “Categories,” 232: the implication reverses direction, from not-A to not-B.

⁶² See Mignucci, “Relatives,” 135–73, for analysis in support of taking *sunuparchei* in a predicative rather than existential sense this way and for the same entailments. For an extended treatment of this passage, see Duncombe, *Ancient Relativity*, 181–201.

Simplicius then offers to rephrase what he is saying more clearly (166,15–29 (29C)). Relative, he clarifies, are “as many things as, being in a certain condition according to their own character (*hosa kat’ oikeion charaktēra diakeimena*), incline toward something else”; or, as Long & Sedley put it, “all things which are conditioned according to an intrinsic character but are directed to something else,”⁶³ as sweet and bitter would not be altered unless the power within them were altered. Relatively disposed, on the other hand, are “as many things as are of a nature to belong or not to belong to something looking externally, without any change or alteration to itself.” Therefore, whenever something is differentiated and inclines toward something else, it is merely relative (*pros ti*), e.g. state (*hexis*), knowledge, and sense-perception; but whenever it is conceived of not according to an intrinsic difference but merely in terms of its state relative to something else, then it is relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*), e.g. person on the right. The distinction between the two kinds of relatives, in short, is the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties (though not all intrinsic properties will be relative).

This passage has become important in the context of the Categories not only because it tells us something about the fourth Category, the relatively disposed, but because scholars have taken the testimony about what is differentiated (*kata diaphoran*) as evidence about the qualified individual (*poion*).⁶⁴ In passage E, the broadest sense of *poion* includes everything that is *kata diaphoran*, in contrast to the narrow sense matching a quality; in passage F, the chorus is counted as a *poion* despite lacking a unifying *pneuma*, because it is *kata diaphoran* by qualified training; and here in the third Simplicius passage the *pros ti pōs echon* is defined as the contradictory of what is *kata diaphoran*. With this *poion*-*kata diaphoran* bridge constructed, scholars have reached in to these three Simplicius passages for evidence about the difference between the Categories. For example, Long & Sedley take this last passage to show that “relative” is split between the second and fourth Categories, since what is *kata diaphoran* just is the *poion*.⁶⁵ Menn argues that these passages show that the fourth Category was introduced before the third because the *pros ti pōs echon* in the third Simplicius passage (*In Ar. Cat.* 165,32–6,29) is contrasted with what is *kata diaphoran*, i.e. the *poion*. The different senses of *poion* in E and F then testify to the slow and reluctant evolution of the theory after that initial

⁶³ Or Fleet, *In Ar. Cat.*: such things as are disposed in a certain way because of their own character but which are directed toward something else.

⁶⁴ Pace Mignucci, “Relatives,” 154, n. 19, who does not think this passage is about the Categories at all; I appreciate Mignucci’s restraint but do think it is safe to say that Simplicius is talking about the fourth Category as one kind of *pros ti*.

⁶⁵ LS, 165. Graeser, as we saw above, takes this passage to testify to a distinct but overlapping set of Categories that classifies the “ontological constituents of reality”; non-relational (*per se*) and relational (*pros ti*) beings that are the bearers of attributes and those attributes, respectively, with the relational beings further subdivided into genuine attributes (*kata diaphoran*) and those that are merely *lekta* (the *pros ti pōs echonta*), which overlap here with the canonical four-fold schema. It is in arguing against Graeser in their commentary on 29c that LS take *pros ti*, *per se*, and *kata diaphoran* to be distinctions with the *poion*.

move from the second to the fourth Category; Menn aligns the narrowest sense of *poion* in passage E with the second Category, and takes the widest sense of *poion* to include both the second and the third insofar as they are not *pros ti pōs echon*.

What I have called Menn's developmental narrative is the idea that the four-fold schema of the Categories was developed slowly and reluctantly, because Stoic corporealism could not deliver corporeal qualities for every qualified thing on a subject-inherence model; they started with matter and quality to build their qualified bodies, and then bumped up against cases where no reasonable body could be supplied to make the body qualified, so they introduced first the fourth Category of relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*) and eventually discovered the third, individual disposed (*pōs echon*).

Another part of Menn's narrative is the idea that the Categories were developed in the course of a debate between Aristo and Chrysippus over the unity of the virtues. According to this idea, Aristo departed from Zeno by introducing the fourth Category, *pros ti pōs echon*, to make the virtues one rather than many; Chrysippus then responded with a work titled *That the virtues are poia*, insisting in Zeno's defense that the virtues are many and distinct (Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.12–5 (29E, passage M/Chapter 8), 7.2.17 (De Lacy); DL 7.161, 7.202 (Dorandi); Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034C–D (Cherniss)). But given his Platonic commitment to all Fs (*poia*) being F through a distinct body, F-ness (a *poiotēs*), Chrysippus thereby makes the virtues like so many pebbles in an urn, threatening the orthodox Stoic commitment to the inseparability of the virtues. Then the later, mature Chrysippus solved this problem by arriving at the *pōs echon*, a reductive thesis that secures the distinctness of the virtues without threatening their inseparability: the virtues are thus nothing but the soul, in particular the commanding faculty (*hēgemonikon*) of soul, in a certain state or condition (Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–1D (61B, passage L/Chapter 8); Seneca, *Ep.* 113.2 (29B); SE, *M.* 11.23 (60G2), *PH* 2.81 (33P2)).

Bernard Collette-Dučić argues against the charges of multiplicity that Menn presses on the grounds that Stoic qualities (*poiotētes*, plural) are qualities of themselves, self-predicating in a special sense.⁶⁶ According to this sense of predication, they are qualities that are also qualified, hence the *poiotētes* are also *poia*; yet they are not like pebbles in an urn because they are not distinct bodies, but just the soul (a quality, on this reading) *pōs echon*. Thus, against Menn, Collette-Dučić argues we need not give in to the charges of multiplicity, or see any conflict between virtues characterized as *poia* and as *pōs echonta*, nor therefore any development within Chrysippus. Notice, however, that this challenge to Menn's developmental thesis takes on and works within the subject-inherence premise, rather than resisting it. So too Brian Earl Johnson's response to Collette-Dučić and defense of Menn, which "doubles down" on the hylomorphic perspective, pressing the Stoic

⁶⁶ Collette-Dučić, "Virtues are *Poia*."

archai into the first two Categories and minimizing their corporeality, reading *hupokeimenon* as the bearer of qualities, and saying that the second Category “explains the qualities of any given body by the presence of that quality in it as a part.”⁶⁷

Conclusions

To summarize and close, a review of the texts has revealed a wide array of interpretive difficulties. We saw, first, the question of what it means to say that each of us is four bodies, distinct and yet indistinguishable by perception and sharing all the same physical properties, e.g. shape, size, place. Also, what it means to say that we are several substrates (*hupokeimena*), and what motivates the Stoics to posit what Irwin calls “the doctrine of two substrates.” Related to this question is the conflict Irwin sees between Posidonius and Mnesarchus over whether the substrate is an extreme Lockean mass that never survives growth or diminution, or (Mnesarchus’ “more reasonable” view) that it is a relatively stable continuant. In the first case, Posidonius seems to be denying the existence of things like compost heaps (which plainly do exist), and in the second Mnesarchus undermines the motivation for the doctrine of two subjects (since there is already a subject to persist through growth). A third problem concerns the nature of the *idiōs poion*, what it means for it to come to be in substance, as Sedley emphasizes, and how a single property or combination (*sundromē*) of properties could be responsible both for synchronic individuation (uniqueness) and for diachronic persistence (identity). The more specific the properties, or the longer the list of properties to individuate a thing, the less likely they are to be lifelong properties that can secure the persistence of the entity, not to mention unify an organism and be epistemically accessible.

Finally, there is the developmental narrative. Sedley finds the Stoics in a defensive position against a version of the Growing Argument specially tailored to them by the Academy under Arcesilaus; Chrysippus then invents the Categories, but at the cost of inviting charges of incoherent dualism; Posidonius comes to the rescue with mereology, making the *hupokeimenon* a subpart of the qualified individual to mitigate the absurdity of cramming different bodies into the same place—but at the fatal and unresolved cost of undermining the central Stoic commitment to through and through blending (*krasis di’ holou*). And last, Mnesarchus defends the Stoics against charges of monism, by appeal to the different histories of the lump of clay and the various statues it constitutes.

Menn also finds the Stoics on their heels, innovating to contend with pesky cases where no corporeal quality can be given for the qualified individual. First Aristo introduces the *pros ti pōs echon* to unify the virtues, to which Chrysippus

⁶⁷ Johnson, “Commentary on Colette-Dučić,” 226.

responds that the virtues are *poia*; but in so doing Chrysippus overshoots the mark, rendering the virtues like pebbles in an urn and threatening the core Stoic commitment to the inseparability of the virtues. Only later does Chrysippus make the schema four-fold, devising the *pōs echon* to differentiate the virtues in a reductive sense that does not threaten their inseparability by making them *poia*.

Here stands the state of the debate, trapped in hylomorphic perplexities (where, again, “hylomorphic” includes the subject-inherence and substance-quality models) and complicated developmental accounts. There are essentially three lines of interpretation, little engaged with each other: Sedley’s seminal account that he has followed up more recently, pressing the developmental narrative; Irwin’s account, followed up recently by Nawar; and Menn’s account, recently criticized by Collette-Dučić and defended by Johnson.⁶⁸ Although these treatments are few, they merit extended exposition both because they are intricate, and because they run parallel to each other on separate tracks. It is time to assess these accounts together.

⁶⁸ The semantic and ontological interpretations of the Categories have not been followed up in the literature, so I leave them to the side in this summary of views.

8

The Categories, A Fresh Start

τέσσαρά γε ποιούσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ
ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέσσαρ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν

I propose a fresh start on the four Stoic Categories.¹ They are, again: substrate (*hupokeimenon*), qualified individual (*poion*), individual disposed (*pōs echon*), and individual relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*). I will proceed by setting aside hylomorphic presuppositions about the Stoics (where, as described in Chapter 7, “hylomorphic” includes the subject-inherence and substance-quality models), and urging methodological modesty with respect to historical claims, as well as charity with respect to developmental claims. I will emphasize the working examples we are given, and stay close to the terminology and context of our texts. I will begin with the *hupokeimenon*, then move to the *poion*, untangle the *idiōs poion*, run through the *pōs echon* and *pros ti pōs echon*, and then address the developmental narrative. Along the way, we will see how the Categories can be distinct bodies with all the same physical properties, what it means for the Stoics to say there are several substrates, how the *idiōs poion* can be responsible for both synchronic individuation and diachronic identity, revisit the dialectic with the Academy, and see why the Stoics say there are qualified individuals that lack a quality.

Ὑποκείμενον (*Hupokeimenon*)

The first Category is the *hupokeimenon*, which is identified as substance, i.e. *ousia* (B4, C8–12).² This much is clear, but there is trouble immediately with respect to what Stoic *ousia* is and what that dictates for our understanding of *hupokeimenon*. Let us start from scratch. The Greek “*ousia*” is a noun formed from the participle of the verb “*eimi*,” “to be,” and it is just as well rendered “being” as it is “substance”; indeed “being” is the natural translation of the term as it is used in Plato’s *Sophist* in the discussion of *being* (and *non-being*) for which he uses “*ousia*,” “to on” (neuter participle),

¹ Some of what I say here appears in de Harven, “The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism.”

² Lettered references A–F are to the texts in Chapter 7; because this chapter is a continuation of the last, I continue the lettering of passages from Chapter 7, picking up with G, rather than starting over from A.

and “*einai*” (infinitive) interchangeably. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Stoics argue that only bodies *are* because only bodies meet the ontological criterion for *being*, the capacity to act or undergo. And in Chapter 3 we saw Diogenes report explicitly that *ousia* for the Stoics is body (DL 7.150–1, passage E in that chapter), as does Clement, *Strom* 2.436 (SVF 2.359)). So there is good reason to think that *ousia* for the Stoics is body. However, the barrier to this straightforward thesis is the widespread presumption that *ousia* for the Stoics is not body, but matter (*hulē*) to the exclusion of *pneuma*, a presumption fueled by hylomorphic presuppositions.³ Stephen Menn, for example, understands the *hupokeimenon* as the *subject* or individual composed out of *ousia* (*hulē*) and *pneuma* (*poiōtēs*), and on that basis takes A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, David Sedley, and Richard Sorabji to task for translating “*hupokeimenon*” as “substrate”; as he sees it, *Socrates* is the *hupokeimenon*, not his matter (i.e. *ousia*):⁴

The whole, this man Socrates, is called “this”—or, more generally, ὑποκείμενον—because he contains this οὐσία, and he is called “human” or “Socrates”—or, more generally, ποιόν—because he contains this ποιότης. Thus the same thing, under different descriptions, is both a ὑποκείμενον and a ποιόν, but it is neither an οὐσία nor a ποιότης, although parts of it are. In a sentence like “This is Socrates,” the Stoics seem to treat the οὐσία as the abstract of the subject, the ὑποκείμενον, much as the ποιότης is the abstract of the predicate, the ποιόν.⁵

Since Menn sees the Platonic distinction between substance and quality as the starting point for the Categories, for the Stoics as for Aristotle, then if the *hupokeimenon* is to be *ousia* (as we are indeed told in the texts), it must be as an Aristotelian substance, an object; but if *ousia* is to be matter, as Menn takes it to be, then he owes an explanation for how these two quite different conceptions of *ousia* (as a thing’s matter and as the whole object) are connected, which is where the apparatus of abstract and concrete terms comes in.⁶ The same situation arises

³ The question “How did *ousia* become matter for the Stoics?” was put forth by Hahm, *Origins*, 40, and pursued by Sedley, “Origins.” Hahm thinks we may never get an answer to the question. Sedley’s suggestion, 72, is that “Originally the Academy bequeathed to the Stoa the notion of matter as an unqualified kind of *ousia* (ἄποιος οὐσία), technically contrasted with another, intelligible kind of *ousia*, but because this latter kind had largely fallen out of the picture the simple noun *ousia* itself acquired the material connotations which were thereafter to become inseparable from it.” Bronowski, *Lekta*, 136, takes the Stoics to assimilate matter to body and says that in so doing they “merely pushed to its proper conclusion the line of thought [sc. in Plato and Aristotle] conducive to assimilating matter to body.” My contention is that *ousia* is not matter but body, and that these are not the same thing for the Stoics; this conflation of matter and body merits its own separate treatment, but I will do what I can here.

⁴ Menn, “Categories,” n. 1, n. 2, n. 10, and 221–3.

⁵ Menn, “Categories,” 222, followed by Johnson, “Commentary on Colette-Dučić,” 226–7.

⁶ The hylomorphic assumption that the Stoics are taking over and expanding the Platonic substance-quality distinction and that substance (i.e. *hulē*) and quality are parts of the individual with the quality *inhering* in the substance is evident throughout Menn’s account (215, 218, 221–2, 224, 227, 228–9, 230, 236, 237, 239–40, 243, 246). The assumption that the Stoics observe a “sharp distinction” between concrete and abstract terms, F (*poion*) and F-ness (*poiōtēs*), is made explicit (but not argued for) on 217 and plays an instrumental role in the analysis (221–2, 224, 242). A third assumption governing Menn’s account, as I mentioned above, is that it is a problem for the Stoics that there are Fs without an F-ness,

insofar as Menn equates the second Category, *poion*, with *poiotēs* as the other hylomorphic building block. I will address the *poiotēs* on its own in a moment; for now I ask, what reason is there to think that *ousia* is matter for the Stoics? One text Menn cites in support of *ousia* as matter is the following from Diogenes Laertius (whose last line is the first line of passage E in Chapter 3):

- G. (1) Substance (*ousia*) is the prime matter (*protē hulē*) of all existing things, as both Chrysippus in the first book of the *Physics* and Zeno say. (2) Matter is that out of which anything is produced. (3) Both substance and matter are spoken of in two ways, that of all things and that of particulars. Therefore that of the whole becomes neither greater nor less, while that of the particulars both increases and decreases. (4) Substance is, according to them, body and limited, just as Antipater in the second book of *On substance* and Apollodorus in the *Physics* say.

οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων. ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὅτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται. καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς, οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτ' ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία καὶ πεπερασμένη, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ.

DL 7.150 (Dorandi)

It is obvious how someone could interpret *ousia* as matter here. After all, Diogenes reports that substance is the prime matter of all things (G1). However, this is not especially Stoic terminology and, more importantly, we are told exactly what is meant both by “matter” and by “substance.” Matter is that out of which things come to be, the material constituent (G2). This is a functional account of substance, as that out of which all things come to be; the description of it as prime matter is neutral with respect to what that constituent is, be it cheese, atoms, air, or whatever. Both terms, we are then told, are used in reference to the whole cosmos and in reference to particulars (G3). That out of which the whole is constituted neither grows nor diminishes; this is because there is no substance apart from that of the whole that could be added to it, and nowhere for any of it to depart to. The substance of individual bodies, on the other hand, does increase and decrease, as we have seen the Stoics say in response to the Growing Argument. There is no more or less substance than the totality of the substance that there is, so there is no way for the cosmos as a whole to grow or diminish (though it does expand and contract);

cases where they could not come up with an abstract entity for the concrete (218, 220, 223, 229, 240, 241–4).

but there is always more and less substance than the totality of an individual's substance, and so plenty of room for partial wholes to grow and diminish.

Next we are told what substance *is*, no longer in functional or theory-neutral terms that report what substance *does*, but in terms that unequivocally identify Stoic *ousia* as body (as opposed to cheese, air, atoms, *and* matter) (G4). So the dialectic of the passage is simply this: *ousia* for the Stoics is the material constituent of all things, and *ousia* is body (and it is finite). Notice how natural it is to describe the role of *ousia* as the material constituent of the cosmos, and that this kind of talk gives no reason to think that Stoic matter (*hulē*) has been invoked in any specific or technical sense, or that body or *ousia* has thereby been identified with *hulē* to the exclusion of *pneuma*. The rest of the passage (not quoted here but appearing in Chapter 3 in the discussion of infinite divisibility as passage E) reports that *ousia* is malleable, infinitely divisible, and subject to blending. If *ousia* were being identified with matter to the exclusion of *logos* or *pneuma*, this report would not make sense.

The first Category, *hupokeimenon*, is thus a thing's corporeal substance (*ousia*) as such: solid, three-dimensional extension, the bulk or material constituent of the individual. Several other texts confirm this point (Aëtius 1.9.7 (SVF 2.325); Clement, *Strom.* 2.436 (SVF 2.359); Theodoretus, *Graecarum affectionum curatio* 2.1.78 (SVF 2.305)). We can elucidate the idea by appeal to Plotinus (*Enn.* 6.1.25,30–4 (passage F/Chapter 3)), who testifies that the *hupokeimenon* is one and undifferentiated, i.e. a homogeneous bulk or mass (*ogkos*). Thus, to say that the *hupokeimenon* is substance, as Plutarch does, is to identify it with the total corporeal substance of the individual, i.e. both the *pneuma* and the matter out of which the individual is composed. Both are bodies with bulk that together constitute the individual. The *hupokeimenon* is an individual's total corpulence, not an individual like Socrates (which is the *poion*).

And although the *hupokeimenon* is sometimes described as unqualified matter (*apoiōs hulē*), the context in each case makes clear that the terminology is a function of the commentator's hylomorphic perspective or, as with Diogenes here in passage G, that it is functional and hence theory-neutral language rather than a reflection of Stoic commitments about *hulē* specifically (e.g. Calcidius, *In Tim.* 290; DL 7.137; Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 48,11–6 (28E); Stobaeus 1.132,27–3,11 and 133,18–23 (28q; EK fr. 92)).⁷ To be *hulē* in these contexts is to be the material

⁷ Porphyry (in Simplicius text cited) is speaking broadly, intending to include Aristotle in the characterization of substrate as unqualified matter. Stobaeus reports that *ousia* is the prime matter of all things that are, and that this *substance* alone is deathless, undergoing no addition or subtraction but only qualitative change; as we saw in Chapter 5, both principles are deathless, so prime matter cannot refer to Stoic *hulē* alone in this context. DL says that the four elements together are the unqualified substance, i.e. matter, to make clear that the four elements together (though two will be matter and two *pneuma*) are substance in the sense that they will be the mass or bulk of the world, which from a hylomorphic perspective is restricted to matter. Calcidius, as argued above in the cosmology (Chapter 6), reports that the substance is prime matter at its most ancient, i.e. at the foundation, and it is both principles that answer to this description, not matter alone.

constituent of thing, the *ex hou*; and this does not entail anything about what that material constituent is, whether prime matter, proximate matter, fire, cheese, or, as for the Stoics, body. And to be *apoios* is not thereby to lack a *poiotēs* in any technical sense, nor therefore to indicate that the *ex hou* is matter to the exclusion of *pneuma* just because a *poiotēs* is a qualitative state of *pneuma*; to be *apoios* is simply to be amorphous, or undifferentiated. We have seen this predilection of critics to equate body with matter before, in the context of the two *archai* or principles of the cosmos in Chapter 5, where I argued that, for the Stoics, both the *archai* are bodies, but only one is matter. Everything that *exists* for the Stoics is body, but not everything that *exists* is matter; the divine active principle *logos* is a body but it is not matter and it has no matter. The Stoics are unique in making this distinction, so it is not surprising that when our sources speak in terms of “matter” it is often in reference to Stoic body rather than to *hulē* proper, i.e. the passive principle or the downstream blend of earth and water.

Now, again, I maintain that *ousia* is body and hence properly rendered as “corporeal substance,” and thus that the Stoic *hupokeimenon* is not matter awaiting its *pneuma*, or an Aristotelian substance or subject of predication, but rather the totality of a thing’s corporeal substance as such: solid three-dimensional extension, or bulk, and hence the *substrate* of the individual. Composition having taken place by a blend of matter and *pneuma*, as described in Chapter 6, the schema of the Categories takes that individual once built as its starting point in an entirely different explanatory enterprise, what makes each thing F in the various ways that it is. That the individual already composed is the starting point and analysandum of the Categories is evident in the widespread talk of making *each of us*—all plants, animals, and artifacts—four, *each of us* several substrates. There is never any question in the Categories of what makes the individual one, only what makes it unique, persistent, and qualified. Furthermore, we do not find the language of substrate and qualified (or quality for that matter) in the cosmology, nor do we find the language of the cosmology in the Categories. In the cosmology, we find talk of passive matter and agent *pneuma* as the ingredients that blend to generate a new individual, tarring the ark inside and out (Philo, *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin* 2.4 (47R)). Both *pneuma* and matter are bodies, and both together compose every individual. So, it stands to reason that once the Categories are invoked, the *hupokeimenon* of the individual should be understood as *both* the matter and the *pneuma* together, the total corporeal substance of the individual they compose.

Defined as *ousia*, the *hupokeimenon* is simply a thing’s corpulence, a quantity or portion of body for which constitution is identity. As such, the *hupokeimenon* is homogeneous and unqualified; but bear in mind that in saying that body or the *hupokeimenon* is unqualified, I have not thereby said that it lacks a quality and therefore must be matter to the exclusion of *pneuma* (on the grounds that qualities are *pneuma*). For Stoic body to be *apoios* is not for it to be missing a *poiotēs* from which we can infer the absence of *pneuma*. Nor does being *apoios* mean that a body

lacks all properties whatsoever; as we saw in Chapter 5, the two *archai* in their original state are formless bodies, but they are always of some shape or size or another even if none per se; and this is as true for *hulē* as it is for *logos*. Thus we should not treat the adjective “*apoiος*” as a technical term invoking qualities or *pneuma*, but as ordinary language meaning the same as “amorphous” and “homogeneous.” For a body to be *apoiος* for the Stoics is simply for it to be homogeneous and undifferentiated, shapeless and formless per se (though always of some shape or other), like a bulk or mass. And, again, just as “formless” does not in Stoic terms invoke the absence of a form in particular, so too being unqualified does not signal the absence of *pneuma* or *poiotes*. The *hupokeimenon* is simply a thing’s corporeal substance (all of it) considered in abstraction from its qualities and differentiations, as a quantity of solid extension subject to all manner of qualitative flux and no quantitative change (addition or subtraction). The *hupokeimenon* does in this sense play the role of underlying subject, but this is not to equate *ousia* either with matter or with an Aristotelian substance; it is simply a thing’s corpulence. Thus, I render *hupokeimenon* as “substrate,” what literally underlies the qualified individual as its corporeal substance.⁸

This brings me to the conflict Irwin finds between Posidonius and Mnesarchus concerning the persistence of the *hupokeimenon*. Stobaeus reports (C5) that Posidonius says “substance neither grows nor diminishes by addition or subtraction, but only alters, just as in the case of numbers and measures.” Thus Posidonius treats the *hupokeimenon* as an “extreme Lockean mass,” as Terence Irwin puts it.⁹ Mnesarchus, we are told (C10), emphasizes that the *poion* and the *hupokeimenon* are not the same according to what we now call Leibniz’s Law: “for it is necessary that things that are the same have the same properties.” He exemplifies the point (C11) by asking us to suppose that a lump of clay in the shape of a horse is smashed and remolded into the shape of a dog; the dog (the *poion*) back then did not exist, but the clay (the *hupokeimenon*) did, therefore they are distinct individuals. Further, Mnesarchus argues (C12), it is implausible that we are identical to our *hupokeimenon* because the substance often pre-exists generation, and often

⁸ In translating “*hupokeimenon*” as “substrate,” I follow LS and Sorabji, *MSM*, in contrast not only to Menn, “Categories,” but also to Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 407, where the *hupokeimenon* is characterized as “an object, something out there, and as such it is treated simply as a discrete lump of matter.” See Rist, “Categories and their Uses,” who takes the *hupokeimenon* alternately as a substance that exists (154), prime matter (159), and a material object (169), in a strongly developmental account from a strongly uncharitable bias that takes Posidonius to be frequently mistaken about the original Stoic doctrine. Finally, see Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 168, n. 47, for references to Ravaissou and Stein with the comment that their claim that *tina* and *poia* represent the first two Categories are unfounded; I am not sure why it would be unfounded to say that the second Category is for *poia*, but I certainly think that casting the first Category as Something is unfounded (as Rist, Mates, and others in the semantic and ontological vein of interpretation take it).

⁹ Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 462–3; Sedley, “Criterion,” 257, also makes the connection to Locke (and Hume). Again, for an extreme Lockean mass constitution is identity, it does not survive addition or subtraction.

the substance remains after destruction, e.g. Socrates' body remains although he no longer exists.

Irwin reasons that it is unlikely a process of generation and destruction of statues could take place without the clay losing or gaining any constituents, and so Mnesarchus must be committed to the *hupokeimenon* as a relatively stable continuant rather than an extreme Lockean mass. But this sort of empirical observation is out of place in a thought experiment like this; and that it is indeed a thought experiment is signaled in the text by the otherwise unnecessary interpolation of "for the sake of argument" (C11).¹⁰ Thus the fact that we are being asked to consider the *hupokeimenon* to persist through this process does not signal any deviation from the persistence conditions given by Posidonius. On the contrary, it relies on the idea that the clay merely alters, neither growing nor diminishing (as described in C4–5), and that this qualitative alteration during the quantitative stability of the *hupokeimenon* is what destroys and generates each of the statues. The context of the report is that there are four kinds of generation and corruption, and what is distinctive about this kind is that it does not involve the addition or subtraction of mass, but only qualitative alteration. This thought experiment underscores, rather than undermines, that the *hupokeimenon* is a Lockean mass for Mnesarchus, and does not suggest any conflict with Posidonius.

It is also incorrect to think that Mnesarchus takes Socrates' substance to pre-exist and survive him as "a single material subject before, during, and after the lifetime of an organism," as Irwin does.¹¹ For Mnesarchus to take this position would be not only question-begging (for how could we know that it is a single subject without presuming so), but contrary to the common conception that our matter does not persist from life to death—the very intuition that gives rise to the Growing Argument. Irwin takes his interpretation to be more natural, however this account is not only less natural but also circular. Irwin says that if Mnesarchus "is simply saying that the pre-Socratic substance exists before Socrates and the post-Socratic substance exists after Socrates, so that neither of them has precisely the history of Socrates," then he "does not show that Socrates is not identical to a material substance that persists through his lifetime and for neither a longer nor a shorter time. Mnesarchus' argument does not show that there is no such substance."¹² But, of course, one already has to think that Mnesarchus takes the *hupokeimenon* to be a "relatively stable continuant" persisting through some addition and subtraction in order to take that as his target. His objective as stated in the text, however, is to show that the substrate (for which constitution is identity) and the *poion* are not the same, and his argument does indeed show this.

¹⁰ For arguments that the Stoics did not have the concept of a thought experiment but did use thought experiments as probative examples, see Ierodiakonou, "Ancient Thought Experiments."

¹¹ Irwin, "Stoic Individuals," n. 14.

¹² Irwin, "Stoic Individuals" 478–9.

The case of the clay and statues and the case of Socrates are two different cases, two separate arguments that the *hupokeimenon* and the *poion* are not identical, i.e. that constitution is not identity for the qualified individual. What Mnesarchus brings to the dialectic is Leibniz's Law (C10). One argument for that is the case of the clay that persists through constituting now a horse, now a dog (C11). Another argument is that Socrates' substance when he is born is there before he is generated, and that Socrates' substance when he dies is there after his destruction (C12); there is no reason to think that these two substances (pre- and post-Socratic) are identical to each other, or that the substance of an organism could persist in the way that a lump of clay could survive qualitative alteration of molding and squashing—this is presumably why Mnesarchus did not use an organic example in the case where the same *hupokeimenon* persists through generation and destruction of multiple *poia*. Thus, again, we have no reason to think that Posidonius and Mnesarchus are at odds about the persistence of the *hupokeimenon*.

Notice, too, that to embrace the *hupokeimenon* as an “extreme Lockean mass” for which constitution is identity in no way commits the Stoics to denying the existence of compost heaps. To be sure, compost heaps do not have the unity that living organisms have, and the *hupokeimenon* of a compost heap will not survive growth or diminution; but this is no reason to think Posidonius or anyone else denies that there are compost heaps and that they do have some sort of persistence. The error is to think that the compost heap must itself *be* a *hupokeimenon*. Simplicius (passage F) testifies that the Stoics recognize qualified individuals that are not living organisms, e.g. ships and armies, which are weaker unities than those unified by a single tenor tarring the ark inside and out, so the compost heap is itself a *poion*, not a *hupokeimenon*. Indeed, what would it be the *hupokeimenon* of?

Ποῖόν (Poion)

Interpretive decisions concerning the *hupokeimenon* are closely related to analysis of the second Category, *poion*. Just as the *hupokeimenon* is not to be construed as matter to the exclusion of *pneuma*, so too the *poion* is not to be construed as the form or quality to that matter; and just as the *hupokeimenon* is not to be construed as an Aristotelian substance or subject of predication, so too the *poion* is not to be construed as its quality, property, or predicate. It is essential to getting the Stoics right to observe that the second Category is not a *quality* (*poiotēs*), but a qualified thing or individual (*poion*); it is not, for example, the quality or property of humanity, but the human being. There is no textual evidence that reports the second Category is *poiotēs* as opposed to *poion*, and yet this assumption is nearly universal. Again, sometimes scholars translate “*poion*” directly as “quality” instead of “qualified individual,” other times the distinction is observed but only verbally in the sense that the quality is still taken to be the hylomorphic partner to

the *hupokeimenon* understood as matter, so that the focus of the analysis remains on the quality.¹³

Certainly the Stoics are giving an account of what makes something F, a corporealist rehabilitation of Plato's Sons of the Earth that will satisfy the Friends of the Forms. They also take the *hupokeimenon* as an ontologically prior subject on which the *poion* depends (and, transitively, the *pōs echon* and *pros ti pōs echon* as well). However, these objectives are achieved from an entirely different perspective, namely the *constitution* of one thing by one other.¹⁴ That the Stoics are pursuing a one-one constitution model in contrast to the composition of one thing out of many offered in the cosmology (or by a hylomorphic account) is plain from the examples they use: the clay in relation to the statue it constitutes, the hand in relation to the fist, and the corporeal substance in relation to Socrates. The fact that our substance as such does not grow underscores the constitution model. Take the set of your molecules, the totality of your substance (or whatever you take your material constituent to be) at any given moment; that one set or lump or puddle or puff is a Lockean mass; the fact that we as individuals do grow shows that qualified individuals are not identical to the Lockean masses that constitute them. This dialectic about growth and diminution would be a propos of nothing if the Stoics were not adopting a constitution model, and the examples would be ill suited if the objective were to account for unity and composition along hylomorphic lines. Thus Sedley's original comparison of the Stoics to David Wiggins, despite his focus on the case of Tibbles and Tib (a cat and the cat considered minus its tail), is the most fitting model for the Categories.¹⁵ To underscore the fit, I quote Wiggins:

¹³ See Chapter 7, n. 33 for bibliography.

¹⁴ Not blending, as Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 12–3 holds.

¹⁵ Sedley, "Criterion," n. 24, invokes the "is" of constitution in passing, in contrast to his focus on Tib and Tibbles at 268–70. With respect to Tib and Tibbles, Sedley takes Chrysippus in Philo, *De aet. mun.* 48 (28P), to be turning the Growing Argument against the Academics by showing that material diminution is a *condition* of persistence, rather than a barrier: on account of Dion persisting through (growth and) diminution, it must be Theon that perishes. The puzzle merits more attention that I can give it here, but I will register that I am not sure that Sedley is right that Philo's quotation begins once the paradox is already set up, since the quotation begins with "Let it be granted for the sake of argument and speculation. . ." and proceeds to set up the case. My hunch is that the order of the dialectic is that Chrysippus says in advance that there cannot be two *idiōs poia* in one substance. Then, for the sake of argument he hypothesizes Dion as a whole person, and Theon as a part (Dion considered minus one foot), and asks which has perished if Dion's foot is cut off. We are told that the reason for picking Theon as the one who perishes is that Dion collapses into the incomplete (*atelos*) substance of Theon, and there cannot be two *idiōs poia* in one substance. The case of Dion and Theon is not in fact described as a case of two *poia* in one substance, and technically they are not, since Theon's substance is Dion's minus a foot's worth of substance. Once Dion's substance becomes equal to Theon's, however, the principle is invoked and the choice is forced between them. So, it's not that Chrysippus is struggling with the puzzle in order to hold on to the principle that there cannot be two *idiōs poia* in one substance, but that the principle can be invoked to disarm such a puzzle and show that subparts are not individuals. What this text tells us about the Categories is that the Stoics are committed to this schema as a nested one-to-one relation of part to whole, and that each substrate is *not* a proper part with remainder, or subpart of the whole. Irwin, "Stoic Individuals," 467–8, argues that Dion and Theon are two separate people; thus Theon is an *idiōs poion*, and he perishes because he loses the peculiar quality of being one-footed (not much of a peculiarity!). Therefore the *idiōs poiōtēs* is a perceptible distinguishing mark; I will argue against views of this sort shortly, when I address the *idiōs poion*.

A certain tree T stands (leafless, suppose) at a certain spot at time t_1 and occupies a certain volume v_1 at this time t_1 . All and only v_1 is also occupied by the aggregate W of the cellulose molecules which compose the tree. Indeed it is their occupation of v_1 which precisely determines that the volume which the tree occupies is volume v_1 . The tree T and the cellulose molecules W are thus in exactly the same place at exactly the same time. Are they identical? Now $T = W$ only if whatever is true of T is true of W (Leibniz' Law). It follows, I think, that $T = W$ only if T and W have exactly the same conditions of persistence and survival through change. But self-evidently they do not.

Suppose T is chopped down and then dismembered and cut up in such a way that no cellulose molecule is damaged. It seems that W then survives. And there is just as much wood in the world as there was before. But T , the tree, cannot survive such treatment.¹⁶

Wiggins' W is the *hupokeimenon*, his T is the *poion*, and the rationale for their being different in both cases is Leibniz's Law.¹⁷ Notice that the interpolation of T-ness (a quality) in a case like this is out of place, as are questions about how the tree is generated, and empirical worries of the sort Irwin raises about whether clay is likely to lose any of its substance in a process of molding and smushing. This would be like objecting to Wiggins that it is unlikely the aggregate of cellulose molecules W could survive the tree's being cut up. The tree is given as a starting point for the analysis, just as each of us (all plants, animals, and artifacts) is the starting point of the Categories. So, again, the *hupokeimenon* is not correctly understood as matter seeking form, and the *poion* is not a quality seeking matter in which to inhere.

But, someone might object, doesn't Simplicius (passages E and F) equate the *poion* with the *poiotēs*? The answer to that is no; in fact, it is a central mistake in scholarly analysis of the Categories to reach inside these passages for evidence about the schema of the Categories. Simplicius reports in passage E that the Stoics recognized three senses of "qualified" ("*poion*"), two of which are broader than the quality and one of which is coextensive. The broadest sense includes all things that are differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), including both processes (e.g. running) and states (e.g. holding out a fist, being on guard, being wise), the next includes states but not processes, and the narrowest includes only stable states (e.g. being wise) without reference to the activity or exercise of the state. What passage E shows about the Categories, if anything, is that the Stoics are permissive about what counts as a *poion* and can be subjected to the four-fold analysis; it gives us information about the *inputs* to the schema of the Categories, not about the difference between the Categories themselves. It does not say that only those things with a

¹⁶ Wiggins, "Same Place Same Time," 90–1.

¹⁷ Cf. Koslicki, *Structure*, n. 12, n. 19, and "Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy," on Leibniz's Law-style arguments for numerical distinctness.

quality count as a *poion*, nor does it indicate that there is any sort of a problem with qualified individuals that lack a quality. It says, simply, that the senses of the term “qualified individual” are distinguished according to the stability of the differentiation; it says nothing about the difference between *poia* and *pōs echonta*, and the three senses do not align or give insight into differences within the schema of the Categories at all. In a loose sense, everything differentiated is a *poion*, including an individual running or on guard; in a stricter sense it includes only those things that are in a *stable* differentiated state, as in the case of people who are wise and virtuous (DL 7.89 (61A)). This point about stability is perhaps why the Category *poion* is itself divided only into the *idiōs poion* and the *koinōs poion*, since only these are lifelong. It is, at any rate, a mistake to try to align the different senses of “*poion*” distinguished according to their stability with the four Categories themselves, inchoately or otherwise.¹⁸

What Simplicius reports, again, is that being a qualified individual does not depend on having a quality, let alone on having a quality inhere in a substance. In fact, he says the opposite: that the Stoics are permissive about *poia*, strict about qualities, and that being a qualified individual does *not* depend on having a quality. The context of the passage is whether it is circular for Aristotle to define the quality in terms of the qualified. The Stoics are put forth as thinkers who do not even treat them as coextensive, so when they do define a quality as a state (*hexis*) of a qualified individual, we have to keep in mind that they are permissive in this way and mean “*poion*” in the strictest sense, “for quality is spoken of in only one way, but qualified in three” (E8). There is no reason to think this is a problem for the Stoics by their own lights; Simplicius does reject the idea that quality and *poion* are not coextensive, and he does so on the grounds that qualities are *in* us, but there is no indication in the text that the Stoics themselves saw things this way (on a subject-inherence model) or that they struggled with this as a problem (*In Ar. Cat.* 213,1–5 (Kalbfleisch)).

Likewise, passage F reports that the Stoics recognize many qualified individuals without a quality, indeed everything differentiated (*kata diaphoran*). Only those things that are unified by *pneuma* in a certain state of tension (as described in the cosmogony) can be said to have qualities (F2), but even those things whose ark is not tarred inside and out, as Philo puts it, are *poia*, e.g. a ship whose unity is merely by contact, or an army or chorus that exists even in separation but is nevertheless a certain kind of unity (F3). These are *poia* without qualities because they do not have the unity required for things to have a quality (F4). Again the Stoics

¹⁸ As Menn, “Categories,” 232–4, does. It is also a mistake to think that because *pros ti pōs echon* (which is the fourth Category) is defined in the third Simplicius text (165,32–166,29 (29c)) as the contrary of what is *kata diaphoran*, therefore the broadest sense of *poion* (as everything *kata diaphoran*) includes the *pōs echonta*, as Menn, “Categories,” n. 23, does; and a mistake to think, as LS, 165, do that this third Simplicius passage is testimony about the difference between the second and fourth Categories; as argued in the last chapter, this Simplicius passage is simply testimony about two kinds of *pros ti* and not really about the Categories at all, except insofar as the fourth Category is one kind of *pros ti*. More on these issues ahead when I address Menn’s developmentalism.

are permissive about *poia* and strict about qualities, and again there is no reason to think that this is a problem for them. Notice, also, that while it is true (1) that *pneuma* is what unifies, generates, and sustains an individual (be it a stone with *pneuma* in a state of *hexis*, a plant with *phusis*, or an animal with *psuchē*), (2) that only unified things have qualities, and even (3) that qualities are *pneuma* in a certain state, it does not follow that qualities are what unify, nor is that what the text reports.¹⁹ A quality is a state of *pneuma*, and *pneuma* is the agent of unity that tars the ark inside and out (the sustaining cause), but the quality and the *pneuma* are not one and the same thing—indeed, the quality is a *state of the pneuma*. Water and its state of liquidity or solidity are not the same thing. So, while *pneuma* is the agent of a thing's unity, nevertheless the *pneuma* and its various qualitative states are not the same thing; it is therefore a category mistake to say (of the Stoics) that *any* quality is responsible for the unity of an organism.

Further, in all our reports on Stoic physics, there is never any reference to qualities, unique or otherwise, as the principles of unity. The unity of the cosmos is delivered in terms of *pneuma*, and what this shows is that qualities are *not* treated as the agents of unity that make something a single organism rather than a mere collection. This is a hylomorphic import. So Irwin is wrong to say about this passage: “When something is fully qualified, and has a genuine quality, it is unified, and the quality makes it unified, by being the source of cohesion among its parts.”²⁰ What the text reports is that only unified things have qualities, not that qualities are what do the unifying. In fact, none of the Simplicius passages offers substantial testimony about the Stoic Categories. At most we can infer what sorts of entities will count as *poia* and be the right kind of *inputs* for the four-fold analysis, but we are not in a position to reach into these texts for evidence about distinctions among the four Categories themselves.²¹ We are in a difficult position given the scarcity of our resources, and we must hunt and peck for evidence of Stoic theory, but also be modest in our conjectures. In this case, it is an error to identify the different kinds of *poia* with the different Categories.

¹⁹ These points are confirmed by Plutarch, *Praec. conjugalia* 34 (SVF 2.366).

²⁰ Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 469; he is followed in this assumption by Nawar, “Identity, Identification.” Similarly, while it is true that *pneuma* is what unifies a human being, and that our soul is the *pneuma* that unifies, it does not follow from the fact that qualities are *pneuma* in a certain state that the soul itself is a quality, as E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” and Collette-Dučić, “Virtues as *Poia*,” see it. Only those things that are unified will have an *idia poiōtēs*, but this does not mean that the soul is an *idia poiōtēs*, even though it may well be the *poion*; this latter point, whether the soul by itself is the *poion* (as opposed to soul plus body), is a matter of some debate that I will not pursue here.

²¹ With respect to the inputs, I think we can safely infer that the schema of the Categories applies only to differentiated bodies, and hence not to *pneuma* and matter, the four elements, or the *archai*. These things are not inputs for the schema of the Categories because they are not integrated wholes sufficiently determinate to be *poia*—note that saying so does not make “*kata diaphoran*” synonymous with “*poion*,” see Chapter 3 for integrated wholes and the distinction between being definite and being determinate, e.g. a candle, stone, plant, or human.

Ποιότης (*Poiotēs*)

I have urged that we set aside two hylomorphic presuppositions: that the Stoics are pursuing a substance-quality or subject-inherence model, and that the Categories are intended to account for the unity and composition of individual bodies. This raises the question: what, then, is a quality according to the Stoics, if not the counterpart to matter that makes it qualified and unified? Simplicius offers valuable evidence, and again this evidence is not about the Categories but about the nature of qualities.

- H. The Stoics say that what is common to quality in the case of bodies is to be a differentiation of substance (*diaphora ousias*), not separable as a part (*apodialēptē*) per se (*kath' heautēn*), but terminating in a concept and a uniqueness (*idiotēs*), specified (*eidopoioiomenē*) neither by time nor strength, but by its own suchness (*hē exautēs toioutēs*), according to which the generation of a qualified individual subsists.

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 222,30–3 (28H)

Keeping in mind that *ousia* is body and not matter alone, as argued above, there is no reason to think that being the differentiation of substance treats qualities as parts. In fact, this passage says specifically and explicitly that qualities are *not* considered parts of the qualified individual. The Greek “*apodialēptos*” can be translated simply as “separable”; however, LSJ cite this passage as evidence for the translation, thus we would do well to consult its cognates; we find that “*apodialēpsis*” is defined as a division into parts. Since it is clear that we are not dealing with a case of dividing the quality into parts, the sense here can be captured by saying that qualities are not separable in the way that parts are, i.e. distinguishable as parts. Thus I take this passage to convey a mereological commitment, or rather the denial of one: qualities are not parts. Drawing on the digression on Stoic mereology in Chapter 3, recall that parthood requires being one by having its own *perigraphē*, a certain individual circumscription, some individuating compass or character. Now see that qualities are not individuated this way, as distinguishable units; they are, instead, purely qualitative, as conveyed by locutions like “its own suchness,” or “intrinsic suchness” (as Long & Sedley translate). The Stoics are perhaps the first to take really seriously the distinction between quantity and quality—Stoic qualities are not quantities (i.e. they are not one with their own *perigraphē*).

The follow-on to this passage confirms that the Stoics are indeed thinking this way. First Simplicius complains that, by Stoic lights, the category of quality will be fractured and fall under different genera, since some qualities will be corporeal and others incorporeal (222,34–3,2). But because the Stoics do not recognize a Category of quality (since, again, the second Stoic Category is the qualified individual, *poion*, and not quality, *poiotes*), this objection is no real problem for them,

nor is the charge of smuggling in incorporeals. Then Simplicius complains that “what is even more absurd than this” is to say that qualities have no substantial existence, or subsistence, but that they terminate in a concept, unless what they really mean is that they are only separable in thought as matter and form are (223,2–6). Here Simplicius confirms that the Stoics are rejecting a hylomorphic picture that treats qualities as individual unities with their own *perigraphē*; the only way their view could be right, he tells us, is if they were to take the Aristotelian line that substance (matter) and quality (form) are distinct parts that are separable, even if only in thought. . . which by his implicature they do not.²²

Next, he affirms that the Stoics treat qualities in purely qualitative terms and not as individuals, complaining that “its own suchness” applies as much to substance as to quality *unless* they think that having suchness is unique to quality, while thisness, being an individual, belongs to substance (223,6–8); this exception is precisely the path the Stoics take, treating qualities in purely qualitative terms, and not as quantities or units. Finally, Simplicius leaves it beyond doubt that the Stoics are *not* working in hylomorphic terms when he complains that “according to which a qualified thing is generated” is absurd if qualities are meant to be corporeal, since bodies are really composites of matter and form (223,8–11). Thus we have here evidence that the Stoics are treating qualities in purely qualitative terms, not as individuals or parts or elements that are one in virtue of having their own *perigraphē*.²³

That the Stoics sometimes thought along these lines, differentiating things qualitatively without reference to a *perigraphē*, is confirmed by Iamblichus:

- I. Then how are [the soul's faculties] distinguished? According to the Stoics, (1) some are distinguished by a difference of the underlying bodies (*hupokeimena sōmata*); for they say that different and distinct (*alla kai alla*) breaths extend from the commanding faculty, some to the eyes, others to the ears, and others the other sense-organs. (2) And some by a uniqueness of quality (*idiotēs poiōtētos*) in the same substrate (*hupokeimenon*); for just as an apple has in the same body sweetness and fragrance, so too the commanding faculty combines in the same body impression, assent, impulse, and reason.

Iamblichus, *De an.* (Stob. 1.368,12–20) (53K)

²² Cf. Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 186–7, about these lines. I disagree with Sedley, “Stoic Metaphysics at Rome,” 119, that *having* should be assimilated to having as a part, and that the Stoics are blurring the distinction between qualities and parts, or mapping onto Plato's ontology.

²³ SE, *M.* 11.22–6 (60G) does not show otherwise, even though virtue is called a part of the good person. This passage is complicated, but I can say briefly that it does not show that virtue is a part for two reasons: because the part in question is the *hēgemonikon*, and because the parthood relation licensing the inference that the good person and friend are not different (*heteron*) from benefit is that the good person and friend are among (parts of) the good. Thus, I disagree with Menn, “Categories,” n. 10, that virtue is a part of the sage the way the hand is, so that the *poiōtēs* and *ousia* are parts of the composite *poion*.

Some faculties are distinguished by a distinct *perigraphē*, like the senses that are different underlying bodies located in different places. The Stoics famously liken the soul to an octopus, with the commanding faculty located in the region of the heart, and seven distinct parts growing out from it and literally stretching into the body; five of these parts are the senses, e.g. sight is *pneuma* that extends from the commanding faculty to the eyes.²⁴ According to this picture, the faculty of sight clearly has its own *perigraphē*, the three-dimensional extension of the *pneuma* extending from the *hēgemonikon* to the eyes; it is thus a bona fide part of soul, being one and not disjoint, in a rather ordinary sense of parthood. I take the plural noun “*pneumata*,” or breaths, to underline the point that these are each one.

This case is then contrasted with another way of distinguishing a faculty, one in which there is no difference in underlying body, but only a qualitative difference. Since they share the same substrate, the faculties of impression, assent, impulse, and reason are distinguished only by the uniqueness of the quality (*idiotēs poiōtēs*) and not by any *perigraphē*; accordingly, they are not one or, therefore, parts. Just as the sweetness and fragrance of an apple share the same bodily substance, and yet can be distinguished by their unique sensory qualities—without inviting the intuition that taste and smell are distinct parts of an apple—so too the capacities of the commanding faculty can share the same substance in the region of the heart, and yet be distinguished by the uniqueness of their qualities (awareness, endorsement, motion, and thought, perhaps), without inviting us to think of them as parts of the soul with a distinct *perigraphē*.²⁵ So, a quality is distinguished by its intrinsic suchness, which makes it discernible on the model of sweetness and fragrance, but the intrinsic suchness is not thereby a *part* of the qualified individual, one among so many pebbles in an urn.

This brings us to the role of the concept (*ennoēma*) in distinguishing a quality. What does it mean to say that a quality “terminates in a concept and a uniqueness”? Do concepts somehow individuate the qualities where the intrinsic suchness of the bodies does not? The Stoics are well known for rejecting Platonic Forms and reconstruing them as concepts; but they also consider concepts to be figments of the imagination, phantasms of soul corresponding to no real impressor (Aëtius 1.10.5 (30B); DL 7.49–51 (39A), 7.60–1 (30C, passage B/Chapter 15); Stobaeus 1.136,21–7,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15)).²⁶ It seems unlikely that merely

²⁴ The other two are the reproductive faculty, or seed (*sperma*), extending from the commanding faculty to the genitals; and voice (*phōnē*), extending from the commanding faculty of soul to the windpipe and tongue (Aëtius 4.21.1–4 (53H)).

²⁵ This is perhaps confirmed by Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1084B (Cherniss), when he complains that they proliferate psychological bodies including in the point-like *hēgemonikon*.

²⁶ We saw the Stoic rejection of Forms and commitment to particulars in Chapter 2, in the context of their ontological criteria, specifically the Not Someone argument. I address the topic of concepts in Chapter 15, where I will agree with Caston, “Something and Nothing,” that there is no ontological category of Not-Something for the Stoics, but disagree that concepts were ever intended as *tina*; thus, I will

intentional objects could serve any genuinely physical individuating function; in fact, one might even worry that delimiting qualities by our concepts makes the Stoics fictionalists or even subjectivists about qualities. However, as noted in the discussion of mereology in Chapter 3, our concepts are imprinted on us by the world itself, and the Stoics are confident in our ability to grasp the basic features of the world. Our rationality is even constituted by these concepts; we are born with a *tabula rasa* and acquire our rationality by interacting with the world (Aëtius 4.11.1–4 (39E)). So, the role of the concept is not to create, unify, or otherwise determine reality, but to reflect it; it is a dialectical tool of collection and division, definition, and analysis.²⁷ For a quality to terminate in a concept and a uniqueness is for the extension of the term to be determined for dialectical purposes by a concept, which is itself a reflection of the various qualified individuals of that kind in the world. This is not circular: the qualified individuals there are the qualified individuals there are independent of our concepts and dialectical activity; these give us our concepts, which we then use for dialectical purposes of collection and division, definition, and analysis.

The force of characterizing concepts as phantasms, “in the way that the pattern of a horse arises even though none is present” (DL 7.60 (30C2, passage B2/Chapter 15)), is to press their irrealism about Forms specifically, e.g. the pattern of a horse. Such a concept is a phantasm to the extent that there is no such pattern present in any horse (or anywhere else, for that matter), and thus an invention of the mind. This does not mean that the *quality* of being a horse is something imposed by us on the world. Rather, there is *this* horse with its *pneuma* in a state of intrinsic suchness that is the common quality of horse, *that* horse with a similar quality, and that one, and another one, and so on. In this regard, the Stoics are aptly described as trope theorists, or resemblance nominalists.²⁸ There is something common, some resemblance, between this horse and that horse, but nothing is literally shared, and there is no pattern of horse in any horse. Further, apparent reference to universals or qualities like humanity and horseness is easily paraphrased away: “For whoever says ‘Human is a rational mortal animal’ says the same thing in meaning as whoever says ‘If something is a human, that thing is a rational mortal animal’, although it is verbally different” (SE, M. 11.8 (30I1, trans. LS)). So, the concept of a horse corresponds to, and indeed is caused by, the real corporeal qualities of individual horses. These qualities are natural joints in the world, distinguishable by their qualitative suchness, but without the *perigraphē* of a bona fide individual. Nor do concepts help to individuate these qualities or to eliminate any of their

be eliminative of concepts as *tina*, denying that they count as Something for the Stoics (but not thereby denying the Stoics recourse to concepts in their epistemology). Note that this connection to concepts does not support equating the Categories with *lekta* as, e.g., Rist does, “Categories and their Uses.”

²⁷ In this I agree with Bailey, “Structure.”

²⁸ See Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 184, for this point.

fuzziness.²⁹ Concepts are both posterior, as mere reflections of the qualities themselves, and different in kind, being merely intentional objects with no corporeal credentials, and thus unfit for the job of individuating a body anyway.

The upshot of the Stoic treatment of qualities in purely qualitative terms is that qualities are not parts or ingredients and they do not play the role of unifying, generating, or sustaining an individual—notwithstanding the fact that qualities are *pneuma* in a certain state and *pneuma* is the part of an individual that unifies, generates, and sustains it. Thus talk of qualities and qualified individuals is not about building, composition, or cosmogony. Not only is the second Category not quality; Stoic qualities are not even fit to do the hylomorphic job that commentators have tried to press them into. Stoic qualities are not, as Menn sees it, like so many pebbles in an urn. Qualities are entirely qualitative, which means they cannot be isolated as parts or individuals inhering in or occupying substance. The dominant picture of the Categories that assimilates the second Category to quality is thus wrong both about the *poion* and about the *poiotēs*: the *poion* is the qualified individual, not the quality, and qualities are not parts or unities responsible for unifying an individual. It is a fundamental category mistake to think so.

Ἰδίως Ποιόν (*Idiōs Poion*)

This brings me to the vexed Category of the peculiarly qualified individual (*idiōs poion*). I have dispensed just now with the idea that either the *poion* or the *poiotēs* is responsible for the unity of an individual, so from here on I leave the question of unity to the side as settled. The central problem that scholars have found with the *idiōs poion* is that it seems as though any quality sufficiently unique and specific to individuate a body synchronically, distinguishing it from all others qualitatively like it, is not the kind of quality that could conceivably be present from life until death to secure identity diachronically. Uniqueness and persistence pull in opposite directions. The fuel for this fire is the text of Dexippus (passage D), which reports that the *idiōs poion* is distinguished by a certain crookedness of the nose, blondness, baldness, greyness of the eyes, or some other confluence (*sundromē*) of qualities. The foregoing discussion of qualities as purely qualitative gives us the solution to this problem. What distinguishes Socrates from all others, and this “identical” necktie from that one, is not some one pebble in the urn or even some particular collection of pebbles, as scholars have thought. This atomic model of qualities is precisely what generates the puzzle that scholars have sought to solve in

²⁹ See M. J. White, “The Stoic Model,” for arguments that the Stoics eliminate limit entities from the physical world (as observed in Chapter 6 on the cosmogony), and that with the continuous nature of the cosmos they might have recognized a certain fuzziness or indeterminacy even in the case of ordinary individuals, like animals and tables. See Drozdek, “Infinity,” for the view that all limits *subsist* only in the mind, which seems to eliminate the possibility of natural joints. More on limits in Chapter 13.

various ways; but the puzzle is a false one. The peculiar quality is not a feature of the person or thing that can be isolated from all the others, or a collection of such properties, and so it is not something we should worry can be gained or lost over time or fail to individuate. It is, rather, a *pervasive* quality of the individual, discernible everywhere and throughout as long as that individual is in *existence*. It is what we might call a certain signature or *je ne sais quoi*, a qualitative aspect of a person or thing that is not some one individuating property of the person alongside all the others in the urn, but a suchness that makes everything about them unique in this way.³⁰

So it is not the generic property of having grey eyes, or a certain shape of the nose, or lacking one foot (like Theon and Tib), or even a single maximally specific property of having this greyness of the eyes or this shape of the nose (or a collection of such qualities). It is, rather, an intrinsic suchness, a certain something, a signature that pervades all those properties and makes everything about the individual unique. The *pneuma* that unifies, generates, and sustains a person is in a unique qualitative state (with its matter), e.g. being Socrates, for the lifetime of the individual (but, as I emphasized, that qualitative *state* is not what unifies, generates, or sustains the individual). The *pneuma* is also (with its matter) in a common qualitative state, e.g. being human, for the lifetime of the individual. In addition, it is in countless other qualitative states of varying degrees of stability, from the most fleeting processes (e.g. running) to the most stable characters (e.g. being wise). Only those conditions that endure will be sufficiently stable to count as qualities, but all states and processes are conditions of *pneuma* making the individual F, i.e. differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), and no quality has its own *perigraphē* that makes it one (or a distinct part of the individual). Hence Socrates' uniqueness is pervasive, visible in the snubness of his nose, the baldness of his head, the color of his eyes, the furrow of his brow, and everywhere else in his appearance (and, of course, behavior).³¹

The Stoics are committed to the idea that a person's state of character is visible, written all over them, not like a mole or any other single or "atomic" quality that one might isolate from all the others, but present *everywhere* (DL 7.89

³⁰ Perhaps this account would be welcome to Sedley, "Diachronic," n. 7, who is "increasingly inclined to think of X's peculiar quality as amounting to what-it-is-like-to-be-X-and-no-one-else"; cf. Nawar, "Identity, Identification," 148, who says that "in perceiving an individual's physiological attributes, one perceives the effects of an individual's peculiar quality." For a current example of a unique signature quality of this sort, see "Something in the Way We Move," *The New York Times*, October 19, 2019. And more recently, Beyoncé, in *Alien Superstar*: "We dress a certain way, we walk a certain way/We talk a certain way, we-we paint a certain way/We-we make love a certain way, you know/All of these things we do in a different/Unique, specific way that is personally ours."

³¹ It would be fruitful to compare the *idiōs poion* or, rather, the *idia poiōtēs*, to the haecceity of medieval and contemporary metaphysics. I cannot do that here, but I will say that to the extent that a haecceity is not understood as a quality it will not be like the Stoic notion. The bare thisness of the haecceity is not a quality, it has no properties, while the *idia poiōtēs* is a quality, and has many properties beyond its thisness or particularity.

(61A), 7.173; Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.12–5 (29E, passage M below); Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1042E–F (60R), *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D (61B, passage L below); Seneca, *Ep.* 113.2 (29B), 117.2 (Gummere); Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.*, 217,32–218,1 (28L, passage B/Chapter 9), 212,12–213,1 (28N, passage E/Chapter 7)). There is something in the way Socrates moves, looks, and behaves that is unique to him; hence his snubness and baldness et al. are unique, but not because any one or many of them is doing the work of individuating him (let alone unifying). That is the wrong order of explanation: it is because Socrates is a uniquely qualified individual that he has a certain snubness, not because of the snubness that he is either unique or persistent. Socrates is a uniquely qualified individual because the *pneuma* that is tarring the ark inside and out as his sustaining cause (his soul) is in a unique and lifelong state of *suchness*, and no amount of plastic surgery will change that state of suchness either to make him qualitatively identical to anyone else or to threaten his persistence as Socrates (as scholars have worried). Once we recognize that the Stoics are entirely qualitative about their qualities, i.e. that they are not parts or unities with their own *perigraphē*, it is easy to see that the atomic approach to the *idiōs poion* is misguided and itself the source of our interpretive difficulties.

The text from Dexippus (passage D) in fact bears this out. The main culprit of the misguided reading is the term “*sundromē*.” Long & Sedley take it as a standard doublet for “*athroisma*,” which conveys a collection or aggregate on a numerical model.³² However, this is only one of the meanings of this term. It is also a medical term indicating a concurrence of symptoms or a determination of blood, and more generally a tumult.³³ And when Galen reports that reason, i.e. a person’s rationality, is an *athroisma* of conceptions and preconceptions (*Plac.* 5.3.8 (47H)), it cannot be the notion of a collection or aggregate that he has in mind; the concepts that constitute our rationality are inferential by their nature, connected to other concepts, and no mere collection could be what constitutes human rationality.³⁴ Thus the aggregate model is by no means a given, and the medical model of symptoms in fact suggests otherwise; the symptoms of an illness, though we might speak of them individually, are not like so many pebbles in an urn, and neither are our conceptions.

Further, the context of the passage shows definitively that a mere aggregate is not what is meant; I quoted the passage above more fully than is usual for this reason. The question that Dexippus is considering (D1) concerns the numerical

³² Hence, “the doctrine as presented here is a weak one. It is hard to see how any common quality beyond those constituting the individual’s species could be guaranteed to last from birth to death, as on the Stoic theory it must be if it is to be part of the peculiar quality,” LS vol. 2, 174.

³³ LSJ A.2.

³⁴ For more on the inferential import of concepts (the intentional objects of our conceptions), see Chapter 12; for arguments that concepts are not Somethings but can still do their dialectical duties, see Chapter 15. I thank Brian Johnson for suggesting this as further evidence.

distinctness of one thing from another, and he is criticizing the Stoics for solving the puzzle by the uniquely qualified individual. After describing their solution as a *sundromē* and stating that he does not think they solve the problem well, he adds this explanatory clause: “for it is not the confluence (*sundromē*) of qualities that makes them differ numerically, but if indeed anything does, then it is quality” (D2). Now, it might look at first sight like this is an explanation of Dexippus’ own dissatisfaction, hence confirming the aggregate model in contrast to this qualitative model. However, this cannot be correct because in the very next sentence (D3) Dexippus expresses what he takes to be the correct solution, which is that numerically distinct things differ *not* qualitatively but in being countable; this human differs from that one not “in nature and substance” but in being separable, i.e. in having different matter rather than different form.³⁵

Scholars have omitted this crucial explanatory clause at the end of D2, which tells us that it is *not* a mere list or aggregate of qualities that differentiates one individual from another, but rather a purely qualitative difference that cannot be isolated in the way a hylomorphic thinker would prefer. Dexippus is saying that he would be happier if the Stoics *did* give an aggregate of qualities considered as so many distinct items on a list, which would be less generic than a single quality, but instead they give a purely qualitative account, as though a quality could be unique. The dialectic of the passage is therefore this: the Stoics solve the puzzle of distinctness by a *sundromē* of qualities, but they are wrong to do so because the *sundromē* is not even a collection of qualities, but a purely qualitative difference that cannot be isolated or collected or, for that matter, unique; the correct solution is that things are distinct by having distinct matter. Thus the scholarly consensus that the *idiōs poion* cannot account both for synchronic distinctness and diachronic persistence is misguided. The peculiar quality is not some atomic quality or a collection of such properties, as a hylomorphic account would have it, but a pervasive qualitative signature that cannot be isolated. It is purely qualitative, identifiable but lacking a *perigraphē* by which to count it as one.

This signature quality is completely unique and present unchanging from birth to death; hence it serves both to individuate synchronically and to secure the persistence of the individual diachronically, without pulling in opposite directions. It is also, in being present everywhere, visible and epistemically accessible as required for the *kataleptic* impression. One need not worry about making fingerprints, or any other single property (or collection of properties), responsible for uniqueness and persistence, since all features and properties of the individual will bear the

³⁵ Thus I disagree with Sedley, “Criterion,” 267, that matter does the work of synchronic individuation for the Stoics.

mark of this uniqueness. It is not the fingerprints that *make* a person unique; rather, the fingerprints are a symptom of the person's uniqueness. Likewise for the greyness of the eyes, snubness of the nose, et al. None of these is responsible for uniqueness or persistence; rather, all will be unique and none need persist (even though many will persist).

Finally, the peculiar quality *is* the *pneuma* in a certain state or condition, but the quality is not what unifies, generates, or sustains the individual. Only those things that have a single unifying *pneuma* tarring the ark inside and out will have such a quality, but the quality is not itself what does the unifying; likewise, the unifying *pneuma* is the soul (*phusis* in plants, *hexis* in inanimate objects like stones) that is qualitatively unique, but the soul is not itself a quality. These are the category mistakes that have fueled the interpretive difficulties for the *idiōs poion*. Seen aright, the *idiōs poion* is not a component part responsible for unity; rather, as a purely qualitative suchness, it explains both the uniqueness and the persistence of every individual, and it is epistemically accessible for *katalēpsis*.³⁶

I have urged that we set aside hylomorphic presuppositions that the Stoics are pursuing a Platonic substance-quality model according to which qualities inhere in matter as discrete unities or atoms of a sort, and that the Categories are not accounting for the unity and composition of individual bodies.³⁷ Rather, the Categories take these unified individuals as given and offer an analysis of what makes each one F in various ways, from being human, to being Socrates, to being wise, on guard, running, and to the left of someone. According to this innovative schema, what makes this thing Socrates and human is that his *hupokeimenon*, i.e. the totality of his corporeal substance, is arranged or organized in a certain way that is both unique and persists from life to death. What makes this thing a fist is that it is a hand (*poion*) arranged a certain way (*pōs echon*). And what makes Socrates be a man to the right of Cebes, or the husband of Xanthippe (*pros ti pōs echon*), is the extrinsic relation to Cebes, or Xanthippe, which could change without any internal change to Socrates. And this explanatory schema is a constitution relation, not composition. The Categories are not building unified bodies out of several ingredient parts, but analyzing bodies once built according to these four distinct metaphysical aspects. That this is a distinct explanatory enterprise from the composition in Stoic physics is established not only by the language of making *each of us* four, and the proprietary vocabulary of *hupokeimenon*, *poion*, *pōs echon*, and *pros ti pōs echon* not found in the cosmology, but also by the fact that the Categories are a self-consciously mereological analysis, as I will now show.

³⁶ I cannot go down the path of Stoic epistemology here, but I take myself to have shown how the peculiar quality is epistemically accessible. I do not thereby endorse the idea that *katalēpsis* should be assimilated to recognition; rather, the Stoics are committed to *katalēpsis*, and recognition of qualitatively similar things is intended by critics as a counterexample to the sage's infallibility.

³⁷ Again, my criticisms are not of hylomorphism as a theory, but of hylomorphic interpretations of Stoic theory.

Each of Us is Four

Having given a negative account of what the Categories are not (subject-quality, matter-form, substance-predicate), I now offer a positive account of what the Categories are: a four-fold mereological analysis of each individual. We can confirm that this is a mereological, and hence metaphysical, or logical (as opposed to physical) analysis by the language of parthood in the testimony of Stobaeus (passage C). The general context of the Growing Argument already makes plain that we are dealing with constitution, but attention to the details of the text will confirm that this is a self-consciously mereological analysis, in contrast to the cosmology, which does make mereological commitments, but not in mereological terms. Recall that Stobaeus reports that Posidonius recognizes four kinds of generation and corruption (C1), and that the first three (division, alteration, and resolution) happen in the case of the *idiōs poion*, while generation and corruption by alteration happens in the case of substance (C2–3). What the first three have in common is that they are all cases in which the thing undergoing the change, the *idiōs poion*, is destroyed: the *division* of an egg into yolk and white, the *fusion* of egg with the other ingredients in making a cake, and the *resolution* of an egg into its elements (earth, water, air, and fire) all involve the destruction of the egg.³⁸ In the case of alteration, however, the thing undergoing the change, the corporeal substance (*ousia*), is *not* destroyed because alteration (*alloiōsis*) is qualitative rather than quantitative change, and “substance neither grows nor diminishes by addition or subtraction, but only alters, just as in the case of numbers and measures” (C4).³⁹ In other words, body as such survives qualitative but not quantitative change—constitution is identity. Two things then follow from the fact that for substance constitution is identity: one is that growth takes place in the case of the uniquely qualified individuals like Dion and Theon (C5), and the other is that the unique quality persists in such individuals from life to death (C6).

Next we are given the mereology. We are told first (C7) that in the case of qualified individuals there are two receptive parts (*dektika moria*), one with the identity conditions of substance (not surviving growth and diminution) and the other with the identity conditions of a qualified individual (that does survive growth and diminution). It might be tempting to see here a mereological schema such

³⁸ I use the examples from LS, 173; that resolution is into the elements is attested by Stobaeus 1.129, 2–30, 13 (47A), as LS point out.

³⁹ Substance, like a set or measure, is only generated or destroyed by addition or subtraction of a member or portion. Qualitative flux, like the internal ordering of a measure, is not relevant to identity and persistence; two cups of sugar remain the same two cups of sugar no matter how the grains are arranged and rearranged, and cease to be the same two cups of sugar as soon as any grain is either added or subtracted. I take this to answer LS’s puzzlement (vol. 2, 172) about “why qualified individuals should not also be subject to generation and destruction by ἀλλοίωσις”; the answer is that qualified individuals *are* subject to generation and destruction by alteration (e.g. a statue coming about in clay), but the context makes clear that qualified individuals and substance are being considered and contrasted as the things undergoing such changes, rather than the results.

that one receptive part is matter and the other quality, which together compose the individual. Indeed, Sedley sees here a *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity that needs solving.⁴⁰ However, it is not clear in that case what it would mean for the quality to be a receptive part; more importantly, the discussion that follows speaks against a hylomorphic understanding. We are told next (C8) that the uniquely qualified individual (*idiōs poion*) and the substance out of which it is constituted are distinct; if we were being offered a hylomorphic schema, the distinctness of substance and quality would not be in question or need defense. Further, their distinctness is now put in explicitly mereological terms that indicate the substance is a part (*meros*) of the *poion*, and not that substance and quality each are parts of a composite whole. The substance and *poion* are described as neither the same nor different—a technical mereological phrase not found in our reports on Stoic cosmology. The reason they are not different, we are told, is that the substance both is a part of and occupies the same place as the qualified individual, and being different or other (*heteron*) requires both being separate in place and being not conceived of as a part, i.e. disjoint. The reason they are not the same, we are then told, is that they have different properties—an appeal to Leibniz's Law (C9), which is exemplified first by the artificial case of clay constituting a horse (C10) being smashed and then constituting a dog statue, and secondly by the natural case of Socrates and his substance having different persistence conditions (C11).

As we have seen, Sedley takes this mereological talk to show that Posidonius is trying to mitigate the absurd redundancy of two individuals being in the same place by relating them not “as two different items crammed into the same place, but a whole plus one of its own parts.”⁴¹ Notice, however, that this analysis requires both positing the *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity and making the hylomorphic presupposition that takes the substance to be one of *two* parts composing a *poion*, the other being the *poiotēs*. However, all we are in fact told here is that the substance is part of the qualified individual, not that quality is the other part or, indeed, that there is any other part at all. The example of the clay and statue gives no reason to suspect that any other parts are involved; and neither does Socrates, unless one presupposes a building operation. The *hupokeimenon* is not one among several parts of the whole *poion*, it is the *only* part of the *poion*. Plotinus gives evidence that the Stoics did see it this way when he complains that ontologically nested entities (“what supervenes on those that already are” and “those things that are prior to it,” i.e. already are) cannot be classed together as species of a single genus (body):

- J. Further, it is absurd to class together in the same genus a thing in the genus of what supervenes on those that already are with those things that are prior to it; for there must be one and two first, in order for there to be also half and double.

⁴⁰ Sedley, “Diachronic.” I will continue to use the neuter *poion*; see Chapter 7, n. 2.

⁴¹ Sedley, “Diachronic,” 32.

ἔτι δ' ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ <τὸ> ἐπιγινόμενον πρᾶγμα τοῖς ἤδη οὖσιν ἄτοπον συντάττειν [τὸ ἐπιγινόμενον] εἰς ταὐτὸν γένος τοῖς πρότερον οὖσι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ διπλάσιον.

Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1.30,24–8 (Armstrong)

Plotinus' complaint is that the species of a genus must be ontologically coordinate, and not hierarchically ordered. However, it is not clear why the Stoics should accept that premise, or at the very least why we should understand the Stoics as aiming for a genus-species taxonomy with the Categories. They may (or may not) be called genera, but this need not be a technical term that accepts Plotinus' constraint. It could mean, quite simply, that they make each of us four bodies that stand in a successive relation, each to next, rather than being coordinate species. In levying his complaint, Plotinus takes it for granted that the Stoics are committed to this one-to-one nested relation between the Categories, or else he would be missing his target. This commitment to a one-to-one relation between the Categories is further confirmed, in one direction, by Philo's quotation of Chrysippus in the context of a puzzle about synchronic identity, saying explicitly that "two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate" (*Aet. mundi* 48 (28P)). It is confirmed in the other direction, that there cannot be one qualified individual in two substrates, by Plutarch, who reports the Stoic complaint against the Academics that they "confuse everything by their 'indiscernibilities' and force a single qualified individual to occupy two substances" (*Comm. not.* 1077C (28O1)).⁴² In other words, the Stoics complain that in pressing the possibility of distinct but indiscernible entities, the Academics run afoul of the fact that it is impossible for one and the same qualified individual to occupy two substances, or substrates. It is clear, then, that the Stoics intend for the Categories to stand in a one-to-one relation of part to whole, and that each is the only part of the next as whole.

Nor is there any textual reason to think there is a *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity, as Sedley assumes. The phrase "coming to be in," or "coming to occupy," as Sedley renders "*genesthai epi*," need not be considered particularly out of the ordinary for the Stoics or hylomorphic. The statue example can quite naturally be described as a dog statue coming to be in a lump of clay without invoking qualities, or forms occupying substance, or matter in any hylomorphic spirit. Likewise, Plutarch gives no reason to worry that there is a *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity in the Stoic complaint that the Academics force a single qualified individual to occupy two substances (mentioned just above), or in the following complaint that the Stoics are guilty of putting two *poia* in one substance:

⁴² Pace Mattingly, "Early Stoicism," 278–9, 286, 292, who takes the Stoics to be committed to allowing "a plurality of individuals in the same piece of matter" against the Philonian evidence; Mattingly understands the *idiōs poion* somewhat idiosyncratically.

- K. What's really contrary to common sense is what they say and pretend, that two peculiarly qualified individuals (*idiōs poia*) come about in (*genesthai epi*) one substance (*ousia*) and that the same substance, having one uniquely qualified individual, admits of another in addition and maintains both alike. For if two, and three, and four will be, also five and so many a person could not say them all about one substance; and I mean not in different parts, but all the indefinitely many likewise in the whole.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1077D (28O3)

What this passage testifies is not that the Stoics think of several *poia* as occupying substance in the way that qualities or forms do, but that the Stoics embrace a nested, one-to-one part-whole relationship between each of the Categories. What Plutarch is legitimately invoking in his complaint is that the substance underlies the *poion* and that the *poion*, in turn, underlies the *pōs echon* ("another in addition and maintains both alike"). And his complaint is that the Stoics are overly inflationary: why stop at four, why not five or indefinitely many? The truth in his complaint is that the Stoics *do* make each of us many; however, they are not doing this in any sort of hylomorphic spirit ("and I mean not in different parts"), for which they take the Academics to task, nor does Plutarch say or imply that they do. He is simply trying to turn the tables on the Stoics to say that they suffer from an opposite problem, not of one individual in two substances but of several individuals in one substance, by their nested, and hence transitive relation of *pros ti pōs echon* to *pōs echon*, *pōs echon* to *poion*, and *poion* to *hupokeimenon*. It does not follow from the Stoic picture that they recognize several peculiarly qualified individuals (*idiōs poia*) in one substance, of course, even though it is true that Socrates (*idiōs poion*) and Socrates sitting (the *idiōs poion pōs echon*) are both unique and distinct individuals and that both have the same *hupokeimenon*, or substrate.

And again, there is nothing genuinely out of place about the "*genesthai epi*" locution saying a qualified individual comes to be in substance. When the clay is arranged in a certain way, e.g. in the shape of a dog, then a dog statue (*poion*) comes about, comes to be, or is generated in the substance; there is no suggestion that a form or quality is what *really* comes about in or comes to occupy the substance. Nor does the case of Dion and Theon, where Theon is described as Dion conceived minus one foot such that when Theon loses a foot, he "comes to occupy" the same substance as Dion (Philo, *Aet. mundi* 48 (28P)), necessarily signal a *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity. Finally, even if one were to insist that the "*genesthai epi*" locution is distinctively Platonic, it would still not show that the Stoics are ambiguating between a *poiōtēs* (what *really* comes about in substance) and a *poion* (what they *say* comes about in substance). The Stoics could be co-opting and redefining the Platonic language in their own terms. We have seen them do this with Plato's *dunamis* proposal that only what can act or undergo *is*, using it as a criterion for *existence* to uphold the Giants' thesis that only bodies are (Chapter 2). And we will see it again in Chapter 15, in their

elimination of Forms, redefining them as concepts (*ennoēmata*), while working in the language of sharing or participating in (*metechein*, Stobaeus, 1.136,21–7,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15)). Thus the textual evidence about the Categories does not suggest the mereology of matter and form or substance and quality composing a body, or any other relation of several parts to a composite whole.

In fact, it suggests an entirely different mereological relation, a one-to-one constitution relation between a single part and its non-composite whole as exemplified by the clay in relation to the statue it constitutes, or the hand to the fist. Such a relation is perhaps unexpected, considering the focus in Plato on making one out of many, but it is consistent with the mereology described in Chapter 3 and a perfectly coherent theoretical option in its own right. Recall that the ancient conception of parthood, as Jonathan Barnes has shown, is asymmetrical (if *a* is a part of *b*, then *b* is not a part of *a*), irreflexive (nothing is a part of itself), and transitive (if *a* is a part of *b* and *b* is a part of *c*, then *a* is a part of *c*). In contemporary terms, this is to say that the ancient conception of parthood is Proper Parthood, or a Strict Partial Ordering. As we saw there, this conception is generic in allowing two kinds of Proper Parts, those with and without remainder, corresponding to two kinds of whole_{Count}, non-composite and composite. And as we saw in Chapter 5, the cosmos is a whole_C composed out of many parts, so the Proper Parts of the cosmos (matter and *pneuma*) always have a remainder. Now, in the case of the Categories, we can see that the mereological commitment is to each substrate as a Proper Part with no remainder (i.e. such that there are no other parts in addition); and this is what I mean by a “nested one-to-one relation” between the Categories. Put this way, the Stoics deny Supplementation. Alternatively, on the assumption of Supplementation, one could say that the Categories are neither Proper Parts (because the lump is the only part of the statue) nor Improper Parts (because the lump and statue are non-identical and asymmetrically related as part to whole). The statue is a non-composite whole_C constituted by a single part, the clay.⁴³

So, to be the *hupokeimenon*, whether the *hupokeimenon* proper (the first Category) or the substrate of a further Category, e.g. hand (*poion*) to fist (*pōs echon*), is to be the single Proper Part of a whole_C, a Proper Part with no remainder. When a hand comes to constitute a fist, or the clay comes to constitute a statue (as

⁴³ On this basis Lynne Rudder Baker, *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, 159–80, denies that constitution is a mereological relation: since Parts are either Proper or Improper, and tertium non datur. But the Stoics clearly *are* working in technical mereological terms, and their view could be put as a third kind of Parthood that is neither Proper nor Improper (tertium datur); indeed the Stoics are known for their tripartite divisions, and could offer Nolan yet another trichotomy related to objects that are neither the same nor different due to overlap (“Stoic Trichotomies,” n. 7). Though one could put it this way, it is more economical to work in terms of Proper Parthood with and without remainder than to attribute to the Stoics a distinction between Proper Parts and Neither Proper nor Improper Parts, especially when there is no evidence that they recognize Improper Parts. I am greatly and warmly indebted to conversation and correspondence with Lynne Baker about these ideas.

in a case of generation by alteration), it is not by the *addition* of anything (whether material or immaterial) to the substrate. Nothing has been introduced to the hand to make a fist, nor to the clay to make a statue; each *hupokeimenon* is simply arranged, organized, or differentiated in a certain way. But they are not therefore identical to the whole, because they have distinct identity and persistence conditions. The Categories are not only counted as distinct bodies, since the Stoics make each of us *four* and justify that move by appeal to Leibniz's Law, but each is also one in virtue of its *idia perigraphē*, its own unique compass or character. Recall that a thing's *perigraphē* that makes it one, its identity conditions, can be either quantitative (admitting of no addition or subtraction, but all manner of qualitative change) or qualitative (admitting of addition and subtraction, but no qualitative differentiation). The *hupokeimenon* is one quantitatively (its *perigraphē* is its corporeal constitution, subject to no addition or subtraction), while the others are one qualitatively by their intrinsic suchness (which is not itself an individual or, therefore, a part). Thus each substrate in the Categories is a Proper Part, because it is distinct from the whole_c; and because there are no other parts, this is a case of Proper Parthood with no remainder.

And each Category after the *hupokeimenon* fits the definition of wholeness_c too: Something is a whole_c iff it is both one (*hen*) in virtue of its own *perigraphē*, and ordered (having an internal arrangement or organization). Certainly one way to be ordered is to have several parts organized in a certain way (like the cosmos, or a bicycle), but this is not the only way for something to be ordered or organized. The *poion*, *pōs echon*, and the *pros ti pōs echon* are all ordered by the substrate's being in a state of intrinsic suchness, where that qualitative state is not something distinct from or additional to the substrate. The organization of the substrate is not a relation among several parts, but a state or arrangement of the substrate, the only part. Again, the move from one Category to the next does not happen by the addition of any new element, but by the state, arrangement, or condition of the substrate. When a hand (*poion*) becomes a fist (*pōs echon*), there is no entity that has been added to the hand to make it a fist; it is simply the hand arranged or organized in the shape of a fist. And when the fist is held high (*pros ti pōs echon*), there is nothing added to or inhering in the fist that makes it be above my head, or a sign of protest. To be one qualitatively is to be an individual, e.g. one fist, one person, simply in virtue of the substrate's organization or arrangement.

Thus the *hupokeimenon*, as undifferentiated and homogeneous substance, is not ordered but it is one by being a certain quantity or mass of body; and this is right, that the first Category should be a part but not a whole_c. The *poion*, on the other hand, is both one and ordered, not by several component parts, but by the qualitative character of its one and only part; hence the *poion* is a non-composite whole_c. What makes this thing Socrates (both one and ordered) is that his substance is in a certain qualitative state, and his being Socrates is not indifferent to being arranged that way—indeed any change to that ordering would be destructive

to Socrates. Likewise, the *poion* is the single constitutive part of the individual disposed (*pōs echon*) (Porphyry, *Praep. ev.* 15.11.4); for example, a hand is one in virtue of its own qualitative *perigraphē*, and it is not disjoint from the fist, therefore it is a prior part of the fist (prior in that the fist depends for its existence on the hand but the hand does not depend on the fist).⁴⁴ And the fist is an ordered whole_c because it is both one with *its* own *perigraphē* and ordered insofar as the hand is arranged a certain way. Likewise, Socrates wise and virtuous are wholes_c constituted by the *idiōs poion* that is habituated and hence disposed a certain way (*pōs echon*). And, finally, the individual relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*) is also a whole_c entirely constituted by the disposed individual as its only part, e.g. Socrates in all his habituated states, inseparable (i.e. not disjoint) from his relations to all other things in the ultimate whole_c, the cosmos. A full description of Socrates must make reference to his extrinsic relations to all other parts of the cosmos, thereby capturing his parthood (Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1054E–F (29D)). Thus the fourth Category seems to be required not only to explain extrinsic properties, but also as a function of the Stoic commitment to the cosmos as an integrated whole (whole_i) explanatorily prior to its parts.

I have developed the mereology of the Categories to show that this is a distinct explanatory enterprise from what we find in Stoic physics. The Stoic cosmology that builds the world and all its contents out of two fundamental bodies, making one out of many, certainly contains mereological commitments to composition, including an answer to the Special Composition question; but the only mereological terminology in Stoic physics is the reference to the cosmos as the whole (*to holon*). Nowhere is there reference to the *archai*, elements, *pneuma* (fire and air), or matter (earth and water) as parts or as being neither the same nor different from the cosmos they compose (even if the Stoics would agree that they

⁴⁴ Koslicki, “Varieties,” 210–1, grapples with how to classify the smile-mouth relation, resisting the Constituent analysis that makes the mouth a constituent of the smile, as well as the Feature analysis that might lead to thinking of smiles as constituents of mouths. Here the Stoic conception of constitution as distinct from composition is helpful for resolving this kind of a problem case. Koslicki’s Constituent Dependence (CD), “Varieties,” 205–6, is restricted to Φ ’s that are complex entities such that Ψ is not the only constituent; accordingly, in *Structure* she embraces Weak Supplementation to ensure that there is always some other part called for, namely form, and then applies this schema to constitution. But we have seen Stoic mereology reject this constraint to accommodate entities with only one part (Proper Parthood with no remainder) alongside entities with many parts. Recognizing these two varieties of dependence, the smile-mouth relation falls comfortably into this second variety of CD. To the extent that a hand can be considered the single constituent of the fist, so too can the smile-mouth relation go that way. It sits comfortably as a case of ontological dependence, since the smile (*pōs echon*) depends on the mouth (*poion*) for its existence, just as the fist depends on the underlying hand for its existence, and on this model the case no longer strains intuitions about mouths as constituents. To the extent that Koslicki is committed to form as a proper part of the whole, as she is in *Structure*, she will not herself be open to this suggestion since it presumes to do away with form and treat what takes its place (the pneumatic quality) not as a part. But if my rehabilitation of Stoic corporealism is successful, perhaps the Stoic view recognizing constitution alongside composition as distinct mereological enterprises should be considered a promising physicalist alternative to hylomorphic accounts like those of Koslicki, *Structure*, and Harte, *Plato on Parts and Wholes*.

are parts of that whole_C). That the Categories are developed with their own vocabulary and in self-consciously mereological terms signals that this is a distinct explanatory enterprise, and thus should not be given the same explananda as the physics (namely unity and generation). And the fact that the Categories answer the Growing Argument does not change this, since the problem they solve is a logical puzzle rather than any physical question about how, say, food gets incorporated into the body. Not only is there is no sign of the Categories in Diogenes' account of Stoic physics (7.132–60), the mereological commitments themselves are different. The cosmology is a building enterprise that makes one (cosmos) out of many (*archai*, elements) and this, as we have seen, is composition; the Categories, on the other hand, are a metaphysical enterprise proceeding in terms of constitution rather than composition, making many out of one by making each of us four. As I have just been arguing, this is not a many-to-one relation of several parts to one whole, but a one-to-one relation of single (one and only) part to non-composite whole.⁴⁵

With the mereology made precise, we can now address Sedley's concern that the mereology of the Categories is in conflict with the Stoic commitment to through and through blending (*krasis di' holou*). First, as I have argued, it is incorrect to think of the *hupokeimenon* as a Proper Part with remainder (e.g. as matter to the exclusion of *pneuma* in a composite *poion*), because the *hupokeimenon* is the *only* part of the whole_C, and the *poion* is not a composite in this schema. This is where I differ from Sedley's assessment of the mereology of the Categories: it is a mereological thesis, and the *hupokeimenon* is a part of the *poion*, but it is not a subpart (as Sedley puts it, or a Proper Part with remainder), which is to say that it is not matter to the exclusion of *pneuma*, and the Categories are not in the business of building one thing out of many. Secondly, the relation of blended bodies to each other is not a relation of part to whole; neither is a part of the other, although both are ingredients of the blend. So even if Sedley were right in taking the *hupokeimenon* to be a subpart of the *poion*, this would still not conflict with the Stoic commitment to *krasis di' holou*, because the ingredients of a blend are not related to each other as part to whole. The ingredients of a blend *are* in the same place, but they are not parts of each other; indeed, they are, ex hypothesi, separable in place and remain independent entities even while blended—hence they are disjoint.

Now, it is true that the text of Stobaeus (passage C) says that in addition to not being conceived of as a part, to be *heteron* is to be separated (*kechōristhai*, perfect passive infinitive), in place; it does not say merely separable. I appealed to this passage in the digression on mereology (Chapter 3) in elucidating the relation between part and whole as neither the same nor different, i.e. neither identical nor disjoint. Now we need to ask whether this perfect passive infinitive is a reason to

⁴⁵ For this reason, I am resistant to Sorabji's application of the Categories to the cosmology to reduce god to matter, *pneuma* to air (or fire), and qualities to body, *MSM*, 94–7.

think Posidonius is introducing mereological innovations that conflict with the commitment to blending. Is he introducing a standard of *heteron* that is stronger or different from the standard applicable to blending? Textual evidence concerning the separability of the ingredients in a blend says that they must be separable (*chōrizesthai*, present infinite middle-passive with modal sense), not that they must be in fact (i.e. have been, as conveyed by the perfect tense) separated in place (or else they wouldn't be blended) (Stobaeus 155,5–11 (48D); Alexander, *Mixt.* 216,32–17 (Todd)). Does this mean that they are not really *heteron*? No. The fact that the ingredients of a blend are colocated does not make them any less disjoint; it is a defining characteristic of blends that the ingredients remain distinct and capable of being separated (*dunasthai chōrizesthai*) even while blended (Alexander, *Mixt.* 213,20–6 (Todd)).

Does this mean that Posidonius is introducing his own standard of *heteron* that conflicts with blending? I do not think so. Given the mereological context of the Categories, the stronger claim in terms of being separated is apt as a contrast to the relation of *hupokeimenon* to *poion*, which certainly could not be separated without destruction of the *poion*; but the weaker modal claim in terms of separability would be just as good as the stronger one we find. Posidonius does not need the stronger claim to make his point that the *hupokeimenon* and *poion* are related as part to whole._C It is not the fact that parts are not actually separated that makes us see that they are not *heteron*, but the counterfactual observation that if we were to separate them (which we could), they (and the whole) would be damaged; hence Sextus' report that the hand is not different from the person because the person is conceived as having a hand (SE, M. 9.336, passage D/Chapter 3), 11.24 (60G3)).

Further, most things in the world that are different and not thought of as parts are in fact separated in place. However, blending is not a garden variety case of being *heteron*, and blending is not the subject on the table in Stobaeus' report. So, even if the perfect tense is an accurate transmission of an accurate report, both of which could be doubted, we still do not have good reason to see evidence of mereological innovation in tension with *krasis*. The local point that the *hupokeimenon* is not different from the *poion* does not require the stronger reading of being separated, and even if Posidonius did make the stronger statement, invoking garden variety cases of being *heteron* when he did so, this need not make for internal conflict or evidence of doctrinal innovation. I urge modesty in our developmental conjectures. Given that most things that are *heteron* really are separate in place rather than merely separable as in the case of blending, and given that the logical context of the Categories is quite distinct from the physical context of blending, it is too tenuous to infer from this one case of the perfect tense that Posidonius is modifying Stoic mereology and upending *krasis di' holou*. It is much more economical and charitable to assume that the perfect is a slip along the way, whether by Posidonius himself (perhaps ignoring or forgetting about the unique case of blending in making the point) or by Stobaeus (likewise) or in a manuscript.

I, at any rate, am not prepared on the basis of this lone use of the perfect tense to infer that there was internal conflict or doctrinal development.

With the one-to-one mereology of constitution in view, we are also in a position to address our opening explananda for the Categories: why do the Stoics posit several substrates (B3–8, C7), and how can they say that each of us is four distinct bodies, yet with all the same physical characteristics? The idea that we are each several substrates is simply the idea that each of us is four distinct, nested entities. Because this is a one-to-one nested relationship of part to whole, each part serves as substrate to the next: the *hupokeimenon* is substrate to the *poion*, and *poion* to the *pōs echon*, and *pōs echon* to the *pros ti pōs echon*. As the ultimate substrate to all the others, the first Category is the *hupokeimenon* most properly speaking and earns the title, but each is a receptive part (*dektikon morion*, C7), playing the role of substrate to the next. The substrate of my hand is the total corporeal substance that constitutes the hand; the hand is, in turn, the substrate of my fist; and my fist is itself the substrate of my fist held high. Naturally, the fourth Category of individual relatively disposed is not itself a substrate, since there is no further Category of which it is receptive. That is why Plutarch clarifies his description (B6): “I am simplifying their account, since they make four substrates in every individual; or rather, they make each of us four”; the point of the “or rather” clause is that each of us is all four bodies, but only the first three Categories play the role of substrate to the next.

There is thus no real puzzle about what motivates the Stoics to posit “the doctrine of two subjects,” as Irwin puts it. Recall that Irwin generates this puzzle by finding a conflict between Posidonius and Mnesarchus over whether the *hupokeimenon* persists and takes it that only the Posidonian view, which makes the *hupokeimenon* an extreme Lockean mass, motivates the need for a second substrate to be the subject of growth and diminution. At the same time, he takes the Posidonian view to be problematic for denying the existence of things like compost heaps, hence he sees the Stoics as facing an unfortunate dilemma of their own making: either undermine the doctrine of two subjects or deny the existence of compost heaps. I have already addressed both of these problems above: there is no conflict between Posidonius and Mnesarchus on the persistence of the *hupokeimenon*, which straightforwardly does not persist through growth and diminution (but does persist through qualitative change); and no one is denying the existence of compost heaps, which are simply *poia* in the sense that things like ships and armies are *poia*, qualified individuals that lack a unifying tenor (as reported by Simplicius, passage F). I can add now that we have a perfectly good explanation for the doctrine of several substrates, namely that it captures the nested, one-to-one mereology of the Categories as described above. Furthermore, this schema is not a doctrine of *two* substrates, but of four (or, rather, they make each of us four); indeed, if the Categories were devised only to address the Growing Argument, we would not have any explanation for why there are *four* Categories rather than two. Three of

them are substrates to the next, not just two. Nor is the second substrate *called* a substrate because it is the subject of growth and diminution, or the subject of predication. What motivates talk of substrates is simply the nested mereology of constitution, which is not concerned with building one thing out of many, or with pursuing either the subject and inherence or substance and quality model of Plato and Aristotle. To say that each Category underlies the next, acting as its substrate, is a natural description of the constitution relation.

The mereology of constitution also explains why there are no visible differences between the Categories, and why they have all the same physical properties; one cannot discern the corporeal substance from the individual it constitutes because to see the individual just is to see the substance in a certain qualitative state, as in the case of clay constituting a statue. Likewise, to see an individual disposed just is to see the qualified individual in a certain state, as in the hand that constitutes a fist.⁴⁶ There is no distinct part of the statue that is the quality of being a statue, nor any distinct part of the fist that is its fistiness. And there is nothing untoward about this result, unless one presupposes the framework of composition and building, or subject and inherence. A mereological distinction like material constitution is not the sort of distinction one would expect to be able to see or otherwise discern by the senses, since it is a *logical* distinction that is being made between a statue and its clay or a tree and its molecules. Hence the Categories are a part of Stoic logic, not physics; and the difference in the vocabularies by which they proceed reflects this division of labor. The Growing Argument is happily situated alongside the Mowing Argument, the Master Argument, the Veiled Argument, the Horned Argument, and all the other fallacies and sophisms to which the Stoics paid so much careful attention (LS31, 37); and this dialectical context is clearly distinct from that of the physics, where the reports concern *archai*, elements, *pneuma*, and matter (et al.).

Again, the fact that the Categories are not visibly discernible from each other does not undermine their distinctness; it shows that it is a category mistake to complain that one cannot see the fist apart from the hand. It's not that the Categories are not perceptible, either; the Stoics take one's state of character to be quite literally visible, just as the patina of a supple, well-worn glove is visible. But the Categories are not to be sought after as distinct parts of a composite whole, e.g. as matter and a collection of qualities, like so many pebbles in an urn. The Stoics do

⁴⁶ One need not worry here that this indiscernibility renders the Categories incorporeal or invisible; in fact, the Stoics are committed to the expert's ability to perceive the world in its maximal specificity. They are also explicitly committed to the virtues and our states of character as visible (DL 7.173; Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1042E–F (60R); Seneca, *Ep.* 106.2, 117.2 (60S)). Thus, one would literally *see* that Socrates is wise, by discerning that intrinsic suchness, without thereby seeing a distinct component part. Note that these texts (and Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.12–5 (29E, passage M below)) do not individuate or count the virtues as individual bodies; Plutarch reports they are perceptible (*aisthēta*), Seneca that they are corporeal (*corporealem*), and Galen that the virtues are *poia*, qualified individuals (which, of course, are countable and visible units in contrast to qualities, which are not). Nor does SE, *M.* 11.22–6 (60G) show the virtues are parts, see n. 23 above.

indeed make each of us four, in fact each of us is as many bodies as we are Fs; and all of these bodies, though grounded in a single *hupokeimenon*, are distinct. But to then seek out these bodies as physically distinct individuals is to misunderstand the explanatory role of the Stoic Categories. This point is crucial to understanding the dialectic with the Academy, which charges the Stoics alternately with inflation and reduction. And crucial, also, to seeing that this dialectic need not indicate any innovation or retooling of Stoic theory in response to Academic blows.

Developmentalism Defanged

I turn now, finally, to the developmentalist strain of interpretation. Sedley has proposed that Chrysippus introduced the Stoic Categories in response to Academic criticisms specially targeted to the Stoics, and that we can discern five distinct phases of development in response to their critics. I will begin with Plutarch (passage B), where Sedley sees the Academics leading a charge against the Stoics with the Growing Argument and Chrysippus responding by inventing the Categories. A second look at the text shows that this is not the order of events Plutarch reports. What he reports is that the Growing Argument is ancient, as Chrysippus points out, and that the Stoics are themselves critical of the Academics who insist “the puzzle is not altogether easy or straightforward” (B1). This does not read like the Academics leading the charge and introducing the Growing Argument as a new or specially formulated challenge to the Stoics, so much as the Stoics (presumably Zeno) *first* solving the ancient Growing Argument on their own terms (with the Categories), *then* being taken to task for that solution (“Not so fast!”), and in turn (Chrysippus) criticizing the Academics for “destroying our preconceptions and contravening our conceptions,” presumably by denying that growth is possible (“You’re nuts!”). The dialectic *begins* with the Stoic solution, which the Academics then resist, prompting *the Stoics* to go on the offensive, which is then followed, in the remainder of the passage, by Plutarch going after the Stoics for “failing to save our conceptions and perverting sense-perception” (“They’re not crazy, *you* are!”).⁴⁷

Plutarch then states the Growing Argument, indicating that the Stoics grant its premises (B2), and introduces their solution with thick and caustic sarcasm (“these champions of the evident, these yardsticks of our conceptions”) but also with fidelity to the facts (B3). The solution the Stoics offer is that each of us is two—they are inflationary; and these bodies are not two on the model of Siamese twins,

⁴⁷ In support of this order of dialectical exchange, see Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 2, 623–4, 650–1, and the anonymous commentary on Plato’s *Theaetetus*, 70.5–26 (28B). Why think, as Sedley says in “Diachronic,” 26–7, that the Academics set the Stoics a puzzle they can’t solve? Why think that Anonymous’ mockery of the Stoics confirms they can’t solve it?

but in fact have all the same physical properties (color, shape, weight, place). There is no indication that this solution is proposed by Chrysippus in response to the Academics rather than on Zeno's own terms in response to Epicharmus' ancient argument. Plutarch's snarky criticism is that "the Stoics *alone* have seen this composition," i.e. that this kind of duality and ambiguity is what *really* contravenes common sense: the idea that we could be indiscernibly two substrates ("nowhere giving sense-perception a grasp of the difference"), each undergoing all the opposites of the other (the one in constant flux and motion, "neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as it is at all," and the other perfectly stable, remaining as it is, even while growing and diminishing) (B4). Plutarch goes on: what kind of duality of opposites could this possibly be (the one in flux, the other unchanging from life to death) that is completely indiscernible to us, and that no one has ever noticed (B5)?! Then he clarifies that the schema is in fact a four-fold schema, but that the two he has emphasized are sufficient to expose the absurdity of their view (B6), which applies to everything in the world (all people, animals, trees, furniture, implements, and clothes), clearly showing that they are "going crazy in their arithmetic" and forcing us to "mis-think rather than to think" (B7). Finally, Plutarch concludes that there may be no other way for them (as corporealists) to salvage the process of growth (B8).

This passage is extremely informative, but not *historically* informative so much as *dialectically* informative. There is no evidence that the Academics first pressed the puzzle on the Stoics (B1–2), or reason to think that Plutarch reports a historical development in Stoic doctrine (B3–8).⁴⁸ At most, Plutarch limns the ongoing dialectic between the two schools: the Stoics first give their solution to the ancient Growing Argument, then that solution comes under fire from the Academy, and the Stoics fire back at those who would deny processes of growth. The Categories are thus not the result, but the *object* of Academic attacks. It is also incorrect to take the remainder of the passage in which Plutarch attacks the Stoics for their own absurdities as reporting fatal blows to Stoic doctrine for which they must devise workarounds. It may be a good dialectical move for critics to complain about indiscernible differences and unnecessary proliferation, but there is no reason to think these blows are fatal or even worrisome to a Stoic, nor that they occasioned developments in the theory. The Stoic will embrace the visual indiscernibility of the Categories, and is actively pursuing an inflationist somatology (as, again,

⁴⁸ I resist the idea in Sedley, "Criterion," that the focus on growth rather than stable flux indicates that the Growing Argument is tailored by the Academics to the Stoics; in fact, growth is not especially central to Stoic cosmology, since the totality of substance does not increase or decrease, and the cosmogony is thus a case of generation by alteration (DL 7.150, passage G above, which shows that Zeno was already thinking this way). The totality of substance is the totality of substance, with nowhere for any of it to go or from which to arrive. There is thus no special sting to the Growing Argument for Stoic cosmology as Sedley argues; on the contrary, it is the one individual for which there is *no* possibility of growth or diminution. Furthermore, stable flux is just a special case of growth and diminution, so the ship of Theseus would only obscure the point.

Brunschwig puts it), so these complaints are not likely to prompt any revision to Stoic theory. Of course the clay and the statue, or the hand and the fist, are not visibly different, since these are *logical* distinctions being made; of course, we are making many out of one—that is a key explanandum for the theory, what makes something F in the various and sundry ways in which we are all F. Thus I am not sympathetic to what I have called a strongly historical reading that discerns development and defense at each turn, or successful charges of incoherent dualism that put the Stoics on the defensive.

Likewise with the Stobaeus text (passage C), we do not have evidence that the Stoics are on their heels or retooling their theory in response to evolving Academic criticisms or internal conflicts. First, the locution of qualified individuals “coming to be in” (*genesthai epi*) substance (C3) is not genuinely problematic: when the clay is qualitatively altered, i.e. molded a certain way, we can straightforwardly say that a statue comes to be in the clay. Sedley is right to worry that a *poion* is not the sort of thing to be predicated of a subject; but whereas I see this as evidence that the Stoics are not operating in terms of predication, Sedley infers a *poion-poiotēs* ambiguity in need of resolution (since they must really mean *poiotēs* as what gets predicated). As I have been arguing, it is a hylomorphic hangover to assume that qualities must come to be in things, and that the phrase “*genesthai epi*” must signal some sort of confusion on the Stoics’ part.

Now, since this is not a problem in need of a solution, there is no need to think that Posidonius is rescuing Chrysippus from this ambiguity, or from the absurd redundancy charged by Academics (in passage B). Certainly Posidonius is working in mereological terms, but there is no reason to see the mention of mereology (or of Posidonius) as an innovation in the Categories or, as I argued above, to think there is conflict with blending. The mereological move is not introduced in order to mitigate the absurdity of “two different items crammed into the same place,” or any such specter. The Categories are already, and by design, a mereological schema—but not because they make the *hupokeimenon* one of several parts to the *poion* as a composite whole_C; rather, because the constitution relation is a one-to-one mereological relation between an object and its material constituent taken as a totality. Attention to the mereology is a good dialectical response to Academic charges of absurd redundancy, but Stobaeus does not report any such *historical* (as opposed to dialectical) debate, and there is no independent reason to think the mereology was innovated to avoid such charges.

Likewise, Mnesarchus’ appeal to Leibniz’s Law does offer the dialectical resources to resist charges of monism and reductive consequences to the theory, and there is also no compelling reason to think that this move was made defensively, as an innovation in response to further criticisms from the Philonian Academy. Stobaeus does not say that this is a historical report, and while he is surely faithful to the dialectical line between proliferation and reduction, it is a further and, to my mind, unjustified step to infer doctrinal development from such dialectic. Again,

Sedley sees evidence that the Stoics *first* argue that the Categories are not different, defending the schema from charges of absurd redundancy, and that then *later*, in a separate phase of the theory responding to new charges of monism, they argue that the Categories are also not the same.

But being neither the same nor different is a single mereological concept, passed down from Plato (as Barnes has shown), so Stobaeus is not likely to be reporting a historical evolution in Stoic thought from saying first that the Categories are not really different to adding later that they are not the same. He reports simply that, as a part, each substrate is neither the same as nor different from the whole_c it constitutes. The most we can say is that Posidonius emphasizes the mereology of the Categories, focusing on the fact that they are neither the same nor different from one another, while Mnesarchus emphasizes that they are genuinely distinct because they have different properties and persistence conditions, offering both an artificial and a natural case in support of the position; these cases serve the further purpose of giving one case where the substance remains the same while the *poia* come and go, and another where the substance changes and the *poion* is constant. Again I urge modesty in our developmental conjectures, restraint in seeking active debate and disagreement between the Stoics and their critics, and charity in our reconstruction of Stoic theory. We should not presume that the Stoics were on their heels, developing the Categories ad hoc in response to fatal blows, and we should not hear every mention of an individual Stoic as a historical report of doctrinal development.

I turn now to Menn's influential reading of the Categories, in which he proposes that the Stoics were pursuing a subject-inherence model, failing at that endeavor, and then devising workarounds that do not require corporeal entities to inhere in a subject. Menn's evidence that the Stoics are failing at the subject-inherence model is that they recognize *poia* without a corresponding *poiotēs* (as Simplicius testifies in passages E and F). The first thing to note in response to Menn is that while the Stoics do indeed recognize qualified individuals that do not have a corresponding quality (*poia* without a *poiotēs*), there is no reason to think of this as an unwelcome result or concession that they make in pursuit of a subject-inherence model. First of all, I do not accept Menn's guiding presupposition that the Stoics were pursuing a Platonic (or Aristotelian) subject-inherence model to begin with. Secondly, the texts do not indicate anything amiss with the Stoic distinction between *poia* that do and do not correspond to a *poiotēs*; one must presuppose the problem in order for this to look like evidence that there is a problem. The texts from Simplicius reveal only that the Stoics are permissive about *poia* and strict about qualities. I would even go so far as to say that these reports are not really about the Categories at all, except incidentally. I will explain.

The first Simplicius passage (E) reports a distinction between three senses of "*poion*," the broadest including processes and states, the second only states, and the narrowest only stable states considered independent of their exercise. This

taxonomy, as I have argued, might tell us something about which things count as *poia* and can be taken as inputs for analysis by the schema of the Categories (this is the respect in which the report *is* about the Categories, in that one of them is mentioned); but it does not tell us that the distinctions are problematic, or that these three senses correspond to the different Categories themselves (this is the respect in which the report is not about the Categories, in not being about the four-fold schema). The text reports clearly and straightforwardly that there are different senses of *poion* corresponding to the stability of the qualification; it says nothing to suggest that these senses correspond to differences between *poia* and *pōs echonta*, nor is there any evidence of doctrinal struggle in positing the three senses.⁴⁹ Likewise, the second Simplicius passage (F) tells us about different kinds of *poia*, only some of which have a *poiotēs*: ships, armies, and choruses are qualified individuals that lack a unifying tension, or *pneuma*, and therefore can't have qualities (since qualities are states of *pneuma*, presumably); but again there is no indication that this distinction is either problematic or that these different kinds of *poia* correspond to the different Categories. Thus this report is also not really *about* the Categories; at face value, the passage reports simply what kinds of things count as *poia*, and says nothing about the other Categories or the schema itself.

The third Simplicius passage, too, is silent about the differences between the Categories. It is simply a report about a Stoic distinction between relatives: those that are relative (*pros ti*), and yet intrinsically differentiated, e.g. sweet and bitter, and those that are relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*), and only extrinsically differentiated, e.g. being on the left. The fact that what is *pros ti pōs echon* is defined as the contradictory of what is *kata diaphoran*, i.e. differentiated, does not give license to reach in to the distinction between relatives for evidence about differences among the Categories themselves. Menn, again, takes this contrast with *kata diaphoran* as evidence that the fourth Category was introduced before the third, and as proving that the widest sense of *poion* must include both the second and third Categories.⁵⁰ Long & Sedley, too, take this passage to report a contrast between the *pros ti pōs echon* and the *poion*. But this bridge to the *poion*, built on the contrast with what is *kata diaphoran*, cannot bear the load it is given. The fact that in passages E and F the broadest senses of *poion* are described as being *kata diaphoran* does not mean that the contrast here between what is relatively disposed and what is *kata diaphoran* is evidence that the Categories were at some point conceived of without the *pōs echon*, or even that this text is a report *about* the second Category at all. Certainly it is a report about the fourth Category, but it is also clearly a report about a Stoic distinction between two different kinds of relatives,

⁴⁹ Pace Menn, "Categories," n. 29: "The fact that running or making a fist do not last very long is not the real reason why they are not strict ποιά, but is merely a symptom of the fact that these conditions are not explained by the presence of some object in the person."

⁵⁰ Menn, "Categories," 223–2.

one of which happens to be the fourth Category. That may be all there is to it. The description “*kata diaphoran*” is not technical terminology, but rather ordinary Greek by which the technical terms are explicated, and it is not synonymous with “*poion*” such that any use of “*kata diaphoran*” counts as evidence about the second Category. The Simplicius passages are an unstable bridge between what is *kata diaphoran* and the Category *poion*.

It is true that the relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*) is contrasted with what is intrinsically differentiated (*kata diaphoran*), and that *poia* are intrinsically differentiated, but this does not make the report about the Categories except in the minimal sense that what is relatively disposed happens to be one of the Categories. Reaching in to the passage for evidence about the difference between the second and fourth Categories, or evidence that there was a time when the Stoics recognized the second and the fourth Categories without the third, is overreaching. None of these three Simplicius passages makes reference to the other Categories, and while the paucity of our evidence makes for desperate interpretive times, it is out of bounds to reach in to these passages for evidence about the schema of the Categories. In particular, the fact that the *pōs echon* is not mentioned in these passages about *poia* does not license the developmental conjecture that the Categories were conceived separately or developed reluctantly, the third only after the fourth, following failed attempts at subject-inherence with bodies.

I address now Menn’s strongly historical narrative that the fourth and then the third Categories were introduced over the course of a debate between Aristo and Chrysippus about the unity of the virtues. In a word, I contend that this debate over how to classify the virtues is not evidence of doctrinal development but, at most, of a lively debate over how to classify the virtues within the schema of the Categories. It is equally likely, and even more plausible, that the debate took place against the existing background of the Categories as introduced by Zeno, and that the question was simply: which Category do they go in? If Aristo elects the fourth Category and Chrysippus the second, that is not evidence that Aristo *invented* the fourth Category, rather than availing himself of it. Furthermore, if Chrysippus opts for *poia*, that does not mean that he threatens the unity of the virtues except on the twin presuppositions that the second Category is really the *poiotes* and that these qualities are to be understood as atomic entities, like so many pebbles in an urn.

Long & Sedley, even while doubting that Aristo classified the virtues in the fourth Category, say that “the dispute between Chrysippus and Aristo could only have been made possible by Zeno’s failure to explicitly assign a genus to the virtues.”⁵¹ But is this so? Aristo is known to be heterodox, so his suggestion that the

⁵¹ LS, 178–9; Sedley, “Criterion,” n. 21. Cf. LS vol. 2, 181, where Simplicius’ perplexity in 29g “underlines the Stoics’ own lack of clarity on the point”; this point is not warranted, given LS’ own observation that Simplicius is discussing Academics “whose views seem to be a synthesis of Stoic and Platonist metaphysics.” On this count, there is no reason to think the Stoics were unclear, or that this report is legitimately about the Stoics.

virtues are relatively disposed (if indeed that was the suggestion, and not merely that they were *pros ti*, as Long & Sedley entertain) really does not entail that Zeno failed to classify them. Chrysippus' classification of the virtues as *poia* is also silent on the matter, since he could be either upholding Zeno or making an alternative suggestion within Zeno's schema, perhaps that they are *poia* in contrast to *pōs echonta*.

Furthermore, there is some positive evidence that Zeno was thinking in terms of the Categories in Diogenes' report that Zeno and Chrysippus take prime matter to be corporeal substance, when he says that the substance of the whole does not grow (it neither increases nor diminishes), while that of particular bodies does (7.150, passage G above). Though the vocabulary of the Categories is largely absent, the identity conditions of substance (body as such) in contrast to that of qualified individuals (particular bodies), and the Stoic solution to the Growing Argument that turns on this distinction, are clearly operative.⁵² After all, as Chrysippus points out (passage B), the argument about growth is an ancient one and it is the *Academics* who contravene the common conceptions in resisting the Stoic solution. Even without consideration of these admittedly tenuous hints about Zeno, it is far simpler to assume that the debate between Aristo and Chrysippus is over how to classify the virtues according to a schema already available, rather than to, first, assume problems with a subject-inherence model, and then "solve" these problems by finding internal struggle and doctrinal development. As far as explanatory elegance and charity goes, it is more attractive to think Aristo and Chrysippus were invoking rather than inventing the Categories in a debate about the unity of the virtues.

Even this much, however, is not strictly warranted. The debate between Aristo and Chrysippus may not even be about how to classify the virtues; it could be a debate over the unity of the virtues that does not invoke the Categories at all. The evidence about Aristo is that he treated the virtues as *pros ti scheseis*, relative states or conditions (Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.12–5, passage M below; Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D, passage L below); and while it is true that for a *poion* to be disposed, or *pōs echon*, is for it to be in a certain state or condition, there is no reason to think that the vocabulary of the Categories is fluid in such a way that any mention of a state or condition (*schesis*, *hexis*) automatically invokes the *pōs echon*. Like "*kata diaphoran*," "*schesis*" is ordinary Greek used in explicating the technical terms; and just as the broadest sense of "*poion*" includes all things that are *kata diaphoran*, so

⁵² Menn, "Categories," 228, takes the first two Categories to have originated with Zeno for two reasons: first, because according to DL 7.134 (44B, passage A/Chapter 5) Zeno equates *apoiōs ousia* with *hulē* (NB: this only counts as evidence on the presupposition of a hylomorphic subject-inherence model; this text is about the Stoic *archai*, and so counts as evidence only on the presupposition that the Categories are doing the work of unity); and, second, because at SVF 1.100 Zeno is said to interpret the Titan Koios in Hesiod's *Theogony* as signifying *poiōtēs* (here, again, this will only count as evidence on a strong presupposition that the Categories are to be understood on hylomorphic terms).

too all Categories are body in a certain *schesis*. There is no evidence that the *pōs echon* or the schema of the Categories is being invoked at all. A quick look at the central texts will help.

- L. (1) Menedemus of Eretria eliminated the plurality and the differentiations (*diaphora*) of the virtues, holding that it is one and called by many names; for the same thing is called temperance, courage, and justice, just as mortal and human.

(2) Aristo of Chios used to make virtue, on the one hand, one and the same in substance (*ousia*), and called it health; and on the other hand in a way different and many by the *pros ti*, as if someone should wish to call our vision whiting when grasping something white; for virtue, when considering things to be done and not done, is called wisdom, but when ordering desires and defining what is fitting and opportune in pleasures, temperance, and when dealing with commercial transactions and those with each other, justice. Just as the knife, is on the one hand one thing but cuts different things at different times, and fire acts on different matters having one nature.

(3) It seems that even Zeno of Citium is brought to this point, defining wisdom in what must be assigned as justice but in things that are to be chosen, temperance, and in matters of endurance, courage. Those defending him believe that in these cases it is *epistēmē* that is called wisdom by Zeno.

(4) But Chrysippus, considering virtue to be unified (*sunistasthai*) by a unique quality (*idia poiotes*) according to the qualified individual (*poion*), unwittingly stirred up, according to Plato himself, “a swarm of virtues,” neither conventional or notable; for as beyond the courageous person there is courage, the mild one mildness, and justice beyond the just, and so beyond the graceful one graces, beyond the good one goodnesses, beyond the great one greatnesses, and beyond the fine one finenesses, and positing other virtues such as handinesses, affabilities, wittinesses, they fill philosophy with many absurd names of which it has no need.

(5) All these people agree that virtue is a certain condition (*diathesis*) and capacity of the commanding faculty of soul that has been brought about by reason, or rather they posit that it is reason that is in agreement, firm, and unchangeable; and they think that the passionate and irrational is not distinguished from the rational by any difference in the nature of the soul, but that it is the same part of soul, which indeed they call thought and the commanding faculty, that becomes virtue and vice, being transformed and changing through and through by the passions, and states (*hexis*), and conditions,

and having nothing irrational in itself, and it is said to be irrational whenever it is carried away by the excess strength and dominance of an impulse toward some absurdity contrary to the dictates of reason. For, also, passion is wicked and intemperate reason—from poor and mistaken judgment—that takes on violence and might.

Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D (61B)⁵³

The gamut of the unity thesis reported here runs from strong to weak. First the virtues are one thing with many names (Menedemus), then there is Aristo making the virtues one and the same in substance (*ousia*) yet many by being *pros ti*, relative to a certain domain, just as a knife is one thing that cuts different things at different times. Next on the gamut of unity is Zeno, who Plutarch says is “brought to the same point” as Aristo by defining the virtues as wisdom in their respective domains, e.g. wisdom in matters of endurance is courage. Then Chrysippus, in securing the unity of the virtues “by a unique quality in virtue of the *poion*,” stirs up “a swarm of virtues, neither conventional nor notable.” This portion of the text is tricky. For one thing, the swarm is two-fold: first in that Chrysippus recognizes both qualified individuals and qualities, e.g. beyond the courageous person, courage, proliferating qualities in addition to qualified individuals; and second in that he posits many other virtues besides the conventional ones, e.g. handinesses, affabilities, and wittinesses (alongside the handy, the affable, and the wit). For another thing, this double proliferation is said to result from Chrysippus’ unifying the virtues “by a unique quality (*idia poiotes*) according to the *poion*,” a phrase as difficult to translate as it is to interpret.⁵⁴ Collette-Dučić sees here evidence that Chrysippus takes the virtues to be self-qualifying, each with its own peculiar quality, and renders the phrase “holding a virtue to be constituted by a peculiar quality.”⁵⁵ This move is intended to defend Chrysippus from Menn’s developmental narrative of an early and late Chrysippus by making the virtues *both poia* and *pōs echonta*, so that there need be no tension between the two.

However, there is a simpler reading available that does not burden the Stoics with a subject-inherence model, or with a self-predication thesis not echoed elsewhere in the evidence, or with applying the thesis of the *pōs echon* to virtues as opposed to individuals. The context of this discussion is the unity of the virtues, and Chrysippus is securing unity by reference to the *idiōs poion*; the virtues are all one because they are all virtues of one and the same qualified individual, e.g. Socrates. Note the order of explanation. It’s not that the virtues are many and differentiated because each virtue has its own unique quality; rather the point is that the virtues are one *even though* they are many, *because* they belong to a single uniquely qualified individual. The role of the *idiōs poion* is not to *qualify* the virtues, but to unify

⁵³ See also Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1034C–E (62C), for substantially the same narrative to which the same remarks apply.

⁵⁴ Χρύσιππος δέ, κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων κτλ. . .

⁵⁵ Collette-Dučić, “Virtues are *poia*,” 196–203.

them as the substrate of all the virtuous individuals (the affable person, the wit, the handy, et al.). It then results from such an account of unity that Chrysippus stirs up a swarm of virtues; once the *idiōs poion* secures the unity of the virtues, there is no limit to the number of virtues he can introduce, wittiness alongside courage, handiness alongside justice, and no reason he cannot recognize wittiness (a *poiotēs*) alongside the wit (a *poion*), handiness alongside the handy, courage alongside the courageous, and justice alongside the just. As we saw above in the discussion of the second Category, qualities are not individuals with their own *perigraphē* (to make them one); nor is the second Category to be assimilated to quality. So this double proliferation of virtues is innocuous, neither threatening the unity of the virtues by making them separable, nor introducing self-predication, a notion not echoed elsewhere in Stoic thought.⁵⁶ There is also no independent reason to think that virtues themselves have (or are) a peculiar quality, as Collette-Dučić suggests; the *idiōs poion* is consistently attested for *individuals* like Socrates, Dion, an egg, a hair, or a grain of rice, and never for a quality. Nor does Galen give us evidence of such self-predication in his own report about Chrysippus in conversation with Aristo:

- M. But mind you, one should not find fault with him [sc. Chrysippus] for correctly striking down Aristo's sect by what he writes. For that man [sc. Aristo] considers that virtue is one, which is called by many names, according to a relative state or condition (*pros ti schesis*). You know, Chrysippus shows a plurality of virtues and evils do not come about in a relative state, but in the qualitative variations (*hupallattomena kata tas poiōtētas*) of their own substances (*oikeiai ousiai*), as the account of the ancients wished it.

Galen, *Plac.* 7.1.12–5 (29E)

The context is that Galen has just finished complaining that Chrysippus cannot say the virtues are *poia* while maintaining a monistic picture of soul; he then adds here that Chrysippus is nevertheless right to say the virtues are many not by being *pros ti*, but by the qualitative variations of their own substances, i.e. intrinsically rather than extrinsically. The debate that Galen bears witness to is not a debate about the Categories, but a debate about the unity of the virtues. Aristo's "relative state or condition" (*pros ti schesis*) need not refer to the fourth Category (*pros ti pōs echon*) in order to be an extrinsic differentiation (since "*schesis*" is not synonymous with the technical term "*pōs echon*"), and Chrysippus' "qualitative variations of their own substances" need not treat the virtues as homuncular *idiōs poia* in order for the differentiation to be intrinsic. Collette-Dučić takes it that the virtues have their own substances only because they are or have a peculiar quality. But the Stoics do not speak of the virtues as either having or being *idiōs poia*, and nothing in this passage

⁵⁶ Pace Collette-Dučić, "Virtues are *poia*," 199–202, who does offer several texts in support of his novel suggestion that qualities are qualified by themselves, all of which strike me as missing their mark in the same way as this one (by going out of bounds with the evidence).

uses the language of the Categories—"oikeion ousia" does not automatically invoke an *idiōs poion*, and a *schesis* is not automatically a *pōs echon*. "The qualitative variations of their own substances" indicates just that the virtues differ intrinsically, by being *pneuma* (i.e. substance) in a state of intrinsic suchness (qualitative variation).

This interpretation of the Galen passage accords well with what Plutarch goes on to say after he reports the gamut of positions from strong to weak unity. After mocking Chrysippus, he tells us (L5) that *all these people* agree that virtue is a certain condition (*diathesis*) of the *hēgemonikon*, the commanding faculty of soul; in particular, that virtue is a firm and unchangeable state (*hexis*) of the *hēgemonikon* itself, which is a single and monistic (i.e. partless) part of soul that is *transformed* into virtue or vice. It also accords well with Simplicius' report (passage E) that only stable differentiated states correspond to a quality, and his report (passage H) that qualities are differentiations of substance, not separable as parts but terminating in a concept and their own suchness. Menn argues that Plutarch's talk of virtue and vice in passage L in terms of states and conditions invokes the *pōs echon*, and thus that this Category is new with Chrysippus.⁵⁷ But there are two problems with this argument. One is that the virtue talk is not attributed to Chrysippus, but to *all these people*, so even if the language of states and conditions were a reference to the *pōs echon*, it would not be Chrysippus' own commitment, or a development within his own thinking. The other is that the language of conditions and states (*diathesis*, *hexis*) is not legitimately understood as talk of the *pōs echon*. To say that virtue is a certain condition or state of soul is not by itself to invoke the schema of Categories, and Plutarch's remaining remarks show that his target in characterizing virtue as being a state of the *hēgemonikon* is a psychological commitment, namely the idea that "the passionate and irrational is not distinguished from the rational by any difference in the nature of the soul." Whether virtue is a *poion* or a *pōs echon* is not material to this psychological datum, and the language of conditions and states is too weak a bridge to bear the interpretive load it is given.

The evidence we have that clearly *is* about the Categories is consistent in its vocabulary, and it does not sometimes use "*hexis*," "*schesis*," or "*diathesis*" in the place of "*pōs echon*." Likewise, discussion of what is *kata diaphoran* cannot automatically be translated into the language of the Categories. It is true, as we have seen in passage F, that for the Stoics what is differentiated (*kata diaphoran*) is also *poion*; "differentiated" is a generous and non-technical way of picking out qualified individuals, allowing even those that are not individuals unified by a single tenor of *pneuma* to count as *poia* (e.g. ship, chorus, army). It is also true that as such they would be subject to analysis by the schema of the Categories, the right kind of input for analysis in terms of the constitution relation. But it does not follow that whenever there is testimony about what is *kata diaphoran*, we should read in the

⁵⁷ Menn, "Categories," 341.

poion and take the contrast cases to align with the other Categories, or to give insight within the schema of the Categories.

Thus when Simplicius reports the broadest sense of “*poion*” is what is *kata diaphoran*, which includes processes and temporary states like running and holding out a fist as well as stable states like being wise, it does not follow that this sense of “*poion*” is the “real” or privileged sense and that the narrower senses of “*poion*” are to be aligned with the other Categories. Indeed, they do not naturally align. Crucially, the fact that they do not naturally align does not prove that the Stoics were struggling to develop the Categories to salvage their failed corporealism, as Menn holds. Difficulty aligning the three senses of “*poion*” with three of the Categories is, rather, evidence that the substance-quality shoe does not fit. The simplest account of the text is that there are three senses of “*poion*” distinguished according to their stability, and only the narrowest, most stable sense is coextensive with a quality; there are *poia* without a *poiotēs*. There is nothing justifying us to reach inside the three senses to align them with the Categories, and the difficulties in doing so are a sign that these historical and dialectical narratives do not fit the evidence.

Furthermore, the order of exposition in Plutarch’s gamut of unity (Menedemus-Aristo-Zeno-Chrysippus-everyone) is not chronological, or even all Stoic, which underscores the fact that the report is dialectical and not historical. The report moves from the strongest thesis of unity (with Menedemus, a pupil of Stilpo but not a Stoic) to the weakest, independent of chronology (placing Zeno after Aristo and ending with Chrysippus). This weak reading need not mean that Chrysippus threatens the unity of the virtues in any meaningful way, nor that he therefore needed to devise a way out of *poia*, inventing the *pōs echon* for that purpose. There are interesting questions and fruitful debates to be had about the unity of the virtues, which I cannot pursue any further now.

My contention here is that these texts are not windows into the Categories, and that the debate between Aristo and Chrysippus over the unity of the virtues is not a font of doctrinal development in the Categories. Strictly speaking, this extended negative argument against the developmentalist does not contribute to my positive account of the Categories; its role is to make room for an alternative to the orthodoxy. But because the historical approach to the texts is so widespread and the resulting views are so intricate, their dominance can only be undone by meeting them at the same level of detail that they marshal. I hope that in addition to clearing the way for my own account of the Categories, I am also making the case generally against this widespread historical approach to the texts that seeks discord, defense, and innovation at every turn and that I am thereby making the case generally in favor of a more charitable approach to the Stoics (as described in the Introduction).

Why, then, *do* the Stoics recognize *poia* without a *poiotēs*, one might still want to know? One straightforward reason would be to uphold the common conception

that while many things, like ships and armies, *are* qualified individuals, they are also clearly different from unified individuals like rocks, plants, and animals, which “achieve a realization of a single tenor” (Simplicius, passage F). Because a *poiotēs* just is an intrinsic suchness of a thing’s unifying *pneuma*, entities that exist only in separation or merely by contact cannot have qualities; as Simplicius puts it, they are *poia* on account of their organization and fulfillment of a single function (F3), but they are without a *poiotēs* “for there is no tenor in them, since a quality or a tenor is never found in separated substances which have no inherent union with each other” (F4). Now, this passage does not *say* that the Stoics recognize *poia* without a *poiotēs* in defense of common sense; in fact it does not say anything about why the Stoics make this distinction. Simplicius is just saying that this is how the Stoics *could* object to Aristotle’s equating the qualified thing with the quality (F1). By their calling qualities *hekta*, or havable, and restricting havables to unified things, which exclude things like ships and armies (F2), but still recognizing ships and armies as *poia* because they are enduringly differentiated (F3), the Stoics can say that there are *poia* without a *poiotēs* (F4). It is not explicit from the immediate context what motivates the Stoics to recognize *poia* without a *poiotēs*, but we can easily see a common-sense distinction to be made between armies and organic unities.

The other passage attesting to the Stoic commitment to *poia* without a *poiotēs* (E) is similarly neutral (or uninformative) about why exactly they make such a distinction, telling us only that they are not one and the same because the Stoics recognize three senses of “*poion*” and only the narrowest corresponds to a *poiotēs*. Here again, however, we find a common-sense point being made, namely that not every state (*schesis*) of unifying *pneuma* is a quality, but only those that are stable and enduring. Running or being on guard do not correspond to qualities because they are fleeting and thus not sufficiently stable. In the first case we saw that there is no unifying *pneuma* in ships or armies that could be in a state of intrinsic suchness; in this case there *is* a unifying *pneuma*, but fleeting processes and non-enduring states of that *pneuma* do not rise to the level of a quality. Thus running is not a quality, not because there is no body to play the role, but because running is too transient a state to be a quality. The question might remain, why be strict about qualities and permissive about qualified individuals? Why pull the *poion* and the *poiotēs* apart? Perhaps it is a nod to Plato: to the Friends of the Forms, an acknowledgment that qualities are indeed something special, *beings* rather than *becomings*; and against the Late Learners, a permissiveness about predication that makes many out of one without violating the unity of the individual.

An answer to this question can only be speculative, and I do not claim to have answered it, but I do hope to have made the case that we are not on solid ground in seeing the recognition of *poia* without a *poiotēs* as a failure to corporealize the

going subject-inherence model. In fact, there is a clear narrative according to which the recognition of *poia* without a *poiotēs* is a successful *departure* from such a model, and questions about whether the virtues are *poia* or *pōs echonta* is no doctrinal crisis but a natural debate to arise. What makes something F is that its substance (i.e. body, corpulence) is in a certain state or condition. These states come in different degrees of stability; only the most stable states become qualities. Because virtues are stable states of soul, they earn the status of qualities, but they are still and always states of the *idiōs poion*, and on that score the virtues are more naturally conceived of as *pōs echonta* (more like the fist to a hand than the hand to its corpulence). So perhaps there was an active debate over which way to go with the virtues—whether to classify them as *poia* because of the stability of the condition, or as *pōs echonta*, reflecting the metaphysical fact of their being states of the *idiōs poion*, which is to say *poia pōs echonta*. From this perspective, there is no innovation in Chrysippus saying that the virtues are both *poia* and *pōs echonta*.

Further, when Chrysippus invokes the *idiōs poion* to secure the unity of the virtues, he is not thereby assigning the virtues to one Category or the other (or making the virtues either self-qualifying or themselves *idiōs poia*); he is rejecting Aristo's extrinsic construal in favor of an intrinsic suchness reading, but that does not engage with whether the virtues are *poia* as opposed to *pōs echonta*. The debate between Aristo and Chrysippus over the unity of the virtues does not turn on which Category the virtues go in; their debate is over the unity of the virtues, and whether they are so strongly unified that they are only many by being relative (*pros ti*), or whether they are many by being intrinsically differentiated states of the soul. In fact, Aristo's *relative state or condition* (*pros ti schesis*) need not even refer to the fourth Category (*pros ti pōs echon*), and Chrysippus' *qualitative variations of their own substances* need not make them *poia*. Thus a debate over how to classify the virtues is not clearly in evidence between Aristo and Chrysippus. And to the extent that one thinks it is, it can be counted as a victory for common sense, recognizing an intuitive difference between fleeting and stable states. Furthermore, we can explain why there is evidence in both directions, for the virtues both as *poia* and as *pōs echonta*. As states of soul, the virtues are *pōs echonta*—they are states of an *idiōs poion* (and not directly of the *hupokeimenon*). On the other hand, as highly stable states of soul, they are *poia*—they are sufficiently stable to move over to the *poion* Category.

I rest here my case against the developmental strain of interpretation. I have systematically resisted the assumptions and reasoning behind such interpretations, and offered a simpler account that does not find the Stoics constantly working and re-working their theories in response to fatal blows from their critics. I find, instead, an interesting and fruitful dialectical exchange between the Stoics and their critics, and a view worthy of consideration in its own right.

Conclusions

What, then, are the Stoic Categories, and where does my account fall on the gamut of interpretations with which we began in Chapter 7? As a nested one-to-one mereological schema, with each Category constituting the next in the manner of clay to statute, and hand to fist, the Categories are best characterized as meta-physical aspects. They are not semantic entities, either as grammatical or reference classes, or as *lekta*. The texts have not given us any reason to suppose the Categories are a theory of meaning or reference; they are never referred to as what is signified (*sēmainomena*), as what is true or false, or with reference to the rational impression, nor do we find any grammatical vocabulary in our reports about the Categories. In fact, the semantic line of interpretation relies on taking the second Category as quality (*poiotēs*) to build a shaky bridge to a grammatical context (DL 7.58 (33M)). But we have seen that this interpretive move is not licensed—the second Category is the qualified individual, e.g. Socrates, not the quality.

Nor are the Categories an ontological schema delineating different kinds of Something, or dialectical divisions according to genus and species. Although they are explanatory of many ways of being F and do in some sense represent different kinds of body, the Categories are not coordinate species of a genus the way that place, void, time, and *lekta* are species of incorporeal; they are, rather, successive and inclusive strata of every individual body. This is where it is important to remember that the language of “categories” and “genera” is imposed by sources, commentators, and scholars making a comparison to Aristotle. To be Something is not to be some one of the Categories, but, rather, to be either a body or an incorporeal or what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; there is a taxonomy of Somethings, but the schema of the Categories is not that taxonomy. Indeed, the Categories are not related to each other as coordinate species of a genus. Thus, although Hadot and Long & Sedley are right to classify the Categories as kinds of *being (to on)* in contrast to *non-beings*, the Categories are not species of the genus body or *being* the way that place, void, time, and *lekta* are species of incorporeal. Rather, each is ontologically dependent on the prior Category as its substrate, so that the four are related successively and not coordinately. We can illustrate this distinction by Fig. 8.1 below.

This successive mereological relation, wherein each Category is inclusive of those that come before it, is also an ontological dependence relation; so this figure is also a grounding map for the Categories (but not for the incorporeals).⁵⁸ The statue depends for its existence on the clay, just as the fist depends for its existence on the hand. But for all that, the Categories do not undertake a building operation wherein composite wholes_c are constructed out of several parts, as in

⁵⁸ Like the grounding map given in the cosmology (Chapter 6); see Introduction, n. 7, for Schaffer on flat, sorted, and ordered ontologies, where the ordered ontology is illustrated by a grounding map.




Fig. 8.1 Successive vs. Coordinate Relations

the cosmology. Instead, the Categories take an individual, once unified and built, as input and offer an analysis in terms of constitution. This is a case of Proper Parthood without remainder, in contrast to the composition of one thing (a *composite* whole_c) out of many. We can capture this variety of ontological dependence with Kathrin Koslicki's notion of a Real Definition, which deals in entities rather than facts and propositions, and gives not only necessary and sufficient conditions, but is explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.⁵⁹ Each definition makes reference to its essential constituent, capturing its dependence on the prior category; in the case of the *hupokeimenon*, of course, there is no essential constituent or dependence relation, only an identity to be expressed.

- A substrate (*hupokeimenon*) = the total corporeal substance (*ousia*) of a *pneuma*-matter composite; one by a quantitative *perigraphē*.⁶⁰
- A qualified individual (*poion*) (Φ) =_{Real Def.} a substrate (*hupokeimenon*) (Ψ) in a lifelong qualitative state of being of a certain kind, whether common (e.g. being human) or unique (e.g. being Socrates); one by a qualitative *perigraphē*.

⁵⁹ Koslicki, "Varieties," even though she does not accept Proper Parthood without remainder, instead embracing Supplementation as the impetus for positing form as itself a constituent. See n. 44 above for suggestions about how Stoic constitution could solve the smile-mouth case, which does not fit neatly into either Koslicki's Constituent Dependence or Feature Dependence; I suggest that with the distinction between composition and constitution the Stoics recognize two kinds of Constituent Dependence: Proper Parthood with and without remainder, and that the smile-mouth relation is a straightforward case of the latter. Though this latter kind of parthood won't be welcome to Koslicki, it is an interesting option for contemporary metaphysicians to consider, and this difference poses no barrier to using her notion of a Real Definition, on which see Introduction.

⁶⁰ Reference to the *pneuma*-matter composite serves merely to pick out the *hupokeimenon* in question, like a rigid designator, and does not make reference to anything more basic on which the *hupokeimenon* depends, as made clear by the case of the clay that survives being a horse, a lump, and then a dog; the composite thus does not figure in the definition as an essential constituent of the definiendum.

- An individual disposed (*pōs echon*) (Φ) =_{Real Def.} a qualified individual (*poion*) (Ψ) in a certain state or disposition, e.g. Socrates wise, running, singing; one by a qualitative *perigraphē*.
- An individual relatively disposed (*pros ti pōs echon*) (Φ) =_{Real Def.} an individual disposed (*pōs echon*) (Ψ) in relation to something else external to it, e.g. Socrates being a father, an accomplice, or to the left of Simmias; one by a qualitative *perigraphē*.

Thus, returning to the gamut of interpretations, the Categories are not semantic entities or coordinate species of an ontological taxonomy. Nor are they related to each other either as the two parts of a composite whole, or as one subpart to a composite whole, as the physical interpretation holds. This schema is not tasked with explaining what makes something one or unified. The Categories play no role in Stoic cosmology, and they do not correspond to substance and quality, matter and *pneuma*, or the *archai*. Rather, this schema takes an individual once built (“each of us”) as its input, and it is tasked with explaining its identity conditions, kinds, and qualities—everything except the unity! It offers a four-fold mereological analysis, in entirely corporeal terms, of what makes that thing qualified in the various ways that it is, from the most stable to the most fleeting. And as such, it is a part of Stoic logic, not physics. What I mean in placing the Categories in logic is not that there is evidence of a formal branch of logic devoted to mereology, but that the Growing Argument and the various sophisms with which it is akin are squarely in logic and that the distinction between the Categories, not being available to perception, are logical distinctions. What I mean in denying that the Categories are a part of Stoic physics is that they play no role in the cosmology, in the workings of the *archai*, elements, *pneuma*, etc. The vocabulary of the Categories is absent in our evidence about the workings of the cosmos; it appears nowhere in Diogenes’ list of topics in Stoic physics, for example (DL 7.132 (43B, passage A/Chapter 9)), and Chapters 3–6 on body, blending, the *archai*, and the cosmogony all proceed without it. But there is of course a sense in which everything is physics for the Stoics, since there is just this one physical world for them. In that sense, I wouldn’t want to deny that the Categories are part of physics. But I would prefer to say that the Categories are central to Stoic *physicalism* as described in the Introduction, but not strictly speaking a part of Stoic physics.

Thus it is clear that the Categories are metaphysical aspects of a body once built, and that they are a distinct explanatory enterprise from the cosmology. The Categories explain what makes a given body be unique, what makes it persist as that unique individual through change, and what makes it be qualified in the many and sundry ways that it is. Understanding the Categories this way solves many interpretive difficulties. It explains the talk of several substrates (*hupokeimena*) as vocabulary that conveys the nested one-to-one constitution relation between all the Categories, dissolving worries about why the Stoics would need more than one

subject of change and offering a univocal sense of the term that applies to the whole schema (not just the first two Categories). The aspects view also explains what it means to say that each of us is four distinct bodies with all the same physical properties and indistinguishable to perception. By Leibniz's Law each Category is distinct from the next (or prior), as exemplified by the persistence conditions of a lump of clay in contrast to the statues it constitutes, and there is no reason to expect these bodies to be distinguishable by perception. A tree and its molecules are no more distinguishable by perception than a hand and the fist it constitutes. Further, once the Categories are recognized as metaphysical aspects, complaints about unnecessary proliferation and indiscernibility are dissolved.

With respect to the *idiōs poion*, this line of interpretation also dissolves the tension scholars have found between uniqueness and persistence. The Stoics are not saying that there is some isolated quality, like a mole or birthmark, or some collection of qualities that could never be, at once, sufficiently unique to individuate and sufficiently generic to persist. On the contrary, there is a maximally specific quality present everywhere in every individual from life to death, and thus not something like a mole (or collection of qualities) that could be lost or gained, nor anything that could be qualitatively identical to any other.⁶¹ Socrates' uniqueness is pervasive, present everywhere and written all over him, regardless of what other properties might come and go over the course of his lifetime. Thus the uniqueness and persistence of the *idiōs poion* are not in tension with each other, but of a piece—the qualified individual is everywhere both unique and unchanging in its uniqueness from birth to death.

This reading of the Categories also avoids the developmental strain of interpretation, which casts the Stoics as thinkers on their heels, stumbling backward into their theory. Recognizing *poia* without a *poiōtēs* does not show that the Stoics were struggling to find bodies to fit the subject-inherence mold, nor is there reason to think that the Stoics were trying to avoid cramming two bodies into the same place by their mereology, and then dodging new charges of monism with further innovations. The Stoics are not swinging to and fro, responding first to charges of dualism by making the Categories not different from each other, and then to charges of monism by making them not the same; being neither the same nor different is a single mereological commitment, evident already in Plato, so the Stoics are not likely to have stumbled upon it piecemeal. Further, the dialectic reported between the Stoics and the Academics is more plausibly understood along

⁶¹ Which is why it is perfectly coherent for the Stoics to maintain, in their doctrine of everlasting recurrence, that individuals are numerically identical from one world order to the next even when there are small differences between them, e.g. if Dion previously had moles and now does not (Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 180,33–181,25 (52F, passage F/Chapter 11)). Identity across worlds is not determined by Leibniz's Law, nor is that the criterion of persistence within each world; the identity conditions are qualitative in the sense that this quality cannot change, but not in the sense that all qualities of the individual must remain the same. More on everlasting recurrence in Chapter 11.

philosophical lines, as the narrative of their doctrinal disagreements, rather than historically, as a series of Stoic innovations in response to fatal Academic blows. Mentions of individual Stoics are not necessarily reports of theoretical innovation, doctrinal development, or internal disagreement.

And the story is not, for all that, less interesting. The Stoics offer a compelling philosophical alternative to their predecessors and peers, which explains what makes something F in entirely corporeal terms: the constitution of one body by another. And once we see this about the Categories, that it is a constitution relation, we can see that it is a distinct explanatory enterprise from what we find in the cosmology, which proceeds not by constitution but rather by the composition of one thing (the cosmos) out of many (the two *archai*). These two explanatory enterprises are not in competition, or even in cooperation with each other over any shared explanandum; rather, they are complementary accounts answering to a division of corporealist labor between physics and logic. The corporealist cosmology is one thing, proceeding from two fundamental principles (*archai*), through the four elements, then *pneuma* and matter, to the composition of the cosmos and all individuals in it by the through and through blending of agent and patient. The Categories are another thing, proceeding in entirely different terms from a given individual, once composed, to a four-fold mereological analysis of its identity conditions, kinds, and qualities—what makes it F in all the ways that it is.

Returning to the theme of Plato's *Sophist* introduced in Chapter 1, we can see how the schema of the Categories responds to Plato's third challenge, *Reform the Giants*, and dare to corporealize the virtues (and qualities generally) instead of being either eliminative like the original Giants, or too ashamed to corporealize like the hypothetically civilized Giants. This challenge is represented by the Friends of the Forms in the Battle of Gods and Giants, who demand an account of the virtues and insist that they are incorporeal Forms. The path not taken by the Giants in the *Sophist* is the Stoic path, to corporealize the virtues, and qualities generally. To be F is to be a body (whether the *hupokeimenon*, the *poion*, the *pōs echon*, or *pros ti pōs echon*) in a certain state or condition. The Stoics thereby resist, at once, the savage eliminativism of the untamed Giants and the dispirited concessions of the civilized Giants, and emerge as fully rehabilitated Sons of the Earth.

In addition to (ii) *Defending the Giants*, and (iii) *Reforming the Giants*, the Stoics also respond to Plato's challenge (iv) *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, hear the children's wish, and make being capable of both rest and change. They do so with what I will now call the dynamic stability of body, which we have in fact already seen, both in Stoic physics, in the metaphysics of what it is to be a body, and in logic, with the Categories. Recall that body as such, i.e. as finite solid three-dimensional extension, is completely malleable; it has no shape, size, density, or determinate quality per se, yet it is always of some definite size and shape or other.

Nevertheless, although it is subject to this kind of qualitative flux, it remains identical so long as it has no body added to or taken away from it—for body qua body, constitution is identity. This is one way, then, in which the Stoics are able to say that *being* (body) is both in motion and at rest: a certain lump or mass of body is at rest, i.e. remains the same lump, so long as no portion of body is either added to or subtracted from it; it is in motion in every other regard, qualitatively. The other sense in which being is both in motion and at rest is that the uniquely qualified individual (*idiōs poion*) is subject to growth and diminution (it undergoes quantitative change) but cannot change in its uniqueness (it is qualitatively at rest); it undergoes all the opposites of the *hupokeimenon*. The Stoic response to the children's plea thus delivers the seemingly impossible twice over: that being should be, at once, both in motion and at rest. A body at rest quantitatively (body as such and the *hupokeimenon*, because it is body as such) can be in motion qualitatively, and a body at rest qualitatively (the *idiōs poion* and the *koinōs poion*) can be in motion quantitatively (subject to growth and diminution). Stoic corporealism is thus no crude insistence that only bodies *are*, but a reasoned commitment to body as *being*.

The Stoic Categories also respond to Plato's fifth challenge, *Silence the Late Learners*, and say how one thing can be both one and called many, e.g. how a person can be one "even when we name him several things, that is when we apply colors to him, shapes, sizes, defects, and virtues" (*Sophist* 251 A 8–B 3). As we have seen, Stoic virtues and qualities generally are not to be understood like so many pebbles in an urn, which might well risk making each thing a collection or plurality. The move from one Category to the next is not a matter of adding any entity to what was there before, risking plurality. For example, the move from clay (*hupokeimenon*) to statue (*poion*) does not involve the addition of anything to the *hupokeimenon*; indeed, that is why this is described as a case of generation by alteration. Nor, likewise, does the hand receive anything new in order to constitute a fist. Each one of us is indeed indefinitely many Fs, and body now includes many more entities than ever before; hence Brunschwig's description of the Categories as an "inflationist somatology" is entirely apt. Not only are the virtues and all qualities now considered bodies rather than incorporeal Forms, the Stoics can even admit wittiness in addition to the wit, and a swarm of other virtues. But the permissiveness of the Categories in no way jeopardizes the unity of the individual; indeed the unified individual is the starting point of this analysis, and the *idiōs poion* serves as the single substrate to its swarm of qualified individuals.

Just as the predicational challenge of the Late Learners (to make many out of one) serves as a bookend to the physical challenge posed to the Presocratics (to make one out of many), so does the Stoics' inflationist somatology stand in complement to their corporealist cosmology. The distinctness of these enterprises, and hence the Stoic division of labor between physics and logic, has not been

appreciated in the literature, and this blind spot has obscured our understanding of Stoic corporealism. These complementary explanatory enterprises together give substance to the commitment that only bodies *are* or have *being*: first insofar as body is fundamental and the cosmology proceeds in entirely corporeal terms, and second, insofar as nothing is left out of account, the schema of the Categories succeeds in corporealizing not only the soul and its virtues, but qualities generally.

SECTION III

INCORPOREALS

ἄσῶματα
asōmata

This section takes us into a new dimension of Stoic physicalism. It argues that the Stoic incorporeals (*asōmata*)—space, time, and the *lekta*, or sayables—are all dependent on body. In contrast to bodies, which *exist*, Stoic incorporeals are said to *subsist* (*huphestanai*, have *hupostasis*). Chapter 9 argues that this *subsistence* consists in the incorporeals inheriting their spatial, temporal, and semantic properties from underlying body. Chapter 10 makes the case for the dependence of the spatial incorporeals: place, room, surface, and void all inherit their extension from the body or bodies on which they depend. Chapter 11 makes the case for time, which depends on the world’s motion, and Chapter 12 for the *lekta*, which depend for their *subsistence* on rational impressions (themselves bodies). This univocal dependence of the incorporeals on body yields a sophisticated one-world metaphysics that orders its incorporeal and corporeal entities into grounded and ungrounded kinds, dependent and fundamental, rather than sorting them into contrary kinds, as Plato does. The Stoics are thus early non-reductive physicalists.

The Incorporeals, A Grounded Account

οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται¹

Like Plato's hypothetically civilized Giants in the *Sophist*, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Stoics do embrace certain incorporeals. However, unlike Plato's Giants, the Stoics are not merely agreeing to Forms out of shame and giving up on their one-world principles. Rather, the Stoic incorporeals are spatiotemporal entities dependent on body for their *subsistence*, like the flow of traffic depends on cars for its qualities. This dependence is what makes the Stoic response to Plato's *Sophist* so much deeper than has so far been appreciated. In this I go beyond, and in important ways depart from, Jacques Brunschwig's views, arguing as I do for a hierarchical, ordered ontology that grounds all *non-existent* Somethings in two fundamental bodies, the Stoic principles (*archai*).² So in recognizing the incorporeals as Something, the Stoics are already being inclusive, meeting challenge (vi) represented by the Battle itself, but by grounding them in body they rise to the most difficult challenge, (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and say what is naturally united, at once, with both bodies and incorporeals to which one can look in saying that both are.³ This is the physicalist challenge to say what relation, what common account there could ever be, for things as different as bodies and incorporeals.

This challenge is not addressed by the thin ontological criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* described in Chapter 2. As ontological criteria they are practically silent on what it is to be a body as opposed to an incorporeal (or what is neither corporeal

¹ Nemesius 81,6–10 (45D, passage Cbelow).

² I go beyond Brunschwig, *TGS*, which has certain traces of sympathy for the view that incorporeals are dependent on bodies, and I depart from "Stoic Metaphysics," which treats the incorporeals as independent entities, thus yielding a merely sorted ontology still compatible with a two-worlds interpretation. I oppose Brunschwig altogether in rejecting the class of Not-Somethings, which I will address in Section V. See Introduction for a discussion of Quinean counting as well as grounding and the distinction between ordered, sorted, and flat ontologies.

³ The Stoics will not say that both *are* since they reserve *being* for bodies, but the spirit of the challenge, to give a one-world account of bodies and incorporeals, is just as well captured by saying what they have in common such that both alike are Something, and among what there is. Recall that this question does not arise for Brunschwig, *TGS*, 60, who takes the move to two ontological criteria to be the Stoics' way of sidestepping the question of what bodies and incorporeals have in common; nor does it arise for Alessandrelli, "Qualcosa," 17–9, who takes *subsistence* as just an ontological marker to indicate that the incorporeals are something more than nothing.

nor incorporeal).⁴ So the challenge to give a one-world metaphysics still stands. It is the challenge to give, in addition to the ontological criteria, also the metaphysical principles by which the inclusive Giants can coherently admit incorporeals into what there is. If the Stoic incorporeals are dependent on body, inheriting their very *subsistence* and all their properties from body, then the Stoics successfully deliver a one-world metaphysics or, in other words, non-reductive physicalism.

My next task will be to argue that the Stoics do indeed offer such a hierarchical account of their entities. I will argue that the Stoics are both counting their incorporeals and grounding them in body, and that there is a univocal principle of incorporeal *subsistence* according to which all incorporeals inherit their spatial, temporal, or semantic characteristics from the underlying body on which they depend. Only then do we have anything like a complete response to the Battle of Gods and Giants. What is naturally united with bodies and incorporeals at once is that they are physical, and what they have in common is their being spatiotemporal individuals. Thus bodies meet the ontological criterion for particularity, i.e. they pass the *Outis* test described in Chapter 2 straightforwardly: *If Socrates is in Athens, then he is not in Megara*. But the incorporeals also pass this test, because they inherit their properties (and hence their particularity) from the bodies on which they depend. The fact that the incorporeals are grounded in body explains *why* they count as Something.

This is how the Stoic response goes beyond ontological criteria that count things in or out (and avoids the question of what they have in common), to metaphysical principles that say what it is to be a thing of each kind, and thus how and why each one is an individual Something in the physical world. More specifically, Stoic metaphysics shows how incorporeal entities can be intelligible and incapable of contact, and yet be a part of this one and only physical world: by grounding them in body so that everything there is (everything that is Something) is either a body that *exists*, or Something that depends on body for its *subsistence*. Far from a two-worlds metaphysics that sorts its entities into contrary kinds, the Stoics offer a hierarchical, one-world account that orders its entities into grounded and ungrounded kinds, dependent and fundamental; and these kinds are not contrary to each other. This ontological dependence gives substance to Stoic corporealism and principle to their recognition of incorporeals—in contrast to Plato’s hypothetically civilized Giants who fold in the face of the virtues and straightaway admit Forms to their ontology, then abandon their commitment to body as *being* by agreeing to the *dunamis* proposal. Herein lies the unity of Stoic metaphysics, in the equilibrium

⁴ I say “practically silent” because the *subsistence* criterion is a spatiotemporal criterion and hence not *entirely* silent on the question of physicalism; nevertheless, it is compatible with a sorted ontology that is not hierarchically ordered and does not seek to connect the kinds of Something to each other, and to that extent it does not really give a common explanatory account of its entities. *That* both count as Something does not yet tell us *why* they count as Something, or what it is to be Something. In the case of *existence*, the criterion is causal, requiring contact, and hence not *entirely* silent either, but again the *dunamis* proposal does not speak to whether body is metaphysically fundamental (ungrounded) or, rather, dependent (grounded).

between counting and grounding that yields a sophisticated non-reductive physicalism with an ordered ontology grounded in body.

Interpretive Landscape

The gamut of interpretations of Stoic incorporeals attests to the plasticity of Stoic philosophy when so little evidence remains. This is no fine-grained debate over the details of an otherwise agreed-upon orthodoxy about Stoic incorporeals.⁵ The accepted canon of Stoic incorporeals includes place (*topos*), void (*kenon*), time (*chronos*), and sayables (*lekta*, roughly the meanings of our words) (SE, *M.* 10.218 (27D), 10.234; Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1116B–C (Einarson & DeLacy)). Scholars agree that these four entities are all considered incorporeal, and that all incorporeals are incapable of causal contact and interaction (Cicero, *Acad.* 1.39 (45A, passage A/Chapter 2); Nemesius 78,7–9,2 (45C), 81,6–10 (45D); SE, *M.* 8.263 (45B)), but little else goes uncontested. For instance, there is debate over whether there are only these four, or whether they have an open-ended list of incorporeals that includes room and surface. There is also disagreement about whether the canonical four are coordinate species of incorporeal, or whether the *lekta* are privileged in some way, perhaps even as the genus of the other incorporeals so that space and time are no longer physical but ideal entities. And there is debate about the term “*subsistence*,” whether it is just a label to indicate that the incorporeals (though *non-existent*) are not nothing at all, or whether it signals something more about their ontological status, either that they are ontologically independent of body,

⁵ Many commentators do not see (or seek) any univocity to the category of incorporeals. So, for example, many scholars see some incorporeals as dependent entities, and others as independent—but which ones those are and what that means for Stoic theory will vary from interpreter to interpreter, e.g. Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 314–21, denies that *lekta* are Something, and takes void and (probably) place to be absolute, while time is dependent; Powers, “Void and Space,” 430, likewise takes void as independent and thus the outlier; Drozdek, “Infinity,” 405–8, takes void to be independent but time to be dependent; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 92, indicates that time is “an accompaniment of change, not something with an independent being of its own” but does not treat the other incorporeals (except to mention void and say it is less interesting than time); Isnardi Parente, “Incorporel,” sees an exclusive divide between incorporeals that are physical (time, place, and void) and the *lekta*, which are purely logical or semantic, and sees this divide as fatal to Stoic theory; S. White, “Posidonius,” 49, 52, takes void, limits, and time to be dependent on bodies as real and objective parameters of being but does not address place or *lekta*. More typically, commentators treat the *lekta* without attention to the other incorporeals, e.g. Kahn, “Logic and LOGOS,” takes the *lekta* to be Fregean thoughts (I do not include here Bobzien, “Frege Plagiarized the Stoics,” because she explicitly sets aside the ontological considerations); D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” sees the *lekta* as laws of nature guaranteeing the coherence of the cosmos; Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 22–7, “Stoic logic,” 95, and M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” take the *lekta* as facts or states of affairs, as do Barnes, “Meaning,” “Meaning, Saying and Thinking”; J.-B. Gourinat, *Dialectique*, “Causes de prédicats,” “Stoic dialectic,” “Ontology and Syntax”; A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics.” A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 132, 138, 161, “Language and Thought,” and “Stoic psychology and language,” advocates a view of the *lekta* as mind-dependent, but is non-committal as to the status of the other incorporeals; he tempers his commitment to mind-dependence in “Representation and the Self.” The list of views I present in the main text to provide the interpretive landscape is limited to those who pursue a univocal account of the incorporeals.

or codependent, or dependent on body. The most basic dispute, however, is over what the incorporeals even are.

On one side of the interpretive spectrum, the incorporeals are considered conditions of intelligibility, existence, and possibility for the corporeal cosmos, and thus ontologically independent entities that the Stoics could not corporealize, or do without. David Sedley, for example, says: “incorporeals provide the dimensions within which bodily movement can occur, and must *therefore* themselves be independent of body.”⁶ On this reading, then, the incorporeals are metaphysically independent entities, and “Stoic physics goes much of the way with Epicureanism on this point.”⁷ Marcelo Boeri, seemingly in agreement with Sedley (but not explicitly engaged with him on this point), says that the incorporeals are “fundamental to constituting the realm of the existent,” and has suggested that bodies and incorporeals are therefore on equal ontological footing, indeed that they depend on each other for their ontological standing.⁸ For Boeri, the incorporeals are the temporal, locative, and linguistic determinations of bodies, and their inseparability is a testament to their ontological codependence.

For Ada Bronowski, likewise, bodies and incorporeals are interdependent: “existence and subsistence are parallel and correlated modes of reality [. . .] that is to say, things cannot exist without other things subsisting and vice versa.”⁹ The incorporeals are thus co-constitutive of reality, because of their ontological status as *subsistent*.¹⁰ But their ontological status as incorporeals is what makes them independent, in the manner of Plato’s Forms: “As incorporeal items, the independent status of the Ideas is reinterpreted as the Stoic incorporeals, characterized by their independent ontological status outside the mind and in reality.”¹¹ This reinterpretation consists in putting the incorporeals on an ontological par with bodies, rather than above them.¹² Further, Bronowski argues that the incorporeals are independent because of “the particular status and role of the incorporeals in the Stoic *syntēma* which determines the kind of relation there is between the bodies

⁶ Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 400, my emphasis; for agreement on this point see Brunschwig “Stoic Metaphysics,” 249; Ju, “Geometrical Limits.”

⁷ Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 395–6; the qualification “much of the way” concerns disagreements only on the finer points of room. Brunschwig “Stoic Metaphysics,” 212–9, also finds unity in the category of incorporeals in their being “incorporeal although ‘objective’ conditions, without which the interaction of bodies in the world would neither be analyzable nor fully intelligible.” Drozdek, “Infinity,” 405–8, takes void to be an entirely independent, actual infinity, “like a receptacle of matter; it is a precondition of the expansion during conflagration,” place to be “a finite part of an infinite void,” and the finitude of the world to somehow depend on infinity of void, but takes time to be dependent on motion, like a shadow, and *more* incorporeal than void because it is not a precondition for the actuality of the cosmos.

⁸ Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals,” 729.

⁹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 339; cf. 330–1.

¹⁰ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 167–9, 225.

¹¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 166; I am skeptical that the Stoics would have thought this was a job that needed filling.

¹² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 166–9.

and the incorporeals such as to result in the cosmic structure.”¹³ The idea, if I have understood it correctly, is that the *systema* is the connective structure of the world, and because “the existence and identity of the components is solely determined by their place within the structure they constitute,” the incorporeals must be “at least minimally real,” where real means mind-independent and thus independent full stop.¹⁴ Further, because of the role and structure of the *systema*, there have to have been four and only these four incorporeals, not an open-ended list and not a developing or changing list of incorporeals.¹⁵

A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, taking a different path to independence, see the incorporeals as Meinongian subsistents that have character (*Sosein*) but not existence; thus, they are Something (because they have character) but do not *exist* (because they are not corporeal).¹⁶ This Meinongian suggestion seems to be motivated by an interest in finding a place for figments of the imagination, like centaurs and giants, which Long & Sedley classify as neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Unfortunately, the suggestion of Meinongian subsistence is not ultimately compatible with saying that time has no actual independence apart from the world’s motion; nor with saying that a centaur has no independent existence from someone’s mental image. Indeed, apart from the broad suggestion of Meinongian subsistence as non-existent reality, Long & Sedley offer rather a variegated account of the incorporeals, taking the *lekta* to be mind-dependent, abstract entities in logical contexts but to *subsist* objectively in causal contexts as the effects of causes;¹⁷ place, on the other hand, is characterized as an abstraction from bodies, as presupposing bodies, and as depending solely on being occupied by body;¹⁸ while void is the spatial condition for the world’s changes in volume;¹⁹ and time is said to depend

¹³ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 260–1, cf. 166–7. There seems to be some tension between taking the incorporeals to be independent and taking them to be codependent; with respect to being co-constitutive of reality, if the idea is simply that the Stoics are realists about their incorporeals, and thus they are part of the furniture of reality, then I am on board; but if there is more to the story, as I suspect there is with claims about *systema*, I am no longer on board.

¹⁴ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 339, cf. 330–1. That they are at least minimally real is not only correct, it is the starting point of scholarly conversation about the status of the incorporeals; but it does not follow from their being real that the incorporeals are ontologically independent. Bronowski equates being real with being mind-independent and from there simply with being ontologically independent. But these are not equivalent notions. Not only do I resist defining what is real in terms of mind-independence, since many products of thought are nevertheless real and Something, e.g. the *lekta*, as I will argue; but even to the extent that mind-independence is the right way to understand being real, i.e. to the extent that nothing that is Something will depend on the mind of any one person, or require being thought about all the time by any mind, there is nothing about being mind-independent that makes something ontologically independent full stop; many things will be mind-independent, without being independent full stop, e.g. shadows, place, time, void.

¹⁵ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 276–86.

¹⁶ LS, 164–5, 199–200, 340. I do not italicize Meinongian uses of “subsistence” or “existence,” only Stoic uses.

¹⁷ LS, 164–5, 199–200, 340.

¹⁸ LS, 241, 296, and 307, respectively.

¹⁹ LS, 297.

solely on the existence of motion.²⁰ Long & Sedley are not concerned to give a unified theory of incorporeals, so the fluidity of their accounts is not necessarily a pressing difficulty for them, except insofar as it is unclear how the incorporeals could all come out as Meinongian entities.

Victor Caston, in a salutary discussion of Meinong and Meinongianism, offers some important qualifications to Long & Sedley's analysis, namely that an entity does not count as Meinongian just in virtue of being subsistent (i.e. subsistent entities are not the only Meinongian entities); rather, to be a Meinongian entity proper is to have character (attributes) *regardless* of ontological status (i.e. entities that neither exist nor subsist can still have attributes).²¹ Caston goes on to align the Stoic incorporeals with Meinongian subsistents (as opposed to Meinongian entities proper), taking them to be abstract entities that supervene on bodies, and noting (rightly) that their essential role in physics and logic shows the Stoics were not motivated by Meinongian considerations in positing them.²² Although Caston *does* think the early Stoics had Meinongian motivations in positing centaurs and giants, which were subsequently abandoned by Chrysippus, he does not think the Meinongian analysis (proper) applies to the incorporeals; the only sense in which the Stoic incorporeals are Meinongian is the sense in which Meinong saw abstracta as subsistent entities. These details and differences notwithstanding, I will take Long & Sedley and Caston together as representing a loosely Meinongian interpretation of the incorporeals as independent abstracta of some kind.

Finally, still on the side of independent abstracta, D. T. J. Bailey seeks "to show that the right model for the Stoics from the achievements in the philosophy of intentionality of the last two centuries comes from a later strand of this tradition," namely the work of Pavel Tichý.²³ According to Bailey, the Stoic incorporeals should be seen as offices or roles, such as the office of being the president of the United States or the role of being my watch. On this view, an incorporeal is "an immaterial object that sustains the same mode of being regardless of whether or not it is occupied, and regardless of which material object occupies or does not occupy it."²⁴ These offices are ontologically distinct from their occupiers in that they may or may not be filled, i.e. there may or may not be a hunk of metal that plays the role of being my watch, but in any event the offices themselves are the same and *subsist* independently across all possible worlds. Although Bailey embraces this Platonizing dimension of the account, and avows it as a goal to show that the Stoics were "more sympathetic to Platonism than has so far been appreciated," he nevertheless endeavors to show that the incorporeals are in some sense dependent on bodies.²⁵

²⁰ LS, 308.

²¹ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 152–4.

²² Caston, "Something and Nothing," 153–4, 208–10.

²³ Bailey, "Structure," n. 31.

²⁴ Bailey, "Structure," 262; cf. 277, 284.

²⁵ Bailey, "Structure," 277.

In particular, he identifies three ways of being: the *being* of bodies (captured by “*einai*”), the independent *subsistence* of incorporeals as offices (captured by “*huphestanai*”), and the actual obtaining of incorporeal offices when they are occupied (captured by “*huparchein*”); this latter obtaining is the means by which Bailey seeks to secure the dependence of the incorporeals on body.²⁶ Only when a spatial, temporal, or semantic office is occupied can it be said to be actual or obtain, and so incorporeals depend on bodies in order to obtain (have *huparxis*), although not in order to *subsist* (have *hupostasis*); further, although Bailey does not reduce the other incorporeals to *lekta* as some arguing for dependence do, he does ground the (weak) dependence of time, place, and void in the (strong) dependence of *lekta* on their deictic referents.²⁷ Bailey thus shares my objective to show that the Stoic ontology is ordered and not merely sorted; however, as I will object, his is not a case of genuine ontological dependence (indeed, the Platonizing dimension makes that impossible), and thus it is not a truly ordered ontology.²⁸

On the other side of the interpretive spectrum, the incorporeals are considered ontologically dependent. One account, introduced by Emile Bréhier, supported by Pasquale Pasquino, and recently revived by Wolfhart Totschnig, takes the incorporeals to be “surface effects at the limit of bodies,” a shadow’s existence, or something like the Doppler effect.²⁹ They are ontologically dependent in being the

²⁶ Bailey, “Structure,” 260–2, 268. I italicize “*being*” and “*subsistence*” because they are modes of being for the Stoics, and not “obtaining” because it is not a mode of being; see Chapter 12 for an analysis of *subsistence* and obtaining.

²⁷ The details of Bailey’s account are intricate. I can attempt a summary by saying that time, place, and void depend weakly on their occupying bodies, while the *lekta* have a strong dependence on their deictic referents (“Structure,” 282); the asymmetry of this weak-strong dependence grounds the further asymmetry of *lekta* as prior entities to time, place, and void, which are posterior because all incorporeals bring *lekta* with them but not vice versa (“Structure,” 277–8, 284). Place is the office of being the extension of matter in the world, which is occupied by whatever bodies there are in the world; void is a second-order office occupied (in a second sense of the term “occupy”) by places, namely the office of all and only contingently occupied offices (“Structure,” 269–76); time in turn is the temporal office occupied by all and only present motions (“Structure,” 265–6); and the *lekta* are semantic offices occupied by all and only actual events when they are true, e.g. “It is day” obtains when the body, day (the sun?), occupies the semantic office expressed by the words “It is day” (“Structure,” 266–9).

²⁸ Bailey, “Structure,” n. 47, where he avows the objective; cf. 284, where he belies the commitment to an ordered ontology by speaking of incorporeal offices that subsist “alongside their materialism.”

²⁹ Bréhier, *Théorie*; Pasquino, “Incorporels”; Totschnig, “Effects.” See also Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, 52, who embraces this account of the *lekton* as “an event that occurs at the periphery of the domain in which bodies act and are acted upon”; Lapidge, “ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα,” 264, who says, citing Bréhier, that “in so far as the ἀσώματον did not really exist it was said to be a λεκτόν: it existed in name but not in fact”; Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 165, who says: “The Stoics’ distinction between, on the one hand, the ἀσώματον as *lekton* and, on the other, body, is one of the most important features of their thought and simultaneously perhaps its most virulently anti-Platonic characteristic.” It is difficult to classify the view of Goldschmidt, *Système*: on the one hand his views seem somewhat like those of Bréhier et al., when he says the incorporeals, while differing in degrees of *non-existence*, are quasi-realities characterized by indeterminacy, i.e. an absence of limit, which they take on in being corporealized by bodies; they are conditions comparable to Bergson’s “retrograde movement” (26–8); on the other hand, at 43–4, he describes incorporeal subsistence as “an existence simply thought or in thought,” equating the past and future with predicates (incomplete *lekta*), which conjures the view of Christensen et al. (to be described in the next paragraph), which reduces all incorporeals to *lekta* construed as mental constructs; yet elsewhere (95) he aligns “incorporeal events” with auxiliary and

effects, events, or actions of body; however, crucially, this view equates these effects, and thus the incorporeals as a whole, with *lekta*. Thus time, place, and void are all themselves *lekta*, epiphenomenal facts at the surface of being, or actions and events at the periphery of bodies; as such, the incorporeals are said to have the ontological status of obtaining (*huparchein*), and they are said to *subsist* (*huphestanai*) when they are being thought about or apprehended. Here the incorporeals have an inferior ontological status, and even a derivative or dependent standing as the effects of bodies such that if there were no bodies, neither would there be their effects, events, or actions at their surface. This view, which was influential on Deleuze, is tricky to capture.³⁰ For our purposes here, the crucial point is that on this view the incorporeals are all reduced to *lekta*, which are understood as the epiphenomenal surface effects of bodies.

Another view on the side of dependence agrees that time, place, and void are all *lekta* but takes them to be constructs of the mind, our own impositions on reality rather than the objective intelligible effects of the world itself. Johnny Christensen, Andreas Graeser, and Gerard Watson all hold this view, seeing the incorporeals as “unreal” (and thus ontologically inferior to bodies) in being inherently subjective.³¹ As Watson puts it, the incorporeals are frames, or constructs of the mind that we impose to classify reality; these are our contribution to the world, and as such they are all mind-dependent *lekta*. Thus, according to Watson: place is an imaginary constant, and we talk *as if* there were really void; time is a useful division we make but still a mere construct of the mind; *lekta* are the connections that we establish in the world between it and us; and incorporeality generally is the intention to link word and object.³² So, on this view, the incorporeals are also reduced to *lekta*, but understood now as entirely subjective constructs of the mind, as opposed to Bréhier’s mind-independent surface effects. In both cases, though, time, place, and void are species of *lekta*.

However, as I will argue, it is not necessary to reduce all incorporeals to *lekta* in order to see how the incorporeals are ontologically dependent on body.³³ Another

proximate causes; in “Υπάρχειν et ὑφίστάσθαι,” Goldschmidt defends his view in *Système* that incorporeal *subsistence* is the mind-dependence of *lekta*, against Hadot, “ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ,” who argues that the incorporeals are all *lekta* understood as events, processes, or activities, in line with Bréhier; more on this when I address *hupostasis* and *huparxis* in Chapter 12 on the *lekta*.

³⁰ Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*. For valuable help in this area, see Lampe, “Kristeva, Stoicism, and the ‘True Life of Interpretations.’”

³¹ Christensen, *Unity*; Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, “Theory of Meaning”; Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, who also sees a Kantian bent to the Stoics.

³² Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 38–44; cf. Christensen, *Unity*, 46, where “non-corporeal” is equated with “non-objective,” and 26, where meanings (i.e. *lekta*) are significant but non-denoting; Graeser, “Theory of Meaning,” 94, where “incorporeal” is equated with “abstract,” and 99, where being incorporeal is parsed as indicating a meaning without any genuine denotation.

³³ Although the idea of dependence is not new, it has not been pursued as applicable to all the incorporeals as a class (apart from the views described above that reduce time, place, and void to *lekta* in one way or another). Alessandrilli, *Problema*, 117, suggests in passing that the incorporeals, inasmuch

interpretive option is available. Here, briefly, is the alternative account of the Stoic incorporeals and their *subsistence* that I will propose. To be an incorporeal is to be an intelligible entity, a non-sensory impressor (in contrast to bodies, which are perceived through contact with the senses, on which see Chapter 2) entirely dependent on body for its *subsistence*. I will capture this dependence with the phrase *body-less* (borrowed from Long & Sedley), emphasizing that these entities are not *a*-corporeal in the sense of being outside space and time in another world or realm like abstracta, but *in*-corporeal in the sense of being very much a part of this physical world.³⁴ To be *body-less* and to have incorporeal *subsistence* (*hupostasis*) is to inherit positive physical characteristics from underlying body. In particular, this inheritance will be a sort of lack or privation of body like, for example, the three-dimensional non-solid extension of place determined by its occupying body. Brunschwig seems to have had this intuition in saying that “if bodies, even while being divisible to infinity, possess a veritable and objective unity, the places they occupy ought to benefit derivatively from this unity, once this [sc. unity] is stripped of its properly physical aspects (i.e. those having to do with action and passion, and notably *antitupia*) that characterize it as the unity of this or that body.”³⁵

This idea of place, as benefitting derivatively from the unity of the body that occupies it, captures the sense of inheriting that I have in mind when I say that the incorporeals inherit their particularity from their grounding bodies. But it is not just metaphysical properties like unity and particularity that the incorporeals inherit, but also their physical and, in the case of *lekta*, semantic properties. Place inherits its defining characteristic, finite three-dimensional extension (*diastēma*), from its occupying (or delimiting) bodies; it has the size and shape that it does as a function of the solid three-dimensional extension of the bodies on which it depends. Thus that parking place is too small for this car, because of how close the

as they *subsist*, are dependent on body; but then, “Qualcosa,” 21–2, changes course and suggests the incorporeals, inasmuch as they *subsist*, are simply real rather than nothing at all. Brunschwig makes the suggestion in *TGS*, 94, in reference to place but does not pursue a unified account (indeed, his strategy is to identify a lack of univocity among the incorporeals, to show that the genus Something was developed in a theoretical vacuum and thus as a principled response to the Battle of Gods and Giants). Inwood, “Extension and the Void,” n. 25, says that *lekta*, place, and void “are somehow parasitic on bodies for their subsistence,” but also that “the Stoics need to say a good deal about this ‘subsistence’ and how it relates to existence”; he treats time as the odd one out, 265. Robertson, “Mathematical Objects,” 170, takes the canonical incorporeals and surface all to be “metaphysical consequences of bodies,” but is focused only on limits. Tieleman, “Posidonius on the Void,” 79–80 says that “the incorporeals have a ‘subsistence’ that is derivative from body, i.e. they are a kind of attribute that remains related to the cosmic mass,” citing the infinity of time and void as examples.

³⁴ LS, 200.

³⁵ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 94. He does not, however, see this intuition through; in fact, it seems in conflict with what he says about the void in *TGS* and is absent in “Stoic Metaphysics.” Note, in passing, that by placing unity and infinite divisibility in tension (“even while”), Brunschwig reveals the widespread presupposition that infinite divisibility involves antecedent parts that make up a body, i.e. that infinite divisibility is decomposition as I put it in Chapter 3.

surrounding cars are to each other. Void also inherits its defining characteristic, infinite three-dimensional extension, from the cosmos as a whole. It is empty space extending from the edge of the cosmos outward, with no other body to limit it; as such it is the absence of cosmos, where the cosmos is not. Thus, even the infinity of the void is inherited from the finite cosmos, insofar as neither it nor any other body limits the void. Chapter 10 will cover the spatial incorporeals.

Likewise, and in the same language as the spatial incorporeals, time is defined as the infinite extension (*diastēma*) of the world's motion; it too inherits its defining characteristic from the cosmos as a whole. This temporal extension or dimension of the world is the rate of world's motion, which is to say, corporeal motion deprived of the moving bodies. Here (in contrast to void) the infinity of time *is* inherited from the infinity of the world's motion; time is infinite because the world is infinitely recurring (Chapter 11). Finally, even the *lekta* fit this schema, inheriting their semantic content from rational impressions, which are themselves bodies. It is not rational impressions that get their content from *lekta*, but *lekta* that inherit their propositional content from rational impressions. Thus even the semantic dimension of the cosmos depends on body for its *subsistence* (Chapter 12).

On this reading, the term “*subsistence*” thus indicates a *modus essendi* or mode of being Something that is dependent on or grounded in body, and the *subsistence* of incorporeals in particular is an absence or lack of that body from which the incorporeal inherits its positive physical characteristics. This account is univocal for the incorporeals; even the *lekta* are spatiotemporal entities dependent on body for their *subsistence*. And, as I will argue in Section IV, this is not the only kind of *subsistence* the Stoics recognize; in addition to incorporeal *subsistence*, the Stoics also recognize *subsistence* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*), which is the mode of being Something that underwrites the third kind of Something, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. These entities, including idealized limits and creatures of fiction, will also inherit their properties and *subsistence* from underlying body insofar as they are products of thought that are spoken, illustrated, etc., portrayed in various ways among various communities.

Now, I recognize that talk of “inheriting” properties from an underlying body stripped or plucked (*dépuoillée*) of its corporeality (as we saw Brunschwig put it above) may not be perspicuous by itself and likely still has an air of metaphor. However, I prefer a neutral term whose ordinary sense I can embrace, instead of theory-laden terms that do not fit the bill and have the potential to mislead, e.g. “supervenience,” “emergence,” “epiphenomenalism,” and even the one I choose, “grounding.”³⁶ I would

³⁶ “Supervenience,” indicating a modal-existential analysis, fails to capture the asymmetry of ontological dependence; “emergence” may be the closest notion to incorporeal *subsistence*, but fails to capture the sense in which incorporeals result from a lack or privation of body; the incorporeals can certainly be called epiphenomenal in the sense that they cannot enter causal relations, however they are definitely capable of being impressors and they have important roles to play in the physical world. “Grounding” is fraught because it is often used to indicate a relation between propositions, facts, or states of affairs, which is not something I endorse for the Stoics.

like for the relevant sense of Stoic grounding to emerge from our analysis of the texts themselves in the following chapters, and so I will often choose the phrase “body-less” and the pre-theoretical term “inheriting” for the dependence of incorporeals as we find it in the texts, with as few connotations as possible.³⁷

However, since I do embrace the term “grounding” to characterize the body-less nature of the incorporeals, let me say something here about the precise sense I have in mind. Whereas the composition and constitution relations found in Stoic corporealism align roughly with what Kathrin Koslicki calls Constituent Dependence, it is her notion of Feature Dependence that applies to the incorporeals: Φ is Feature Dependent on Ψ just in case (i) Ψ is a constituent in a Real Definition of Φ , and (ii) Φ corresponds to a real feature of Ψ .³⁸ The relation of holes and boundaries to their hosts is useful in capturing the *subsistence* of Stoic incorporeals, which I have said is a certain lack or privation of body.³⁹ Koslicki captures this intuition as follows: “In the case of holes or boundaries, to speak of constituency at all seems a bit of a stretch. For to think of a hole, which after all marks the *absence* of cheese in a piece of Emmentaler cheese, as being a constituent of a piece of cheese would require quite an unusual notion of constituency, to say the least.”⁴⁰ She proposes to elucidate this kind of essential dependence “by availing ourselves of the notion of *abstraction*, without supposing that this notion must be given an explicitly epistemic construal.”⁴¹ This would involve, in the case of surface (and line), for example, taking the relevant body as a starting point and arriving at the two-dimensional surface (one-dimensional line) by blocking out all the other features present in the body that are not relevant to the surface (edge), notably its

³⁷ Perhaps it could be a certain isomorphism, as Ricardo Salles has suggested in correspondence, though not in the sense that Socrates and a picture of Socrates are isomorphic. Perhaps inheritance could be put in terms of overlapping properties, in the sense that body and its place will share the same size, and both be extended, as suggested by one of the referees; in that case one might wonder whether the body has incorporeal properties. However, this notion of overlap does not apply to inheritance as I am thinking of it: the body and its place are the same size because place gets its own size from the body, not because they literally share some one attribute or quality in common, like something that gets instantiated twice.

³⁸ Koslicki, “Varieties,” 209.

³⁹ The relation of tropes to their bearers (if they had to be accommodated) would fall under the constitution relation captured by the Stoic Categories; the work of universals would be split between the constitution relation of Categories (by the *koinōs poion*) and the role of concepts.

⁴⁰ Koslicki, “Varieties,” 208; cf. McDaniel, “Being and Almost Nothingness,” for a somewhat similar account of holes et al., i.e. absences with positive physical characteristics, rendered in terms of “ontological pluralism” and “being-by-courtesy” (in contrast to the “being-in” enjoyed by attributes); I worry that McDaniel’s degrees of being are too ecumenical (permissive, e.g., of possibilities, relations, Meinongian entities) to capture the narrower dependence of a genuinely ordered, physicalist ontology that I have in mind, and at the same time that it is too austere in taking being-by-courtesy as a reductive thesis; at the very least the accounts are mismatched in that Stoic incorporeals are certainly natural and no mere case of supervenience. For the material host as prior, see originally Lewis and Lewis, “Holes,” and also Casati & Varzi, *Holes and Other Superficialities*.

⁴¹ Koslicki, “Varieties,” 210, original emphasis. I find it difficult to work in terms of abstraction without falling into an epistemic construal, so I avoid using this terminology; in the spirit of the incorporeals as body-less, however, I welcome the idea, which is perhaps what S. White has in mind in “Posidonius.”

three-dimensionality. That the Stoics were live to the notion of privation is confirmed by Diogenes Laertius' reports that Chrysippus had a work on propositions (*axiōmata*) asserted in terms of privation (*sterēsis*) (7.190), and that being without hands is conceived of by privation (*sterēsis*) (7.53 (39D)), as well as by the fact that void is defined negatively as a lack (*erēmia*) of body (Aëtius 1.20.1 (SVF 2.504, passage A/Chapter 10)).

To illustrate the relevant notion, let's return to the case of the drill sergeant described by Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 8.409, passage D/Chapter 2). This text was relevant earlier in establishing that the Stoics recognize availability for thought and discourse as a logical measure of being Something—if the commanding faculty can be impressed *in relation to* (*epi*) a certain impressor (even if not *by* (*hupo*) it through contact with the senses), then it must be a proper object of thought and discourse, i.e. an intelligible Something. Now this text will help establish the respect in which the Stoic incorporeals are body-less. The drill sergeant's motions are themselves corporeal, and when he takes the boy's hands to teach him the drill he makes corporeal contact. But what is the model the sergeant provides such that it can be an impressor without making contact? It's not the motions of the body, since those are corporeal and make an impression by printing on the soul, like white and black and body in general. Rather, the model in relation to which the boy is impressed is a three-dimensional pattern of motion that arises from the sergeant's individual bodily motions, as the absence or privation of his corporeal motions. If the sergeant had not moved that way, there would be no model (or it would be a different model). Yet the model is still Something in its own right, with its properties inherited from the corporeal motions; the model is not reducible to any one of the sergeant's motions or to all of them collectively (just as the flow of traffic is not reducible to or nothing but the cars). It is neither the same as those motions, nor is it different (*heteron*), perhaps.

The notion of a Real Definition that Koslicki develops is also useful for capturing the nature of the incorporeals, holding that (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.⁴² This last feature speaks to the idea that what explains *why* the incorporeals meet the *subsistence* criterion is their being grounded in body; an ontological criterion might well provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being Something *subsistent*, generating the correct extension, and yet say nothing about *why* those entities count as Something. Counting without grounding can only yield a sorted ontology and by itself is all but mute on the score of Stoic physicalism. Koslicki's notion of a Real Definition that makes essential reference to the

⁴² Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201.

host, or grounding body, is thus welcome as an account of the asymmetrical ontological dependence relation that holds between bodies and the incorporeals.⁴³ According to this account, the Real Definition of the drill sergeant's jumping jack (say), would be as follows.

The jumping jack (Φ) =_{Real Def.} a non-solid, three-dimensionally extended pattern *subsisting* according to (Feature Dependent on) the motions of the drill sergeant (Ψ)

In the following three chapters on space, time, and the *lekta*, I will arrive at a Real Definition for each of the incorporeals, showing one by one that the incorporeals are all grounded in body in a univocal sense of *subsistence*. In the rest of this chapter I will focus on the incorporeals as a class, offering textual and linguistic evidence that the Stoics considered them ontologically dependent on body in the manner of Feature Dependence I have described.

Textual Evidence of Grounding

There are several passages, from a variety of contexts, that give us good reason to think that Stoic incorporeals—as a class—are dependent entities, that Stoic physics is metaphysically ordered, and that the one (and only) world to which bodies and incorporeals belong is the physical world. These passages could not by themselves be decisive; for that we need also to consult the evidence about each incorporeal. However, the following passages do give us good *prima facie* reason to think that the Stoics are grounding their class of incorporeals in body in pursuit of a one-world metaphysics. I begin with Diogenes' overview of Stoic physics:

- A. They [the Stoics] divide the account (*logos*) of physics into both (*te. . .*) the topic (*topos*) concerning bodies (*sōmata*) as well as (*. . . kai*) those concerning principles (*archai*), elements (*stoicheia*), gods (*theoi*), limits (*perata*), place (*topos*), and void (*kenon*). It is thus that they divide [the account of physics] specifically, on the one hand, as opposed to generically into three topics: that concerning the cosmos, that concerning the elements, and thirdly the topic giving an account of causation.

DL 7.132 (43B)

⁴³ As is the following way of capturing degrees of reality by McDaniel, "Being and Almost Nothingness," 633: "x is more real than y if (i) the mode of being of x has an n-placed logical form whereas the mode of being of y has an n+ m-placed logical form (n and m are positive integers) and (ii) all entities that have y's mode of being have being relative to some entity that has x's mode of being. The intuition behind this condition is that modes of absolute being are more real than modes of relative being, and if your mode of being is being relative to something else, then you can't be more real than that something else."

Scholars have puzzled over this division into specific and generic topics. Brunschwig, for example, suggests that the passage reveals the Stoics had not just one but two “metaphysics.”⁴⁴ The specific division covers those topics that belong, strictly speaking, to physics, but they are understandably seen as metaphysics insofar as they are all in some sense primary; in this regard, he suggests, the specific topics are like a *metaphysica specialis* concerned with those items that are ontologically or otherwise privileged. The generic division, on the other hand, he aligns with *metaphysica generalis*, or the study of ontology, cutting across logic, ethics, and physics.

Long & Sedley go the opposite way, observing that the “two divisions appear to have as their basis a distinction between physics and metaphysics (as it would now be called), with the ‘specific’ division covering the kind of topics that Aristotle regarded as the business of ‘first philosophy’ [. . . giving] an exhaustive account of the species of real things [. . . and detailing] those items which are fundamental to any understanding of the world in general and its features.”⁴⁵ For Long & Sedley, then, the specific division corresponds to Stoic ontology whole and is construed as counting *all* Somethings. Thus they organize the specific topics, as follows: (i) bodies, (ii) principles, (iii) elements, (iv) gods, and (v) non-bodies represented by limits, place, and void; the first four species are corporeal, listed in ascending order of complexity; the fifth, which they call non-bodily Somethings, completes the picture so that “there is nothing in the nature of things that this division omits.”⁴⁶ Because Long & Sedley are committed to a tripartite ontology that includes figments and limits as neither corporeal nor incorporeal Somethings, and they ask the specific topics of physics to give a complete ontology, they construe the last three topics (limits, place, and void) as *non*-bodily rather than as incorporeal. The second, generic division they say corresponds to physics proper, taking the present world order as its starting point, and offering “an account of natural phenomena, with some reference to general principles but nothing comparable to the scope of the ‘specific’ division.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 206–09, original scare quotes. For skepticism about Brunschwig’s division, see Gourinat, “Ontology and Syntax”; Mansfeld, “Essays on Stoicism”; Vogt, “Brutes.” For an account of DL’s report on Stoic physics pressed into service of a Platonic reading of limit as ratio, see Scade, “Cosmological Limits,” 150–4.

⁴⁵ LS, 267–8.

⁴⁶ LS, 268, where “non-bodily” stands in contrast to *incorporeal*. Hicks, *DL: Lives*, also makes the division into five topics, grouping the last three with “bounding surfaces and space whether filled or empty.”

⁴⁷ LS, 267–8. Mansfeld, “Essays on Stoicism,” 67–8, conjectures that the specific topics are specific because they are species of the genus Something, and the generic topics generic because they do not fall under a higher genus, but are instead parts of a whole (I am not sure which whole, perhaps the whole of physics?). Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 383, likens the Stoics to the Epicureans in that “the opening topics map out the cosmos, as it were, whereas what will then follow tackles the range of metaphysical questions which this world-picture can give rise to—the status of time, predicates, universals, so on.” M. J. White, “Physics and Cosmology,” 125, n. 3, says simply that the distinction is “far from obvious” and that he has not been able to do better than Brunschwig’s account. S. White says of the specific division

I am not convinced that the distinction between specific and generic topics reveals a difference between physics and metaphysics, or between two kinds of metaphysics. I am doubtful that the distinction between specific and generic topics tells us very much at all, really.⁴⁸ I do not, however, think we should infer from the fact that these analyses do not succeed that the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics at all.⁴⁹ In fact, I think there are useful lessons about Stoic metaphysics to be found in this important passage, even if the distinction between specific and generic topics is not all it has been cracked up to be. The significance is not that we can identify “Stoic Metaphysics” with one of these topics or divisions, but that insofar as there is metaphysics throughout Stoic philosophy, as the guiding principle of Stoic thought, we find evidence of Stoic metaphysics almost everywhere.⁵⁰ In this case, the metaphysical lesson of DL 7.132 lies in the ontological hierarchy revealed within the specific topics. I propose to take a closer look at the specific division now, and show that these topics are organized not just in ascending order of complexity, as Long & Sedley suggest, but also in descending order of fundamentality. This latter point about fundamentality has several upshots: first, that Long & Sedley’s grouping of non-bodies cannot be right, interpolating something neither corporeal nor incorporeal between bodies and incorporeals; second, that the specific topics of physics do not cover *all* Somethings; and therefore, third, that the specific topics of physics are not intended to provide a complete ontology.

that “the metaphysical trunk of physics supplies the vital principles required in ethics and the special sciences, and the ramified branches of natural science provide comprehensive explanation,” and of the generic branch that it is to be aligned with cosmology, “Posidonius,” 38 and 61, respectively. My own hunch, which I do not pursue here, is that because Diogenes is reporting a pedagogical or at least dialectical division of Stoic physics as LS, 160, suggest (*pace* Inwood in correspondence), we might take the specific topics as something like individual “courses” in the curriculum and the generic topics as the areas of study they fall under; or perhaps the generic division represents more advanced studies that presuppose a working knowledge of the preliminary, specific topics as prerequisites. In support of this see DL 7.40–1. In either case I am inclined to render the generic topics as cosmology, composition, and causation, with “elements” understood as the subject of composition since elements generically are that out of which something is composed and into which it is broken down (DL 7.136, passage A/Chapter 6).

⁴⁸ I am therefore doubtful that all the remaining chapters of Diogenes’ treatment of Stoic physics (through section 160) are meant to be classed as either specific or generic, as LS, 267, suggest. While section 133 is certainly a continuation of the subject matter of 132, explicit that it is describing further distinctions among the generic topics of cosmos and causation, section 134 clearly introduces a new subject of discussion, the principles (*archai*); further, the language of topics disappears altogether after section 133. Thus there is no reason to think that section 134 continues the discussion of 132–3 or the dialectical division of physics into topics. In other words, Diogenes opens with a report of topics in the Stoic curriculum, but he proceeds with his own doxography of their physical views. Diogenes’ doxography is not *without* structure, but neither is it adhering to the topics he reported (or any other clearly defined structure for that matter). In fact, Diogenes affirms in conclusion (160) that “these are the physical doctrines (*ta phusika*), as much as seems to be sufficient for those of us aiming at due proportion in a book. Those things which some disagreed with them about are as follows.” Therefore, we can conclude that although 7.134–60 does not proceed in terms of the Stoics’ formal topics, nevertheless Diogenes is clearly reporting the Stoic orthodoxy against which the heterodox that follows will be contrasted. It should not be lost on us how extensive this avowed orthodoxy is.

⁴⁹ As Vogt does, “Brutes,” 144–5.

⁵⁰ For further thoughts along these lines, see de Harven “Stoic Corporealism.”

To begin, notice that in our text the account of physics is divided into the topic of bodies not just first but arguably also foremost. A fully transparent translation of the Greek shows that physics is divided first into the topic concerning bodies (*eis te ton peri sōmatōn topon*) and then separately (*kai peri*) into the rest of the topics. The first topic stands apart grammatically, in contrast to the remainder of the topics listed all together after a second, distributive “concerning” (“*peri*”).⁵¹ There is the topic of bodies governed by one preposition, and then all the others collectively governed by a second preposition. This could be merely stylistic flare by Diogenes; but it could also be that the topic of bodies comes first, before even the principles, because of the fundamentality of body in Stoic physics: one cannot even treat of the two principles, the fundamental ungrounded grounds of all there is, without covering bodies as such first.

One might be puzzled as to why the topic is bodies in the plural, as opposed to body, particularly considering that in 7.135 Diogenes defines body as solid three-dimensional extension. It will be impossible to say with certainty why Diogenes opens with the plural, but one reason might be that because Stoic body is finite, all (i.e. every) body is not just *some* extension (in a mass sense) but also *a* body (in a count sense). The indifferent use of “body” and “bodies” could then be an artifact of this aspect of Stoic theory. This general point was made in Chapter 2 in terms of molasses, which is both *some* molasses and a blob (a quantity) of molasses, to show in the context of the *Outis* test that being picked out by a mass term is compatible with being counted. And Chapter 3 established how Stoic body specifically can be picked out, at once, by mass and count nouns.

So, in this passage, it does not seem unreasonable to infer from the double use of “*peri*” that only after the topic of bodies has been covered can the two principles (*archai*), *logos* and *hulē*, be addressed. That the topic of bodies comes first does not undermine the fundamentality of the principles, but serves, rather, as a prerequisite topic for introducing the Stoics’ two fundamental entities that are the ungrounded corporeal grounds of everything there is. Before saying what the two fundamental bodies are, we have to say what body is; or, as we saw Lesley Brown put Plato’s challenge in Chapter 1: “say what it is to be, before plunging into extravagant cosmological theorizing on the number and nature of beings.”⁵² The first

⁵¹ One might worry that the paratactic structure of the passage speaks against the priority that I advocate; however, against this, I would point out, first, that the two distinct occurrences of “*peri*” emphasize the privileged status of the topic concerning bodies, and, second, that *parataxis* is often used to coordinate ideas that stand in a subordinate relation to one another (Smyth, 2169b, cites Thucydides as “especially fond of using καὶ or τε to coordinate two ideas, one of which is subordinate to the other”; this is compatible with the clauses not being grammatically subordinate to one another as described in 2974). Further, as the context shows, there is something odd about pulling out bodies from their natural place between gods and limits if not for the sake of treating the topic as privileged. I thank Patricia Marechal for pressing me on this point about *parataxis*. I also thank Brad Inwood for the suggestion that the *te kai* construction might be exegetical, linking bodies and principles, thereby explaining why “bodies” appears in the plural. However, the second *peri* seems to me to blunt this possibility decisively, and the plural can be explained in other ways (coming up). For discussion of the possibility that discussion of the *archai* came later, after the elements and cosmogony, see Hahm, *Origins*, 29–31, Appendix 2.

⁵² Brown, “Innovation and Continuity,” 204.

topic of physics thus covers what body is, body qua body (or, equivalently, bodies qua bodies). The second topic then says *which* bodies there are at the ground level of the cosmology, namely the active and passive principles (*logos* and *hulē*) out of which the cosmos is created (Chapter 5).⁵³

Next on the list is the traditional elements (*stoicheia*: earth, water, air, and fire), which are generated from the primordial designing fire that is itself a blend of the principles *logos* and *hulē*.⁵⁴ Insofar as the elements are composed out of this designing fire, they are metaphysically posterior to the principles.⁵⁵ As these elements enter into various combinations with each other and take on increasingly determinate forms, the resulting entities become correspondingly more complex (Chapter 6). The principles themselves are metaphysically simple, each a finite, continuous body that is fundamental. Designing fire is a blend of the two principles; it is therefore, as a composite, both less fundamental and more complex. Next on Diogenes' list is gods; taken in the plural and coming after the elements, this topic is best parsed according to the third sense of god that Long & Sedley give: "the traditional gods of the Greek pantheon, interpreted allegorically as symbolizing the Stoic immanent deity in...[a] multiplicity of guises."⁵⁶ These gods are less fundamental and more complex than the elements because they do particular cosmological work as increasingly complex combinations of the more fundamental elements that constitute them (DL 7.147 (54A); Seneca, *Ep.* 9.16 (46O)). Each successive entity is grounded in the bodies that compose it, i.e. each is ontologically dependent on the prior, more basic entities that make it up.⁵⁷

Next Diogenes' list moves to the incorporeals. Again, Long & Sedley have grouped the last three topics (limits, place, and void), carefully, as *non*-bodies, in light of their commitment to limits as mental constructs that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal; accordingly, they take the specific topics of physics to be exhaustive of everything there is in the ontology. However, 7.135 says specifically that it is the limits *of bodies* that are at issue rather than mathematical or otherwise idealized limits that have no role to play in Stoic physics.⁵⁸ According to the Stoics,

⁵³ Thus I disagree with Vogt, "Unified Notion," 69–70, that the fact that the principles do not appear first on either of the lists in 7.132 shows that the Stoics are not engaged in an explanatory enterprise.

⁵⁴ Aëtius 1.7.33 (46A, passage D/Chapter 6); DL 7.135–6 (46B), 7.142 (46C); Stob. 1.129–30, 13 (47A); Cicero, *Nat. deor.* 2.23–5, 28–30 (47C).

⁵⁵ For agreement on this point about fundamentality, that the principles are more basic and the elements derivative and subsidiary, see Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter"; M. J. White, "Physics and Cosmology," 126, 133–4.

⁵⁶ LS, 331; for agreement on this reading and a perspicuous account of how "the Stoics make sense of various elements of traditional polytheistic myth by re-interpreting these in a cosmological sense," see Algra, "Stoic Theology," 165–70. For a congenial account of the difference between god proper and gods in an extended sense, which are creations of god proper, see M. Frede, "Théologie," especially 230–2.

⁵⁷ I am thinking of this as the relation that Koslicki, "Varieties," 206, calls Constituent Dependence: "entities that have the character of *collections* or *constructions*, i.e. entities that are in some way built up from the constituents on which they are ontologically dependent" (original emphasis). See Introduction for further discussion of Constituent Dependence.

⁵⁸ Pace Gourinat, "Matter and Prime Matter," 56–8; Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium," 160–2.

individual bodies are shaped and unified by the tension of the *pneuma* blended with their matter, so there is no physical role for limits as the external or independent containers of individual bodies. Rather, the limit of a body will be the two-dimensional incorporeal surface (or one-dimensional line, i.e. edge, or even smallest possible mark, or point) that *subsists* according to its underlying body.⁵⁹ It is clear from the present context that limits must be considered either incorporeals or something intermediate between bodies and incorporeals; whatever such an intermediate could be, it is not likely to be creatures of fiction and mathematical limits that show up here as the next topic of physics between gods and place.

By this token I resist the Long & Sedley grouping of limits, place, and void as *non-bodies*, and embrace the last three topics as incorporeals, yielding a clear and simple ordering of the topics. There is no independent reason to make room in physics for mental constructs, or to make physics comprehensive of all Somethings, nor therefore should we think of the specific topics listed by Diogenes as intended to provide a complete ontology.⁶⁰ Thus, limits find their natural place in the order of topics as incorporeals that are less fundamental and more complex than the preceding bodies insofar as they are grounded in those bodies. For example, the surface of a table (its two-dimensional limit) is less fundamental than the table, i.e. ontologically dependent on it, and it is therefore a more complex entity: an account of surface requires an account of the underlying body whose surface it is, while an account of a body makes no essential reference to its surface.⁶¹

⁵⁹ In support of which, see Mansfeld, "Essays on Stoicism," 67; Robertson, "Mathematical Objects"; S. White, "Posidonius," in favor of limits as incorporeal; cf. Ju, "Geometrical Limits," for a developmental account according to which the status of limits evolved from mental constructs for the early Stoics to incorporeals from Posidonius on.

⁶⁰ Perhaps this is why the *lekta* do not appear on the list of topics either—an uncomfortable fact for those who argue that *lekta* are central to Stoic physics as the effects of causes. Time is also conspicuously absent from the list of topics, yet time obviously *is* physical; and time is addressed later (at 7.141), so its absence from the list in 7.132 is likely an oversight by Diogenes, in contrast to the *lekta*, which are not brought up anywhere else in Diogenes' treatment of physics (*pace* IG, who emend "*tauta*" to "*lekta*" at the end of 7.140; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 285, who argues from this passage that *lekta* are not semantic entities). Seeing the limits of bodies as incorporeal does not prevent us from countenancing, in addition, idealized limits as neither corporeal nor incorporeal (as I will do in Chapter 13); the Stoics may well have recognized two distinct senses of "limit," as Diogenes explicitly testifies in 7.135 (passage N/Chapter 10 and passage A/Chapter 13), when he says that "Posidonius [cast by 7.160 as orthodox] retains surface both according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) and according to subsistence (*kath' hupostasin*)," which I understand to mean both as a product of thought that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal and as an incorporeal. A tripartite ontology is not only compatible with but seems to require that the topics of physics be narrower than the topics of the complete ontology. This does not mean those entities falling outside the topic of physics are not physical or cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms, or that there is any violation of a one-world metaphysics; it means that the study of physics (as opposed to logic or ethics) does not involve *lekta* or what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal—these are not the *subject matter* of physics, but they can still be physical entities in a one-world metaphysics, or non-reductive physicalism.

⁶¹ Hence, the fact that surface and body are inter-entailing (the fact that there cannot be a body without a surface or a shadow or a singleton set) does not conflict with the asymmetrical dependence relation between them (the fact that surfaces, shadows, and singleton sets depend on bodies); a modal-existential analysis is silent on questions of dependence, so the fact that all body has surface does not undermine the ontological dependence of one on the other or establish that they are codependent (as Boeri, "Bodies and Incorporeals" argues).

Although this order of fundamentality and complexity already fits all the incorporeals qua incorporeal, so that limits, place, and void could be taken as a single topic, there is no grammatical indication that limits, place, and void are to be taken as a group. So we might yet try to eke out a certain ontological hierarchy within these last three.⁶² We can say that place is less fundamental than limit because only bodies with surfaces can have place; or, better, that place begins and ends at the limit (surface) of a body. And in fact we have some evidence that they did think of it this way. Sextus reports that place is defined as the air surrounding the surface a body; air, of course, isn't incorporeal, but the reference to surface is plain and the idea is that place is what surrounds the surface (SE, M. 10.15, 95, 108 (Bury); SE, PH 3.75, 119 (Bury)). Thus the Real Definition of place will make essential reference to surface, but the Real Definition of surface does not include place. Along these same lines we can see that the extra-cosmic void will be least fundamental and most complex in being the outermost entity: in being outside the cosmos, the Real Definition of void will make essential reference to place, which in turn depends on surface (and, of course, the cosmos itself).

Thus, Diogenes' testimony, with the specific topics presented in decreasing order of fundamentality, bears out the idea that Stoic physics is hierarchically ordered. And this goes to suggest, in outline, how the Stoics meet challenge (vii) from the Battle of Gods and Giants, *Be principled*, and be able to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common such that both are Something. This challenge, as we have seen, goes beyond furnishing a thin ontological criterion like the *dunamis* proposal, which is ex hypothesi insensitive to what it is to be a thing of each kind and therefore not concerned with bridging the two worlds. It is the challenge, surely per impossibile for Plato, to give a one-world account that covers at once the sensible and intelligible, corporeal and incorporeal. The dependence of Stoic incorporeals on bodies as their grounds does this, offering an ordered, one-world metaphysics that is best characterized as non-reductive physicalism: it is physicalism in its one-world commitments, and non-reductive in classifying the incorporeals as Something, grounding them rather than reducing or eliminating.

I will now analyze a second passage to support the idea that the Stoics were aiming for a one-world metaphysics in which the incorporeals are grounded in body. Again, the ultimate proof of this thesis resides with the analysis of each incorporeal, but thinking of the incorporeals as a class, consider the following testimony from Simplicius:

⁶² Brunschwig, *TGS*, 28–30, finds no implication of a common ontological status among the group that could earn them a place in the class of incorporeals, preferring to see limits as pure products of thought and, as such, Not-Somethings between Something and nothing at all; they earn their place there as kin of universal concepts, on the grounds that one surface can be shared by two bodies.

- B. (1) The Stoics say that the qualities (*poiotētes*) of bodies are corporeal, those of incorporeals incorporeal. (2) But they stumble because they suppose that causes are the same nature as the things affected by them, and (3) because they posit a common explanatory account (*koinon logon tēs aitias*) set over (*epi*) bodies and incorporeals. (4) But how will the nature of corporeal qualities even be of breath (*pneumatikē*), when breath itself is composite (*sunthetos*)?

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 217,32–8,1 (28L)⁶³

The corporeality of the qualities of bodies is Simplicius' target in B1; he is a Platonist who would not be worried by the incorporeality of qualities. His diagnosis of the problem with making qualities corporeal proceeds as follows. The Stoics restrict causes and the things they act upon (*apoteloumena*) to corporeal *being* in making them of the same nature or substance (*homoousia*); that is, they deny a two-worlds metaphysics that takes causes to be incorporeal and the things they affect to be corporeal (and vice versa, for that matter) (B2).⁶⁴ Further, they are committed to a common explanatory account (*koinon logon tēs aitias*) that covers bodies as well as incorporeals (B3). Here the rejection of Plato's two-worlds ontology is explicit, and the affinity with challenge (vii) *Be principled*, and say what is common to bodies and incorporeals, is strong.⁶⁵ No two-worlds ontology that considers incorporeals to be outside space and time can give bodies and incorporeals a common explanatory account. Indeed, the force of saying it is a common *explanatory* account is to emphasize what Simplicius would most reject: a metaphysical picture according to which bodies are the fundamental building blocks of everything there is, so that incorporeals are grounded in, and therefore explained by, body.

If Stoic incorporeals are grounded in body, as I am arguing, then the common account that Simplicius invokes and attacks here is aptly characterized as non-reductive physicalism, at least inasmuch as it rejects a two-worlds metaphysics and goes beyond brute materialism to accommodate incorporeal, intelligible entities dependent on the corporeal and sensible—under a common explanatory account. The logic that underwrites Simplicius' conclusion confirms such a picture. Simplicius' diagnosis (and intended *reductio*) of the Stoic thesis that corporeal qualities are corporeal (B4) is that the nature (*ousia*) of corporeal qualities cannot be considered corporeal (conveyed by *pneumatikē*) when the putative

⁶³ Cf. Brunschwig, *TGS*, n. 151; LS, 174.

⁶⁴ In support of "*apoteloumena*" in B2 as "things affected" rather than "effects," see LS vol. 2, 175. The point would not be affected by reading "*apoteloumena*" as "things effected," since these too will be corporeal (e.g. bleeding flesh cut by a knife), but scholarly sensitivity about the effects of causes as incorporeal makes it unwise to go down this path; more on effects in Chapter 12 on the *lekta*. I do not worry, as Totschnig, "Effects," 121, does, that Simplicius is suggesting that incorporeals have causal efficacy.

⁶⁵ Thus, I do not take it that the common account is a link, either literally, as in LS vol. 2, 174, or by way of analogy between (2) and (3), as in Brunschwig, *TGS*, n. 151.

body (*pneuma*) is itself a composite, presumably of body and incorporeal.⁶⁶ Thus corporeal qualities are not corporeal all the way down, as the attack goes, and the Stoics are shown to be smuggling in incorporeals, so that causes are not after all the same in substance as what they affect, and they cannot be given a common explanatory account. If the Stoics were not abdicating a two-worlds metaphysics in favor of a new kind of physicalism that grounds its incorporeals in body, Simplicius' argument would be missing its target. This is not to say that Simplicius' argument succeeds, since the composite nature of *pneuma* is no real strike against its corporeality (*pneuma* is a combination of air and fire, both equally corporeal all the way down to the principles, as we saw in Chapters 5 and 6). The point, rather, is that Simplicius presupposes—and hence reports—their one-world physicalism in constructing his argument against the Stoics.

Now consider the following piece of testimony from the Platonist Nemesius. In the context of giving Stoic arguments for the corporeality of the soul, he makes use of a general principle about the nature of incorporeals as inseparable from body.

- C. (1) Chrysippus says that death is the separation (*chōrismos*) of soul from body. (2) Now nothing incorporeal is separable (*chōrizetai*) from a body. (3) For an incorporeal cannot even make contact (*oude gar haptetai*) with a body. (4) But the soul both makes contact with and is separated from the body. (5) Therefore, the soul is a body.

Nemesius 81,6–10 (45D)

One way of asking whether something is dependent or independent is to ask whether it is separable (*chōrizetai*) from other things, and here we have testimony that for the Stoics nothing incorporeal is separable from body, in a sense of “separable” that tracks their use of the term in other contexts. The sense of “*chōrizetai*” can be read in a passive modal sense, not saying merely that as a *matter of fact* incorporeals are not separated from bodies, but rather that it is not *possible* that they be separated; this reading is confirmed by C3, which uses the same verb form to cite the Stoic commitment to incorporeals as *incapable* of contact (a point established independently in Chapter 2, from which it followed that incorporeals do not *exist*). As Nemesius explains, incorporeals are never separable from body because separation requires the ability to make contact. The idea is that anything that can be in contact can also not be in contact, i.e. be separated as something distinct and disjoint. Spatial disjointedness implies ontological independence. And if only bodies can make contact, it follows that only bodies are separable, which is to say that only bodies can be independent (but not that all bodies are

⁶⁶ This latter hylomorphic assumption is confirmed by the Platonist Nemesius 70,6–1,4 (47J2), who says “it has been proved that every body needs something to sustain it, which is an endless regress until we reach something incorporeal.”

independent).⁶⁷ This metaphysical principle that only bodies can be independent is not the point of the passage (which is to establish that the soul is a body); but it is a commitment that the passage identifies and trades on, and thus a piece of evidence that the incorporeals are, by contrast to bodies, dependent entities.

One might wonder whether talk of separation is so easily assimilated to ontological independence. Even if Plato is known to operate that way, why should separability (especially of the Platonic kind) be the mark of independence for the Stoics? It would help to have other evidence that separability is the mark of independence. Fortunately, we have already seen several passages attesting to this; certainly it won't be the separability of a two-worlds metaphysics, but that is to be expected. One place we saw confirmation that separability is the mark of independence was in the context of Stoic mereology (Chapter 3) and the Stoic Categories (Chapters 7–8), where being separable was understood as being disjoint. Stobaeus reports that, for the Stoics, the qualified individual (*poion*), e.g. a certain statue, is neither the same as nor different from the substance (*ousia*) of which it is made, e.g. the clay that constitutes the statue, precisely because in order to be other than (*heteron*), i.e. an independent entity from the statue, it would have to be both spatially separate (disjoint) and not be considered a part of it (Stobaeus 1.177,21–9,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7)).⁶⁸ Thus, the Stoics say that a fist is neither the same as the hand (because they have different properties, e.g. persistence conditions), nor different from the hand (because the fist is not separable from the hand, and the hand is considered a part of the fist). Fists are not independent or disjoint from hands, in contrast to the way that two hands are independent and disjoint from each other. So being separable is plausibly understood in terms of independence.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Cf. Hahm, "Origins," 16. That this is a legitimate inference is supported by Brunschwig, *TGS*, 87, who uses it as a "graft of corporeality" by which to infer that something is a body (a move he argues is necessary for the Stoics because the action/passion criterion is not sufficient to establish corporeality and which explains why we find so many "x is a body" statements); for more on this "graft," see Chapter 2, n. 9.

⁶⁸ I appreciate Kidd's rendering of *τόπω κχωρίσθαι* as spatially separate (F96, *Posidonius, The Translation*) but do not otherwise embrace his analysis of the passage. Note that Stobaeus' testimony also shows us why the Stoics do not say that *all and only* bodies are fundamental: some bodies are clearly not independent or fundamental, but rather grounded. So, I take it that anything fundamental will be separable in place, at least in principle, but not that everything separable will be fundamental. Accordingly, I take the Stoic principles to be separable in principle, in the sense that they are independently existing entities that happen to always be in the same place (crucially, not as parts of one another, so they do not violate the conjunctive *heteron* criterion), but they could separate from one another under the right circumstances—indeed, it seems to be a requirement on *krasis* that the blended entities remain separable (and not in the sense advocated by E. Lewis, "Diogenes Laertius and Mixture," according to which the blended entities are destroyed while blended, but remain separable such that they can still be pulled out and reconstituted, yielding entities are that are non-spatiotemporally continuous in being punctuated by periods of destruction while mixed).

⁶⁹ The hand constitutes the fist, and the fist is neither the same as nor different from the hand; this is the Stoics' strategy for corporealizing the virtues. So, it would not be surprising if the Stoics' strategy for physicalizing the incorporeals were to say also here that the incorporeal is neither the same as nor different from the underlying body. To be clear, there is no explicit evidence that the Stoics *said* incorporeals are neither the same nor different from their grounding bodies, and certainly no reason

Also in the context of the Categories, we saw that the difference between qualified things (*poia*) with and without a *poiotēs* or quality is a matter of being independent: in qualified things that lack a quality, e.g. an army or chorus as opposed to a person, there is no unifying tenor, since a tenor is never found in separated substances with no inherent union (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 214,24–37 (28M, passage F/Chapter 7)). Being separated with no inherent union indicates that the soldiers in an army and the singers in a chorus are independent of each other. Finally, we also saw that separability is the mark of independence in the context of blending, where Alexander explains that blended bodies remain capable of being separated even while blended, which is to say they remain independent of one another, preserving their own substances, qualities, and natures (Alexander, *Mixt.* 216,14–8,6 (48C)). That the ingredients of a blend retain their identities and remain distinct, i.e. separate, is precisely what distinguishes blending from fusion; so here, again, we see that separability is the mark of independence.⁷⁰ With this evidence in mind, it is safe to say that Nemesius delivers a crucial piece of testimony that incorporeals are not of a nature to *subsist* independently from bodies. Therefore, we have evidence that *only* bodies can be independent and *all* incorporeals are dependent entities.⁷¹

Finally, consider Stobaeus' report that bodies are divisible to infinity, as well as "things comparable (*proseioikota*) to bodies," such as surface, line, place, void, and time (1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3)). What does it mean to say that incorporeals are comparable to or resemble (*proseioikota*) bodies? Both are divisible

to think the incorporeals were viewed as parts; however, their inseparability, i.e. inability to be disjoint, and the fact that the Stoics are clearly not reducing the incorporeals to body, certainly conjures the same kind of trichotomy. Applying this to Nolan's account ("Stoic Trichotomies," n. 7), then, being neither the same nor different will have several varieties: the hand to the person, the *sum* of the ingredient parts to the whole they compose, the relation of clay to statue (all of which are part-whole relations), and, now, the relation of grounding body to the incorporeal that depends on it (which is not a case of Constituent Dependence, to invoke Koslicki's distinction, but of Feature Dependence); I would also say, of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, e.g. centaurs and giants, that they are neither the same as the thoughts, texts, illustrations, and stories that ground them, nor different (since they do depend on them for their *subsistence*); more on this in Section IV.

⁷⁰ Thus I do not agree with Bronowski, *Lekta*, 168–9, 224–7, that the Stoic notion of separation as used in Nemesius is reserved for items of the same ontological category; even though it is true that only bodies can be separate, or independent, and so all separation will, as a matter of fact, be between items of the same ontological category, it does not follow that this is *because* they are of the same ontological kind. Bronowski is focused on SE, *M.* 8.75, where Sextus argues that the Stoics won't be able to establish the existence of *lekta* as distinct (separate) from voice and thought; she takes him not to be reporting Stoic doctrine so much as misleadingly oversimplifying their position. I agree that SE, *M.* 8.75 is not a Stoic use of "separation," but I do not agree that the Stoic notion of separation is restricted to items of a single ontological kind (as opposed to being restricted to bodies) or that Sextus is here misleadingly equating the Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists; he is simply saying that there is no such thing as a *lekton* that is something distinct from voice and thought, so the Stoic position will not be possible. At stake in these minutiae is Bronowski's commitment to the independence of the incorporeals: if independence is restricted to bodies, then incorporeals cannot be independent; thus Bronowski needs separability in the Nemesius passage not to be restricted to bodies.

⁷¹ I am grateful to David Sedley for pressing me on this point in conversation, and prompting me to explore in greater depth the evidence that *only* bodies are independent.

to infinity without reaching minima, but that doesn't say anything about *why* they are similar in that way. I suggest that it is not an isolated fact, but rather a consequence of the grounding relation, that both bodies and incorporeals are continuous (and thus infinitely divisible). If being body-less means inheriting properties from underlying body, there is good reason for surface et al. to be divisible to infinity: because the grounding body is that way, offering no minima as a feature to which to correspond (to use Koslicki's language).⁷² So, we could understand "things comparable to bodies" as those things whose properties come from those bodies, or at least take the resemblance to be a function of that dependence. It would not be out of place for the Stoics to use the language of resemblance, as Plato does, to capture metaphysical deficiency—even if the ontological order is reversed; indeed, they use the language of participation and sharing in describing the relationship between particulars and universals, while denying that universals are anything at all. So, in the Stoics' hands, the notion of resemblance would, as in Plato, mark a deficiency in the dependent entity—in this case the lack or privation of solidity—hence a deficiency in being unable to enter causal relations. However, the dependent entity is not a copy, image, or likeness, nor is the "original" an exemplar of any kind. Rather, these incorporeals are comparable to body in that they all (including time) have continuous extension (*diastēma*), which they inherit from the underlying body.

Thus, the Stoics are not just helping themselves to both the corporeal and incorporeal, the sensible and intelligible in a crudely sorted ontology, as the hypothetically civilized Giants do. Rather, they are delivering a sophisticated hierarchical picture that eliminates Plato's two worlds in favor of an elegant one-world ontology that grounds its incorporeals in body. These four passages, though not many, can give us valuable insights into the nature of Stoic incorporeals as a class. Simplicius takes aim at their one-world metaphysics, not succeeding in his criticism but confirming their stance; Diogenes presents the topics of physics in order of fundamentality; Nemesius tells us that no incorporeal is separable from, i.e. ontologically independent of body; and Stobaeus describes the incorporeals as comparable to bodies, revealing a commitment to their spatiotemporal kinship.

Linguistic Evidence of Grounding

I will now offer some linguistic considerations that favor thinking of the incorporeals as dependent entities. First, the privative alpha of "*asōmaton*" is compatible with the

⁷² This is not to say that incorporeals have all the same properties of the underlying body, even plucked of their corporeality; just that the properties of the incorporeal are a function of underlying body so that a certain "resemblance" is natural. Void, as we saw above, is not infinite because the corporeal cosmos is infinite; rather, its infinity is due to the fact that there is a single finite cosmos and thus no other body to limit the void once begun. Here the notion of an isomorphism, suggested to me by Salles, would be apt; see n. 37 above.

notion of lack or privation that I have advanced; so even though the English transliteration “a-corporeal” conveys an abdication of the corporeal realm, we need not render it that way. It is just as fitting to render the Greek as “non-corporeal” or “body-less.” The English “incorporeal” is thus the right translation because it is neutral between these various senses. As a matter of exegesis, however, I will often continue to use “body-less” to signal the privation that I have in mind.

Second, the cluster of Greek terms for *subsistence* deriving from the verb “*huphistēmi*,” meaning to place, set, or stand under, suggests the dependence of one thing on something else that underlies: “*hupostasis*” (noun, subsistence, or a case of one thing underlying another), “*huphestanai*” (perfect infinitive verb, active, to subsist, or to underlie), and “*huphistasthai*” (present infinitive verb, middle-passive, to be subsistent, or to be underlain), “*to hupostatos*” (substantival use of verbal adjective, what is subsistent, or what stands or sets under), “*to huphestos*” (substantival use of perfect participle, active, what subsists, or what stands or sets under, underlies), and “*to huphistamenon*” (substantival use of present participle, middle-passive, what is subsistent, or what has something set under, is stood under, or underlain). Further, all the incorporeals (limits, place, void, time, and *lekta*) are described in the textual evidence as *subsisting*, so it is reasonable to presume, as many scholars do, that this is the ontological status of the incorporeals. Among the meanings of “*hupostasis*” according to LSJ is (1) that which settles at the bottom, (2) the foundation or ground of something, (3) existence, subsistence, actual reality: substance, nature, essence. As a matter of ordinary language and as a general philosophical use, the third sense is applicable; to speak of subsistence is certainly to speak of a thing’s being or reality. However, as a piece of Stoic theory, wherein “*existence*” is a technical term defined by the criterion of doing and undergoing, “*subsistence*” cannot be synonymous with “*existence*.” The Stoics are not speaking loosely. Indeed, Galen mocks the Stoics’ technical distinction between what *exists* (*to on*) and what *subsists* (*to huphestos*) as “linguistic quibbling”; and this barb only stings if the Stoics did insist on such a distinction (Galen, *Meth. med.*, 10.155,1–8 (27G)). So we can take *subsistence* to involve dependence.

Third, *subsistence* is not to be confused with obtaining (*huparxis*, *huparchein*). Not all incorporeals are described as obtaining, only time when it is present and *lekta* when they are true are said to hold, obtain, or belong. So only *subsistence* is eligible to be the ontological status of incorporeals. This is an important fact about our evidence that, to my mind, is decisive against those who would characterize all incorporeals as obtaining.⁷³ Like “*hupostasis*” (*subsistence*), “*huparxis*” (obtaining) is a tricky term to translate because it has a common ordinary language sense of existing or being real. I will address this important terminology and its puzzles

⁷³ Those in the surface effects camp, and Bailey, “Structure”; thus I disagree with Totschnig, “Effects,” 137–8, who argues that because the incorporeals are also described as obtaining, therefore *subsistence* cannot be their only *modus essendi*. Not only is there no evidence that all incorporeals are said to obtain, but the fact that only some obtain shows that obtaining is *not* their *modus essendi*.

in Chapter 12 on the *lekta* (and some in Chapter 11 on time), but for now I set “*huparxis*” aside, since it is not a term applied to all the incorporeals and thus not central to understanding the incorporeals as a class.

With “*huparxis*” out of the way (for now), the question is why the term “*hupostasis*” is apt for the incorporeals. In one sense, it seems entirely counter to the spirit of dependence I advocate, since what subsists is technically the foundation that underlies the dependent entity—as the prefixes *sub-* and *hupo-* convey. However, insofar as the term signals a grounding relation, it should not bother us that the Stoics apply the term to the grounded entity rather than to the grounds. Indeed, the grounds (body) are already said to *exist*, so the label could *only* go to the dependent entity (incorporeal). *Subsistence* is not interchangeable with *existence* in Stoic parlance, and no one takes the incorporeals to be more fundamental than the corporeals. So, the fact that “*hupostasis*” is the Stoics’ term of choice is in fact a strong piece of evidence that they saw the incorporeals as dependent on body.

Another reason to think the incorporeals depend on body for their *subsistence* is that they are sometimes described not just as *subsisting* (*huphistasthai*) but as *subsisting in consequence* of (*paruphistasthai*) bodies. This cognate term conveys even more clearly a dependence relation according to which the underlying body grounds the *subsistence* of the incorporeal. One such use of the term is made concerning place (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 361,10 (passage M/Chapter 10)), and another two are made concerning the *lekton* (SE, M. 8.11–2 (33B, passage A/Chapter 12); Syrianus, *In Ar. Met.* 105,25 (Kroll)). Richard Gaskin translates Simplicius by saying that place “subsists [merely] as an appendage to bodies”; and R. G. Bury renders Sextus as reporting that the *lekta* are what “we apprehend as existing in dependence on our intellect.”⁷⁴ Further, A. C. Lloyd argues that Simplicius uses this term specifically to signify a privation, and that Proclus and the Neoplatonists generally use it to signify a parasitic and “totally dependent existence.”⁷⁵ John Dillon and Dominic O’Meara translate Syrianus’ use of the term as “byproduct,” in his denial that Forms “arise as a byproduct in the intellect analogous to the notorious ‘sayables’” (*In Ar. Met.* 105,25 (Kroll)).⁷⁶ This stronger term, “*paruphistēmi*,” and its cognates, is thus further evidence that the simple term “*subsistence*” indicates the dependence of incorporeals on body. Of the incorporeals place is perhaps

⁷⁴ Gaskin, Simplicius, *On Aristotle Categories* 9–15; Bury, *Logicians*; cf. Brunschwig, *TGS*, 94, “subsiste en liaison.” Whether this is Stoic language or not, and whether the reports are hostile or not, this language is evidence of the Stoic commitment to dependence, indeed all the more so if the reports are critical. See Introduction for methodological comments about hostile sources.

⁷⁵ Lloyd, “Parhypostasis in Proclus,” 148–9, 154–7; on the other hand, Lloyd also takes place to be one of the *lekta*, so my agreement is limited to this point of translation, which is already limited by the focus on Proclus.

⁷⁶ Dillon & O’Meara, *Syrianus*. For more on the prefix *para-* in connection with the preposition “*kata*” in the context of *lekta*, see Chapter 12.

easiest to see as dependent on body and *lekta* the hardest, so linguistic evidence that shows them treated on an ontological par is significant.

We can add to this linguistic evidence of dependence a report from Stobaeus that defines time as the extension (*diastēma*) following on or entailed by (*parakolouthoun*) the world's motion (Stobaeus 1.106,5–23 (51B)).⁷⁷ There is also evidence that the Stoics considered void body-less in the sense of lacking or being deprived of body. As we saw above, Aëtius, a neutral doxographer c. 100 AD, tells us explicitly that for the Stoics “void is a want or absence (*erēmia*) of body” (1.20.1 (SVF 2.504, 1.95, passage A/Chapter 10)). I take this language of want, lack, or absence to report the privation of body that is unique to incorporeals, akin to Koslicki's Feature Dependence as a case of abstraction. Linguistic considerations cannot be decisive on their own, but they certainly have the force to corroborate a dependence thesis argued on independent grounds.

Conclusions and Forecast

I began this chapter with the interpretive landscape and I will close with it now too. I have argued that we have good textual reasons to think that the incorporeals as a class are considered dependent on body, and that the Stoics embrace a hierarchically ordered ontology. The topics of physics are presented by Diogenes in descending order of fundamentality, from bodies to the incorporeals; Simplicius takes aim at the Stoics' one-world metaphysics, resisting the idea that there could be a common explanatory account of bodies and incorporeals; Nemesius testifies that no incorporeal is separable (hence, independent) from body; and Stobaeus describes the incorporeals as “resembling” bodies, co-opting Plato's language to capture the ontological deficiency of incorporeals (rather than of bodies, as Plato would have it). In addition to this textual evidence, I gave linguistic evidence that the term “*hupostasis*” and its cognates convey dependence. So we have at least *prima facie* reason to think that the incorporeals, as a class, are dependent on body for their *subsistence*. If I am right about this, and the details of each incorporeal bear out the dependence thesis in the next three chapters, then the interpretive landscape will turn out as follows.

The view that the incorporeals are independent (Sedley) or codependent (Boeri) physical (pre)conditions of intelligibility and existence for the cosmos will not be right. As things stand now, it is not a foregone conclusion that the incorporeals are independent or codependent physical entities, even if wherever there is body there must also be place, void, and time. In fact, a modal existential analysis, according to which bodies and incorporeals are inter-entailing, is

⁷⁷ Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 399, denies that the term implies dependence on the grounds that time is presupposed by motion; I will address this in Chapter 11.

silent about metaphysical status and tells us nothing about the fundamentality or dependence of the entities in question. For example, the fact that the conflagration requires there to be extra-cosmic void for the cosmos to expand does not make the cosmos *ontologically* dependent on the void, but only physically dependent for the conflagration. Void may be a necessary condition for the cosmos to expand, but this does not make the cosmos ontologically dependent on void; if there were a cosmos with no void then it could not expand, but it would not necessarily cease to exist. Thus the codependence thesis cannot be established simply from the fact that where there is body there are incorporeals. And whether the incorporeals really are preconditions for the cosmos in any literal sense that requires their metaphysically prior, independent existence remains to be seen. Once the incorporeals have been addressed individually, establishing the dependence thesis for each one, I will consider independence and codependence to be fully ruled out.

Nor will it be right to say that the Stoics were filling Plato's job of being ontologically independent, as Bronowski suggests. The fact that the Stoics are realists about the incorporeals, recognizing them as Something, does not by itself establish that they are either fundamental or ontologically independent. And it would be surprising for the Stoics to see the ontological independence so central to Plato's two-worlds metaphysics as a job that needs filling. On the contrary (as I argue in Chapter 1), challenge (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, is the challenge to *not* just fold like the civilized Giants and straightaway admit the Gods' incorporeals; it is the challenge to *bridge* the two worlds, to *cease* Platonizing. And the cosmogony described in Chapters 5 and 6 does not require the independence of the incorporeals either; in fact, it does not require (and makes no reference to) the incorporeals at all. This undermines not only the preconditions thesis but also the explanatory appeal of *lekta* understood as laws of nature guaranteeing the causal closure of the cosmos (Dorothea Frede) and of a reified *systema*, particularly one so fixed that there can only be the four canonical incorporeals, and no room for doctrinal development (Bronowski).

Further, being ontologically dependent on body, or grounded in the Koslickian sense I am using, is not equivalent to being mind-dependent, just as being a product of thought (and in that sense mind-dependent) is not equivalent to being unreal. Ontological dependence and mind-dependence are two different things, and being a product of thought is compatible with being real. Thus the *lekta* will be grounded in body, just as the other incorporeals are, and *this* is not a matter of mind-dependence; but because the body on which the *lekta* depend is the mind, this case of grounding is also a case of mind-dependence. In Chapter 12, I will first establish this positive thesis, that the mind can be the sort of body fit to host *lekta*, and that the mind-dependence of *lekta* is compatible with being objectively available for thought and reference, as their dialectical duties require; and then I will make the negative point that the role of *lekta* in the causal context does not

make them independent facts or states of affairs, or an extra layer of “metaphysical entities.”

If I am right in all of this, then neither will the Platonizing spirit of Bailey’s interpretation of the incorporeals as independently *subsisting* offices or roles that depend on bodies to be actualized be correct; and likewise the views of Long & Sedley and Caston, who also see the Stoics as engaged in the philosophy of intentionality in positing independent abstracta. Already, in Chapter 2 on the ontological criteria for *existence* and *subsistence*, we saw reasons to doubt that the Stoics had Meinongian motivations. In the chapters that follow I will show that my dependence thesis bears out for place, void, time, and the *lekta* (as well as room and surface), and thus that the view that treats them as independent abstracta cannot be right. Because these chapters proceed case by case, I will say a little more now (and not later) about Bailey’s proposal that the incorporeals, as a class, are offices.

Bailey argues that we should attribute to the Stoics a theory of offices or roles on the grounds, first, that time obtains (has *huparxis*) when it is occupied by present motions; second, that *lekta* are occupied by bodies when they obtain (*huparchein*); and finally, that it is natural to extend this account of *huparxis* to place and void.⁷⁸ However, there is reason to be wary of attributing this thesis to the Stoics. There is no textual evidence that the Stoics spoke this way, in terms of either time or *lekta* being occupied by body. In fact, the language of being occupied only occurs in the context of place and void *subsisting* (*huphestanai*), and these spatial entities are never said to obtain (*huparchein*). Thus the textual evidence that the Stoics had an ontology of roles and realizers, or offices and occupiers, is not very strong.

Bailey also argues that nothing less than a metaphysical story as complex as offices and their occupants can explain the presence of both bodies and incorporeals, and the distinction between *being*, *subsistence*, and obtaining. However, as I am arguing, these explanatory burdens can be met in much simpler terms. Bodies *exist*, some of them (the two principles or *archai*) fundamentally, while incorporeals *subsist*, all of them by inheriting their properties from underlying body. Two (and only two) of the incorporeals—true *lekta* and the present time—are said to obtain because they correspond to the world as it is. When a *lekton* that *subsists* is true, it corresponds to the world as it is (says what is the case), and thus obtains; and when time *subsisting* according to the world’s motion is present, it corresponds to the world as it is unfolding, and thus obtains. I will argue in Chapter 10 that space (place, room, surface, and void) depends for its *subsistence* on underlying body; in Chapter 11 I will show the same for time and begin to address the nature of obtaining; and in Chapter 12 I will make the case that *lekta* depend for their *subsistence* on the rational impression (a body), and then complete my account of obtaining.

⁷⁸ Bailey, “Structure,” 261, 264, 268–9.

The upshot is that obtaining is not an additional ontological status at all, but a correspondence relation between two of the incorporeals and the world; *existence* and *subsistence* are the only two ways of being Something that the Stoics recognize and the incorporeals have only one ontological status, *subsisting*. And yet the incorporeals are still ontologically dependent on body (as Bailey seeks), but not as independent abstracta that depend on bodies to be realized or actualized and switch from *subsisting* to obtaining. Rather, to *subsist* just is to depend on body, by inheriting properties from the grounding body. Thus the philosophical motivations for attributing roles and realizers to the Stoics are also undermined.

Likewise, the surface effects view that attributes obtaining or *huparxis* to all the incorporeals as an ontological status (and takes *subsistence* or *hupostasis* as the status of being thought about) will also be ruled out. Totschnig argues that because some incorporeals are said to obtain, therefore *subsistence* cannot be their only way of being.⁷⁹ But this is to presume that obtaining is an ontological status, as well as to swim upstream of the textual evidence, which says only that true *lekta* and the present time obtain. While I appreciate the idea of the incorporeals as dependent on bodies in the manner of shadows, and even as epiphenomenal results of bodies, I do not think this makes them all *lekta* or that this dependence is established—even for the *lekta*—by the causal context. Seeing the incorporeals as dependent on body does not make them effects in the technical sense required to equate them with *lekta*, and the dependence of the *lekta* on rational impressions is entirely distinct from their role in the causal context. The positive dependence thesis will be established for each incorporeal in the next three chapters; and the negative thesis that incorporeals and *lekta* are not the effects of causes will be established in Chapter 12.

Finally, the view of Christensen, Graeser, and Watson that makes all the incorporeals into *lekta*, but now as our own impositions on reality, will be ruled out in Chapters 10 and 11 by the clear physical realism about space and time, and (already) by the fact that there is no textual evidence that place, void, or time are considered *lekta*. And Chapter 12 will show that the mind-dependence of the *lekta* does not make them subjective entities unable to fulfill their dialectical duties as the bearers of truth value, what we share in communication, and the objects of assent and impulse.

If I am right in all of this, and the incorporeals are body-less by inheriting their properties from underlying body, then the dependence of the incorporeals is an apt response to Plato's challenge (vii) *Be principled*, bridge the two worlds and give a common account of bodies and incorporeals; and this response is aptly characterized as non-reductive physicalism. It is, furthermore, to go beyond simply counting entities in or out with ontological criteria, to grounding them in body

⁷⁹ Totschnig, "Effects," 137–8.

with metaphysical principles, in this case the principle of incorporeal *subsistence*. For each incorporeal, then, I will show that it meets the ontological criterion for *subsistence*, as described in Chapter 2, and give a Real Definition that captures its ontological dependence and, at once, explains why it meets the *subsistence* criterion. This explains why the incorporeals are all non-sensory impressors or proper objects of thought and discourse that meet the ontological criterion for *subsistence*: because they inherit their properties from underlying body, e.g. the pattern of the drill sergeant's motions, they are Something and we can be impressed *in relation to (epi)* them.

10

Space

τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν

I turn now to the Stoic account of the spatial incorporeals, which include void (*kenon*) outside the cosmos and place (*topos*) inside the cosmos, as well as the phenomena of room (*chōra*) and surface (*epiphaneia*), over which there is much scholarly disagreement.¹ Not that void and place are without controversy; on the contrary, it is in debates about the void that all the other interpretive difficulties terminate. Is place just a finite portion of infinite void that is occupied? Is room just a portion of void that is partly occupied? If so, then void must be an independent entity prior to place and room, which risks collapsing into the Epicurean notion that puts void on an ontological par with body. Further, if the cosmos occupies the middle place or room of void, then how can the Stoics maintain that the void is infinite—how can there be a middle to what is infinite? And if room is supposed to be a portion of void bigger than the body it contains, but finite, how is this portion of void differentiated from the rest of the infinite void? Or is there some further phenomenon, let's call it space, that is the backdrop to place, room, and void? If so, one wonders what this entity is called, and why it is not named or described in the sources; and since the same questions arise for this entity as for void, why is it worth positing? Finally, if surface is among the spatial incorporeals, as some evidence suggests, how does this square with place, room, and void? Is surface just void (or “space”) that is occupied in two dimensions? If so, what is it occupied by? So the first question to ask is: what is void, anyway? What could something that is arguably nothing even be?

Void

To appreciate the uniqueness of Stoic void a little background is necessary. Leucippus and Democritus, in the 5th century BC, were the first atomists, followed by Epicurus in the Hellenistic period (4th and 3rd centuries BC) (Aristotle, *Metaphys.* I.4 985 b 4–20 (DK67A6); Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 56–9 (9A); Lucretius 1.599–634 (9C);

¹ What I say here incorporates and updates de Harven, “Nothing.”

Simplicius, *In Ar. De cael.* 295,1–22 (DK68A37), 242,18–26 (DK67A14), 583,18–20 (DK67A16)). As David Sedley has argued, these theories did not come about in a vacuum (so to speak), and their evolution is instructive of the conceptual difficulties of ancient Greek physics.² The Greek translated as “void” is “*to kenon*,” which literally means the empty. It is natural to take this as a mass term and thereby understand void as empty space. As Sedley argues, however, in responding to Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Melissus, the atomists Leucippus and Democritus conceived of void rather as an element, a negative substance that itself occupies space. Indeed, this is the force of positing atoms and the void (better: voids) as the ultimate constituents of the cosmos. Epicurus and Lucretius, on the other hand, did espouse a concept of void as empty space. Epicurean void is best characterized as three-dimensional extension that persists when atoms move through it, so that it is sometimes occupied and sometimes unoccupied. Though void is no longer an ultimate constituent of the cosmos qua element, it remains fundamental in that it is not a derivative attribute of body (atoms), i.e. Epicurean void has independent existence. David Konstan has argued against Sedley’s conception of Epicurean void as a matrix extending uniformly through the cosmos, and instead (following Brad Inwood) for a conception of void as the complement of matter, as a sort of “ideal fluid” that goes wherever matter is not.³ On this view, Epicurean void is never occupied by body, but rather changes its configuration with the motion of bodies; it is simply the absence of body, the space in between, and not something that body moves through. On this view too, although it is the complement of matter, void is ontologically independent.

As I will argue, the Stoics embraced none of these options, though their conception of void has aspects of all three. Stoic void is on the one hand a discrete entity denoted by a count noun, like the Democritean conception of void as a negative substance; on the other hand, it is also empty space and can be described by a mass noun, like the Epicurean conception. And while it is what can be occupied, in accordance with Sedley’s conception of Epicurean void, it is also the absence of body that does not persist when occupied, akin to Konstan’s ideal fluid conception. However, unlike any atomist picture, Stoic void is not an independent element of the cosmos; if there were no body there would be nothing at all—not even void. In this latter respect the Stoics are akin to contemporary relationists about space (and time), but in a non-reductive spirit that allows them to embrace substantialist discourse that takes void as a particular. Accordingly, Stoic void is Something rather than nothing (as Aristotle would have it), even though it does not exist independently (as the Epicureans would have it).

Because the phenomena of place, room, and void are complementary concepts, they are often attested together and I will quote them that way. Nevertheless, I will begin the analysis with void, and then proceed to room and place.

² Sedley, “Two Conceptions of Vacuum.”

³ Konstan, “Epicurus on the Void.”

- A. (1) Zeno and his followers say that void (*kenon*), place (*topos*), and room (*chōra*) differ; and void is lack (*erēmia*) of body, (2) while place what is occupied by body (*to echomenon hupo sōma*), (3) and room what is partly occupied, just as in the case of a jar of wine.

(1) Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διαφέρειν κενόν, τόπον, χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, (2) τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, (3) τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ οἴνου πιθάκνης.

Aëtius 1.20.1 (SVF 2.504)

- B. (1) The extra-cosmic void (*to ektos autou kenon*) is what extends into infinity (*eis apeiron*) from all sides (*apo pantos merous*). And of this, (2) what is occupied (*to katechomenon*) by body is called place (*topos*), (3) while what is not occupied will be void. (4) And because it is void, we can call it to mind in short order. It is necessary that every body be in something, and this, in which it is, must be different from that which occupies and fills it, being incorporeal and an intangible sort of thing. (5) Therefore, such a subsistence (*hupostasis*), being what is able to admit body and be occupied, we say is void.

(1) τὸ δὲ ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ κενόν ἐστιν ἀπὸ παντὸς μέρους εἰς ἄπειρον διῆκον. τούτου δὲ (2) τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενον τόπος καλεῖται, (3) τὸ δὲ μὴ κατεχόμενον κενὸν ἂν εἴη. (4) ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶ κενόν, διὰ βραχέων ὑπομνήσομεν. πᾶν σῶμα ἔν τινι εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον, τοῦτο δέ, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ, τοῦ κατέχοντος αὐτὸ καὶ πεπληρωκότος ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ, ἀσώματον ὃν καὶ οἶον ἀναφές. (5) τὴν οὖν τοιαύτην ὑπόστασιν, οἶαν τ' ἂν οὖσαν δέχεσθαι σῶμα καὶ κατέχεσθαι, κενὸν εἶναί φαμεν.

Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,17–24 (Todd; SVF 2.538+)

The first thing to notice is that void appears to be an inherently negative conception, defined purely in terms of lacking body, as texts A1 and B3–4 attest. But then the question arises what sense there can be for the Stoics to maintain that void is Something: if void is just what is not a body, and only bodies *exist*, doesn't that make it nothing at all? The problem is all the more pressing when we notice that void is strictly speaking extra-cosmic, i.e. outside the corporeal cosmos (earth and the surrounding heavens and sun, moon, etc.) that exhausts what *exists*, as B1 shows and Galen confirms: “The Stoic void is not something within, it obtains outside the cosmos” (Galen, *An. pecc. dignosc.* 7.5.101 (SVF 2.542)).⁴

⁴ ὁ δὲ Στωϊκὸς οὐκ ἔνδον τι κενὸν εἶναι, ἔξωθεν τοῦ κόσμου ὑπάρχειν αὐτό. See also Galen, *Diff. puls.* 8.674,13–4 (49D).

One approach to this question is to take void as something self-subsistent or independent, along the Epicurean lines of empty space that is there whether the cosmos exists or not.⁵ As evidence for the independence of void, scholars cite the following passages.

- C. Void is not scattered (*katesparthai*) among bodies but encompasses (*sunechein*) them, and void is something outside the heavens per se (*kath' hauto*), just as the impression (*phantasia*) of many people exceedingly holds, considering void to be something infinite (*apeiron*) outside the heavens.

μη κατεσπάρθαι μὲν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλ' εἶναι συνεχῆ, ἔξω δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἶναι κενόν τι καθ' αὐτό, ὥσπερ μάλιστα καὶ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ἔχει φαντασία, ἅπειρόν τι νομίζουσα εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

Philoponus, *In Ar. Phys.* 613,23–7 (Vitelli; SVF 1.96)

- D. Moreover it is necessary that there be a certain subsistence (*tis hupostasis*) to void. The notion of it [void] is exceedingly simple, being incorporeal (*asōmatos*) and intangible (*anaphēs*), and neither having shape (*schēma*) nor accepting shape, and neither undergoing nor doing anything, but (rather) being simply what is capable of receiving body (*haplōs de sōma dechesthai hoīou te ontos*).

Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,64–6 (49C)

- E. Outside is the infinite void (*to kenon apeiron*) encompassing (*perikechumenon*) it, which is indeed (*hoper*) incorporeal, the incorporeal that can be occupied by bodies but is not occupied.⁶ And in the cosmos there is no void, but it is a united whole (*hēnōsthai*); for the union (*sumpnoia*) and tension (*suntonia*) of the heavenly relative to the terrestrial necessitates this.

ἔξωθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ περιεκεχυμένον εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἅπειρον, ὅπερ ἀσώματον εἶναι· ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἶον τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον. ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἀλλ' ἠνώσθαι αὐτόν τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν.

DL 7.140 (SVF 2.543); cf. Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,96–103 (49H)

⁵ Algra, *Concepts of Space*; Inwood, “Extension and the Void”; Powers, “Void”; Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics”; Sorabji, *MSM*.

⁶ I read ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἶον τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον as specifying which incorporeal this is, not saying that insofar as it is incorporeal it is what can be occupied, as Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems,” n.14; Hicks, *DL: Lives*; and Mensch & Miller, *Lives*, take it. After all, even if one were to adopt Algra’s view that what can be occupied is a general notion of space, one wouldn’t want to say the same about time, presumably, and certainly not about *lekta*. My translation gets this sense and avoids Zeller’s suggested emendation of ἀσώματον to κενόν, on which see apparatus of Dorandi, *DL*.

The negative conception of void as unlimited non-body outside the corporeal cosmos remains evident in passages D and E. Its independence from body is found (by those who seek it) in the “per se” locution in passage C and the testimony of passage D that there must be a certain *subsistence* to void. Further, passages C and E suggest that void must be an independent phenomenon if it is to be the sort of thing that can encompass the cosmos.⁷ The virtue of an account of void as independently *subsisting* space is that it gives good intuitive sense to characterizing the phenomenon as infinite; as Keimpe Algra observes, “once an extra-cosmic void had been proved ‘to be there,’ the most common-sensical thing to assume was apparently that this void was infinite.”⁸ The drawback of such an account, as Algra also observes, is that “the Stoic conception of an extra-cosmic void subsisting in its own right might be said to come too close to the Epicurean conception of a self-subsistent absolute void on a par with corporeal being.”⁹ Not everyone agrees that falling in with the Epicureans on void is problematic, and Algra in the end embraces void as independent, but I will resist that result.¹⁰

Another approach to understanding the nature of void as a *non-existent* entity or non-body that is nevertheless Something is to take it as a modal entity or possibilium.¹¹ It’s clear enough why someone would do so, since the Stoics clearly describe void as what *can be* occupied by body (B5, D, E); and with a modal account there is no problem with the status of void as lacking corporeal properties. But talk of what can be occupied need not be understood in strongly modal terms, as signaling the ontological status of void. For example, Algra takes the language of what can be occupied to designate “a general concept of what we might call ‘space’ underlying the various concepts of *topos*, *chōra* and *kenon*,” which he equates to *diastēma* or extension.¹² Whether Algra is right to make this an additional entity remains to be seen, but for now it shows that there is at least one viable alternative to the modal reading. More decisively, to my mind, the further fact that void is extended in three dimensions eliminates the modal

⁷ But see Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems,” 64, for the idea that “claiming that void surrounds the cosmos is tantamount to saying that void is not pre-existing compared to the cosmos and its *ousia*, but rather subsists with them. This means that it only makes sense to speak of void in relation to something full (the cosmos and its *ousia*). For if the latter is removed, what remains is not void but nothingness.” While I agree that if there were no cosmos there would be no void because void depends for its *subsistence* on the cosmos, I do not think that this follows from saying that void surrounds the cosmos. More on these issues ahead.

⁸ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 317.

⁹ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 331.

¹⁰ Powers, “Void and Space,” embraces Stoic void as absolute. Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 395–6, takes the Stoics to go much of the way with the Epicureans, differing only on some of the finer points of room. Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 308–21, takes the independence of void to make it an outlier among the incorporeals, leaning on Brunschwig’s strategy that finds the incorporeals to be a heterogeneous group.

¹¹ Bréhier, *Théorie*; Todd, “Cleomedes and Void,” 130–1.

¹² Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 270.

interpretation, since presumably a modal entity is not also an extended physical entity, as Galen reports:¹³

- F. The Stoics are compelled to admit that extension in three dimensions (*to trichē(i) diastaton*) is common to body and void and place, since they leave void in the nature of existing things even if they say this does not exist within the world.

Galen, *Qual. inc.* 19.464,10–4 (49E)

Seeing void as three-dimensional extension is also helpful in addressing the initial question, how void can be Something rather than nothing—at least now it has some positive physical characteristics of its own. Indeed, extension in three dimensions is uncontroversially a physical phenomenon, which is an asset to the view that void is independently *subsisting* space rather than a modal concept. But then it is unclear why the Stoics would define the phenomenon in negative corporeal terms—as *lacking* body, shape, tangibility, and capacity for action or passion—when they could proceed directly to a definition of it as independently *subsisting*, three-dimensional extension outside the cosmos (as the Epicureans do). And the idea that *diastēma* is a background notion of space such that void is to be understood as this space unoccupied (and place as this space occupied) does not help. In either case, whether void is taken as the kind of space that is unoccupied or simply as space itself, it is assumed that space (or void) is an independent entity; but nothing about the fact that void is three-dimensional extension accounts for the negative definition of void or entails that it is ontologically independent. Indeed, Algra feels the pull of the dependence thesis, though he ultimately rejects it.¹⁴

So void is infinite three-dimensional extension that is not occupied by body, but could be. This explains how void can be Something rather than nothing. But now another interpretive question arises about the nature of this infinity. The meaning of the Greek word “*apeiron*,” which I have rendered as “infinite,” is a controversial matter of its own. The literal meaning of the term is unbounded or unlimited, and so can be translated as “indefinite”¹⁵ just as well as “infinite.”¹⁶ The rest must be gleaned from context. For example, passage D, which describes the void only in terms of lacking shape and causal capacities, might plausibly be taken as evidence for *apeiron* as indefiniteness. On the other hand, the Stoics’ commitment to the continuum as divisibility to infinity speaks to *apeiron* as spatial infinity. As we

¹³ Contra Todd, “Cleomedes and Void,” 129, who says void has no extension in itself; for agreement on this point see Powers, “Void and Space,” 417.

¹⁴ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 308–14.

¹⁵ Inwood, “Extension and the Void,” 255.

¹⁶ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, n. 168; Hahm, *Origins*; LS; Powers, “Void and Space,” 426–9; and Sorabji, *MSM*.

saw in Chapter 9, Stobaeus reports that “things comparable to bodies, such as surface, line, place, void, and time” are divisible to infinity, where being comparable to body is plausibly understood in spatial terms as being extended (Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3)). Stobaeus aims to explain why the void is *apeiron* in the following text, but the account is difficult to penetrate:

- G. (1) Chrysippus declared place to be (a) what is occupied through and through by an existent (*to katechomenon di' holou hupo ontos*), or (b) what can be occupied (*to hoion <te> katechesthai*) by an existent and is occupied through and through either by a particular existent (*hupo tinos*) or by several (*hupo tinōn*). (2) And when what can be occupied by an existent is partly occupied by something and partly not occupied by something, the whole will be neither place nor void, but something else without a name; for void is spoken of almost in the manner of (*paraplēsiōs*) empty containers, while place in the manner of full ones; (3) but is room (*chōra*) (a) a bigger thing that can be occupied by an existent and like a bigger container for body, or is it (b) what has room (*chōroun*) for a bigger body? (4) (a) At any rate, void is said to be infinite (*apeiron*); for what is outside the cosmos is such; and place is finite because no body is infinite. (b) Just as the corporeal is finite, so the incorporeal is infinite, for time and the void are infinite. (c) For just as nothing (*to mēden*) is no limit (*mēden peras*), so neither is there any limit to nothing, as in the case of void. (d) For according to its own subsistence (*kata tēn hautou hupostasin*) it is infinite; and, again, this is made finite by being occupied; but if what fills it is taken away, a limit to it cannot be conceived (*ouk estin autou noēsai peras*).

Stobaeus 1.161,8–26 (49A)

I will paraphrase the line of reasoning in G4 as it I understand it, to see what it tells us about the way that void is unlimited or *apeiron* (whether indefinite or spatially infinite). First (G4a) we are told that void is *apeiron* because it is outside the cosmos; and that place inside the cosmos, having been defined in G1 as what is occupied (and hence delimited) by body, is limited because no body is *apeiron*. Then (G4b) we are given an analogy or comparison: just as the corporeal is limited, so the incorporeal is *apeiron*. It is not immediately clear what the point of comparison is, but it is followed by an explanation (G4c): because void neither limits (“nothing is no limit”) nor is limited (“neither is there any limit to nothing”), it is *apeiron*. So the point of comparison seems to be this: just as what is nothing can’t either limit or be limited, and therefore void is *apeiron*, so what is body limits and is limited, and therefore place is limited.¹⁷ Putting these pieces together, then, we can see that

¹⁷ This is not to say that all incorporeals are *apeiron* but that incorporeals admit of infinity, in contrast to body. Cf. Inwood, “Extension and the Void,” 254–6, who argues from this passage against the spatial infinity of void and in favor of its indefiniteness qua incorporeal; against this as a definition of the incorporeal itself, see Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” n. 21.

being extra-cosmic makes the void *apeiron* (G4a) because only bodies can limit (G4b, G4c) and there are no other bodies outside the cosmos to limit it (implicit).

Next (G4d) we are given another explanation: that according to its own *subsistence*, void is *apeiron*. It is not immediately clear what “its own *subsistence*” means or even what is being explained here: it could be (i) why void neither limits nor is limited (explaining what came immediately before, G4c), or (ii) why void is *apeiron* (offering a second explanation in addition to G4c), or (iii) why being extra-cosmic makes it *apeiron* (offering a summary explanation that captures the content of the comparison in G4b that elucidates the claim in G4a).¹⁸ The first option is ruled out by the fact that neither-limiting-nor-being-limited is meant to explain why void is *apeiron*, so saying that according to its own *subsistence* it is *apeiron* will not be explanatory in this context. Option (ii) also is not appealing because it would be “explaining” that void is infinite by fiat: it is *apeiron* because according to its own *subsistence* it is *apeiron*. Option (iii) is promising. We know that place and void both *subsist*. So I take “according to its own *subsistence*” to indicate the kind of *subsistence* that is unique to void: the kind that begins at the edge of the cosmos and proceeds from all sides into infinity (passage B).¹⁹ This is confirmed by the reiteration (“again”) that void is made finite by being occupied, and that when the occupying body is removed, no limit to void can be conceived.

This reading explains why passage C reports that “void is something outside the heavens per se,” namely because it is the nature of void (and only void, hence “per se”) to be extra-cosmic, and not because it is an independent entity. It also explains why Cleomedes says there must be “a certain *subsistence*” to void (D): he is reporting that void must be Something rather than nothing, and that its *subsistence* will be that of the (only) incorporeal that has no shape or causal force and is simply what is capable of receiving body. Likewise, in passage B5, he speaks of “such a *subsistence*,” explaining that because it is the kind of incorporeal that can come to be occupied by body, it is void. In addition, this reading explains why the void is such as to encompass the cosmos: it does indeed surround the cosmos because it extends from the edge of the cosmos out (and not because it is there antecedently for the cosmos to be placed within). So being *apeiron* according to its own *subsistence*, being extra-cosmic per se, and having a certain *subsistence* does not signal that void is ontologically independent, but that it is *apeiron* because it *subsists* outside the cosmos with no other body to limit it.²⁰ Hereon I will capture this point

¹⁸ I dismiss the possibility that G4d is a second explanation of G4a, that the void is *apeiron* because it is extra-cosmic, distinct from G4b and G4c because it makes reference to points made there.

¹⁹ Cf. Powers, “Void and Space,” 428–9, who argues that the antecedent of “its own” is extended non-being, which is to say space (as distinct from void as a species of space), and that this comes very close to attributing to space a distinct nature or character. While I agree that “its own *subsistence*” signals a distinct nature or character, I do not think this makes it absolute or independent in contrast to the other incorporeals; rather, its nature is distinct in being extra-cosmic and infinite, which the other incorporeals are not.

²⁰ On which see BS, 461–4.

by saying that void *subsists* “from the outside out,” inheriting its three dimensions from the edge of the cosmos where it begins. Sextus Empiricus confirms this picture, linking the negative definition of void as extension that is lacking body (what is body-less) with the characterization of it as what can be occupied but is not.

- H. (1) The Stoics say void is what can be occupied by body but is not occupied, or extension (*diastēma*) empty (*erēmon*) of body, or extension unoccupied by body, (2) and place is what is occupied by an existent and equal (*exisazomenon*) to what occupies it (by *existent* they now mean *body*, as is clear from the interchange of names). (3) They say room is extension (*diastēma*) that is partly occupied by a body, and partly unoccupied. (4) Some say that room is the place of a larger body, so that room differs from place in this respect: that place does not reflect the size of the body contained (for even when it contains the smallest of bodies, it is no less called place) while room is noteworthy in that it does reflect the size of the body in it.

SE, M. 10. 3–4 (49B+); cf. SE, PH 3.124 (Bury)

And the fact that place is equal, or even “made equal” (as Algra and Nathan M. Powers translate “*exisazomenon*”), to what occupies it does not point to the independence of void either. It may suggest that in a certain case void is there first to be made finite, as when what was previously void gets occupied by the expanding cosmos during the conflagration (B2), but this is compatible with void as dependent on the cosmos for its *subsistence*: first the void *subsists* according to the cosmos, extending infinitely in three dimensions out from all sides; then, during the conflagration when the cosmos expands, that portion of the void that gets occupied becomes place and what remains unoccupied remains void. Passage B2 confirms this picture: of what extends into infinity from all sides (“of this”), what is occupied is place and what remains unoccupied is void. The occurrence of the phrase “of this” need not entail that there is some prior entity, space, which has parts that are occupied and parts that are unoccupied, as Powers argues.²¹ Rather, the void begins at the edge of the cosmos, inheriting its three-dimensionality from this underlying body; and it is infinite, because no matter what the size of the cosmos, the void extends infinitely from all its sides, since there is no other body to limit it. As the cosmos expands during the conflagration, it occupies a portion of the surrounding void and turns it into place. It’s not that this portion of the void (or space) remains and is now occupied, but that it is destroyed and new place generated; this is confirmed by Cleomedes (passage D), who reports that void can neither have nor accept any shape. And the following testimony of Cleomedes does not tell otherwise:

²¹ Powers, “Void and Space,” 419; nor does B2 indicate the systematic tendency to call space itself void, embracing a genus-species homonymy between space and void proper, the kind of space that is unoccupied.

- I. And certainly we are able to conceive of the cosmos itself moving from the place which it now happens to occupy. And together with this transition of it we will conceive the place that it has left as being void, and that into which it is moved as taken over and occupied by it. And this would be void that has been filled.

καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν δυνάμεθα ἐπινοῆσαι κινούμενον ἐκ τοῦ τόπου, ὃν νῦν τυγχάνει κατειληφώς. ταύτη δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ μεταβάσει συνεπινοήσομεν τὸν τε ἀπολειφθέντα τόπον κενὸν ὄντα, καὶ εἰς ὃν μετέστη κατειλημμένον καὶ κατεχόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη κενὸν πεπληρωμένον.

Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,39–43 (Todd)

Powers recognizes that his account of void as intangible container greater than the bodies it contains is compatible with but does not require that void be self-subsistent, and offers this passage as decisive evidence against the dependence thesis.²² Because the argument relies on conceiving of the cosmos as moving from one place to another, he argues, there must be something with respect to which it changes place: namely space itself, but only if it can be understood as a fixed and independent volume. Void is thus not “beyond” the place of the cosmos, but that portion of space that is not occupied. However, we need not understand Cleomedes as saying here that the cosmos changes place within an independent matrix; rather, place that is abandoned becomes void, and void that gets occupied becomes place. There is no need to posit an additional entity, space, to make sense of the idea that void becomes place when occupied, and place becomes void when not occupied. What does it add to say that space—which notably corresponds to no term in the texts—is void when it is empty and place when it is filled, or that it has regions that are full and regions that are empty?²³ Once void receives body, it is destroyed and becomes place—it is not now void (or space) with shape and size.²⁴ In this respect Stoic void is like Konstan’s ideal fluid model of Epicurean void rather than like Sedley’s matrix model of space that gets occupied. Stoic void begins at the edge of the cosmos, wherever body is not; it is the absence of body that creates void. Thus void is prior to the conflagration, but dependent on the cosmos for its *subsistence*.

We can now conclude that the sense in which void is *apeiron* is spatial infinity, and not, as Inwood takes it, “unlimitedness in the simplest sense, absence of limits of boundaries [. . .] thus rather a negative conception [that] makes no positive

²² Powers, “Void and Place,” 425.

²³ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 270, equates space with *diastēma* and “that which is capable of being occupied by being,” and Inwood, “Extension and the Void,” 248, equates it with the unnamed entity of G2; in both cases, this is something asserted but not argued for. Powers, “Void and Place,” 418, argues that because place and void are both defined as what can be occupied they are coordinate species of space, even though the Stoics did not label it.

²⁴ Nor does it follow that if void becomes place it would have to be occupied by an infinite body, as Alessandrelli suggests, “Aspects and Problems,” 63.

assertion about spatial extent, as the atomistic conception of infinity does.”²⁵ We can also affirm that this is not meant to be a property of all incorporeals *qua* incorporeal, but only of time and void; indeed, it is clear from the very same passages that place is not *apeiron* and it is explicit at G4b that it is only time and void that are *apeiron*.²⁶ Further, we can see why void is defined in negative terms, as lacking body: in order to signal the dependence of void on body, i.e. the respect in which void is body-less. Again Cleomedes confirms (B5): because this *subsistence* is such as to be what admits body and is not occupied, it is void. We can also see why void is characterized as what *can be* occupied: because it is non-solid extension that is not already occupied. And we need not posit “space” as an additional entity that is void when occupied (and place when it is); rather, we can say directly that void just is unoccupied extension outside the cosmos, and that the portion occupied by the growing cosmos ceases to be void and becomes place instead, without needing any entity to persist in the background. Hence the title of this chapter is meant simply as a catch-all term for the spatial incorporeals, and a wink to my denial that there is a further entity called space.

So void is infinite spatial extension in three dimensions, beginning at the edge of the cosmos from which it gets its *subsistence*; I take the dependence thesis to be established. Now we will confront a problem about the infinity of void that arises from two pieces of testimony in Plutarch, which suggest that Chrysippus thinks the cosmos is at the center of the infinite void: how can what is infinite have an identifiable center? Is the void isotropic, as Algra has put the point, or not? These two passages have spawned a small industry of their own, with scholars alternately siding with Plutarch in finding that Chrysippus does contradict himself by positing a center to infinite void,²⁷ dismissing Plutarch to defend Chrysippus,²⁸ and arguing that both are in their own way right.²⁹ The contradiction in question is that Chrysippus is positing at once an infinite and isotropic void, meaning that it has no spatial determination, and yet saying that it has an identifiable middle.

David Hahm has argued that Chrysippus is not contradicting himself because what Plutarch is reporting is not a commitment of Chrysippus’ own, but an argument for the indestructibility of the cosmos that Chrysippus is refuting.³⁰ Algra has argued that Chrysippus does not contradict himself because he is entertaining the logical possibility, in contrast to the physical impossibility that in fact obtains, of a world in which the cosmos is destructible.³¹ George Boys-Stones has argued that Chrysippus is engaged in a thought experiment that shows substance (*ousia*)

²⁵ Inwood, “Extension and the Void,” 255.

²⁶ For agreement on this point, see Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems,” 64; Powers, “Void and Place,” 428.

²⁷ Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 581; Zeller, *Outlines*.

²⁸ Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems”; Algra, *Concepts of Space*; see Algra for further bibliography.

²⁹ Boys-Stones, “Locating the Cosmos,” n. 595; Hahm, *Origins*; for comprehensive bibliography on these issues, see Alessandrelli, “Reconstructing.”

³⁰ Hahm, *Origins*, 260–6.

³¹ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 261–339.

and the tension (*hexis*) of the cosmos are referentially distinct in this world, which Plutarch exploits to show Chrysippus imagining *hexis* in total abstraction from *ousia*, which *does* involve positing a central point.³² Finally, Michele Alessandrelli argues that Chrysippus is in fact introducing a second, auxiliary causal factor (the middle place) to account for problems with fire being able to resist the centrifugal tendency present during the conflagration. “Chrysippus would thus be consciously questioning the doctrine of void isotropy.”³³

There is much to appreciate in each of these interpretive options, but none seems to me quite right. I will propose a fresh start, though there will be many points of affinity with the views described. From a methodological standpoint, I share Boys-Stones’ objective to be charitable to both Plutarch and Chrysippus, and to find a substantive debate between them. Dismissing Plutarch altogether is too high a cost for making Chrysippus consistent, and simply agreeing that Chrysippus contradicts himself is too low a bar for the Stoics, particularly when faced with a hostile critic. So I take it to be a desideratum of the account that Chrysippus not be contradicting himself on isotropy and that Plutarch not be completely unreliable. I will begin with the shorter passage from *De defectu oracularum*, introduce my own reading as an alternative to the interpretive options just outlined, and then turn to the longer passage from *De Stoicorum repugnantibus* to support my reading:

- J. (1) By not taking the down and up (*katō kai anō*) relative to the cosmos, but outside it, (2) we will fall into the same puzzles as Epicurus, moving all the atoms into the places under our feet, as if either the void had feet or infinity (*apeiron*) granted a conception of the below and above in itself, (3) wherefore also it is to be wondered what impression ever seized Chrysippus to say that the cosmos is established (*hidrusthai*) in the middle and its substance (*ousia*) has laid hold of the middle place eternally, and being helped by this, no less, for its permanence (*diamonē*) and as-if indestructibility (*hoionei aphtharsia*). For he says this in the fourth book of *On Possibles*, not dreaming rightly of a middle place of the void, and (4) even crazier, hypothesizing that the cause of the cosmos remaining is a non-existent middle: even having said these things many times in other works, that substance is maintained (*dioikeitai*) and held together (*sunechetai*) by movements into its middle and from its middle.

(1) ἐπεὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον ἀλλ’ ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ κάτω καὶ ἄνω λαμβάνοντες, (2) ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀπορίαις Ἐπικούρῳ γενησόμεθα κινουῦντι τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπάσας εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ πόδας τόπους, ὥσπερ ἢ τοῦ κενοῦ πόδοας ἔχοντος ἢ τῆς ἀπειρίας ἐν αὐτῇ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω νοῆσαι διδούσης. (3) διὸ καὶ Χρύσιππον ἔστι θαυμάζειν, μᾶλλον δ’ ὅλως διαπορεῖν, ὅτι διὰ παθῶν τὸν

³² Boys-Stones, “Locating the Cosmos.”

³³ Alessandrelli, “Reconstructing,” 55.

κόσμον ἐν μέσῳ φησὶν ἰδρῦσθαι, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ τὸν μέσον τόπον ἀδίδως κατελιγφύϊαν, οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτῳ συνείργεσθαι πρὸς τὴν διαμονὴν καὶ οἰοῖναι ἀφθαρσίαν. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν λέγει, μέσον τε τοῦ ἀπείρου τόπον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὄνειρώττων (4) ἀτοπωτεραν τε τῆς διαμονῆς τοῦ κόσμου τῷ ἀνυπάρκτῳ μέσῳ τὴν αἰτίαν ὑποτιθεῖς· καὶ ταῦτα πολλὰκις εἰρηκῶς ἐν ἑτέροις, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὐτῆς μέσον ἢ οὐσία καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσει.

Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 28, 425D–E (Babbitt)³⁴

I reconstruct this passage as follows. If one grants absolute direction (up and down) to void (J1), then problems ensue for Epicurus (J2) and for Chrysippus (J3–4). That this is about absolute direction (up, down, center, as most put it) and not about infinity (beginning, middle, or end) is confirmed by the contrast with Epicurus who is committed to the downward motion of atoms. Epicurus, in saying that atoms carry down (“moving all atoms into the places under our feet”), violates isotropy (“as if either the void had feet,” i.e. an absolute bottom, or “infinity granted a conception of the down and up in itself,” i.e. as if what is infinite admitted of absolute direction) (J2).

Chrysippus, in wrongly hypothesizing (“not dreaming rightly”) that the cosmos is in the middle and its substance has landed into the middle place eternally, also violates isotropy and even uses that commitment to secure the permanence and indestructibility of the cosmos (J3). I take it that what Chrysippus is wrongly hypothesizing is a world in which there is absolute direction, an Epicurean universe, and he is saying that in such a world the cosmos would cohere (have “permanence and as-if indestructibility”) just because it occupies the middle place and substance would have come to rest in the middle eternally. It is this latter thesis that leads to Plutarch’s charge of an “even crazier” contradiction, that the cosmos coheres (“remains”) because of a middle that doesn’t even exist (whether by Plutarch’s lights or Chrysippus’ own) and that the cosmos coheres (“is maintained and held together”) by the tensile motion of *pneuma* (“movements into its middle and from its middle”) (J4).

In what respect is Chrysippus wrongly hypothesizing Epicurean space? First, it is clear that Plutarch himself takes the hypothesis of a middle in what is infinite to be contradictory: he cites this as a problem both for Epicurus and for Chrysippus, so this is not merely an ad hominem or dialectical commitment aimed at the Stoics. He is also clear that the source of problems for Chrysippus is Chrysippus’ own commitment to the hypothesis. This is where Plutarch is wrong about Chrysippus. It is true that Chrysippus hypothesizes a world with Epicurean space, and considers that if the world were such, the cosmos would only cohere if it occupied that middle space. But it is not true that Chrysippus is committed to there being such a middle

³⁴ Translation is an amalgam of Alessandrelli, “Reconstructing”; Algra, *Concepts of Space*; Boys-Stones, “Locating the Cosmos”; Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*; and Hahm, *Origins*.

in void or that he is abandoning his commitment to the tensile motions of *pneuma* being what makes the cosmos cohere. Hahm, Algra, Boys-Stones, and Alessandrelli make Chrysippus consistent insofar as they take him to be considering the logical possibility of void with a middle while maintaining its physical impossibility, so that the charge of violating isotropy is neutralized. Again, there is much to appreciate in each of these views, but none seems to me quite right. I will review each of these interpretations, and then support my position with an analysis of the second passage.

As Hahm sees it, Chrysippus is arguing that the cosmos is destructible, even though it never will in fact be destroyed, and in this he is giving us Stoic modal theory, which defines the possible as that which admits of coming about, even if it will not come about in the future. In these texts, Plutarch is misattributing to Chrysippus a non-Stoic argument in favor of indestructibility, which does posit an absolute middle to void, but this is “a counterargument that Chrysippus must refute to establish his own thesis that the cosmos is perishable. Chrysippus indicates his lack of sympathy with this argument by introducing it with ‘as if.’”³⁵ Hahm takes Chrysippus to accept only dialectically that the cosmos is at the absolute center of void, but sees this as accidental and at best a contributing cause of its seeming incorruptibility, and to establish only that substance (as opposed to the cosmos) is indestructible. So even by the mystery opponent’s own lights, the cosmos remains destructible. Thus Plutarch is wrong to charge Chrysippus with violating isotropy because he is misattributing to him the opponent’s counterargument.

I agree with Hahm that the commitment to an absolute center of void is dialectical, thus not Chrysippus’ own view, but I do not think this is an opponent’s counterargument that we have to reconstruct or that Chrysippus’ goal is to establish the destructibility of the cosmos. Rather, it is a thought experiment that Chrysippus is entertaining, according to which space is Epicurean; thus we do not need to posit a mysterious counterargument or reconstruct a response to it to see that he does not violate isotropy. I also agree that Chrysippus is committed to the indestructibility of substance, while being committed to the destructibility of the cosmos. But I do not think that establishing the destructibility of the cosmos is Chrysippus’ goal here, or that “as if” signals his disagreement with an opponent. Rather, the opponent (if there is one) is the Epicurean committed to absolute space, and “as if” signals that while substance always coheres and is therefore indestructible, the cosmos, i.e. the world order or arrangement of that substance, is periodically destroyed and thus only as-if indestructible. Furthermore, on my reading his goal is not to establish the destructibility of the cosmos in this world, but to say what would happen in a possible world with Epicurean space; and what would happen is that if substance and the cosmos it constitutes were in Epicurean space but not landing in its middle, then they would be destroyed. More in support of this as

³⁵ Hahm, *Origins*, 262.

Chrysippus' goal and Plutarch's legitimate challenge to that position in the analysis of our second passage.

Algra, against Hahm, argues that Chrysippus is committed to the view that the cosmos is indestructible and that this is not an opponent's argument to which he is responding.³⁶ According to Algra, for Chrysippus it is *physically* impossible that the cosmos be destroyed because of its structure and tensile motions, but it is *logically* possible in an alternate universe where the cosmos is not held together by tension but instead by a middle place acting on it; and in this we are being given Stoic modal theory.³⁷ Hence he renders what I call the as-if indestructibility of the cosmos as "virtual indestructibility," which is to say that it is destructible only according to logical possibility.³⁸ I suggest that while the alternate world under consideration is indeed only logically possible, it is not one in which the cosmos does not have tension, but one in which that tension would be overpowered by the pull of a middle place if the cosmos should not happen to occupy that middle place (shortly passage K will confirm this point and identify the substantive question Plutarch is raising). Further, I take it that the point of saying that the cosmos is virtually or as-if indestructible is not to signal the logical possibility that it is destructible, but the physical fact that it will be destroyed. The cosmos is "as-if indestructible" in the sense that substance coheres, remains, and is maintained and held together eternally rather than disintegrating (so it is permanent and indestructible), but it is avowedly destructible insofar as each world order ends in a period of conflagration before starting over (hence it is only *as-if* indestructible).

Boys-Stones, tweaking Algra, argues that Chrysippus is entertaining a different thought experiment, one designed to show that *ousia* and *hexis* are referentially distinct: not that there's no *hexis*, but that the cosmos might not be centered on its own *hexis* and in that case it would be destructible.³⁹ Thus he does not hypothesize an alternate world so much as an alternate possibility for this world. And since to countenance that possibility is to countenance an absolute middle of void to be the center of *hexis* in abstraction from *ousia*, Plutarch is right in his charge that Chrysippus posits a middle to isotropic void. Here I agree that Chrysippus does not consider a world where there is no *hexis*, but I disagree that this is an alternate possibility for this world (whatever the distinction between this- and other-world possibilities comes to with a commitment to everlasting recurrence). In other words, I maintain that the thought experiment is of an Epicurean world in which void has absolute direction. The distinct mentions of cosmos and substance in the texts do not signal that *hexis* and *ousia* (substance) are referentially distinct, but

³⁶ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 282–307.

³⁷ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 298–300.

³⁸ See Algra, *Concepts of Space*, n. 70, for arguments that we should read "*hōsper*" instead of "*hoionēi*" in the *St. rep.* passage (K) below and "*hoionēi*" here as "in a way" or "so to speak" over Hahm's "as if."

³⁹ Boys-Stones, "Locating the Cosmos," 580–1.

that in an Epicurean world substance takes its place accidentally, according to the absolute directions of space and however the atoms (substances) interact.

So when Plutarch reports in J3 that Chrysippus says that the cosmos is in the middle and substance has laid hold of the middle place eternally, he is reporting (correctly) that Chrysippus says that in an Epicurean world with absolute direction in an independent void, the cosmos would be in the middle—if it even were in the middle—because substance would have happened to lay hold of the middle place (since in an Epicurean world the direction that substances travel is accidental, a function just of material necessity), and for that reason substance would cohere permanently by chance and the cosmos would be as-if indestructible by chance. Substance would remain in the middle eternally just because it happened to land there, thus cohering permanently by chance, and the cosmos would be as-if indestructible by chance for the same reason, because the possibility of a periodic conflagration depends on substance being able to cohere in the first place. So the point of specifying the cosmos as distinct from substance is that while the cosmos is destroyed periodically and is thus merely as-if indestructible, substance coheres permanently and is thus altogether indestructible, not flying off in different directions and losing its coherence but losing its arrangement between world cycles.

Alessandrelli argues that Chrysippus is genuinely concerned about the coherence of the cosmos during the conflagration and that he consciously violates the isotropy of void to offset the centrifugal motion of fire during conflagration.⁴⁰ He finds three modal observations in this. First that the cosmos will in fact be destroyed, a reflection of physical possibility, but since substance persists and is indestructible, the cosmos is merely quasi- (or as-if) indestructible. With this I am in agreement. Second, he finds that Chrysippus is concerned that the cohesive force of substance might not be enough to prevent it from dispersing during the conflagration, so he considers the logical possibility of a center place to void that would guarantee to its coherence. Here I am in agreement that Chrysippus is considering the possibility that the cohesive force of substance might not be enough to keep it from dispersing, but I disagree that this is a concern for this world; rather, the concern is that in an Epicurean world in which void has absolute direction, if the cosmos were not in the center of that void, then the cohesive force of substance would be overcome by the force of absolute direction and would disperse. Thus I disagree that Chrysippus is genuinely worried about this possibility in the Stoic world, and I resist Alessandrelli's third move to stave off this possibility by appeal to teleological considerations, namely that the actual world is chosen by god because it is best (his third modal observation).

Overall, then, I agree with these scholars that Chrysippus is engaged in a thought experiment, but I am not sure this is central to Stoic modal theory.⁴¹ It does certainly

⁴⁰ Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing."

⁴¹ See de Harven "Necessity, Possibility," for arguments that the Stoics recognized three senses of necessary and possible: logical, metaphysical, and providential.

reveal that the Stoics recognized a difference between physical possibility (or, as I put it, metaphysical possibility) and logical possibility, but I doubt that we should be reading much beyond that into these passages with respect to modal theory or that we should be bringing any robust modal theory to bear on our interpretation of these passages. The governing principle of these texts is that Chrysippus is entertaining the logical possibility of an Epicurean world in which independent void has absolute direction, and asking what would happen to the Stoic cosmos in such a world. His verdict is that the substance of the cosmos would disperse in such a world, if it did not happen to fall in the center place, because the force of the absolute center would overpower the cohesive force of substance. Thus substance would not be indestructible and neither would the cosmos be as-if indestructible. That this is so can now be confirmed by an analysis of the second text from Plutarch:

- K. (1) Chrysippus is always saying that outside the cosmos there is infinite void and that the infinite has no down, center, or up (*archē, meson, teleutē*). And by this most of all they destroy what is said by Epicurus about the atom moving downward of itself, there not being any difference in the infinite according to which the up and down can come to be conceived.

(2) But in the fourth book of *On Possibles*, hypothesizing some middle place and middle room, there he says the cosmos is established. This is what he writes:

(3) “Wherefore too in the case of the cosmos, whether it must be said to be indestructible, I suppose is in need of account. Nevertheless it seems to me to hold rather as follows: in the as-if indestructibility the grasp of room also has much to do with it, that is to say (*hoion*) because of being in the middle; since, if it were conceived elsewhere, destruction would bind to it quite completely.”

And after a little bit, again:

(4) “For as somehow also substance (*ousia*) happens to have taken the middle place eternally, straightaway from being something such [sc. in the middle eternally], so, in another manner but still by chance, it does not admit of destruction and according to this itself [sc. its chancing to occupy the middle] it is eternal.”

(5) These things have one manifest and glaring contradiction, the admission of some middle place and middle room in the void, but (6) there is a second [contradiction] beyond this, more unclear on the one hand and more irrational on the other. For supposing the cosmos would not remain indestructible if its settlement (*hidrusis*) happened to come about according

to another part of void, it is clear he is afraid lest, even with the parts of substance being carried into the middle, the dissolution and destruction of the cosmos should come. But about these things he should not be afraid, if he were not supposing that by nature bodies are carried from all over the place to the middle—not of substance, but of the room surrounding substance.

(7) About which he has also often said that it is impossible and contrary to nature; for there is no differentiation in the void by which bodies are drawn hither or thither, and the structure of the cosmos is the cause of motion of all the parts inclining and being carried from all over into the center and the middle of it.

[. . .]

(8) But you, if the cosmos should be elsewhere in the void, supposing that in this way complete destruction is attached and speaking this way and on account of this seeking a middle in the infinite, which by nature has no middle, you discharge those tensions and holdings together and inclinations as having been given nothing in its preservation, and attribute the entire cause of its remaining to its grasp of place.

And yet to these things aforesaid you attach, just as he who loves the honor of refuting himself:

(9) “In the manner each of the parts is moved, being grown together with the rest, it is reasonable also thusly, that it be moved of itself, even if for the sake of argument we should conceive it and hypothesize it to be in some void of this cosmos; (10) for as it would be cohering from all over it should move into the middle, it should remain in this motion, even if for the sake of argument void should all of a sudden come to be around it.”

(11) Then, on the one hand, no part whatsoever ([even though] encompassed by void) escapes the momentum leading it into the middle of the cosmos, and on other hand, the cosmos itself, unless chance should furnish it with a middle room, loses its cohering tenor, the other parts of its substance being carried all over the place.

(1) ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ἐκτὸς ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον οὐτ’ ἀρχὴν οὔτε μέσον οὔτε τελευτὴν ἔχει πολλάκις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ λέγεται. καὶ τούτω μάλιστα τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ’ Ἐπικούρου τῆς ἀτόμου κάτω φορὰν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἀπειρῷ διαφορᾶς καθ’ ἣν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω νοεῖται γιγνόμενον.

(2) ἀλλ’ ἐν γε τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσην χώραν ὑποθέμενος ἐνταυθα φησιν ἰδρῦσθαι τὸν κόσμον· ἔστι δὲ λέξις αὕτη·

(3) “διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου εἰ ῥητέον φθαρτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν, λόγου οἴομαι δεῖσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐμοὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχειν εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰονεῖ ἀφθαρσίαν πολὺ τι αὐτῷ συνεργεῖ καὶ ἡ τῆς χώρας κατάληψις, οἷον διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι ἐπεὶ, εἰ ἀλλαχῇ νοηθεῖ ὧν, καὶ παντελῶς ἂν αὐτῷ συνάπτοι ἡ φθορά.”

καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν αὖθις

(4) “οὕτω γάρ πως, καὶ ἡ οὐσία συντέτευχεν αἰδίως τὸν μέσον κατειληφυῖα τόπον εὐθὺς τοιάδε τις οὕσα ὥστε <καὶ> καθ’ ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συντυχίαν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι αὐτὴν φθορὰν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ’ εἶναι αἰδίων.”

(5) ταῦτα μίαν μὲν ἔχει καταφανῆ καὶ βλεπομένην ἐναντίωσιν, ἐν ἀπείρῳ μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσσην χώραν ἀπολείποντος, (6) δευτέραν δ’ ἀδηλοτέραν μὲν ἀλογωτέραν δὲ ταύτης. οἰόμενος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀφθαρτον διαμένειν τὸν κόσμον εἰ κατ’ ἄλλο μέρος αὐτῷ τοῦ κενοῦ συντέτευχε γενέσθαι τὴν ἰδρυσιν, δηλὸς ἐστι δεδιὼς μὴ, τῶν μερῶν τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερομένων, διάλυσιν καὶ φθορὰ τοῦ κόσμου γένοιτο. ταῦτα δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐφοβεῖτο, μὴ φύσει τὰ σώματα φέρεσθαι πανταχόθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἡγούμενος οὐ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς περιεχούσης τὴν οὐσίαν χώρας.

(7) περὶ οὗ καὶ πολλάκις εἴρηκεν ὡς ἀδουνάτου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κενῷ διαφορὰν ἢ τὰ σώματα δευρὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δευρὶ προσάγεται, τὴν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου σύνταξιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ νεύοντων καὶ φερομένων <πάντων τῶν μερῶν> πανταχοθέν.

[...]

(8) σὺ δ’, εἰ κατ’ ἄλλο τοῦ τεθείη ὁ κόσμος οἰόμενος οὕτω παντελεῖ συνάπτεσθαι φθορᾷ καὶ λέγων οὕτως καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέσον ἐν τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν πεφυκότες μέσον ζητῶν ἀπείρῳ, τὰς μὲν τάσεις καὶ συνοχὰς καὶ νεύσεις ἐκείνας ὡς οὐδὲν ἐχέγγυνον εἰς σωτηρίαν ἐχούσας ἀφήκας τῇ δὲ καταλήψει τοῦ τόπου τὴν σύμπασαν αἰτίαν τῆς διαμονῆς ἀνέθηκας.

καίτοι τοῖς προειρημένοις ταυτὶ συνάπτεις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξελέγξει φιλοτιμούμενος

(9) “ὃν τρόπον δὲ κινεῖται ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων συμφυεῖς ὃν τῷ λοιπῷ, εὐλογον οὕτως καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ λόγου χάριν νοήσαιμεν αὐτὸ καὶ ὑποθίμεθα εἶναι ἐν κενῷ τινι τοῦ κόσμου τούτου· (10) ὡς γὰρ ἂν συνεχόμενον πάντοθεν ἐκινεῖτο ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, μενεῖ ἐν τῇ κινήσει ταύτῃ, καὶ λόγου χάριν ἐξαίφνης περὶ αὐτὸ γένηται κενόν.”

(11) εἶτα μέρος μὲν ὅτιοῦν ὑπὸ κενοῦ περιληφθὲν οὐκ ἀποβάλλει τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον ἄγουσαν ῥοπήν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος, ἂν μὴ τὴν μέσῃν παρασκευάσῃ χώραν αὐτῷ τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀπολεῖ τὸν συνεκτικὸν τόνον, ἄλλοις ἀλλαχόσε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ μέρεσι φερομένοις.

Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1054B–E. . . 1055B–C (Cherniss)

Plutarch's chapter (44) begins by telling us that Chrysippus is committed to the view ("always saying") that void is isotropic, specifically that it has no up, down, or center, and that he makes this point to refute Epicurus, who posits absolute direction in an independent void (K1). Plutarch then charges Chrysippus with contradicting himself in *On Possibles*, where he engages in a thought experiment considering a world with Epicurean space ("hypothesizing some middle place and middle room") and taking the cosmos to be in that absolute middle ("there he says the cosmos is established") (K2). Here Plutarch correctly reports that this is a hypothesis, but takes it as Chrysippus' own posit rather than as a thought experiment, thus incorrectly attributing the commitment to Chrysippus. Chrysippus does commit to the conditional—if the cosmos were in Epicurean space, then it would be destructible—but he does not endorse the antecedent, as Plutarch portrays him.

Next (K3) we are given a quotation from Chrysippus. Translations vary, and the interpretive issues are many; in the interest of space I will give my own reading and signal these issues in the notes. What Chrysippus says is that the destructibility of the cosmos stands in need of an account (*deisthai logou*),⁴² but that nevertheless or even so (*ou mēn alla kai mallon*)⁴³ one can say at least the following (*houtōs*):⁴⁴ with respect to the as-if indestructibility (*hoionei d' eis tēn hoionei*)⁴⁵ of the cosmos, the grasp (*katalēpsis*)⁴⁶ of room has much to do with it

⁴² Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing," offers "stands in need of qualification"; Algra, *Concepts of Space*, Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, "requires deliberation"; Boys-Stones, "Locating the Cosmos," "we would need to qualify the claim"; Hahm, *Origins*, "there is need for discussion."

⁴³ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, roughly followed by Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing," "All the same, the case seems to be rather . . ."; Boys-Stones, "Locating the Cosmos," "As a matter of fact, things really seem to me . . ."; Hahm, *Origins*, "Nevertheless, it appears all the more to me . . ."

⁴⁴ I follow Algra, *Concepts of Space*, as does Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing," in taking *houtōs* to signal what follows; Hahm, *Origins*, argues that *houtōs* refers to what came before (and not to what follows), namely to the destructibility of the cosmos, and Chrysippus is "doubling down" on his commitment to destructibility; Boys-Stones, "Locating the Cosmos," goes with "this way."

⁴⁵ Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing," following Casevitz and Babut, reads *hoion [d'] eis tēn hōsper*; Algra, *Concepts of Space*, reads *hoion eis tēn hōsper*; Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, reads [*hoionei d'*] *eis tēn hoionei*; Hahm, *Origins*, reads *hoionei d' eis tēn hōsper*; I follow Wyttenbach in reading *eis de tēn hoionei*, on which see apparatus in Cherniss.

⁴⁶ Alessandrelli, "Reconstructing"; Algra, *Concepts of Space*; Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*; and Hahm, *Origins*, understand *katalēpsis* in the sense of possession or occupation rather than in an epistemological sense. I do not think that the technical sense of *katalēpsis* as cognitive impression is in play here, but I do think that the sense is epistemological in that the way we grasp or conceive of room is what is at issue, i.e. whether we think that room is the middle place of void; I take the epistemological reading to be confirmed by talk immediately after of conceiving of room elsewhere. However, even if

(*sunergei*),⁴⁷ that is to say because the cosmos is conceived of as being (“grasped to be”) in the middle, since conceiving (*noein*) of it elsewhere would entail its destructibility. I read Chrysippus as saying that more needs to be said about the destructibility of the cosmos, but that with respect to its destructibility in Epicurean space, one can at least say this much: whether the cosmos remains (has as-if indestructibility) depends on how you think of room (*chōra*), and if you think there is an absolute middle room, i.e. a middle place of void (as he puts it in K4), then the cosmos is only as-if indestructible if it is in that middle. Implicit in this statement is that if you don’t think that void has absolute direction and do not conceive of room this way (as the Stoics do not), then substance coheres permanently and the cosmos is as-if indestructible.

Plutarch then offers a second quotation from Chrysippus (K4). For as somehow (i.e. on an Epicurean hypothesis) substance happens (i.e. accidentally) to have taken the middle place eternally (i.e. remaining there by the pull of the absolute middle), it follows again (“so, in another manner but still by chance”) that it is indestructible and eternal merely by its chancing to occupy the middle (“according to this itself”). What Chrysippus is saying is that if there were absolute direction and motion were accidental, as the Epicureans hold, then substance would come to occupy the middle place, if indeed it did, only accidentally and its (as-if) indestructibility and eternality would be merely accidental (which is crazy). Implicit, again, is that there is no absolute direction, therefore substance does not occupy any such middle, and the as-if indestructibility of the cosmos is due to the tensile motion of *pneuma* and is not accidental.

Next Plutarch explains that there are two contradictions in what Chrysippus says. First (K5), the admission of some middle place and middle room in what is infinite, i.e. Chrysippus violates isotropy. Second (K6), a problem that is harder to identify and more irrational than the first: in fearing that the cosmos would not cohere if it were not in the middle, he is mistakenly assuming an absolute middle of the void (“the room *surrounding* substance”) when he should be dealing in terms of the middle of substance. In brief, he charges Chrysippus with ignoring his own best option: to locate the middle in the middle of substance rather than of void, no longer violating isotropy. To which Chrysippus could respond: it’s a thought experiment, not my own commitment to a middle of void, so *I* am not violating isotropy and I am not forgetting about the middle of substance. In an Epicurean world

we do read this grasping as occupation, my reading of the thought experiment remains; in that case Chrysippus would be saying that, in the context of Epicurean space, whether the cosmos occupies the middle has much to do with its destructibility because if we ran the thought experiment with the cosmos elsewhere the cosmos would be completely destroyed.

⁴⁷ Hahm, *Origins*, takes *sunergei* to indicate that the position of the cosmos is at best a contributing cause; Algra, *Concepts of Space*, translates “a good deal is contributed even by the part of *chōra* that it has occupied”; Alessandrelli, “Reconstructing,” “it is as though the occupation of the place *also* contributed much to its quasi-indestructibility, i.e. on account of the fact that it (sc. the world) lies at the centre.”

in which void has absolute direction, isotropy is violated, and in such a world the centripetal force of tension would be overpowered by the force of absolute direction if substance did not happen to land in the middle.

Plutarch presses the point (K7), emphasizing that Chrysippus is committed to the isotropy of void (“for there is no differentiation in the void by which bodies are drawn hither or thither”), thus contradicting himself by positing a middle; and that he is committed to the structure of the cosmos being responsible for substance being drawn to the middle, thus ignoring that by his very own lights he need not violate isotropy. Plutarch, in the lines not included above (1054E–1055B), offers a third quotation from Chrysippus attesting to his commitment to the natural motion of substance toward its middle. Then (K8) he states the charges again: but you, putting the cosmos in the middle lest it be destroyed, not only violate isotropy but also discharge your own account of tension as contributing nothing to the coherence of substance, making the middle place be the cause instead. Although Plutarch is unfairly attributing the hypothesis to Chrysippus, ignoring its status as a thought experiment, it is fair game to press Chrysippus on the contribution of tension to the coherence of the cosmos. By making the middle be the cause of its coherence in an Epicurean world, it seems that Chrysippus does not allow tension to play its natural role. It is this dialectical move that confirms that Chrysippus’ position is indeed that the tension in substance would be overpowered by absolute direction, and that he is not considering a possible world in which the cosmos does not have tension. Now, Chrysippus can respond that it’s not that tension plays *no* role, just that it would be overpowered if the cosmos were not in the middle of Epicurean space, and to that extent he shows that he does not ignore his own solution to the problem of isotropy. So, although the charge of violating isotropy is not well founded, the latter charge is an interesting and legitimate point for Plutarch to press: does tension make substance cohere, or does it not? If the cosmos would disperse in Epicurean space, what work is Chrysippus’ tension doing anyway? (Answer: in a Stoic world where void has no causal force, it is enough.)

Plutarch follows up with another quotation, this time one that does seem to find Chrysippus contradicting himself, though not on the question of isotropy (K9). Chrysippus says that it is reasonable to think the cosmos would cohere by its own tension (“that it be moved of itself”) even in a hypothetical Epicurean world (“even if for the sake of argument we should conceive it and hypothesize it to be in some void”), because if everything is moving to the middle of substance it should continue that way despite being surrounded by void with absolute direction (“even if for the sake of argument void should all of a sudden come to be around it”). It is clear that Chrysippus is conducting a thought experiment since “for the sake of argument” appears twice, so it cannot be the Stoic void that is in question. Thus it does seem that Chrysippus contradicts what he says in *On Possibles*, where he argues that substance would only cohere in Epicurean void if it were in the middle. Here he says it is reasonable to think that substance *would* cohere even

in Epicurean space. It may be that Chrysippus has changed his mind; or it could be that the follow-up to this statement, that it is reasonable to think substance would cohere even in Epicurean space, is that nevertheless it would not. Or it could be that he conceived Epicurean space to have all of a sudden come to be around it in the middle (though this does not sound like a very interesting thought experiment). In any event, Plutarch does seem to have identified an interesting tension, if not an outright contradiction. Plutarch closes the chapter by putting the contradiction as follows (K10): on the one hand, no part of the cosmos escapes its centripetal motion, and on the other hand, unless chance should furnish it with a middle room, the cosmos loses its cohering tenor as the parts of its substance are carried all over the place. Here we can see that Plutarch has put his finger on a legitimate question: is the cohering tenor enough to bind the cosmos, or not? What does this tension even contribute if it can be overpowered so easily?

So, with respect to the Plutarch passages and the question of isotropy, we can say that Chrysippus does not violate isotropy, and that posits of a middle to infinite void are merely dialectical. Chrysippus is entertaining the possibility of an Epicurean world in which the absolute direction of void exercises causal force on substance. In such a world, substance (and the cosmos) would only be (as-if) indestructible if it were in the absolute middle; otherwise, the internal tension that pulls substance to its middle would be overpowered by the force of absolute direction. There is no need to seek a mystery opponent to whom Chrysippus is responding, since it is clearly a thought experiment and thus no real opponent. Nor is the nature of the thought experiment far to find, or especially subtle: Chrysippus is considering the possibility of Epicurean space, as K1 makes explicit. So there is no need to debate whether his goal is to establish the absolute destructibility or indestructibility of the cosmos; neither of these is his goal. Chrysippus is committed to the indestructibility of substance and as-if indestructibility of the cosmos in this world, where the infinite and isotropic void subsists from the outside out and has no causal force on the cosmos.

There is thus no reason to find trouble in the Stoic world, either during the conflagration or because *ousia* and *hexis* are referentially distinct. Substance coheres permanently and is therefore indestructible full stop; the cosmos is only as-if indestructible because the arrangement of substance that constitutes each world order is periodically destroyed during the conflagration. Thus it is *ousia* and cosmos (not *hexis*) that are referentially distinct, if anything. In a world with Epicurean space, however, i.e. a void with the causal force of absolute direction, things would be different: if substance had landed in the middle of void, then it would cohere, and if it had not, then its cohesive tension would be overcome by the pull of absolute direction. This is where Plutarch applies pressure, asking what the role of tension even is if it is so easily overpowered and whether Chrysippus hasn't contradicted himself on this point elsewhere. This reading not only absolves Chrysippus of violating isotropy, it is a simple and satisfying way to do justice to both Chrysippus and Plutarch.

There is a final puzzle concerning the infinity of void, which concerns a report that Posidonius denies the infinity of void and takes it to be just as large as required for the conflagration.

L. On what is outside the cosmos, whether there is void

- (1) The Pythagoreans say that there is extra-cosmic void, into which and out of which it breathes.
- (2) The Stoics say that there is extra-cosmic void, into which <the cosmos> dissolves at the conflagration, and it is infinite (*apeiron*).
- (3) Posidonius says that it is not infinite, but only as great as (*hoson*) is sufficient in the dissolution.
- (4) Plato and Aristotle say that neither outside the cosmos nor inside is there any void.

Περὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου, εἰ ἔστι κενόν

- (1) οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου κενόν, εἰς ὃ ἀναπνεῖ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἐξ οὗ.
- (2) οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ εἶναι κενόν, εἰς ὃ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἀναλύεται, ἄπειρον.
- (3) Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ ἄπειρον, ἀλλ' ὅσον αὐταρκες εἰς τὴν διάλυσιν.
- (4) Πλάτων Ἀριστοτέλης μήτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου μήτ' ἐντὸς μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν.

Aëtius 2.9 (Mansfeld & Runia)⁴⁸

This text attributes to Posidonius the heterodox view that the void is not infinite but only as large as is required for the cosmos to expand during the conflagration.⁴⁹ Scholars have responded initially either by embracing Posidonius as heterodox without giving it further thought, or by rejecting the testimony of Aëtius and, in I. G. Kidd's case, arguing for an emendation of the text (L3) to say that the void is not infinite *insofar as* (*kath' hoson*) it is sufficient for the conflagration (but that it is nevertheless infinite).⁵⁰ More recently scholars have rejected Kidd's emendation

⁴⁸ See text-critical remarks in Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 323–4; EK and Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, F84, F97; Mansfeld & Runia, Aëtius; S. White, "Posidonius and Stoic Physics," 49–51.

⁴⁹ For parallel textual evidence and reasons to doubt sources that ascribe this view to the Stoics in general, see Algra, "Posidonius on Void," and *Concepts of Space*, 321–9.

⁵⁰ See Algra, "Posidonius on Void," and *Concepts of Space*, 321–9, for exposition and bibliography. On the side of Posidonius as orthodox, see Inwood, "Extension and the Void," n. 44, who takes Posidonius to *explain* what Chrysippus really meant by "*apeiron*," namely that it is indefinite but not strictly infinite in a spatial sense, rather than to correct Chrysippus, as doxographers mistakenly took it; thus the textual evidence attributing finite void to the Stoics in general need not be doubted, and Posidonius need not be heterodox. And see Powers, "Void and Space," 423–4, who argues that the use of "void" here may be a concession to Peripatetics, using the term to refer to what can be and will get occupied, rather than to deny the infinity of Stoic void.

but also sought reasons for Posidonius to make this heterodox move. Algra argues that Posidonius makes the void finite as a bridge between Chrysippus' heterodox view of room (*chōra*) as a finite vessel and the infinity of void. In the next section I will call into question Algra's account of room and argue that it is not an extra-cosmic phenomenon at all. If I am right in this, then the concept of room is not a reason for Posidonius to have made the void finite.

Teun Tieleman has argued that Posidonius identified a genuine problem with the infinity of void that caused him to deny the orthodox commitment to void as infinite.⁵¹ According to this reading, Posidonius is seeking a middle ground between the problematic posit of an infinite void and the denial of conflagration advocated by his teacher Panaetius; thus he is not altogether heterodox in his view but is offering, rather, a compromise or "doctrinal streamlining" between two bad options—the denial of conflagration and the infinity of void. The problem Tieleman finds with infinite void can be put in the form of a syllogism: void is defined as what can be occupied by body; but no body is infinite; therefore void is not infinite.⁵² Here I resist the idea that this a legitimate problem for the infinity of void even though I agree with Tieleman that "Stoic incorporeals have a 'subsistence' that is derivative from body, i.e. they are a kind of attribute that remains related to the cosmic mass."⁵³ The definition of void as what can be occupied by body does not entail that there must be an infinite body to occupy it (Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,86–8 (Todd)). Whether there could be an infinitely large body to occupy the infinite void is not relevant to whether it is such as to admit body and become occupied; it is fit to admit body whether there is a body to occupy it or not because it begins at the edge of the cosmos and extends infinitely outward with no other body to limit it. The reason void is defined as what can be occupied is simply that it is extension that is not already occupied; as Sextus reports, void is what can be occupied but isn't or, equivalently, extension empty of body (H1). Thus the infinity of void does not strike me as a genuine problem for the dependence thesis or a good reason for Posidonius to have made void finite.

Stephen White argues that Posidonius would have had to choose between two different theoretical perspectives in tension with each other: a physical perspective that finds the void only large enough for the dissolution, and an abstract perspective that finds the void infinite because there is nothing beyond it to limit it.⁵⁴ Since physics is primary for Posidonius, he would have chosen the first perspective and made the void finite. Here I resist the idea that there are distinct theoretical perspectives in tension with one another. Both are physical arguments, and neither entails that the void is finite, thus we still do not have a good reason for Posidonius

⁵¹ Tieleman, "Posidonius on the Void."

⁵² Tieleman, "Posidonius on the Void," 80.

⁵³ Tieleman, "Posidonius on the Void," 79–80.

⁵⁴ S. White, "Posidonius," 49–51.

to have made void finite. Here, Powers' observation that the void is not infinite because of the conflagration, even if the conflagration is one reason they posit void, is apt; if we allow only the mechanics of the conflagration to dictate our understanding of the void, we will not explain its infinity.⁵⁵ What explains the infinity of void (on my reading) is that it *subsists* from the outside out with no other body to limit it; it is infinite because it is extra-cosmic (G4). That the conflagration does not require infinite void to expand does not change the metaphysics of void, even if the conflagration is what motivated the Stoics to recognize extra-cosmic void.

The upshot is that we do not know why Posidonius held this heterodox view, or even with certainty that he did. I don't see any reason to doubt the testimony, or emend the text, except to make him orthodox. But neither are there any devastating problems with the orthodoxy that clearly motivate his divergence. And while I resist accounts that find the Stoics in disagreement at every turn, and am certainly arguing here in favor of a Stoic orthodoxy concerning incorporeal *subsistence*, I do not think this requires us to deny all internal disagreement or innovation. Perhaps Posidonius was heterodox on this point. I will not take a stand on this question because for Posidonius to be heterodox on the infinity of void does not undermine my account of void as dependent on body for its *subsistence*. The view I propose as the Stoic orthodoxy is that void is infinite because it *subsists* from the outside of the cosmos out, inheriting its three-dimensional extension from all sides with no other body to limit it. But if Posidonius was committed to void as finite, this heterodoxy is still a way of being true to the dependence thesis, *subsisting* only according to the cosmos at its largest, during the conflagration. I have addressed this debate without taking a stand on Posidonius' heterodoxy in order to show that the Stoic commitment to infinite void is not inherently problematic.

This question brings us to the elephant in the room: room (*chōra*). I said at the beginning of the chapter that interpretive difficulties about the other spatial incorporeals terminate in debates about the status of void. So before turning to room and the other spatial incorporeals, let me summarize the results on void. First, we saw that void is a negative conception, it is what lacks body and hence *existence*. This raised the question: how can void be Something rather than nothing? The answer is that it is infinite three-dimensional extension (hence not a modal entity)—but not in an Epicurean spirit that makes void independent or absolute, on an ontological par with body (hence without adequate explanation for the negative characterization).⁵⁶ Rather, it is infinite three-dimensional extension in

⁵⁵ Powers, "Void and Space," 423–4.

⁵⁶ Powers, "Void and Space," 430–1, argues that the collapse into Epicurean void can be avoided even though Stoic void is absolute because the mark of substancehood for the Stoics is not independence or three-dimensional extension but causal power, hence void is not on a par with body after all. It is true, of course, that the ontological criterion for *being* is what I have called the action/passion criterion, and that in this the Stoics distinguish between *existence* and *subsistence*. But I am not sure this move addresses the collapse Algra fears for the Stoics, which is the collapse into treating both body and void as independent elements of the cosmos.

a grounding spirit that makes void dependent on underlying body (the cosmos) for its *subsistence* (infinite three-dimensional extension from the outside out), hence not absolute or independent and not on an ontological par with body. This infinity, we saw, is spatial infinity, a quantitative notion from the outside out of the cosmos, rather than a general qualitative indefiniteness. Further, this infinity is genuinely isotropic, with no up, down, or center (contrary to Plutarch's charges), and its being what *can be* occupied by body does not require an infinitely large body able to occupy it. In short, with these various puzzles neutralized, nothing stands in the way of understanding void as infinite extra-cosmic extension grounded in body.

We are now in a position to see just how the Stoics agree and disagree with the atomists about void. They agree with the Democritean conception of void (or rather, voids) as a real entity, in that Stoic void is something referred to with a count noun: *the* void is Something for the Stoics and, as I will show at the end of this chapter, it meets the *subsistence* criterion including the Not Someone (*Outis*) test for particularity. This allows the Stoics to use substantialist discourse. But they also agree with the Epicurean conception that takes void in the sense of empty space, in that Stoic void is non-solid three-dimensional extension that can be occupied by body but is not occupied; it is empty and it is the same in its whole and parts. This allows the Stoics to speak of the void in mass terms. Yet while it is what can be occupied by body, Stoic void does not persist in the background when it is occupied, but is destroyed and becomes place; it is by definition *unoccupied*, and the invention of a further entity "space" (with no Greek clearly corresponding to this term) to serve as that background entity that persists while being occupied is not necessary. In this, Stoic void is akin to Konstan's conception of Epicurean void as the space between bodies; of course, there is only one body at the cosmic level for the Stoics, and so the void will never be between bodies, but to the extent that it does not persist while occupied it corresponds to the "ideal fluid" conception. On the other hand, Stoic void is unlike any atomist picture insofar as it is not an independent or self-subsistent entity but, rather, dependent on body for its *subsistence*. If all body were eliminated, there would be no void—there would be nothing at all. So the Stoics are rather like relationists about space, but in a non-reductive spirit that allows them to use substantialist discourse that takes void as a countable entity.

Room

The elephant in the room in our discussion of void has been the idea argued for by Algra that *chōra*, room or space, is the finite portion of void that gets occupied by the cosmos during the conflagration. Whether the void is isotropic or not, then, depends on whether we think that there is a portion of it that has spatial

determination.⁵⁷ The accounts of room we have seen do not obviously tell us that *chōra* is an extra-cosmic phenomenon, and I will argue that it is not. Aëtius tells us that room is “what is partly occupied, just as in the case of a jar of wine” (A3). And this is echoed by Sextus, who reports that room is extension that is partly occupied and partly unoccupied (H3), adding that some say room is the place of a larger body with the result that place makes no reference to the size of the occupying body but room does (H4). Stobaeus says more, but also raises more questions. He reports that whenever what can be occupied is partly occupied and partly unoccupied, the whole is neither place nor void, but something else without a name (G2); and then asks whether room is a bigger thing that can be occupied by body, like a bigger container (G3a), or what has room for a bigger body (G3b). Our account will need to explain not only what room is, but also what the nameless entity is, its relation to room, and the difference between a bigger container and what has room for a bigger body. In addition, we will need to contend with the mentions of room in the Plutarch passages we saw above.

Algra argues that *chōra* is an extra-cosmic phenomenon rather than, as suggested by Long & Sedley, the “less technical point that a spatial container within the world, for instance a half-filled wine jar, can accommodate more of the body which partly fills it.”⁵⁸ He says that “the whole context of the definitions at issue seem to be primarily concerned with what we might call ‘large-scale *topos*,’” citing as evidence that Cleomedes (passage B) reports the void is extra-cosmic and of this, the part that is occupied will be place and the part that unoccupied is void.⁵⁹ Certainly void is an extra-cosmic phenomenon, and void that gets occupied by the cosmos does become place, but I do not think that this shows that place or the spatial incorporeals generally are being considered only at the cosmic level such that the occupying body is the cosmos itself as opposed to individual bodies.

As argued above, “of this” does refer to void that becomes place, but this does not make it independent or entail that there is some further entity, “space” that gets occupied; it only makes the void that becomes place prior to the place it becomes, and that is compatible with void itself depending on body for its *subsistence*. Nor am I moved by the suggestion that being occupied by body means being occupied by *any* body (or perhaps *some* body) in contrast to a particular body and that we are therefore dealing at the cosmic level.⁶⁰ To be occupied by *any* body just is to be occupied by a particular body, whether it be a middle-sized body or the cosmos itself; so it does not follow that definitions of room apply only at “what we might

⁵⁷ Konstan, “Stoic Intervals,” argues that the spatial extent of extra-cosmic room is distinguished from the rest of the isotropic void because it is a part of the compound whole consisting of the portion of void that is occupied during the conflagration and the cosmos in its current state.

⁵⁸ LS, 296.

⁵⁹ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 279–80, followed by Konstan, “Stoic Intervals,” Mouraviev, “Zeno’s Cosmology.”

⁶⁰ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, n. 32.

call the ‘macro’ level, i.e. in a cosmic setting, where there is space occupied by the cosmic body next to space that is absolutely unoccupied (i.e. the void).⁶¹

Algra argues, further, that in the Chrysippean description of what is unnamed, the word “*sōma*” refers to the body of the cosmos.⁶² I do not find the word “*sōma*” in the description of the unnamed phenomenon (G2), but it does appear in G3, which raises a question about *chōra*: is it like a bigger container for a body or what has room for a bigger body?⁶³ G4 then picks up with “at any rate,” presumably leaving it open how to characterize *chōra*, and reports that void is said to be infinite because it is outside the cosmos (followed by the explanation of why being extra-cosmic makes void infinite, as discussed above). This contrast between void as infinite and room (implicitly) as finite gives us another reason to think that room is an intra-cosmic phenomenon. Of course, Algra embraces room as finite extra-cosmic void, so what we need to ask is whether *sōma* really does seem to refer to the body of the cosmos in this passage and whether it really is therefore “not unreasonable to expect that, accordingly, also the concept of *chōra* could meaningfully figure in a ‘cosmic’ context.”⁶⁴ It is on this basis that Algra infers that *chōra* is a finite part of space: since room is defined in G3 as what is larger than and can contain more of a smaller body, and since the smaller body in question is the cosmos itself, *chōra* must be the larger but still finite space which surrounds and encompasses the cosmos. But is it the cosmos itself that is in question?

Let us examine the evidence a little more closely. The passage begins with a definition of place as what is occupied through and through by an existent (G1a), or what can be occupied by an existent and is occupied through and through by one or many existents (G1b). I will turn to the analysis of place in the next section, but I can say here that place is certainly an intra-cosmic phenomenon, even if the cosmos itself may also be said to have place (it is, after all, a body) and even though there is evidence elsewhere that void that gets occupied becomes place (making it intra-cosmic). These are compatible positions, but the present point is that there is no indication that we are working at a cosmic level in this passage. Then G2 says that when what can be occupied by an *existent* is partly occupied and partly unoccupied the whole is neither place nor void but something nameless.

The assumption Algra and others make is that there is a general notion of space, what can be occupied, and therefore both place and void are “species of a more

⁶¹ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, n. 32.

⁶² Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 280.

⁶³ Algra, following the text of Diels, takes this latter segment of the text as an assertion that room is either like a bigger container for a body or what has room for a bigger body (as do Alessandrelli, Powers, and Tieleman), but von Arnim, also following the text of Diels, prints it with a question mark, as do Long & Sedley; Inwood, “Extension and the Void;” Konstan, “Stoic Intervals.” I also take it as a question, but not very much turns on it since it is a disjunction either way.

⁶⁴ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 280.

general 'entity', viz. what we might call 'space'.⁶⁵ Place is thus what can be occupied and de facto is; and void, Algra extrapolates, is what can be occupied and de facto isn't.⁶⁶ On this reading G2 reports that what can be occupied, i.e. space, is partly occupied (place) and partly unoccupied (void). This is natural to the extent that void is indeed what can be occupied but isn't. However, the immediate context has just defined place as what can be occupied and is, so what comes next in G2 can plausibly be understood as a further distinction within or related to place, in which case we do not have an extra-cosmic phenomenon on the table. This nameless entity, the whole that is partly occupied and partly unoccupied, is neither place nor void, we are told—but note that this does not mean that the whole is both place and void.⁶⁷ Furthermore, it is natural to take the transition to G3, which raises a question about room, as an extension of G2 about the nameless entity. Indeed the transition is punctuated by a semicolon, suggesting that it is part of the same thought: if the whole that is partly occupied and partly unoccupied is this nameless thing, then what are we to say that room is?

But now one might well observe that room is what is partly occupied, as Aëtius reports (passage A), so it is puzzling what the distinction between the nameless entity and room comes to. Inwood argues that the nameless entity is a new concept, extension, introduced by Chrysippus to serve as the conceptual backdrop for Zeno's incorporeals, but that this is something other than *diastēma*.⁶⁸ Room, in contrast to this unnamed extension, he takes to be an intra-cosmic phenomenon, "extension only partly occupied by some particular body, though of course the rest of it is occupied by something else, say air."⁶⁹ Algra, on the other hand, takes the nameless entity to correspond to an orthodox Stoic conception of room as space or *diastēma*, consisting of the sum of place and void, and takes Chrysippus to be leaving extension nameless because he favors a heterodox conception of room as the finite vessel surrounding the cosmos.⁷⁰ For Powers, like Algra, "place and void imply a notion of *space* as an extension that can be occupied by body (whether or not it is occupied)," except he does not find heterodoxy; rather, he takes the early Stoics to differ from the Epicureans about space just insofar as the Epicureans call it intangible substance while the Stoics generally refrain from labeling it, e.g. Chrysippus in this passage.⁷¹ For Powers, then, the unnamed entity is

⁶⁵ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, n. 28; cf. Alessandrelli, 55–6, n. 14, who suggests that "what can be occupied" is "indicative of the somewhat paradigmatic role of the incorporeality of void." See also Konstan, "Stoic Intervals," and Powers, "Void and Place."

⁶⁶ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 271.

⁶⁷ For agreement on this point, see Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems." For this reason the suggestion of LS, 296, and others that room is the all (*to pan*), the sum of place and void, cannot be right.

⁶⁸ Inwood, "Chrysippus," 247–8; for arguments against this distinction, see Algra, *Concepts of Space* n. 108.

⁶⁹ Inwood, "Chrysippus," 248–9.

⁷⁰ Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 272–3, followed by Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems," 65.

⁷¹ Powers, "Void and Place," 418, original emphasis.

the orthodox conception of space or extension (*diastēma*), while *chōra* is (for both the Epicureans and the Stoics) the surrounding area within which a particular body is situated or through which it moves, which is presumably an intra-cosmic phenomenon.

I propose that all this can be explained as the rather fine-grained distinction between three distinct phenomena. And that we need not make the assumption of an additional entity, space—a word to which no Greek term in our texts clearly corresponds, in order to understand these distinctions. G2 could just as well report that what can be occupied and is occupied (following on G1), i.e. intra-cosmic extension, can itself be partly occupied and partly unoccupied, in which case that whole thing is not strictly place or void, but something else we don't have a name for. This would be to say that an intra-cosmic region of extension can be both occupied and yet only partly occupied and yet nowhere completely empty. This is not so outlandish as it sounds, indeed the jar of wine is a ready model and Inwood's description of being partly occupied by some particular body "though of course the rest of it is occupied by something else, say air" is apt. And the reason the whole consisting of both has no name is that it's an oddball entity, not because it's the common notion of "space" or because it's new.

Consideration of this nameless entity then raises the question whether room, by contrast to this sum, is simply the inside limit of the container itself, i.e. the extension inside the jar ("like a bigger container for body") (G3a), or the unoccupied extension, i.e. the part unoccupied by wine but occupied by air, within the container ("what has room for a bigger body") (G3b).⁷² We might think of the first phenomenon as the total inside extension, considered from the interior limit of the jar in, and the second as extension *subsisting* from limit of the wine, outside out to the interior limit of the jar. These are subtle distinctions, and maybe Chrysippus was innovating in the details. In that case, we can see that the treatment of room is not a less technical point about ordinary phenomena rather than robust spatial theorizing, as Long & Sedley suggest, but an equally technical point about the nature of intra-cosmic space. However, this technical attention to detail does not give us reason to think that we are dealing at a cosmic scale, as Algra argues. The Stoics are being technical about all the spatial incorporeals, inside the cosmos and out. Further, there is no reason to find other Stoics choosing between these as exclusive alternatives.

Nor do these intricacies suggest significant innovation or heterodoxy about "space," place, void, or room. In fact on this reading, even the view reported by Sextus (H4) that room is the place of a larger body is not out of place.⁷³ It may

⁷² It is tempting to use scare quotes for "unoccupied" since it is not fully unoccupied; this may correspond to Alessandrelli's idea, "Aspects and Problems," of an informal sense of occupied space as what can be accessed.

⁷³ Contra Algra, *Concepts of Space*; Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems."

be that the unnamed phenomenon is neither place nor void, but to the extent that this and room are intra-cosmic phenomena, there is a natural sense in which room is a kind of place. In fact, in passage H the exposition begins with void, then goes to place, and after that to room, so there is reason to think room is firmly in the intra-cosmic dimension and that the task is to differentiate between place and room considered as intra-cosmic phenomena. As the place of a larger body it makes reference to the size of the occupying body, whereas place defined just in terms of being occupied makes no essential reference to the size of the occupying body; whatever the size of the occupying body is, that will be the size of the place, whereas room will always be bigger than the occupying body.

Nor, finally, is there any motivation to posit that what can be occupied is one thing, space, or extension, and then that entity is called either void, place, or room depending on whether it is occupied or not. Rather, there is three-dimensional extension *subsisting* inside the cosmos (place, room, and this unnamed phenomenon, among others perhaps) and extension *subsisting* outside the cosmos (void). In both cases, that extension is posterior to and dependent on body for its *subsistence*: either to the occupying or delimiting bodies in the intra-cosmic cases, or to the cosmos in the extra-cosmic case of void. Thus we can see that it's not just room that is relative to body, as Inwood and Algra suggest, but all the spatial incorporeals insofar as they inherit their extension from underlying body.⁷⁴

Finally, we have the various mentions in Plutarch about the middle place and middle room of void. This context clearly is extra-cosmic, but it is also a thought experiment conducted in Epicurean terms. In K2, Plutarch characterizes Chrysippus "hypothesizing some middle place and middle room," which is correct insofar as Chrysippus is considering an Epicurean world in which void has absolute direction, and incorrect insofar as he does not himself commit to there being any such middle in this world. In K3, Chrysippus is quoted saying that with respect to the destructibility of the cosmos "the grasp of room has much to do with it," which I read as saying that how one thinks of room, i.e. whether one thinks of there being some middle room in void, has much to do with whether the cosmos is destructible. If one does think that there is a middle room, as the Epicureans do, then the cosmos will be indestructible only if it is in that middle room, because if it were conceived elsewhere it would be destroyed ("destruction would bind to it quite completely"). In K4 Chrysippus is quoted again, this time speaking in terms of a middle place, and in K5 Plutarch goes after Chrysippus for "the admission of some middle place and middle room." Thus the cosmic context of these passages in which Chrysippus is engaged in a thought experiment that hypothesizes Epicurean space is no evidence of his own commitment to void or space as absolute, or to room as an extra-cosmic phenomenon.

⁷⁴ Inwood, "Extension and the Void," 248; Algra, *Concepts of Space*, 223, 277–8.

Place

I turn now to place (*topos*). Nowhere is incorporeal dependence on body more apparent than in the definition of place as what is occupied by body (A2, B2). Further, we have the testimony of Sextus that place is what is occupied by an *existent*, i.e. by a body, and equal (*exisazomenon*) to what occupies it (H2). The Greek “*exisazomenon*” in the passive voice means to be equal or coextensive with; this tells us that place gets its three dimensions, hence its shape and size, from the occupying body. For example, the place where my car is parked depends for its *subsistence* on my car (and the pavement underneath)—the positive physical characteristics the parking place has, its three spatial dimensions, are given to it by my car. If there were any doubt about this dependence, Simplicius makes it plain.

M. And he [Iamblichus] says that if, as the Stoics say, place subsists in consequence of (*paruphistatai*) bodies, [then] it also takes its definition from them inasmuch as it is filled by bodies [. . .] For if place were inert (*adranēs*) in the infinitely extended void without having any subsistence for being, [then] it would also take its definition from without.

καί φησιν ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσιν, παρυφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθ’ ὅσον συμπληροῦται ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων [. . .] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀδρανὴς ὁ τόπος ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ καὶ διαστήματι ἄνευ τινὸς ὑποστάσεως ἔχων τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἂν ἔξωθεν παρεδέχετο.

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 361,10–2. . .361, 15–7 (Kalbfleisch)

Note, first of all, that place is described not just as *subsisting*, but as *subsisting in consequence* of bodies—*paruphistatai*; or, as Richard Gaskin puts it, place “subsists [merely] as an appendage to bodies.”⁷⁵ A. C. Lloyd has argued that Simplicius uses this term specifically to signify a privation, and that it is used by Proclus and the Neoplatonists generally to signify a parasitic and “totally dependent existence.”⁷⁶ Thus Simplicius’ use of “*paruphistatai*” strongly suggests a dependence relation. One could yet resist the point and choose “subsists alongside,” as a more non-committal rendering—as commentators committed to the independence of the incorporeals *must* in fact do.⁷⁷ However, context confirms the picture of dependence twice over; first, in that the contrast case is Archytas’ account of place as what has being per se (*ousian echei kath’ hauton*). Second, the inference Simplicius

⁷⁵ Gaskin, *On Aristotle Categories* 9–15; or with Brunschwig, *TGS*, 94, as “subsiste en liaison.”

⁷⁶ Lloyd, “Parhypostasis in Proclus,” 148–9, 154–7; on the other hand, Lloyd also takes place to be one of the *lekta*, so my agreement is limited to this point of translation, which, it should be noted, is already limited by the focus on Proclus.

⁷⁷ Or with Caston, “Something and Nothing,” n. 126, following Atherton, “supervenes on.”

draws from the *parupostasis* of place makes the picture fully transparent: if place *subsists* in consequence of bodies (as the Stoics affirm), then place inherits its properties (“takes its definition”) from the bodies that fill it. The context is not polemical, but expository, and Simplicius is a sober commentator whose hostility to the Stoics does not undermine the reliability of his reports.⁷⁸ The inheriting of properties is not an unwelcome commitment that Simplicius is foisting on the Stoics, but rather a straightforward account of the view they embrace.

Let us consider now the disjunctive definition of place reported by Stobaeus. Place is what is occupied through and through by an *existent* (G1a), or what can be occupied by an *existent* and is occupied through and through by one *existent* or several (G1b). This is a curious disjunction, since the second disjunct begins by offering what looks like a distinct conception of place but then immediately adds “and is occupied,” which would seem to assimilate (b) to (a). However, this does not reduce (b) to (a), but rather introduces a distinction between two ways of being place in the intra-cosmic plenum. The first way of being place (G1a) is to be three-dimensional, non-solid extension that *is* occupied by a body, e.g. the place of my car defined by the solid three-dimensional extension of the car that occupies it. Think of place in this sense as *subsisting* “from the inside out,” determined by the occupying body. Place understood as what *can be* occupied (G1b), on the other hand, gets its three dimensions from the *surrounding* bodies that define and delimit the place, like an open parking space is defined by the cars around it. Think of this as place *subsisting* “from the outside in.” The addition to the second disjunct that it also is occupied, by one body or several, does not assimilate (b) to (a) but, rather, underlines the fact that all place is intra-cosmic and the cosmos is a plenum (Galen, *Diff. puls.* 8.674,13–4 (49D)).⁷⁹ That there could be several occupying bodies is likely a reference to the Stoic theory of blending, which allows two or more bodies to be colocated.⁸⁰ Any open parking place that *can be occupied* by a car will also *be occupied* by air (or some other substance); all place is part of the intra-cosmic plenum. Put this way the dependence of place on body is apparent in both disjuncts.

Alessandrelli argues that G1b signals a counterfactual possibility, considering place without the body that occupies it, in contrast to the actual condition of place,

⁷⁸ For a spirited apology of Simplicius and his philosophical contributions, see Baltussen, *Simplicius*.

⁷⁹ As BS also see it, followed by Konstan, “Stoic Intervals.”

⁸⁰ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 95; I do not think it is likely that the plural makes reference to a body considered as a collection of parts rather than as a whole, as Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems,” 55, suggests. There is no evidence that parts are considered Somethings except insofar as all individual bodies are considered partial wholes_c with respect to the whole, cosmos; on the contrary, parts are neither the same as nor different from their wholes and thus not separable without destruction (see Chapter 3); but I do agree that the occupation in question is synchronic rather than diachronic. I am also skeptical that the second disjunct “evokes a counter-factual possibility that stands in contrast to the actual condition of place,” and that it is possible to imagine this scenario because of the ontological difference between place as an incorporeal and the occupying existent as a body (Alessandrelli, “Aspects and Problems,” 57–8).

which is always what is occupied, and therefore G1a and G1b are really just one definition and not two.⁸¹ He takes it that no place could be occupied by another body because a body's place always travels with it, and that this counterintuitive conception of place is what prompts Chrysippus to introduce room as the intra-cosmic space that endures despite the incessant movement of bodies coming, stopping, and going.⁸² However, we need not think of place as problematic in this way, such that the Stoics have no way to talk about bodies changing place. Although the place of my car is delimited by my car, and although wherever my car is that will be its place, it does not follow that the place my car currently is cannot be occupied by another car, or that my car cannot occupy a different space.

Technically all intra-cosmic space is determined by the whole cosmos, so moving a particular body from one place to another does not make the three-dimensional extension where it was go out of *subsistence* (it is still the same place relative to the rest of the cosmos as a whole) or a new piece of extension come into *subsistence*. For example, if I move a wine jar from one place to another, the place it *was* is individuated or picked out by the jar, but that portion of intra-cosmic space does not cease to *subsist* once I move the jar, because the cosmos as a whole gives *subsistence* to all intra-cosmic space. The jar in this case functions as a sort of rigid designator for that portion of intra-cosmic space that it was occupying; the jar does not bring that extension into or out of *subsistence*. Likewise, if we want to think about where to put the jar, where it could be, one could still pick out the place by reference to the place of another jar or to the delimiting bodies that create a place as what can be occupied, e.g. that spot on the shelf between two other jars.⁸³ So, I agree with Alessandrelli that it would be a counterintuitive notion of place, indeed vacuous, if a body always occupies the same place; but I disagree that the solution is an innovation with room. The solution, rather, is to see that Chrysippus did not have this conception of place to begin with. The ontological independence of a particular place from any particular occupying body is supplied by the totality of bodies in the cosmos; and its being defined as the place *of that jar* is a way of picking out a region of intra-cosmic space that *subsists* whether it is filled by that jar or not.

Nor does this fact prevent the Stoics from defining and individuating the place of the jar in terms of the jar, as in the first definition of place as what is occupied; that is, after all, the point of having the concept of place as the place *of a body* to begin with. The first disjunct clearly corresponds to what is described as the exact

⁸¹ Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems," 57.

⁸² Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems," 62–3.

⁸³ It is even possible that the second disjunct in the definition of place, what can be occupied and is, might be designed to indicate that a place currently occupied by one body can later be occupied by another. In that case, perhaps what I have called place *subsisting* from the outside in, delimited by surrounding bodies, might better be called room; or maybe what can be occupied and is covers both. Either way, these are all intra-cosmic pockets and no sign of deep disagreement but of fine-tuning the details of spatial *subsistence*. More on room as a kind of place ahead.

or precise conception (*pros* or *kat' akribeian*, *kuriōs*, *kata perigraphē*) of place defined as “the air surrounding the surface of a body” (SE, M. 10.15, 95, 108 (Bury); PH 3.75, 119 (Bury)). But now a question arises about the broad conception (*kata platos*, *aphelōs*) of place with which the exact conception is contrasted, e.g. being in Alexandria, or the gymnasium, or the city. One might wonder whether the broad conception corresponds to the second disjunct, place defined as what can be occupied. The broad conception of place does make mention of being larger than the body and allowing for a body to move through place in a sense that could be akin to the place I could park my car, i.e. what can be occupied. However, there are reasons to doubt that the second disjunct is a broad conception of place rather than a second, precise definition. First, there is no mention in the definitions of void, place, or room of a distinction between exact and broad conceptions. Speaking broadly is a matter of speaking loosely, or in an everyday sense as opposed to a technical sense (as Bett puts it).⁸⁴ So, as definitions and absent any mention of speaking broadly, we have every reason to think these are exact or precise.

Second, the broad conception of place is never described as what can be occupied; it is simply exemplified as being in Alexandria or in the gymnasium. And, finally, the fact that the broad conception of place is invoked to allow motion in a place does not assimilate it to place as what can be occupied, nor is the idea of what can be occupied ever put in terms of enabling motion. The broad conception of place is simply a response to undue technicalities, allowing us to speak in ordinary language of motion in a place. To the precise question, whether there can be a change of place when place is defined just in terms of the occupying body, the answer is no; but we can still speak of motion or change of place when a body is said to be loosely or (as we might put it today, weakly) located at a place. We can speak of where something is in either way; the term “where” is retrenchable, from the precise account defined by the occupying body to the room, the building, the city, or the cosmos one is in.⁸⁵ We have seen this move before, in speaking loosely of the parts of the body (head, trunk, and limbs) while resisting the technical appeal to parts when infinite divisibility is invoked (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1079B–C (50C3, passage H3/Chapter 3). Thus the second disjunct in the definition of place is not a loose or broad way of speaking, but an exact or precise definition of place as what can be occupied in terms of the surrounding or delimiting bodies.

More importantly, the second definition of place as what can be occupied and it does not give us reason to think that what can be occupied is either void or a distinct entity, space, which is called place when it is occupied. That *would* be to

⁸⁴ Bett, *Against Physicists*, 84 n. 7. I will revisit the distinction between exact and precise ways of talking in the next chapter on time, where we can speak of the now only loosely and not exactly.

⁸⁵ The term “retrenchable” in application to the Stoics is due to Schofield, “Retrenchable,” drawing on Owen; I will return to this point in the next chapter, on time, where we will see that “when” or “now” is also retrenchable from the precise notion of the present instant to the present, hour, day, month, year, or world order.

assimilate (b) to (a) and make the distinction vacuous. If there is any conclusion to draw from the mention of Chrysippus, it is that Chrysippus is being more fine-grained in his attention to the spatial incorporeals. Just as with the description of the nameless entity and the two possible definitions of room, the text does not give us reason to think that Chrysippus is working with a distinct notion of space or being heterodox about room. If he is innovating, it is in the details of the intra-cosmic pockets of spatial extension, not in any way that finds him breaking with the orthodox conception of place and room.

To summarize the results of Stobaeus' report (passage G): we now have several distinct ways for spatial incorporeals to *subsist* according to underlying body. Place defined as what is occupied we can say *subsists* from the inside out, e.g. the place that my car is parked (G1a). Defined as what can be and is occupied, place *subsists* from the outside in, being delimited by the surrounding bodies, e.g. the open parking space where I could park my car (G1b). The nameless entity that is partly occupied and partly unoccupied is the total extension consisting of the place of the occupying body (e.g. the wine in the jar), *subsisting* from the inside out, and the extension that is not occupied by that body but by air or something else, also *subsisting* from the inside out (from the limit of the wine to the inside limit of the jar) (G2). This nameless entity is not void, which is spoken of almost like an empty container (except it's not a container, hence "almost" (*paraplēsiōs*)). Nor is it place, which is spoken of almost in the manner of a full container (except that place is also what can be occupied and is and so is not really full, hence "almost").⁸⁶ But then, Chrysippus rightly wonders what to say about room, which is also described as what is partly occupied: is room like a bigger container for body, all the room there is for wine in the jar, i.e. the total extension *subsisting* from the inside limit of the jar in (G3a); or is it, rather, what has room for a bigger body, the extension *subsisting* from the limit of the wine out to the inside limit of the jar (G3b)?⁸⁷ The one is defined by reference to the container's total capacity, and the other by reference to the remaining room. These are all intra-cosmic phenomena, and all are defined by the bodies that occupy or delimit a determinate extension.

With this in mind, we can return to Sextus, who goes on to report that room is extension that is partly occupied by body and partly unoccupied (H3), and then contrasts place with room. The order of exposition—void, place, room, room vs. place—indicates that we are going from extra-cosmic (void) to intra-cosmic

⁸⁶ See Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems," for the idea of an informal sense of "unoccupied."

⁸⁷ I do not see evidence for the suggestion of Alessandrelli, "Aspects and Problems," 60–1, that G3a has to do with "the way in which perceivers constantly experience the space they access," or that the respect in which room is accessible has to do with its being perceivable, nor therefore that the word "*chōra*" is used to describe "vital space" that is accessed by livings; I also resist his idea (following Bréhier) that room is not an incorporeal but a body containing other bodies. For room to be defined consistently with place and void shows decisively, to my mind, that room is an incorporeal, and since there are other lists of incorporeals that do not match the canonical list of four, the absence of room from that list does not tell against its incorporeality. More on this in the next section on surface.

(place) so that it would be odd for the next entity (room) to then be an extra-cosmic phenomenon (as Algra takes it). And the difference between room and place is also instructive. To the extent that room is described as a kind of place (“the place of a larger body”), we are dealing with an intra-cosmic phenomenon; more importantly, the fact that room reflects the size of the occupying body while place does not tell us that both entities are defined by their occupying bodies. Place is simply equal to the body that occupies, thus the definition does not make essential reference to size, since it will be whatever size the occupying body is. Room, on the other hand, is not simply equal to the occupying body (e.g. the wine in the jar) but is also defined by the part that is unoccupied by that body (e.g. air above the occupying wine in the jar), thus the definition will make essential reference to the size of the occupying body. If this account differs from Chrysippus’ in Stobaeus (passage G), it is not because Chrysippus has a heterodox theory that makes room extra-cosmic, but because he is making more fine-grained distinctions between the nameless whole that is partly occupied and partly unoccupied, the total room inside the container, and the remaining room in the container. Perhaps he did not think the partly occupied and unoccupied whole is technically room, and to that extent he was innovating, but this is a small matter of debate that underscores rather than undermines the orthodox account of the place and room as intra-cosmic phenomena.⁸⁸

Returning to our opening questions, we can see that place is not just a finite portion of independently *subsisting* infinite void, or of some additional entity, “space.” Nor is room a portion of extra-cosmic void or space that is partly occupied. Rather, these are distinct phenomena, all posterior to and dependent on body for their *subsistence*. Void is extra-cosmic extension inherited from the cosmos and extending infinitely from all sides (outside out) with no other body to limit it. Place is finite intra-cosmic extension inherited from either occupying bodies (inside out) or delimiting bodies (outside in). And likewise the various intra-cosmic pockets of extension: the nameless entity is the sum of the place occupied by the wine (inside out) and the remaining place inside the jar occupied by air that can be occupied by more wine (also inside out); room understood as a bigger container for body is the total extension inside the jar (inside in), and understood as what has room for a bigger body it is the extension *subsisting* from the limit of wine out and occupied by air (inside out). These three distinctions are compatible with the more coarse-grained notion of room reported by Aëtius and Sextus as what is partly occupied, and with the account in Sextus of the distinction between place and room.

⁸⁸ Thus a Stoic could embrace any of the following three taxonomies without being heterodox in any serious way: (1) room as subspecies of place, itself with two kinds (unoccupied space in the jar or the total space in the jar) and the nameless entity as spurious (since it is a mere sum); (2) room, itself with two kinds (as above), understood as a subspecies of place understood as partly occupied, coordinate with the nameless entity; (3) room as coordinate with void, place, and surface.

That these intra-cosmic pockets should come out as kinds of place is not surprising. In fact, it shows that the Stoics are likely to have worked with an open-ended list of incorporeals, recognizing various spatial phenomena both inside and outside the cosmos. It may be true that the “canonical” list of incorporeals contains only place and void among the spatial incorporeals; but let us not forget that we are the ones who have dubbed this list canonical.⁸⁹ So arguments appealing to the canonical list as evidence that there are only four incorporeals are ultimately question-begging. Our evidence about room appears side-by-side with place and void for a reason: because it is a spatial incorporeal too and the Stoics were working with an open-ended list of incorporeals.⁹⁰

Surface

So far I have argued that room is to be considered an incorporeal alongside place and void—in its generic formulation as what is partly occupied as well as in its more fine-grained formulations, including the nameless entity. Now I turn to surface (*epiphaneia*) and the limits (*perata*; *peras*, singular) of bodies. I will bypass for now (and address in Chapter 14) the intricacies of the debates over the status of limits, and show here in outline that we have good evidence that the limits of bodies (as opposed to idealized limits) were considered incorporeal in the manner of place, room, and void. We have already seen the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, who places limits alongside place and void in the list of specific topics in the physics curriculum (DL 7.132 (43B, passage A/Chapter 9)); this is a natural order of exposition for the topic of physics if he is indeed moving from more fundamental to less. Then, in 7.135, he defines body as solid three-dimensional extension, followed immediately by the definition of surface, line, and point:

- N. A surface (*epiphaneia*) is the limit (*peras*) of a body, or what has only length and breadth without depth. This Posidonius in his *On celestial phenomena* book 5 retains both in thought and as subsistent (*kat' epinoian kai kath' hupostasin*). A line is the limit of a surface or a length with no breadth, or that which has only length. A point is the limit of a line, and it is the smallest mark (*sēmeion elachiston*).

DL 7.135 (50E)

As argued in Chapter 3, this definition of body is not mathematical or out of place in Diogenes' exposition of Stoic physics, nor is the immediately following definition

⁸⁹ First by Brunschwig, *TGS*, 22.

⁹⁰ For agreement see Mansfeld, “Zeno of Citium,” 159; Robertson, “Mathematical Objects”; S. White, “Posidonius.” For arguments that the Stoics were working with a strict *systema* that could not allow any development or evolution of entities constituting it, see Bronowski, *Lekta*, 79–80, 155–69, 279–84.

of limits purely mathematical or out of place either. Further, it is clear that limits are treated as physical phenomena, since surface is characterized as the two-dimensional limit of a body, line as the limit of that surface (of a body), its length without its breadth, and even the point is described as the smallest mark, presumably of that same body.⁹¹ Further, it is construed as a privation: surface as length and breadth *without* depth, line as length *without* breadth, and (by parity of reasoning) point as the smallest boundary, mark, or limit. So, the notion of limits as dimensionally deprived incorporeals alongside their three-dimensional cousins, place, room, and void, is evident in the testimony.

Diogenes' testimony classing surface alongside the accepted incorporeals is not isolated, either. We have seen Stobaeus testify that surface, line, place, void, and time are "things comparable to bodies," akin in being divisible to infinity (1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3)). Further, Plutarch tells us explicitly that limits are incorporeal for the Stoics, and trades on the fact that incorporeals cannot make contact to try to force the result that bodies cannot touch by means of a limit (*Comm. not.* 1080E (50C7–8)).⁹² Cleomedes also testifies directly that surface is incorporeal (*Cael.* I.1,119–20) (Todd), and then in considering whether an incorporeal could be the limit of void, wonders what incorporeal it would be: "time, surface, *lekton*, or something else like them?" (*Cael.* I.1,139–42 (Todd), my emphasis). All this evidence supports the idea that the Stoics recognize incorporeality as a widespread phenomenon, not a fixed list. We even saw the drill sergeant's model (in relation to which the boy is impressed) described as having a nature *like* that of the incorporeal *lekta*, presumably in being an intelligible impressor *subsisting* according to underlying body (passage D/Chapter 2). Thus, the canonical list of incorporeals (if it is even correct to think of Sextus' list as a canon) may well be a simplification over time, leaving off outlying or otherwise controversial entities for the sake of simplicity.⁹³

So, the first thing to take from Diogenes' testimony is the fact that surface is an incorporeal alongside the others, in the sense of being an absence or privation of

⁹¹ Contrast with Gerard of Cremona, *On the Works of Euclid* 3.23 (Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, II–26), who reports that for Posidonius a point is a limit *without* dimension. With this text in view, one might object that line is defined as the limit of a surface, and point as the limit of a line, so that only surface is incorporeal while the others are mathematical after all. However, because Posidonius retains limits *both* as incorporeal and according to thought, we can take the report of Gerard as evidence about *geometrical* limits, for which it is possible that there be no dimension at all, in contrast to the present report of Diogenes, which is squarely in the section on Stoic physics, and thus about incorporeal limits, which always have some dimension however small; hence the incorporeal point is defined here as the smallest mark (*sêmeion*) of a body, and not as lacking dimension altogether as in the report of Gerard, which (as Inwood, *Later Stoicism* 100, notes) reflects Posidonius' interest in geometry; see also n. 105 below. More on limits according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) in Chapter 13.

⁹² The problem is not fatal for the Stoics: it is open to them to say that two bodies will touch *at* their limits without saying that they touch *by means of* a limit, with some entity in between; indeed, only bodies are capable of being in contact and touching.

⁹³ There is no need, however, to go so far as to say that doctrinal differences were swept under the carpet, or bullied out of the picture, as Robertson does (following Mansfeld), "Mathematical Objects," 172.

body, and that the Stoic list of incorporeals is open-ended.⁹⁴ The next thing to notice is that Posidonius is reported to have classed surface, and limits generally, *both* as mental constructs (*kat' epinoian*) and as incorporeals (*kath' hupostasis*). This report has been the subject of much debate over the status of limits in Stoic philosophy. The prepositional phrase "*kath' hupostasin*" is non-standard, and so one might worry that this is somehow not really intended to signal incorporeality; in fact, it is often rendered as "real" or "in reality" (and sometimes thereby equated with body) and thus contrasted with what is unreal, or Not-Something in metaphysical limbo between Something and nothing at all.⁹⁵ However, given the immediate context of Stoic physics, and the ample additional evidence both of surface alongside other incorporeals and of *hupostasis* as the mode of reality of the incorporeals, it seems reasonable to take the phrase "*kath' hupostasin*" to signal incorporeality; it is only the preposition that is out of the ordinary, not the term "*hupostasis*." Thus this report serves as confirmation that Posidonius takes the limits of bodies to be incorporeal.⁹⁶

What is more interesting, and the subject of greater controversy, is what to make of the contrast with surface *kat' epinoian*, including whether to think of Posidonius as heterodox (or as making a developmental advance for the school) in recognizing two kinds of surface. Commentators have often found these two descriptions at odds, and reacted by choosing one option or the other: either Stoic limits are incorporeal, or they're products of thought (and if they're products of thought, then they must be Not-Somethings). Others react by seeing the Stoics as internally at odds about the matter. Mansfeld, for example, says this about the passage: "The only Stoic, to my knowledge at least, who accepted the actual existence not only of three-dimensional solid bodies but also of their *περάτα* in the sense of 'surfaces,' was Posidonius [. . .] presumably his chief opponent among the Stoics themselves was Chrysippus."⁹⁷ However, the literal, face value reading according to which Posidonius recognizes two ways of being a surface, one incorporeal and one as a product of thought, has not been pursued.⁹⁸ Perhaps this is a lingering effect of

⁹⁴ This is why it is open to the Stoics to say of a case of two bodies blended, i.e. coextended, either that they share one surface (since surface is the absence of underlying solid extension and the underlying extension just happens to be composed of two bodies in one place), or that each body has its own surface and the two surfaces of a blend are themselves colocated (since surface is the absence of underlying solid extension, and there are two distinct extended bodies in one place, it should not be unduly strange to find their surfaces coextended as well), on which see Chapter 4.

⁹⁵ E.g. Kidd, *Posidonius, The Commentary*; Mansfeld, "Zeno." For Not-Somethings in "metaphysical limbo," see Sedley, "Universals," 89.

⁹⁶ For valuable analysis of this passage, bibliography, and additional arguments in favor of limits as incorporeal, see S. White, "Posidonius," 51–3, though I don't follow him in taking "*kat' epinoian*" to mean when someone thinks of them.

⁹⁷ Mansfeld, "Zeno," 166. Notice that treating Posidonius as heterodox in this way clashes with Diogenes' explicit avowal at 7.160 that he is presenting Stoic orthodoxy in contrast to which he will then present the heterodox.

⁹⁸ Ju, "Geometrical Limits," does argue that for Posidonius "limits not only are in thought but also subsist objectively," but she does so in the context of a strongly developmental account motivated by a nest of textual puzzles that dissolve once the distinction is applied to them (as I will show in Chapter 13).

the ancient, but still dominant, presupposition that limits are things in the world that bring unity and form to matter; accordingly, commentators seek a single Stoic theory of limits, and when they do not find limits in cosmology, they cast them off as products of thought and banish them to metaphysical limbo as Not-Somethings. Either way, commentators have not taken the “both...and” of Diogenes’ report seriously and considered the possibility that there are *two* ways of being a surface, or the idea that this does not put Posidonius at odds with anyone.

One way of being a limit is as an incorporeal (*kath’ hupostasin*) that inherits its extension from underlying body; another way is as an idealized entity that corresponds to no body in the world, a product of thought (*kat’ epinoian*). There is thus an ambiguity to the term “limit” in Stoic philosophy, referring on the one hand to the incorporeal limits *of bodies*, and on the other hand to idealized limits that we construct; this latter kind of limit that *subsists* according to thought will include not just the idealized limits of geometry, but also the limits and divisions of the continuum. Indeed, most of our evidence concerning limits comes in the context of the continuum. Having seen in Chapter 3 that the Stoic commitment to the continuum is not to be read as a commitment to gunk, i.e. as consisting of infinitely many actual parts, it should not be a surprise to find that limits of the continuum as such, i.e. partitions of homogeneous, partless extension, are products of thought corresponding to no such division in reality. I will pursue this line of inquiry more fully in Chapter 13, when I argue in support of the ontological category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but note for now that the topic of Stoic limits is far from exhausted by their status as incorporeals covered here; in fact, the status of limits will come up again shortly in the analysis of time.

My suggestion, then, is that the phenomenon of incorporeality is widespread, and the commitment to it is coarse-grained enough to accommodate a family of incorporeals, with robust debate over the precise account to give of outlying or finer-grained phenomena. Without having to engage in the forensics required to fully adjudicate such debates, we can easily see how the principle of incorporeality would apply to the limits of bodies; thus, we have good reason to take the many reports classing them alongside place, void, time, and *lekta* as evidence of their status as incorporeals dependent on body for their *subsistence*. And because incorporeal *subsistence* is a case of privation, we need not worry about finding a two-dimensional body to occupy surface—surface is simply length and breadth without depth and without the solidity and resistance of body. Likewise, line is simply length, minus the other dimensions and solidity of body, and so for the smallest point as well.

Meeting the *Subsistence* Criterion

The dependence of these incorporeals on body (the metaphysics of their *subsistence*) also allows us to explain why they count as Something (how they earn their

place in the ontology), i.e. why they are proper objects of thought and discourse that pass the Not Someone (*Outis*) test for particularity. The *subsistence* criterion, as developed in Chapter 2, is this: All and only those things that are both (1) a proper object of thought, i.e. an *x* that it is possible for anyone to think about, and (2) the referent of significant discourse, i.e. whatever is non-repeatable such that if it is in Athens, then it is not in Megara.

Thanks to its body-less *subsistence*, my parking place is an incorporeal impressor like the drill sergeant's model *in relation to* which the commanding faculty can be impressed—it is available for anyone to grasp and think about. Only the car can be *seen* because only the car has three *solid* dimensions with resistance (only the car is corporeal and thus only the car can make contact with my sense organs), but its place is Something I can think about and be impressed in relation to (*epi*) because it is a real three-dimensional feature of the physical world. And just as occupied place *subsisting* from the inside out in Athens cannot be in Megara, likewise place in Athens *subsisting* according to its delimiting bodies from the outside in cannot be in Megara either. And whatever account of room and the nameless entity one takes, these too are phenomena in relation to which we can be impressed, proper objects of thought, and particulars that cannot be in two places at once. For example, if there is room in a wine jar in Athens (whether the whole extension inside the jar, the room left inside the jar for more wine, or the nameless sum of occupied and unoccupied extension in the jar), that same three-dimensional extension cannot also be Megara. The pockets of extension in Athens are not those in Megara. And likewise for limits: the surface of a table in Athens in relation to which someone can be impressed is not the same as the surface of a table in Megara in relation to which someone can be impressed.

The more interesting question is how extra-cosmic void, being infinite, passes the *Outis* test: If void is in Athens, then it is not in Megara. As stated, the result is unclear. If treated as independent space that gets occupied and persists, describable only by mass terms, it might be false to say that if there is some void in Athens then there is no void in Megara; just as it would be false to say that if there is some honey in Athens, there is none in Megara; or that if there is traffic on the Bay Bridge there isn't any on the Golden Gate. On this interpretation, Brunschwig says the *Outis* test is powerless to justify the extra-cosmic void as Something.⁹⁹ His solution is to say that void, properly speaking, refers to the unified and continuous extra-cosmic void, which does pass the *Outis* test. If (per impossibile) the extra-cosmic void is in Athens, then it can't be in Megara. So far Brunschwig is exactly right—namely that Stoic void is strictly extra-cosmic, and that qua particular it cannot be in two places at once. But worries about room as a portion of void creates problems in addressing the intra-cosmic pockets:

⁹⁹ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 97.

[T]he term “void,” while remaining a mass term, applicable in the same sense to the whole and its parts, designates nothing more, when it applies to the whole, than a continuous whole of a single tenor, with the exception of the enclave of the world that limits it on the interior as a hole limits the continuity of a Gruyère; and when the term *void* applies to the parts of the whole, it designates nothing more than parts arbitrarily lifted from the continuous whole.¹⁰⁰

Brunschwig’s result is that the extra-cosmic void has cosmic parts, and he mitigates this violation of isotropy by making the parts arbitrary. But as I have been arguing, there is no need to think of place and room as occupied parts of void or space.¹⁰¹ Void, strictly speaking, is extra-cosmic: it begins at the edge of the corporeal world and extends infinitely out from there in all directions. As a single, continuous entity dependent on body (i.e. the world) for its *subsistence*, it is itself a particular that passes the *Outis* test. The void outside *this* world can’t be over there, outside *that* world (not that the Stoics recognized more than one cosmos, though they could entertain it as logically possible). In addition to the extra-cosmic void, the Stoics also recognized pockets of space in the world that are not correctly understood as occupied void. Thus Brunschwig’s error is in the way he deploys the Gruyère metaphor. He makes the cheese correspond to void, and body to the holes. But it is the perfectly intuitive sense of Swiss cheese that captures the phenomena: the cheese corresponds to the corporeal world, the holes to the pockets of space in the corporeal cosmos, and everything outside the cheese to the extra-cosmic void. Extra-cosmic void is an incorporeal individual *subsisting* according to the corporeal world, from which it inherits its particular properties.

As such, it passes the *Outis* test straightforwardly, without the need for ad hoc restrictions, as Caston has worried.¹⁰² Insofar as the void is isotropic three-dimensional extension, it can certainly be referred to by a mass term: it is infinitely extended, infinitely divisible, continuous, partless, and homogeneous continuum. But Stoic void is also an individual: *the* (unique) extra-cosmic three-dimensional extension *subsisting* from all sides of the one and only cosmos out into infinity. As I argued in Chapter 2, in rehabilitating Brunschwig’s analysis of the *Outis* test, it is as a putative *individual* that the test is applied to void; its being a continuous mass as well is a separate matter that does not threaten its status as a particular (just as the continuity of place does not threaten its passing the test, either). Modifying the *Outis* test for extra-cosmic application, then, one can see that the void *does* count as an individual. Just as the place of a car in Athens cannot be in Megara, so too the void *subsisting* outside *this* world (in the role of Athens) cannot *subsist* outside *that* world (in the role of Megara). And what makes this so is the fact that it depends on

¹⁰⁰ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 98–9.

¹⁰¹ This assumption is more explicit in Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics.”

¹⁰² Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 158–9.

body for its positive physical characteristics: infinite non-solid, three-dimensional extension from all sides of the cosmos and the essential property of being able to receive body.

Conclusions

To conclude, each of these spatial incorporeals counts as Something *because* it is grounded in body, inheriting its properties and particularity from the underlying body. This principle of incorporeal *subsistence* is what makes Stoic physics an account genuinely common to bodies and incorporeals; counting by criteria alone does not. The Stoics' two criteria are logically independent in counting and sorting entities as *existent* or *subsistent*, but only the principle of incorporeal *subsistence* grounds and orders the entities, transforming the system from ontology to metaphysics, and completing the response to Plato's Battle of Gods and Giants. Any account that "cries both" without giving a common account does not *respond* to the Battle of Gods and Giants so much as *give in* to it.

Accordingly, we can now conclude the chapter with Real Definitions of the spatial incorporeals in the spirit of Kathrin Koslicki's Feature Dependence. As discussed in Chapter 9, Φ is Feature Dependent on Ψ just in case (i) Ψ is a constituent in a Real Definition of Φ , and (ii) Φ corresponds to a real feature of Ψ .¹⁰³ And her account of a Real Definition, again, is that (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.¹⁰⁴

- Place (Φ) = Real Def. the finite, non-solid three-dimensional (i.e. spatial) extension that *subsists* inside the cosmos according to (is Feature Dependent on) the solid three-dimensional extension of (a) its occupying body (or bodies), from the inside out to its surface, or (b) its delimiting body (or bodies), from their outside surfaces in (Ψ)
- Room (Φ) = Real Def. the finite, non-solid three-dimensional (i.e. spatial) extension that *subsists* inside the cosmos according to (is Feature Dependent on) the solid three-dimensional extension of the body (or bodies) by which it is partly occupied, partly unoccupied (Ψ)
 - The unnamed whole (Φ) = Real Def. the sum of the interior extension occupied by body that *subsists* from the inside out, and the extension unoccupied by that body that also *subsists* from the inside out (Ψ)

¹⁰³ Koslicki, "Varieties," 209.

¹⁰⁴ Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201.

- Room considered as the larger container (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the total interior extension that *subsists* from the inside in according to (is Feature Dependent on) the interior limit of the container (Ψ)
- Room considered as what has room for a bigger body (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the interior extension that *subsists* from the inside out according to (is Feature Dependent on) the limit of the occupying body and the interior limit of the container (Ψ)
- Void (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the infinite, non-solid three-dimensional (i.e. spatial) extension that *subsists* outside the cosmos according to (is Feature Dependent on) the outside edge of the cosmos (Ψ), from the outside out
- The limits of bodies (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the two-dimensional or one-dimensional non-solid (i.e. spatial) extension, or the smallest possible non-solid extension *subsisting* according to the underlying solid dimension of body (Ψ)
 - Surface (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the two-dimensional non-solid extension that *subsists* according to (is Feature Dependent on) the solid length and breadth of the underlying body (Ψ)
 - Line (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the one-dimensional non-solid extension that *subsists* according to (is Feature Dependent on) the solid length of the underlying body (Ψ)
 - Point (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the smallest mark that *subsists* according to (is Feature Dependent on) the smallest solid part of the length of the body (Ψ)¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ One might object that classing points as extended conflicts with the mathematical conception of points as being without extension. This would be correct, but no slight to incorporeal points, since incorporeals are not mathematical or geometrical entities. An idealized entity like a mathematical point (line, surface, plane figure, or solid) would indeed be without extension (Gerard of Cremona, *On the Works of Euclid* (3.23, Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, II–26)), and would therefore not be incorporeal but rather a product of thought that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, as I will argue in Chapter 13. Stoic talk of the *now* as the smallest perceptible time around a point-like division in passage F/Chapter 11 supports this idea as well. See also n. 91 above.

11

Time

χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα

The Stoic theory of time has vexed scholars since antiquity, particularly given its intersection with the theory of everlasting recurrence, according to which the same world order repeats (and has repeated) itself infinitely many times. Questions about the Stoic theory of time include whether time depends on change for its *subsistence* (*hupostasis*) and whether, if it does depend on change, time is linear or, rather, circular. If time depends on change and each world order is exactly the same, then how can time be linear rather than circular; and if it is circular, in what respect can the world really be said to be *recurring* infinitely many times? Another cluster of puzzles concerns the status of the present: if only the present obtains or is the case (as “*huparchein*” is typically rendered), yet no time is present exactly but only broadly, one wants to know how the present and, for that matter, time as a whole can even be real. And, again, if time is part past, part present, and part future, but the present is itself part past and part future, how can time be real? Ricardo Salles has recently dubbed these the two classic problems in the Stoic theory of time.¹

I will begin with the Stoic definition of time and give evidence for its dependence on body. Then I will take these two problems in turn, addressing scholarly debates along the way, to show that time is incorporeal in the same way as the spatial incorporeals, *subsisting* according to underlying body and inheriting its properties from the body on which it depends.

Dependence Defended

The incorporeals covered so far are all spatial: void, place, and room are three-dimensional non-solid extension (*diastēma*), while the limits of bodies (surface, line, point) have progressively fewer dimensions. Time is not likewise spatial, of course, but it is noteworthy that the Stoics define time in the same terms, as the *diastēma* of motion or change. In order to emphasize the conceptual continuity of time with the spatial incorporeals I will continue to speak of *diastēma* as extension,

¹ Salles, “Two Classic Problems”; see also *Determinism and Compatibilism* and “Times and Events.”

though dimension may be more apt for both—indeed, we are seeing here the Stoic treatment of the spatial and temporal dimensions of the universe. The point of using the word “extension” is to stress that time is akin to the spatial incorporeals in being body-less, inheriting its *diastēma* from underlying body.²

Salles, who argues for time as independent of change, understands *diastēma* as the range over which a period of time extends, starting from individual times rather than time as a whole, and he argues that because a period of time over which a change extends can be equal to a period of time in which things are static, the term “*diastēma*” does not therefore imply change or motion. Salles is certainly right that the word “*diastēma*” does not convey motion—indeed, none of the spatial incorporeals (also defined as *diastēma*) is understood in terms of motion. However, it is not the word “*diastēma*” that is doing the work of tying time to motion, but the application of *diastēma* to motion. It is the fact that time is consistently defined as the *diastēma* of motion or of the world’s motion that ties time to motion (DL 7.140 (Dorandi); Philo, *Aet. mundi* 4 (Colson); SE, *M.* 10.170; Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 350,14–6 (51A); Stobaeus 1.104,7–23 (51B, B below, 51D, A below, 51E+).³ For example, Stobaeus reports:

- A. Apollodorus in the work *Physics* defines time as follows: time (*chronos*) is the extension (*diastēma*) of the world’s motion, and so (*houtōs*) it is infinite as the totality of number is said to be infinite; for the one (part) (*to men*) of it is past, the other (part) (*to de*) present, and the other (part) (*to de*) future.⁴
Stobaeus 1.105,8–16 (51D, part)

In addition to evidence that time is defined as the *diastēma* of motion, we have here an inference from time being the extension of the world’s motion to its being infinite (signaled by “and so”), which has been underappreciated.⁵ If incorporeals

² For arguments that “only the Stoics explicitly defined *diastēma* as ontologically indicating time proper,” see Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 537; at 548–9, he argues that the Stoic notion of *diastēma* as extension in application to time is just a metaphor or simile, since time is not spatial, and that the real notion of time for the Stoics is an ontological conception of time as a dimension of the world. I like the idea of time as a dimension of the world, but don’t worry that *diastēma* is too spatial to be meaningful in the context of time; time is extended and infinite. See Papazian, “Stoic Ontology,” 106, for the idea that the Stoics define time as *diastēma* in contrast to Aristotle to capture that time is continuous (as opposed to number, which is discrete) and objective (as opposed to number, which requires a counter).

³ I agree with Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 172, and Tzamalikos “Origen,” 536, against Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 278, that the difference between time defined as the extension of motion and as the extension of the world’s motion is not substantive, though I think Chrysippus and Apollodorus might be specifying that it is the world’s motion in order to underscore that time arises at the cosmic level rather than at the level of individual bodies. Bréhier, *Théorie*, 54–5, finds that by adding that it is the world’s motion, Chrysippus emphasizes the unreality of time.

⁴ I put the word “part” in parentheses to signal that “*meros*” is not present in these passages; it is not wrong to supply “part” but neither should we think that there is an explicit or technical mereological commitment being reported here or in the other passages where I will do likewise, supplying “part(s)” or “thing(s)” (D, E, F).

⁵ LS, 305, and Schofield, “Retrenchable,” 365, both render the *houtōs* clause as follows: “and it is infinite in just the way that the whole of number is said to be infinite,” with *houtōs* as emphasis in “in just the way.” But there is an independent *hōs* to do the work of comparing time to number, so it is

depend on body, then the inference from time defined as the extension of the world's motion to its infinity is a substantive report explained by the fact that for the Stoics there is no beginning or end to the world's motion, just an everlasting recurrence of cosmic cycles punctuated by periods of conflagration when the world turns into fire and then starts over. On the other hand, if the incorporeals are independent of body, the inference is not so substantive, being merely the modal-existential inference that where there is motion there is also time, and not an explanatory inference.

The comparison to number is also a substantive report explained by the dependence of time on body, suggesting that from any given place on the number line (corresponding to the present), number (time) extends infinitely in either direction (past/future). Because time depends on the world's infinite motion, which proceeds as a causal sequence of events, time is linear in its infinity. The comparison to the infinite number line by itself supports a linear notion of time and recurrence,⁶ but the inference tells us *why* it is infinite. Furthermore, it is clear from this linear infinity that it is time as a whole that is the Stoics' basic notion, not individual times.⁷

Finally, the dependence of time on body also explains why time is continuous and divisible to infinity alongside surface, line, place, and void—because body is continuous, so are its spatial and temporal dimensions (Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3)). This continuity inherited from underlying body in turn holds the key to our puzzles about the present, as we will see later in the chapter. For the time being, I continue my defense of the dependence thesis with more from Stobaeus:

- B. Chrysippus says time is the extension (*diastēma*) of motion (*kinēsis*), according to which the measure (*metron*) of swiftness and slowness is then spoken of, or the extension consequent on (*parakolouthein*) the motion of the cosmos.

Stobaeus 1.106,5–7 (51B1)

unnecessary to take the *houtōs* as emphasizing the comparison rather than doing its own work of drawing a conclusion from the preceding definition of time.

⁶ As A. A. Long, "Everlasting recurrence," 277–8, notes; cf. Schofield, "Retrenchable," n. 43, who finds it "very hard to fathom" that time could be infinite like number.

⁷ In contrast to Salles, "Two Classic Problems"; BS; LS. Sedley, "Physics and Metaphysics," 398–400, and "Universals," n. 5, takes the parts of time to be basic and construes the whole of time as a generalization and thus a concept in metaphysical limbo as a Not-Something; this may be motivated by concerns for particularity, thinking of particular times like now and today as more concrete or particular than the whole of time. Sedley, "Stoicism," says that only the whole of time is incorporeal, while individual times are bodies. Against this conception and in favor of time as a whole being the Stoics' basic notion, see Brunschwig, *TGS*, 99–109. More on this ahead when I turn to the problem of the present.

There are two things to consider in this report. First is the term “*parakolouthēin*,” which suggests dependence as strongly as “*paruphistatai*” did for place (Chapter 10).⁸ Meaning literally to follow, it is a verb that does double duty to capture ontological dependence on the one hand, and logical dependence on the other. LSJ defines it, first, as (1) following or attending closely, or (2) an incidental result (with reference to Chrysippus), and then secondly, in a psychological and epistemological sense, as (1) following with the mind, understanding, (2) inference, and (3) awareness, consciousness. The fact that it is, first, *diastēma* that follows the world’s motion, and then that the measure of speed is spoken of with reference to *diastēma*, suggests that the ontological sense of “*parakolouthōn*” is in play here, not the epistemological sense.⁹

Salles argues that either a causal or a logical sense of inference could be in play (so that either time causally follows from motion or the fact that there is time can be inferred from motion), but either way all we get is a sufficient condition for time, not a necessary condition; thus we cannot say that time requires motion for the Stoics.¹⁰ In response, first, the sufficiency claim is grist for my mill, particularly the causal sense in which time is caused by motion, since the idea is that motion gives rise to time (hence time depends on and requires motion). Second, we can confirm this causal claim and find the necessity claim made explicit in the following report from Philo:

- C. (1) Time has been interpreted correctly [sc. by the Stoics] as the extension (*diastēma*) of the motion (*kinēsis*) of the cosmos. And since this is sound, the cosmos is the same age as (*isēlix*) time and the cause (*aitios*) of its coming to be. And it is most absurd of all to think that when the cosmos was, then time was not; for the nature of this is without beginning and without end, since these things, themselves, what was, the when, and the then, indicate time. (2) And from this it follows that time did not subsist (*hupostēnai*) per se (*kath’ hauto*) then, when the cosmos was not; for what does not obtain also does not move; and time was put forth as being the extension of cosmic motion. It is necessary, then, that each of them subsists from eternity, having no start of generation; and eternal things do not admit of destruction. (3) Perhaps some quibbling Stoic will say that time has been defined as the extension of the motion of the cosmos, not only of the present world order

⁸ Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 547–9, argues that “*parakolouthōn*” “means that which subsequently accompanies,” and it implies a notion of “coming behind or after.” See Chapter 9 for further discussion of this kind of linguistic evidence for dependence.

⁹ Those arguing for the mind-dependence of the incorporeals as our own constructs and impositions on reality will resist this point and equate the *diastēma* with the *metron*, assimilating the Stoics to Aristotle on time, but the grammatical construction that puts *diastēma* prior to the measure speaks against this move. I will return to this point when I consider the second item of interest in this text, the talk of measure.

¹⁰ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 174.

but also of that motion supposed during the conflagration. To which one must say: friend, you are transposing the names of what you call cosmos and lack of cosmos; for if this which we see is truly and naturally called cosmos, being thoroughly organized and ordered by the highest pitch of infallible craft, then its change into fire must be called a certain lack of cosmos.

(1) ὥστ' εὐθυβόλως ἀποδεδόσθαι πρὸς τῶν εἰωθότων τὰ πράγματα ὀρίζεσθαι χρόνον διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦθ' ὑγιές ἐστι, γίνεται ὁ κόσμος ἰσῆλιξ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ αἴτιος. πάντων δ' ἀτοπώτατον ὑπονοεῖν, ὅτι ἦν ποτε κόσμος, ἡνίκα οὐκ ἦν χρόνος· ἀναρχος γὰρ καὶ ἀτελεύτητος ἡ τούτου φύσις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, τὸ ἦν, τὸ ποτέ, τὸ ἡνίκα, χρόνον συνεμφαίνει. (2) τούτῳ δ' ἀκόλουθον τὸ μηδὲ χρόνον ὑποστῆναι καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἡνίκα κόσμος οὐκ ἦν τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπάρχον οὐδὲ κινεῖται· διάστημα δὲ κοσμικῆς κινήσεως ἐδείχθη ὁ χρόνος ὢν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἐκάτερον ἐξ αἰδίου ὑφessestάναι γενέσεως ἀρχὴν μὴ λαβόντα· τὰ δ' αἰδία φθορᾶς ἀνεπίδεκτα. (3) τάχα τις εὐρεσιλογῶν Στωικὸς ἐρεῖ, τὸν χρόνον ἀποδεδόσθαι διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως οὐχὶ τοῦ νυνὶ διακεκοσμημένου μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὑπονουμένου.

Philo, *Aet. mundi* 52–4 (Colson)¹¹

Philo leaves it beyond doubt that time depends on motion, telling us that because the Stoics have rightly defined time as the extension of the world's motion (referring back to his report at *Aet. mundi* 4), it can be inferred that the cosmos is the same age as time and that it is the cause or explanation of there being time (C1). Furthermore, he infers approvingly from the definition of time as *diastēma* of the world's motion to the fact that it is not self-subsistent or absolute, since being the extension of the world's motion entails that if there were no cosmos there would be no time (C2); this is the necessity claim made explicit. Finally, he calls out the Stoics disapprovingly for maintaining that there is motion and thus time even between worlds, during the conflagration (C3).¹² Not only is time explicitly dependent on

¹¹ See also Philo, *De mundi opificio* 26 (SVF 2.511), *Quod deus sit immut.* 31 (SVF 2.512).

¹² I take it that "some quibbling Stoic" refers to the Stoics as whole who would quibble with Philo about there being motion during the conflagration, and not some one Stoic quibbling with other Stoics about whether there is motion during the conflagration. I thank Jean-Baptiste Gourinat for pressing the latter possibility in correspondence. "Some" (*tis*) is read here as *any arbitrary* Stoic, not *some particular* Stoic. That this is so is confirmed by context. We were told at *Aet. mundi* 4 that the Stoics embrace a third definition of cosmos as "what extends through the conflagration, substance (*ousia*) either ordered or not ordered, of whose motion time is the extension (*diastēma*)."¹³ Then at *Aet. mundi* 8–9 we are told that the Stoics embrace the creation and destruction of the cosmos (against which Philo is arguing), but also that for the Stoics in one sense the cosmos is eternal (as described in 4), persisting through the conflagration, while in another sense it is not, each world order being destroyed. The Stoic quibble at *Aet. mundi* 54, then, is that the present world order is destroyed and yet motion goes on because substance remains in motion during the conflagration. Philo's response confirms that this is the Stoic move, because he rejects the claim attested in 8–9 that substance during the conflagration is correctly called *cosmos*. Thus Philo remains critical of the Stoic position about destructibility, even while approving of

motion as its cause here, but we also see that for the Stoics time persists even between world orders because during the conflagration, when there is technically no cosmos but only fire, there is nevertheless motion.¹³ This confirms a linear conception of time that continues before, during, and after each world order.¹⁴ If there were no motion during the conflagration, time would be interrupted, and hence not linear in its infinity. But there is motion during the conflagration; so that condition is met, and the way is clear to say that time is ongoing and infinite like the number line, not circular. Further, we see again that it is the whole of time, and not individual times, being analyzed.

I would say that we are therefore on firm ground in taking “*parakolouthoun*” in passage B to signal the dependence of time as a whole on motion, and that the explanatory power of this thesis is further support for it. However, David Sedley also denies that “*parakolouthoun*” implies time is parasitic on motion, reasoning as follows:

The regularity of a body’s motion presupposes fixed spatial and temporal intervals through which it takes place. If either of those intervals were identical with the moving body itself, viewed in a certain way, they might say, its motion would be left altogether without objective coordinates. It is, then, anything but surprising that the Stoics should treat not only the spatial intervals—or “places”—but also the temporal intervals as subsisting independently of the moving bodies which pass through it. And that consideration already points to the incorporeality of time.¹⁵

It is certainly true that making space and time identical to body leaves motion without objective coordinates, but that’s because such a move leaves motion without spatiotemporal coordinates altogether, i.e. this is really an eliminative move. However, if space and time are not identical or reduced to (are not nothing but...) body in motion, but are, rather, grounded in (are the products of) body, then the objectivity of the spatiotemporal coordinates is not threatened.¹⁶

their definition of time and attesting to the Stoic commitment to its continuation during the conflagration. I thank Ricardo Salles for pressing me on how Philo, typically critical, could be citing the Stoic definition of time approvingly.

¹³ As Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 538, also notes.

¹⁴ Thus I differ from Gourinat, “Éternel retour,” 222, who says that there is no motion during the conflagration and that time is therefore, because of this interruption in its motion, periodic rather than cyclical, i.e. circular; the problem of circularity, that the world cannot then be said to be recurring multiple times, is solved by the interruption. A linear conception of time does not, of course, face the problem of circularity.

¹⁵ “Physics and Metaphysics,” 399; note here incorporeality as the explanandum rather than the starting point of analysis; cf. Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 214, 217; Schofield, “Retrenchable,” 352.

¹⁶ It is a live option in contemporary physics and metaphysics to understand space and time relationally rather than substantively, and no one worries thereby that they are no longer objective.

To say that time *subsists* according to the world's motion is to identify time with the rate of corporeal change; this rate of change is an incorporeal entity distinct from but dependent on the corporeal change that grounds it. Likewise, the flow of traffic, whether it is fast or slow, smooth or stop-and-go, is something distinct from but dependent on the cars that give rise to it.¹⁷ Thus the Stoic move is not reductive or eliminative, doing away with objective spatio-temporal coordinates, therefore it does not force us to see time as independent or absolute.

That this is how the Stoics saw things is confirmed by Platonist commentators who do prefer a conception of time as independent receptacle of motion, rather than extension dependent on motion. Plutarch and Plotinus complain that Stoic time is a mere result of motion, and that saying time accompanies motion is not yet to say what it is (Plutarch, *Quaest. Plat.* (SVF 2.515); Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.7.8, 3.7.10 (Armstrong)).¹⁸ The Stoics can even agree that saying time accompanies motion is not informative (that was the uninteresting inference from the world's infinity to the infinity of time). But that is not all the Stoics have to say; time is defined as the *diastēma* of the world's motion, not merely something that can be inferred as also there—and that *is* informative. For the Stoics, part of being the incorporeal *diastēma* of body (space) or of body in motion (time) is being dependent on body for its physical properties. And that is a more substantive claim than saying simply that where there is motion there is time, as an independence or codependence view would have it.

So what is this *diastēma*? Space is three-dimensional extension, but what kind of extension is time? What is the temporal dimension of the cosmos? It is the *rate* of the world's change. Just as place, room, and void are defined as spatial extension inherited from occupying or delimiting body, so time is defined as the temporal extension inherited from, or consequent on (*parakolouthein*), underlying corporeal change. It is the rate of change objectively available for thought, an intelligible entity distinct from the corporeal motions themselves, which we apprehend by the senses.

This brings us to the second thing necessary to consider in the report about Chrysippus (passage B). The first was the term "*parakolouthein*"; the second is the measure talk in time defined as "the extension of motion according to which the measure (*metron*) of speed and slowness is then spoken of." Salles argues that this shows time is absolute and independent, on the grounds that it is the passage of time that explains the speed and slowness of motion, rather than the other way around; it is because a certain amount of time passes that change is called fast or

¹⁷ Note that in both these cases it is not individual bodies or cars giving rise to individual times or speeds, but time as a whole and the flow of traffic as a whole that are being analyzed. This does not prevent us from considering individual speeds, but these will be considered by reference to the whole; more on this issue ahead.

¹⁸ As Tzamalikos, "Origen," 538–9, notes.

slow, therefore time does not depend on change.¹⁹ But the order of explanation in this text is that *first* we get time defined as the extension of motion of the cosmos, and *then* (*pote*) this extension is that by reference to which we can speak of the measure of speed and slowness of particular bodies. So this is not to define time by reference to the measure, or measurer, but the measure by reference to time. As Panayiotis Tzamalikos puts it, for the Stoics “time may be *also* a measure, but this is an additional property of it, not its indispensable ontological property.”²⁰ Thus Salles is right that time explains speed and slowness, but this does not make time independent of or prior to motion. Rather, time arises from the motion of the world, not locally so that time is going faster for cheetahs than for sloths, but at the cosmic level. It is by reference to time at the level of the whole, perhaps based on the motions of the heavenly bodies, that we measure the speed and slowness of particular events, or times; therefore those changes that we measure as fast or slow are not what we measure by. And, again, it is the whole of time that is the basic notion, not individual times. Perhaps this is why Chrysippus and Apollodorus specify that time is the extension of the *world’s* motion, to underscore that time arises at the cosmic level rather than at the level of individual bodies.

We find confirmatory evidence that time is measured at the cosmic level in another report of Stobaeus that “the Stoics say that motion itself [sc. the journey of the sun] is the substance (*ousia*) of time” (Stobaeus 1.102.19).²¹ Now, Salles denies that this report makes motion necessary and sufficient for time on the grounds, first, that substance (*ousia*) for the Stoics is matter (*hulē*), and since time is an incorporeal it can’t be either the passive component of a body or a patient body. Second, that there is no other Stoic thesis Stobaeus might be reporting under the misnomer of “substance” that would make motion necessary and sufficient for time. And, third, that if “substance” is understood in an Aristotelian sense as the essence, so that motion *defines* time, this still does not get us to necessary and sufficient conditions.²² In response, first, Stoic substance (*ousia*) is not matter (*hulē*), but body (*sōma*) (DL 7.150, as discussed in Chapter 3). Second, to say that the motion of the sun is the substance of time is not to say that time is itself substance (whatever we take substance to be), in violation of its status as an incorporeal. Rather, all these problems are resolved when we see Stobaeus as reporting in legitimately Stoic terminology that the substance (body) on which time depends for its *subsistence* is the sun in motion. To say that the sun is the substance of time is to say that time depends on the motion of the cosmos as a whole, not that time *is* the sun.

¹⁹ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 173–4; BS, 465–7, take time in its broad sense to *be* a measurement; see also Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 216.

²⁰ Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 539; I do not follow Tzamalikos in saying that *diastēma* “has an absolute ontological priority over motion.”

²¹ This won’t mean measuring time in terms of days, but by the great year of each world order, followed by a period of conflagration, and then another world order, or by the whole of time (as in passage A).

²² Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 170–1.

Having sketched my account of time and made the case for dependence, I turn now to the details to flesh it out. The dependence, infinity, and continuum nature of time will be central to making sense of these details and to dissolving the two classic problems of time.

Everlasting Recurrence

The Stoics are committed to some form of everlasting recurrence, and the details of this intriguing thesis determine whether time does indeed depend on change or is, rather, absolute, as well as whether time is linear or circular. The central puzzle is that if the Stoics say the world repeats itself over and over again down to the smallest detail, but time depends on motion, then if there is not even the smallest difference by which to distinguish each world order, time cannot be linear and the cosmos cannot really be repeating itself. As Jonathan Barnes puts it: “[Chrysippus] dies only once; he will not survive his only death. The infinite cycle of worlds is a big illusion: to be sure, we have infinite worlds—but (what a paradox!)—all the worlds only make up one; because they all unfold in the same temporal extension.”²³ The underlying assumption that generates this problem (for Barnes as for Salles and the others who make this problem a classic) is the idea that times can only be individuated and hence distinct if the worlds on which they depend are not type identical, but the Stoics are committed to saying that every individual in each world order is numerically (and hence type) identical to the individuals in every other world order. Thus it seems that there is no change by which to distinguish the time of any world order from the others.

There are two false steps here. One is the idea that the Stoics are operating in terms of the type identity of events, and the other is the idea that numerical identity for the Stoics adheres to Leibniz’s Law according to which all properties must be exactly alike. The first false step itself rests on two further missteps: one is the assumption that the Stoics have a theory of events, and the other is that they observe a type-token distinction in that theory. I will begin with the type identity of events. Salles, leaning on the work of Susanne Bobzien and Stephen Menn, argues for a robust theory of events that proceeds in terms of types and tokens. It is worth noting that there is no section of this book dedicated to the Stoic theory of events because I do not take there to be any such theory, or any robust notion of events to speak of. What scholars are talking about when they attribute a theory of events to the Stoics is their schema of the Categories, which I addressed in Chapters 7 and 8, and the role of *lekta* in the context of causation, which I will address next in Chapter 12. So I will briefly give here negative arguments against attributing such a theory to the Stoics, leaning on what I say elsewhere about the Categories and *lekta*.

²³ Barnes, “Retour éternel,” 436–7; translations of Barnes are my own.

First, Bobzien argues that because (what I call) states (*scheseis*) and processes (*kinoumena*) (which she calls motions and qualitative states) are caused, they are effects, and as effects they are incorporeal *lekta*; more specifically, they are the actualizations of predicates (*katēgorēmata*), and they are accompanied by facts, which are the actualizations of propositions (*axiōmata*).²⁴ Now, states and processes are certainly caused, and it is therefore natural to call them effects, but this is not sufficient to invoke the technical sense of “effect” (that *of which* a cause is a cause) given in the context of causation, which would make them incorporeal predicates. Briefly, in the context of causation, one body (e.g. a knife) is the cause *to* another body (e.g. flesh) *of* an incorporeal predicate (*katēgorēma*, an incomplete *lekton*) (e.g. “being cut”). I will address the causation passages and the technical sense of “effect” in Chapter 12, arguing that what causes are *of* is not a metaphysical matter but a dialectical one and that treating all causal results as effects in this technical sense is a widespread mistake. In the meantime, I will say that states and processes, if they must be forced into this causal framework, are in the cause *to* relation, not the cause *of* relation. Thus they are not incorporeal, but rather corporeal. As we saw in Chapters 7 and 8, Simplicius (*In Ar. Cat.* 212,1–3,1 (28N, passage E/Chapter 7)) reports that states and processes are included in the broadest or loosest sense of the term “qualified,” and while this distinction between broader and more specific senses of “qualified” does not tell us anything about the distinction between the second and third Categories, it does tell us that as inputs to the schema of the Categories, states and processes are certainly bodies.

Bobzien also argues that states must be incorporeal because “being a type of *μοναί*, and having a duration, [states] must be (incorporeal) qualitative states things are in, and not the (corporeal) being qualified of things.”²⁵ But, I ask, why should duration make states incorporeal rather than corporeal? We know well that virtues are the most stable and enduring states of soul and that they are corporeal (again, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8). And the fact that being in a state is sometimes expressed by an articular infinitive as predicates also are is not sufficient to make states incorporeal predicates or the effects of causation.

Finally, in addition to arguing that states and processes are effects, and that these are actualized predicates corresponding to actualized propositions, Bobzien introduces another kind of entity, events, for that which happens or occurs (*gignomena*), and she introduces the term “occurrent” to cover all these cases of effects (states, processes, and events), with elements of modern concepts of facts and of events (as she describes them). Although Bobzien does not attribute to the Stoics a worked-out theory of occurrents, she nevertheless classifies states, processes, and events as the actualizations of predicates that are effects, and this is certainly a technical

²⁴ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 22–7.

²⁵ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 22. In this Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” n. 25, and “Times and Events,” 99, differs from Bobzien, understanding events as bodily rather than incorporeal.

notion. But in this case there is no technical notion in play, as there is for “effects.” The term “*gignomena*” is not used in a sufficiently special way by the Stoics or frequently enough to count as a technical term, as Bobzien herself acknowledges. So the burden of treating these as technical notions, let alone as predicates, has not been met.

This brings us to the type-token distinction that Bobzien finds between predicates, which she sees as entities that can be actualized any number of times (and therefore as types), and their actualization at a time, which makes them tokens. In Chapter 12 I will give detailed arguments against this conception of Stoic predicates as metaphysical entities that get actualized. But already in Chapter 8 I have shown that properties for the Stoics, whether processes, states, or whatever we might in ordinary language call an event or occurrence, are themselves bodies. The attribution of a type-token distinction here relies on an account of predicates as property (or event) types; but properties and events are not types, and predicates are not properties or events.

Salles attributes to the Stoics a theory of events as property exemplifications based on the work of Bobzien just described and embracing the influential account of the Categories by Menn; it becomes a theory of events when Salles applies the term “event” to the theory of property exemplifications proposed by Menn.²⁶ Here, again, it might be natural to describe the world in terms of events, but there is no special language of events in Stoic theory that rises to the level of a technical term, nor anything apart from (or in) the schema of the Categories that rises to the level of a theory of events. Having argued at length against Menn’s account of the Categories in Chapters 7 and 8, I set aside along with it Salles’ theory of events as property exemplifications. Thus when Salles argues for a type-token distinction among events on the basis of this theory, I take that option to have been rejected as well. It may be that such a theory would align with Jaegwon Kim’s influential theory of events, as Salles argues, but I have argued that it is not the Stoic theory, and thus it does not support attributing to the Stoics a type-token distinction among events.

Let us now look at the central text from Nemesius to see whether there is reason to construe the Stoics as dealing in type and token events, and whether the theory of recurrence is salvageable from Barnes’ criticism:

- D. (1) The Stoics say that the planets being restored to the same celestial sign, in length and breadth, there where each was at the beginning when the cosmos was first composed, at specific periods of time a conflagration and destruction of beings is wrought. (2) And again the cosmos is restored (*apokathistēmi*) from the beginning to the same (condition) (*to auto*); and the stars likewise being carried back, each of the things that comes to

²⁶ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 142–50.

pass (*ginomenon*) in the prior period is accomplished indistinguishably (*apoteleisthai aparallaktōs*). For there will be again Socrates and Plato and each of the human beings together with the same friends and compatriots; and they will suffer the same (things), have encounters with the same (things), and fashion the same (things), and every city and village and plot of land will likewise be restored. (3) And the restoration of everything (*pantos*) comes about not once but often; or rather, into infinity and without end the same (things) are restored. (4) And the gods, who do not admit of destruction, inferring from this single period, know from this all the future (things) that will be in the next periods. For there will be nothing foreign beside (the things) that came to pass before, but all will be likewise indistinguishably even down to the least (*hōsautōs aparallaktōs achri kai tōn elachiston*).

Nemesius 309,5–311,2 (52C)²⁷

What we see here is that all the same individuals, e.g. Socrates and Plato, will undergo, meet with, and do the same things individually and collectively. It is important to note that in the Greek the term “same” (“*to auto*”) lacks a complement, so that it is not explicit what it is that is the same; above I have supplied things and (following Long & Sedley) condition, in order to make for better English, but it would be more transparent to say that all *the same*s are restored. Given this ambiguity, it is natural to say that the Stoics take all the same events to pass from one world to the next, and I will sometimes speak this way—but with the caveat that there is no word for event and no reason to impute to the Stoics a robust or explicit theory of events, least of all a theory of events that proceeds in terms of type identity.

There is another, related ambiguity at the end of the passage when Nemesius reports that everything will be indistinguishable “down to the least (*elachiston*).” Scholars have understood this as down to the smallest details, finding here a commitment to strict type identity.²⁸ The assumption is that the numerical identity of Stoic individuals and events across worlds consists in having all the same properties, adhering to Leibniz’s Law. But “down to the least” need not mean down to every last property; it might mean down to the lowest or least important people and events, or down to the last or smallest events—whether the individuals have all the same properties or not. Likewise, “indistinguishably” (*aparallaktōs*) need not be read in the strongest metaphysical sense either; it has an ordinary sense of things being unchanging, not always the sense of qualitative indistinguishability appropriate to Leibniz’s Law. That events have to be precisely type identical to be the same is nowhere stated, and the strictest sense of identity as having all the same

²⁷ See also Tatian, *adv. Graec.*, Ch. 5 (SVF 1.109).

²⁸ Barnes, “Retour éternel”; Gourinat, “Éternel retour”; A. A. Long, “Everlasting recurrence”; LS; Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” “Times and Events.”

properties is not clearly in play. In another passage, Plutarch quotes Chrysippus using the same phrase, “down to the least”:

- E. “And with the administration (*oikonomia*) of the whole proceeding this way, it is necessarily according to this [sc. administration] that whenever we are disposed we are disposed as we are, whether being ill contrary to a unique nature or having been maimed or having become grammatical or musical.” And again after a little bit: “According to this account we will say similar things also about our virtue and about evils and the whole of the arts and wants of art, as I said.” And after a little bit, destroying all ambiguity: “For none of the particular (things), not even the least (*elachiston*), comes about otherwise than according to common nature and its reason.”

“οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγωγῆς, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἂν ποτ' ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ.” καὶ πάλιν μετ' ὀλίγον “κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνῶν, ὡς ἔφη.” καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον ἄπασαν ἀναιρῶν ἀμφιβολίαν “οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον.”

Plutarch, *St. rep.* 1050A (Cherniss)

The sorts of things that are the same across worlds are being sick, being maimed, becoming grammatical or musical. This tells us that it is the order of events that is the same, not necessarily that every single property is the same, as Leibniz's Law would dictate. If this is type identity, it is rather coarse, requiring that one be maimed again, sick again, etc., not that one have exactly the same scar each time. These events are relevant for their ethical significance, as part of a challenge to the Stoics how even the shameful and evil things can come about in accordance with god's reason. This is not a metaphysical commitment to Leibniz's Law or any other kind of identity condition that is being expressed here, so it is likely that “down to the least” does not mean absolute sameness of all properties, but down to the most insignificant or least important events. As Eusebius puts it, “having returned through the order (*taxis*) from which it began to order the world thusly, it makes the same (*order*) again according to reason” (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.19.1–2 (52D), my emphasis; cf. Aëtius 2.4.13 (SVF 2.597)).

Now, the Stoics are indeed committed to Leibniz's Law with respect to synchronic identity, so that a hand and the fist it constitutes, or a lump of clay and the statue it constitutes at any one moment are not the same individual because they have different properties and persistence conditions (Stobaeus 1.177,21–9,17 (28D, passage C/Chapter 7)). But this is not the account the Stoics give of diachronic

identity, which is secured by the sameness of the uniquely individuating quality even while other properties change. Socrates can change quantitatively (grow) as well as qualitatively (come to have gray hair, become wise, be sitting or standing, be in or out of the agora) so long as he remains the same uniquely qualified individual (*idiōs poion*). Thus the Stoics do not take numerical identity to be the exact sameness of *all* properties; on the contrary, it is the exact sameness of a single property while others are in flux that makes Socrates young, small, and irrational be numerically identical to Socrates old, grown, and wise—as well as Socrates in this world numerically identical to Socrates in the next. Consider now the following testimony of Alexander:

- F. (1) For it is their opinion that after the conflagration numerically all the same (things) come to pass in the cosmos again, because (*hōs*) the uniquely qualified individual again is the same as that in the preceding one and comes to be in that world, as Chrysippus says in *On the Cosmos* [. . .] (2) And they say that for the uniquely qualified individuals that come about later the only distinguishabilities (*parallagai*) from those prior are those that come to be with respect to certain external accidents, such as those distinguishabilities that also in the case of Dion remaining the same even while living do not exchange him for another (*allassō*). (3) For he does not become another if having moles before he later should no longer have them; and they say that such distinguishabilities come to be between the peculiarly qualified individuals in one world and those in another.

Alexander, *In Ar. An. pr.* 180,33–6. . . 181,25–31 (52F)

As Jean-Baptiste Gourinat emphasizes, this text confirms that being numerically identical for the Stoics consists in being the same qualified individual, i.e. having exactly the same uniquely individuating quality, both within each world and across worlds.²⁹ And it adds that just as within a single lifetime one can be numerically identical even while undergoing other changes, like losing moles, so too across worlds one can be numerically identical even with such differences. Thus, again and explicitly, numerical identity for the Stoics does not mean having all the same properties, either within a world or across worlds. Nor does the Stoic conception of numerical identity require that the individual persist without interruption, as Philoponus attests in arguing against everlasting recurrence: numerical identity is required by a commitment to recurrence; numerical identity cannot hold of what is intermittent; therefore Socrates does not recur as the Stoics require (Philoponus, *In Ar. GC* 314,9–22 (BS 19.17)). Numerical identity for the Stoics consists in having

²⁹ Gourinat, “Éternel retour,” 220–1.

exactly the same uniquely individuating quality, whether within a life or across lives, whether ongoing or interrupted.

We can now embrace the report of Origen that “Socrates will not be born again but someone indistinguishable from Socrates” (Origen, *Contra Cels.* 4.68 (Koetschau)), rather than finding this testimony heterodox and seeking to justify the change or seeing it as a move to avoid the problem of circularity.³⁰ Origen is right that this Socrates and the next one are distinct from each other (this one being in this world and the next one in the next) and thus merely indistinguishable (if they even are indistinguishable) rather than one and the same; but he is wrong that this Socrates and the next one are not numerically identical and thus to deny that Socrates will be born again. According to the Stoic account of identity and persistence, this Socrates and the next are numerically identical because they have an indistinguishable uniquely individuating quality—it’s not that they have all the same properties, but that this particular property is exactly the same. In fact, even if this Socrates and the next were exactly alike qualitatively, i.e. “type-identical,” it would not follow that they are one and not two (as Barnes charges) because they could be happening at different times. If time is ongoing rather than repeating, i.e. linear rather than circular, no two world orders will be one rather than two even if all their properties were to be exactly alike. This one is happening now, that one happened last time, and the next one will happen after this one, the next time. The circularity of time depends on type-identity, and if we resist that notion, then time can be linear and dependent.

Once we recognize that the Stoic conception of numerical identity does not involve having all the same properties (adhering to Leibniz’s Law) or even being uninterrupted, we can see that whether there are certain small differences between world orders is irrelevant to whether they are able to preserve their commitment to everlasting recurrence. Not only is the possibility of small differences not a fatal problem for the Stoic account, it need not even be something developed in defense of that thesis, though critics portray it that way:

- G. Indeed the Stoics say that a periodic conflagration of everything comes about, and by this another world order (*diakosmēsis*) comes about, all things being indistinguishable (*aparallakta*) from the prior world order. So much are they ashamed of their dogma, they say small and exceedingly insignificant differences to those things in the period before it.

Origen, *Contra Cels.* 5.20 (52G)

Origen portrays the Stoics in a defensive light, since he (like Barnes) holds that being completely indistinguishable is both necessary and sufficient for numerical

³⁰ As Barnes, “Retour éternel,” and Gourinat, “Éternel retour,” 222, hold, respectively.

identity and hence for genuine recurrence, and so for world orders to be distinct they must differ in some way. And indeed, if one were committed to this view of numerical identity, that may well be the only way to have distinct world orders. But the Stoics are not committed to that view of numerical identity, either within worlds or across them, as Alexander tells us explicitly (F). As we saw in Chapters 7 and 8, there is ample evidence about the Stoic response to the Growing Argument, which denies that constitution is identity for a qualified individual; what makes an individual the same diachronically is that its uniquely individuating quality remains exactly the same through all sorts of other changes, both quantitative (growth and diminution) and qualitative (running, being on guard, sitting, being wise, etc.).

Thus we have no reason to think that Alexander and Origen are reporting heterodox views or different versions of the theory at odds with the reports of Stoic orthodoxy in Nemesius and Plutarch, nor do we have to justify the possibility of small differences across (or within) worlds by finding a defective theory in need of fixing. The Stoics do not need saving from themselves. Our sources do not in fact report that numerical identity across worlds consists in having exactly the same properties and being indistinguishable from each other in every way; they say that everything will come to pass likewise (D), that the people and order of events will be the same (D, E), and that everything will return to the same shape or qualitative state (*schēma*) (Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 7.23 (52B)).³¹ But since numerical identity consists in being the same qualified individual (F), and this is compatible with there being other differences, we need not read Leibniz's Law back into the reports of Nemesius and Plutarch. Nor, by the same token, do we need to find any disagreement or heterodoxy in Origen's reports that there are certain differences between worlds.

Nor, on the other side, do we need to contrive to preserve the absolute indistinguishability of each successive world in order to say that they are numerically identical and that all the same individuals and events come to pass. A. A. Long, for example, makes a distinction between the god's eye view that can distinguish between identical world orders, and the view within each world order, which is exactly like the last, as if the very same movie were to be played and replayed. I embrace this idea of the god's-eye view as sufficient to distinguish each world from all the others, but I resist the pressure to make each world exactly alike. Thus I suggest a modification to Long's metaphor: perhaps it is less like a movie that gets played and replayed, and more like a play that gets performed over and over again, with small differences in the actors' performances here and there. Even if two performances should be exactly alike, however, they would remain distinct performances.

³¹ See Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 22, for the idea that *schēma* "stands for all qualitative features of any object."

In conclusion, to answer the question put so forcefully by Barnes, how time can be linear rather than circular if it depends on change for its *subsistence*, even though numerically the same world repeats itself infinitely many times: time depends on the motion of the cosmos for its *subsistence* and it is linear because even during the conflagration motion is ongoing; whether each world is qualitatively indistinguishable in every way is therefore irrelevant—each world order happens after the last and before the next. Thus the great year (the time of a whole world cycle) *subsisting* according to this cosmos is not the same as the one *subsisting* according to the next; they are distinguishable not only by whatever small differences there may be but, even if they should be qualitatively indistinguishable through and through, they are distinguished by their happening at different times, this one being after the last and before the next on an infinite number line. The phrase “numerical identity” applies to those individuals that have the same uniquely individuating quality, but are nevertheless distinct and distinguishable from the god’s-eye view (at least) by their happening at different times. There is this Socrates distinct from (and yet numerically identical to) the last Socrates and the next one, because time is linear; whether there are small differences between worlds does not matter to their being distinct.

The sameness of each world order does not make time circular, or periodic, nor is absolute sameness required for numerical identity, either within a world or across worlds. Time arises uninterrupted from motion both during and between world orders. Each world order is numerically identical to the last and the order of events is the same, but this does not make time circular. First, because numerical identity does not entail having all the same properties (as circularity would require), but, more importantly, because time is the extension of motion, and motion is particular; just as place, void, et al. inherit their particularity from underlying body, so too does time (and this is why time will pass the Not Someone test, as we will see). Because the causal sequence of events is linear, with the present unfolding now, after the past and before the future, each world is distinguishable from the others by its order in the series and there is no question of recurrence collapsing into a single instance—even if every world were to be exactly alike. And even when they are not exactly alike, each world order is nonetheless numerically identical to the last because the Stoics do not subscribe to Leibniz’s Law for diachronic identity either within worlds or across worlds. The question to ask, then, is not how there can be everlasting recurrence if time is linear, but how there can be everlasting recurrence if time is *not* linear.

Puzzles of the Present

This brings us to the present (*to enestós*) and the nest of puzzles concerning the reality of time. If the present is entirely divisible into parts past and parts future,

how is it really present, or even real? And how is it individuated or distinguished from the past and future, if it is itself part past and part future? These questions correspond to what Salles has called the desiderata of Presentness and Unity for the Stoic theory of time: how can any time be wholly present even though it has parts that are past and parts that are future, and how is a wholly present time unified even though it is divisible to infinity?³² Salles elucidates these puzzles with ideal clarity, and his desiderata capture perfectly the strategy scholars have pursued in order to rescue the present (and hence time as a whole) from being specious or unreal. However, as I will argue, this is the wrong goal.

Our central source of information on the Stoic theory of time is Stobaeus, who catalogs the views of Zeno, Apollodorus, Posidonius, and Chrysippus (in that order, perhaps in order of increasing detail). In addition to the basic definition of time as the extension of (the world's) motion by which speed and slowness are measured, which he attests for each, we are also given various data about the present, including that it is divisible into past and future, that it obtains (*huparchein*) in contrast to the past and future that only *subsist* (*huphestanai*), and both that no time is wholly present and that only the whole of time or time as a whole is present and obtains. One can readily see how if the present that obtains is decomposed into parts past and future, which do not obtain, the very reality of time is threatened; whatever exactly it means to obtain or be the case, there is something fishy about what obtains being composed of what does not obtain. It is also easy to see the apparent paradox in saying that no time is present and yet the whole of time is present. I will introduce the texts, then explain how these reports fit together without paradox or entailing the unreality of time.

- H. *Chrysippus* (follow-on to passage B above): (1) He says this most manifestly: that no (*outheis*) time is wholly (*holōs*) present; for since the division of continuous things is into infinity, according to this distinction also all time has division into infinity; and so no (*mēthen*) time is present exactly (*kat' apartizon*), but is broadly (*kata platos*) said to be present. (2) He says only the present obtains (*huparchein*), and the past and future only subsist (*huphestanai*), but never obtain, as also predicates (*katēgorēmata*) are said to obtain only because the attributes (*ta sumbebēkota*) are (*einai*), e.g. "walking" obtains for me when I am walking, but does not obtain when lying down or sitting.

Stobaeus 1.106,13–23 (51B3–4)

Here we are told that no time is wholly present because of the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility, with the result that no time is present exactly (*kat' apartizon*)

³² Salles, "Two Classic Problems," 141; see also BS 20.

or, literally, without remainder, but can only be said to be present broadly speaking (*kata platos*) (H1). In addition to the basic question, how can time be real if the present is part past and part future, one of our central explananda is what it means for time to be present broadly as opposed to exactly or wholly. We are also told here that only the present obtains (*huparchein*), in comparison to predicates that obtain, while the past and future only *subsist* (*huphestanai*) (H2). This contrast between obtaining and *subsisting*, along with the comparison to predicates, is another central explanandum. If we understand obtaining as existing or being real, as many commentators do, then it is clear why one might worry that time is non-existent or unreal—at least on the assumption that time is composed of times: if no part of time is present exactly, and only the present is real, then time as a whole is not real.³³ But then, in apparent opposition to this result, we also have the following report that the whole of time or, equivalently, time as a whole is present and obtains, even though none of its parts obtains exactly:

- I. *Apollodorus* (follow-on to passage A above): Time as a whole (*ton panta chronon*) is present, as a year is said to be present, according to a greater compass (*perigraphē*), and time as a whole is said to obtain (*huparchein*), with none (*ouden*) of its parts obtaining exactly (*apartizontōs*).

Stobaeus 1.105,12–6 (51D, part)

Here one wants to know what it means for the whole of time to be present and, of course, to obtain, and what the contrast to its parts obtaining inexactly (or, presumably, broadly) amounts to. If no part of time is present or obtains exactly, i.e. is real, the conventional worry goes, how can the whole of time be present and obtain? How can time be real if its parts are not real? Making matters worse, we also have evidence that the present is thought of as point-like.

- J. (1) [Posidonius affirms] that of time conceived of in terms of the when (*to pote*) one (part) (*to men*) is past, one (part) (*to de*) future, and another (part) (*to de*) present,³⁴ which is out of some (part) that is past and some (part) future around the division (*diorismos*) itself; and the division is point-like (*sēmeiōdē*). (2) The now and the like [e.g. the when] are time conceived of broadly (*en platei*) and not exactly (*kat' apartizon*). The now is also spoken of according to the least perceptible time around the division uniting the future and past.

Stobaeus 1.105,21–6,4 (51E3–5)

³³ See especially Sorabji, *TCC*, 21–7. I disagree with Papazian, “Stoic Ontology,” 111–2, 116–7, that Plutarch does not charge Chrysippus with making time unreal in this passage.

³⁴ Following the text of BS 20.10: *kai ton epinooumenon kata to pote tou chronou*. . . “and [he affirms] that of the time conceived of in terms of when, one part is past, another future, and another present”; cf. LS 51E: “that time which is conceived of in terms of ‘when’ is partly past, partly future, and partly present.”

This treatment of the present as a point-like division or limit clearly supports the idea of a specious present (since everyone knows there are no real, extensionless points in the world), and paired with the idea of time being composed of times (a series of presents), it fuels the basic worry that time is unreal. So we also need to inquire what it means for the present to be point-like, and how that relates to being spoken of broadly as opposed to exactly. But before turning to this and our other explananda, let us review the other central text on time, which is from Plutarch. Plutarch of course sees the worst in the Stoics, so his attack will be a worthy target of defense as well as a valuable source of information. Plutarch is a trusted source because, although he is snarky and on the attack, he is reliable in his reports of Stoic doctrine—whether the consequences he draws from these reports really do follow is another matter.

- K. (1) It is contrary to (common) conception for future (*mellonta*) and past (*parōchēmenon*) time to exist (*einai*) but for the present (*enestōta*) time to not exist, nay but (*alla*)³⁵ for the just now (*to arti*) and the other day (*to prō(i)ēn*) to subsist (*huphestanai*) while the now (*to nun*) is altogether nothing (*holōs mēden*). (2) And indeed this follows for the Stoics who do not leave a smallest time and do not wish the now to be partless (*amerē*), but claim (*phaskein*) that whatever someone presumes (*oiomai*) to have in mind, grasping as present, of this one (part) (*to men*) is future and another (part) (*to de*) past. (3) Consequently (*hōste*), nothing remains according to the now, nor is any portion (*morion*) of present time left if that which is said to remain of this is divided into (parts) future and (parts) past. (4) Therefore one of two things follows, either in asserting “there was time and there will be time” they destroy “there is time,” or in asserting “there is present time,” of which one (part) was present and the other (part) will be present, they also say that of what obtains (*to huparchon*) one part is future and the other is past, and of the now one (part) is before and the other (part) after, so that (*hōste*) now is the not yet now and the no longer now; for the past is no longer now and the future is not yet now. <It is necessary for them> in dividing <thusly> to say also that <of today there is one (part) yesterday and another (part) tomorrow>, and of this year there is one (part) last year and one (part) next year, and of what happens at once (*hama*), one (part) is before and another (part) after. For they stir up nothing more fitting than these, equating the not yet, the already, the no longer, the now, and the not now. All other people posit and conceive and suppose both the recently and the soon to be different parts of the now, and the latter to be after now and the former before now.

³⁵ For “nay but” for “*alla*” see LSJ II.1.

(5) Among these [sc. Stoics], on the one hand Archedemus, in saying the now is a certain joint (*harmos*) and juncture (*sumbolē*) of what is past and what is coming on, has forgotten that he himself, as it seems, destroys all of time. For if the now is not time but a limit of time, and every portion (*morion*) of time is such as the now is, it appears that the entirety (*ho sumpas*) of time has no parts (*merē*) but is completely dissolved into junctures and joints.

(6) Chrysippus wishing to be artful (*philotechnein*) in the division (*diairesis*), in his work on the *Void* and in certain others, says that the (part) of time that is past and (the part that is) future do not obtain (*huparchein*) but subsist (*huphestanai*) and only the present (part) obtains; on the other hand, in the third, fourth, and fifth books of on *Parts* he asserts that of the present time, one (part) is future and another is what has gone by. (7) Consequently (*hōste*), it follows for him that the obtaining (part) (*to huparchon*) of time divides into (parts) of what obtains (*tou huparchontos*)³⁶ that do not obtain (*mē huparchonta*), or rather that he leaves wholly (*holōs*) none of time obtaining, if the present has no part (*meros*) that is not future or past.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1081C–1082A (51C)³⁷

Plutarch is foisting on the Stoics the result (“and indeed this follows for the Stoics”) that (i) the future and the past exist but the present does not, or, what comes to the same, that (ii) recently and the other day *subsist* while the now is nothing at all (K1). He takes this to follow from the Stoic commitment to time as divisible to infinity. As Plutarch explains in K2, the Stoics do not leave a smallest time nor do they wish it to be partless (i.e. indivisible); this is to say that they are continuum physicists who reject atomic (indivisible) minima (smallest times).³⁸ Thus they claim that anyone *presuming* to grasp an atomic present as an individual time has in fact grasped something that is part past and part future; there are no such individual times. Consequently, Plutarch argues, nothing remains of the present time, which is to say that the present does not exist and the now is nothing at all, as he sought to show (K1, K3). The scholarly worry that time is destroyed if it is divisible into past and future is ancient.

With respect to the future and the past *existing* and *subsisting* (in (i) and (ii)), which Plutarch treats as equivalent, we can observe that these are indeed both ways of being Something for the Stoics, so there is a certain equivalence insofar

³⁶ I follow LS; Schofield, “Retrenchable” in reading *tou huparchontos* here over Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, following Bury with *to th’ huparchon*. The sense is correct, since dividing the present into past and future gets you to parts that do not obtain, not to some parts that obtain and some parts that do not as with Cherniss and Bury and, more forcefully, Sandbach, “Ennoia and Prolēpsis,” who adds *kai ta huparchonta tou huparchontos*. See also Bréhier, *Les Stoiciens*, 174–5.

³⁷ Cf. translations by Bréhier, *Les Stoiciens*; Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*.

³⁸ Bréhier, *Les Stoiciens*, 174, translates “*amere*” directly as “indivisible.”

as both are considered Something real, i.e. on the ontological map; this is what is true in Plutarch saying the future and past exist for the Stoics. The dialectic common to both cases is that the Stoics are making the past and future real in some way (existing, *subsisting*) while denying that ontological status to the present (non-existent, nothing). The absurdity relies on the assumption that the present, which does not exist, is composed of parts that do exist. These are all ancient variations on the basic question, put most recently by Salles, how can time be real if the present is part past and part future? Plutarch goes on to levy a series of further absurdities trading on the same assumption about composition, e.g. that the now is part not yet and part no longer, today is part yesterday and part tomorrow (K4). His ultimate charge is that the Stoics make not yet, already, no longer, now, and not now all the same, thereby making time unreal all over again (because if the parts of time are all the same, then there are no parts of time).

Plutarch then continues his quest to show that the Stoics make time unreal, working with the same governing assumption applied now to the views of Archedemus and Chrysippus. Plutarch, in characterizing Archedemus' view of the now as a certain joint or juncture, a mere limit of time, even makes the governing assumption of his criticism explicit: Archedemus has forgotten that he himself destroys time, if every portion of time is dissolved into a limit (K5). Not only is the assumption explicit, and explicitly foisted on Archedemus (who forgets or, as Bréhier puts it, fails to see that he destroys all of time), the result is explicitly extended from the present to all parts of time.³⁹ It is not just the present that is specious—all individual times are specious, there are no times, therefore time is unreal. We also see here another of our explananda, reported by Stobaeus in J3, where Posidonius says that the division between past and future is point-like and conceived of broadly. What is the notion of “now” as a limit or division, and what is its relation to the distinctions between being broadly as opposed to exactly present, and between obtaining broadly rather than exactly? Plutarch then foists on Chrysippus (signaled by *hōste*) the result that time is unreal because if the past and future *subsist* (*huphestanai*) but do not obtain (*huparchein*), and only the present obtains, and, further, the present is entirely divisible into parts past and parts future, then what obtains has parts that do not obtain and no time is left obtaining, i.e. (for Plutarch) being real (K6–7).⁴⁰

Thus in the Plutarch passage we see all of our explananda, ancient and modern, at once: the basic question, how time can be real if the present is entirely divisible into parts past and parts future; what it means to be present broadly as opposed to exactly or wholly; why no time is present, yet time as a whole is present and obtains; how to understand the difference between obtaining and *subsisting* and

³⁹ Bréhier, *Les Stoïciens*.

⁴⁰ As Bréhier, *Les Stoïciens*, renders it, the reality of time is divided into unreal elements or parts; cf. Goldschmidt, “Ὑπάρχειν et ὑφίστασθαι,” 339.

the comparison to predicates; and what the present being point-like has to do with being spoken of broadly but not exactly.

Puzzles Dissolved

Let us now answer each of these questions in turn. I mentioned above that the goal of rescuing the present from being specious or unreal, which scholars have pursued as a strategy to preserve the reality of time, is the wrong goal. I will now explain. In the last section we saw how the governing presupposition that numerical identity involves having all the same properties has been a barrier to understanding time in the context of everlasting recurrence. Here, in the context of the present, there is another governing presupposition that has been a barrier to our understanding of time: the assumption that if the present is specious, then time is unreal. This conditional is endorsed both by those who take time to be unreal, e.g. Richard Sorabji and Pierangiolo Berrettoni, as well as those who seek to rescue the Stoics from making time unreal, e.g. Brunschwig, Schofield, and Salles.⁴¹ However, as I will argue, this is a false conditional that relies on the mistaken assumption that time as a whole (or, equivalently, the whole of time) for the Stoics is composed of individual times as its parts.

We have seen this kind of mistake before, in Chapter 3, with scholars who assume that the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility is a commitment to having infinitely many subparts or, in contemporary terms, to having infinitely many Proper Parts, i.e. being “gunky.” I argued there that the Stoics are not committed to the mereological thesis of gunk, and that their continuum physics is a genuinely physical (rather than merely logical) commitment to body, space, and time as homogeneous and therefore *partless*—*not* consisting of infinitely many bodies, lines, points, places, portions of space, or (in this case) times (Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/ Chapter 3)). Body is solid three-dimensional extension, or mass. Space and time, while not solid mass, are still mass-y in being simply extension, with no internal differentiations or, therefore, anything distinguishable as a part. As we saw in the digression on mereology in Chapter 3, to be a part is to be both one, a unity with its own circumscription (*perigraphē*), and to be not disjoint, i.e. not separable from the whole without destruction. Extension as such, whether solid or not, is entirely homogeneous and thus has no internal differentiations that could serve as a *perigraphē* by which to distinguish anything as a part. This is what it means to say that the continuum is partless (not to be confused with the

⁴¹ Sorabji, *TCC*, 21–7, makes time *less* real rather than completely unreal; Berrettoni, “Aspectual Theory,” 33, makes it subjective (and hence unreal). Brunschwig, *TGS*, 99–109; Schofield, “Retrenchable”; Salles, “Two Classic Problems.”

atomistic sense of being indivisible, as in K2, where we see the Stoic *denial* that the continuum is partless).

And while any partition one might create, say by carving off a slice of body, will then have a *perigraphē*, it will also be disjoint (having been cut off) and thus no longer a part. And, crucially, imagining all the parts that could be there does not put them there either. These are all boundaries or circumscriptions created and imposed by us, not circumscriptions or differentiations antecedently there in the homogeneous extension. In the case of incorporeal continua, it is not possible to carve off any parts, of course, since there is no contact or causal interaction for incorporeals. But this hardly serves to reintroduce parts to continuum, nor is the fact that body can be physically carved what makes it homogeneous and partless to begin with; it is not the carving, or even the possibility of carving, that makes something divisible to infinity.⁴²

The thesis of infinite divisibility does not presuppose a physical operation of cutting up, though it is compatible with such an operation in the case of body. Rather, it presupposes that there are no internal divisions to being with, i.e. that the continuum is homogeneous and undifferentiated. Infinite divisibility is not (de) composition (into or) out of infinitely many parts. Therefore, because time is continuous, individual times are not parts of time antecedently there; this is what it means to say that the present is specious. But the speciousness of the present, and of individual times generally, is no threat to the reality of time. The conditional that infers from times being specious or unreal to the complete unreality of time turns on the assumption that time as a whole is composed of individual times like the present as its parts. This is the same mistaken assumption that motivates accounts of the Stoics as gunk theorists.

So, the answer to the basic question about the reality of time is that if the present is not composed of past and future as parts but, rather, divisible into past and future as partitions imposed by us on continuous and hence homogeneous time, then time itself is not destroyed by infinite divisibility. The thesis that time is unreal does not follow from its being infinitely divisible. The question is ancient, but so is the response: infinite divisibility is not decomposition into parts. The response is, I suggest, the original Stoic position seen aright—no unreality or contemporary gunk theories required. Thus I resist Sorabji's idea that the Stoics embrace Aristotle's paradox and use it to make time less real, as well as the strategies of Schofield and Salles that seek to rescue time from this threat by denying the speciousness of the present and preserving it as wholly present (and not part past and part future) and as unified or indivisible (and hence distinct from past and future). On my account, there is no reason to resist the specious present because time is not composed of individual times; their speciousness is irrelevant to the reality of time.

⁴² I appreciate José Navarro Talavera pressing me on the role of carving.

By this same token, we can also resist the consequences that Plutarch foists, even while embracing the reports from which he draws those consequences. In K1 he foists on the Stoics the absurd result that the future and past exist (and *subsist*) while the present time does not exist (and is nothing). The destruction of the present time into non-existence or nothingness follows from or, rather, *just is* the speciousness of the present, which Plutarch reports in K2; but the absurdity that offends common sense follows from the assumption that time is composed of times: how can the whole of time have some ontological status while its parts have none? With this governing assumption set to the side, however, we can see that there is no absurdity in saying that the past and the future are Something (for which Plutarch uses “exists”) and that they *subsist*, while the present, considered as a precise part of time, is specious and thus is not Something (“does not exist”) and is nothing at all (does not *subsist*). Time as a whole, extending infinitely in both directions, *subsists* according to the world’s motion; thus it is true that the past and the future do *subsist*—but, on these terms, it is equally true that the present *subsists*. There are no precise times or parts of time, so any portion of time we choose to carve off (whether past, present, or future) will have the ontological status of time as a whole, *subsistence*.⁴³ Plutarch, in leaving out the present in K1, implies that *only* the past and future are Something and *subsist*. Then, in citing the speciousness of the present as a contrast case in K2, he invokes the governing assumption that past, present, and future are parts composing time in order to generate the absurdity that the whole has ontological status while its parts do not. He then confirms in K3 that this assumption governs the result: nothing remains of the present time if it is decomposed into futures and pasts.

Thus there is no need to write off Plutarch as unreliable in his reports. The consequences he foists do not follow, to be sure, but the views he attributes to the Stoics do stand. The Stoics do deny atomism and do take the present to be specious as reported in K2 (and confirmed in K5), but this does not lead to the absurdity that Plutarch presses—except on the assumption that time is composed of times. He even makes it clear when he is foisting and when reporting: he tells us that the unreality of time follows from and is a consequence (*sumbainein*, *hōste*, *oun sumbainiein*) of their commitments (*apolimpanein*, *boulesthai*, *phaskein*). Following this interpretive strategy we can now make sense of what it means for the Stoics to say that the not yet, already, now, and not now are the same, while resisting Plutarch’s consequence (K4). The truth in this is that time is continuous, i.e. homogeneous and partless (not in the atomistic sense of being indivisible but in the continuum-theorist sense of not being composed of parts); the Stoic denial of parts *does* treat what Plutarch takes to be parts as all the same in doing away with them as parts altogether. If there are no distinctions by which to individuate

⁴³ And not because the incorporeality of the whole is transmitted to its parts, as Brunswick, *TGS*, 106, argues.

the parts of time, then they are all the same. Plutarch even confirms that this is precisely what the Stoics think at the end of K4 when he says that all other people (i.e. who aren't nutty Stoics) recognize that there are parts of time occurring in a determinate order. Plutarch follows the same dialectical strategy in K5, where he charges Archedemus with destroying all of time by making the parts of time mere limits, and in K6–7, where he charges Chrysippus with the result that the part of time that obtains is composed of times that do not obtain.⁴⁴ I will return to the difference between obtaining and *subsisting*, and the point-like nature of the now shortly.

But first I will address the distinction between being broadly (*kata platos*) present as opposed to wholly (*holōs*) and exactly (*apartizontōs*, *kat' apartizon*) present (H1, I, J2). Schofield understands being wholly and exactly present as being *only* present and not divisible into part past and part future, i.e. being point-like; this sense of the term “present” is rigid and there are such divisions in reality, e.g. between yesterday and today.⁴⁵ Being broadly present, on the other hand, is a matter of being divisible into parts past and future, i.e. being extended; this sense of “present” is retrenchable according to our linguistic usage, and does not dictate anything about the nature of reality. For example, the term “now” is retrenchable according to our intentions to refer to anything from the present instant, to this afternoon, today, or this year. In switching to a point about linguistic expressions, which are changeable, the firm and exact divisions in reality between past, present, and future are not affected. The infinite divisibility of time, i.e. its retrenchability, on Schofield's view is not a physical thesis about the nature of time, but a linguistic one that leaves the physical reality of time and the individual times that compose it untouched.⁴⁶ Notice that this evasive maneuver is only necessary on the assumption that the threat to the reality of time is legitimate because time is composed of times or, equivalently, the division of the present into past and future is decomposition into its parts. Retrenchability is meant to save the present from this threat by changing the subject from time, which does have precise divisions, i.e. real presents, to how we speak about time, which is imprecise and changeable. Thus it is not time itself that is infinitely divisible on this view.

Schofield also uses the concept of retrenchability to neutralize Plutarch's paradox in K6, which he takes to be another legitimate threat to the reality of time. Schofield argues that because the division of a present (and obtaining) time *t* into parts past and future is always done relative to some smaller present

⁴⁴ Perhaps Chrysippus' point in saying, in his work titled *On Parts*, that the present is divisible into past and part future is precisely that the past and future are *not* themselves parts of time but partitions; indeed it is Plutarch, in the last line, who introduces the term “part” (“*meros*”).

⁴⁵ Schofield, “Retrenchable.”

⁴⁶ Schofield, “Retrenchable,” 347–8; cf. Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 215, for *kata platos* as extended, understood as containing part past and part future and therefore (for some reason) having a higher degree of reality or special status.

time t_1 , there is no paradox in saying that time t is divisible into parts past and future that do not obtain; the paradox only threatens if one should say that relative to time t itself time t has parts that do not obtain. Notice, again, that this threat is only real on the assumption that time is composed of times and the division into past and future is a case of decomposition into its parts. But once we see that the reality of time is not threatened by the speciousness of individual times (because infinite divisibility is not a case of breaking down the whole of time into its component parts), we can see that Schofield's appeal to retrenchability as a way of shifting the subject matter is unnecessary—not that terms like “now” and “the present” aren't retrenchable; they clearly are. However, the retrenchability of these terms does not signal a change of topic away from the nature of time itself. Rather, it is a linguistic phenomenon licensed by the fact that there are no such divisions in the continuum. In other words, it's not because time terms are retrenchable that we can therefore say there are individual times, as Schofield argues. On the contrary, it's because there are no individual times that time terms are retrenchable.⁴⁷

Salles works toward the same goal as Schofield, to save the present from being specious, but with an opposite strategy, securing his desiderata of Unity and Presentness with the *broad* present in contrast to what he calls a narrow sense according to which no interval of time is present at all because it is entirely divisible into parts past and future.⁴⁸ Salles makes the broad present genuinely present and distinct from (i.e. not divisible into) past and future, by construing it as occupied by a currently ongoing event that is itself causally unified. The causal unity of the event, e.g. walking my dog, confers metaphysical unity on the portion of time that it occupies, thus salvaging the present from being specious and dissolving into past and future. At the same time, it remains entirely divisible (as our texts dictate) because the unified event starts in the past, straddles the point-like now, and ends in the future. Thus, as Salles seeks to show, there is no conflict between saying that, on the one hand, no time is wholly present because of infinite divisibility but, on the other hand, some times are broadly present because they are unified by events that occupy them.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See Mouroutsou, “Plasticity of the Present,” for agreement on this point, namely that it is because the present is specious that our time terms are retrenchable (though I would not also want to put the point in terms of subjectivity).

⁴⁸ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 138–9, argues for the strong thesis that no time at all is present, i.e. the whole of time is not present or none is present, on the basis of an argument that he reconstructs for Chrysippus according to which the parts of time are *only* past and future. Against this, however, the first half of the sentence in Plutarch (my K5) from which Salles argues *does* construe the present as a part, saying that while the past and future parts *subsist* but do not obtain, the present part obtains.

⁴⁹ In BS, 465–7, this distinction is put in terms of two senses of “present,” an abstract metaphysical sense (according to which time is infinitely divisible and thus no time is present) and a physical sense (according to which intervals of time are present in their totality, measurements not logically divisible into past and future). Sorabji, *TCC*, 26, considers and rejects the broad conception of time in analogy with the broad conception of place, which takes it not as illegitimate but rather as “not tight-fitting.”

I agree, of course, that there is no conflict between these two commitments because of the distinction between being broadly (*kata* or *en platos*) present and precisely or exactly present (as I prefer for *kat' apartizon* and *apartizontōs*). But I don't think the distinction has been adequately captured by the contrast between broad and narrow (Salles), or between physical and metaphysical (Boeri & Salles), or between being divisible and point-like (Schofield). Being spoken or conceived of broadly as opposed to exactly is not about whether time itself is extended as opposed to point-like, infinitely divisible, or not, but about the precision with which we are speaking or conceiving of the present. Every time this distinction is invoked it is with reference to how we speak or conceive of time (H1, H2, I, J2); as Sorabji translates, it is "described as present only broadly."⁵⁰ To speak broadly is to speak loosely—or, we might even say, retrenchably—as opposed to using our terms with exact precision.⁵¹ If we are speaking loosely, then we can easily speak of the present, be it of this instant, today, this year, or the present world order; but if someone were to then press the Stoics about the precise boundaries of any of these presents, then they retreat from talk of the present and deny that technically speaking any individual time is present.⁵² We have seen this dialectical strategy before in the context of infinite divisibility, in a Plutarch passage occurring shortly before the one we are working with here:

- L. For Chrysippus says that when we are asked if we have certain parts, and how many, and of what and how many parts they consist, it is useful to make a distinction. To the rough (*holoschleres*) question, we will reply that we are composed of head, trunk, and limbs; for that was all that the problem put to us amounted to. But if they extend the questioning to last parts, he says it is necessary to recognize no such things, but we must speak neither of which we consist, nor, likewise, of how many, either infinite or finite. I have, I think, quoted his actual words, so that you may see the way he preserved the common conceptions, urging us to think of each body as consisting neither of certain parts (*merē*) nor of some number of them, either infinite or finite.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1079B–C (50C3, passage H3/Chapter 3)

Plutarch charges the Stoics with absurdity in saying that we consist of a determinate number of parts (head, trunk, and limbs) and yet no determinate number.

⁵⁰ Sorabji, *TCC*, 22, my emphasis.

⁵¹ LSJ A.III. This is perhaps what LS, 307–8, suggest.

⁵² See Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 24,13–20 (37S) for quiescence recommended in response to a fallacy of equivocation before disambiguating different senses of the term; cf. Cicero, *Acad.* 2.92–6 (37H), where Chrysippus urges quiescence in response to the Sorites paradox (where one might, then, also expect some kind of disambiguation as a resolution). It would be interesting to study all cases in which the Stoics recommend silence, to explore whether there is a dialectical pattern, as Nolan does in "Stoic Trichotomies"; the suggestion is that silence is the appropriate response to category mistakes.

But Chrysippus insists that a category mistake is being made. To the rough, or inexact question, we can recognize the perfectly ordinary sense in which we are composed of a certain number of parts and give an answer like head, trunk, and limbs—this is a matter of common sense or, ultimately, the student of anatomy. To the precise question, the demand for a complete accounting of parts in light of the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility, however, we cannot recognize any such things—this is no longer a composition question or a matter of common sense or even of anatomy, but a conflation of two different questions: what parts compose the human body (rough answer: head, trunk, and limbs) and what parts compose body as such, i.e. malleable homogeneous mass (precise answer: none, it is a partless continuum). We find a similar distinction between exact (*pros* or *kat' akribēian*, *kuriōs*, *kata perigraphē*) and broad (*kata platos*, *aphelōs*) senses of place (SE, *M.* 10.15, 95, 108; SE, *PH* 3.75, 119). Speaking exactly, place is defined by “the air surrounding the surface of a body”; speaking broadly, place can be Alexandria, the gymnasium, or the city. The point there is that, technically speaking, there is no locomotion within a thing’s place, but speaking loosely and retrenching from the body to its larger location, there is motion within a place.⁵³ And the same dialectic is in play here with respect to the parts of time. Speaking precisely or in technical terms, there are no individual times; speaking loosely or in ordinary language, however, there are parts of time and some are present, others past and future.

Thus, as Stobaeus reports for Chrysippus in H1, no individual time (as indicated by *outheis* and *mēthen*, literally *no one* or *single*, and confirmed by *mēden* in I) is wholly (*holōs*, i.e. only) or exactly or precisely (*kat' apartizon*, literally without remainder or further divisibility) present.⁵⁴ Technically speaking, no time is wholly or exactly present because time is continuous and hence partless—there are no time atoms (“we cannot recognize any such things”). But speaking imprecisely, outside the philosophy room, so to speak, we can certainly speak of there being parts of time that are past, present, and future. And even though any precise division will be an imposition by us, these divisions are not therefore, or at least not always, arbitrary. The world does have certain natural joints by which we can speak of days, seasons, and years.

Salles makes this point in the pursuit of Unity, individuating the present by its being occupied by a casually unified event.⁵⁵ I enthusiastically embrace the idea that divisions like these are not arbitrary, and that there are such natural joints in the world and in time. But I resist the idea that a Present time is thereby

⁵³ Not that the possibility of motion requires speaking loosely; technically speaking, intra-cosmic space depends on the whole cosmos, so the fact that I can move a wine jar from one place to another is due to the fact that technically speaking intra-cosmic space depends on the cosmos and moving individual objects does not make portions of intra-cosmic space go into or out of *subsistence*, on which see Chapter 10.

⁵⁴ I embrace the adverbial sense of *holōs* as wholly and find it equivalent to exactly, as the text requires, against which see Schofield, “Retrenchable,” n. 6.

⁵⁵ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 153–4.

individuated as a Unity or part of time in any robust sense and the idea that being broadly present means being occupied by an event. Indeed, the Stoics only use the language of being occupied (*to echomenon*, *to katechomenon*) in reference to place, room, and void, which are characterized in terms of the bodies that do and don't occupy them; we do not find the language of being occupied in any of the textual evidence about time or *lekta*, nor is there any clear language of events to which we might attach the idea of being occupied. So being occupied is not a likely candidate for what it means to be broadly present. Nor is a straightforward meaning far to find: being broadly present means being spoken of or conceived of in a loose sense; it is not a property or part of time itself, but a way that we speak of time, imprecisely. Speaking loosely in ordinary language there are such times, but speaking with precision in technical terms there are no such divisions.

So there are natural joints in the world and in time, and given the dependence of incorporeals on underlying body we can even see *why* time has these natural joints (whereas on a view that takes time to be independent of motion it is not clear how the causal unity of events confers unity on parts of time). But these divisions, in the world as in time, are not precise.⁵⁶ For example, it is true that winter is the chilling of the air above the earth due to the sun's departure (DL 7.151–2); but when do we take that chilling to begin? Is it when the air is 32 degrees Fahrenheit? How far above the earth does it have to be that temperature? Does it have to be sustained, or does it start the first time it happens? Maybe when a certain average temperature is reached over a certain period of time. . .

The point of all this is that while there obviously is the season of winter, it does not have precise boundaries—either corporeal or incorporeal. We say that winter begins at the solstice and ends at the equinox, but the chilling of the air above the earth may or may not coincide with these, so they are somewhat arbitrary markers. And when exactly is it day anyway? When exactly do we count the sun as up? And what about temperature? No one thinks we measure real Fahrenheits in the world as parts of temperature, nor is there any reason to think that minutes and seconds correspond to real parts of time. Whether the natural joints are robust (as in day and night) or absent (as in minutes and seconds), precise limits of time are impositions on the world by us. This does not make time ideal or unreal; it's not that time itself is an imposition on the world by us, but that precise divisions in the continuum (whether corporeal or incorporeal) are imposed by us.

Further, this can be so even if Michael J. White, following Samuel Sambursky, is correct in attributing to the Stoics a certain ineliminable fuzziness or indeterminacy to the boundaries of individual bodies.⁵⁷ Recognizing (correctly) that the Stoics remove limit entities from physical reality, White argues that this

⁵⁶ See Varzi, "Ontology without Metaphysics," 415, for this point using the boundaries of Mt. Everest and downtown Manhattan as examples.

⁵⁷ M. J. White, "The Stoic Model."

indeterminacy does not prevent the Stoics from recognizing discriminable differences between bodies, even if it is also true that there are no precise boundaries between bodies and, in fact, the boundaries are infinitely retrenchable to further, indiscriminable divisions. Even if the Stoics did recognize surfaces, and limits generally, as *regions* rather than precise limits, there is no reason to deny that these are natural joints in the world resulting from the pneumatic tension that gives each entity its character and unity as a body.⁵⁸ Thus, again, even if the continuum does lack precise boundaries and limits, being continuous and hence partless, this does not lead to a total irrationalism about the world's natural joints or the incorporeal phenomena that arise from it because infinite divisibility is not decomposition.

One might then wonder what it means to say that the whole of time is present. If the present is specious and the whole of time is present, isn't time itself specious so that time is unreal after all? The answer is no. The move to saying time as a whole is present, indeed *only* time as a whole is present, is the dialectical move from ordinary language to precision.⁵⁹ Speaking broadly or loosely we can say that there are various parts of time including present times, like today and tomorrow, but if one then wants to get technical about it in terms of infinite divisibility, the answer is that properly speaking only the whole of time itself is present, since there are no parts of time. Notice that although this is a point about linguistic usage, it is not a defensive strategy to change the topic in order to preserve the parts of time, as with Schofield's retrenchability; on the contrary, it is the opponent who changes the topic and the Stoic who calls it out as a category mistake to do so. Individual times are specious, i.e. there are no precise presents, so if precision is called for by the opponent, then technically only time as a whole is present. This is not to change the topic, but to stick to it; not to avoid the specious present, but to embrace it.

This brings us to our next explanandum, what it means for the present to obtain (*huparchein*) in contrast to the past and future that *subsist* (*huphestanai*), and how this relates to predicates (*katēgorēmata*). Here things get a little more complicated,

⁵⁸ So, technically I am agnostic as to whether White's account is correct for the Stoics, but I don't see any barrier to this elegant affinity with contemporary thought, which has the important interpretive virtue of dissolving several puzzles concerning time and infinite divisibility generally. I do, however, wonder whether this account that removes limits from the physical world altogether, making them products of thought, clashes with the avowed realism of place as an incorporeal. Granting for the sake of argument that the limits of bodies are not incorporeal, the fuzziness of bodies that underwrites this result will lead to the same irrationalism about place; but place certainly is considered an incorporeal by the Stoics, so White's argument may be too strong. On the other hand, one might argue that there is no harm in granting that precision about surface and place (and the present time) is imposed by us, and that this does not undermine the reality of these phenomena. In that case, surface and place should both be classed as incorporeals and, perhaps, as being *kat' epinoian* as well just as the parts of time are. More on these issues ahead in Chapter 13 on limits.

⁵⁹ The evidence that *only* time as a whole is exactly present is in passage I, where we are told first that for Apollodorus time as a whole is present, like a whole year can be considered present according to a greater compass or circumscription (*perigraphē*); then that *only* time as a whole obtains (*huparchein*) since none of its parts obtains exactly. And since we know already that only the present obtains (J2), we can infer that only time as a whole is present exactly.

and a full answer requires a full account of the Stoic *lekta*, which I will give in the next chapter. For the time being I will say that the contrast between *subsisting* and obtaining is not an ontological or metaphysical distinction between two different modes of being. *Subsistence* is the mode of being of the incorporeals, in contrast to bodies, and *existence* is the mode of being of bodies; these I italicize as ways of being Something.⁶⁰ To obtain, on the other hand, is not to have some other kind of being distinct from or in addition to *subsistence*. The term “*huparchein*” is tricky because it has an ordinary language meaning of existence or reality. But here its use is clearly technical, especially since it is only used in application to the present time and true *lekta*. So whether it should be taken as *existence*, in particular in a system where only bodies *exist*, is at least questionable, if not clearly wrong.

My suggestion is that obtaining is a relation, not a mode of being: for the present time or for a predicate to obtain is for it to correspond to the world as it is. When predicates are said truly—by corresponding to the world as it is, as the Stoic correspondence theory of truth holds (DL 7.65 (34E))—then they obtain. This does not change their ontological status. As *lekta*, predicates *subsist* whether they are true or false; and when they are true, they are also said to obtain without implying any change in their ontological status. Likewise, when time is present (according to whatever compass or *perigraphē* we choose to apply) it is because it corresponds to the world as it is unfolding, and hence we say that the present obtains. And this does not change the ontological status of time, which always and only *subsists* according to the world’s motion. Nor does the fact that only the present obtains force on us any realism about the parts of time if we are speaking broadly rather than precisely. Speaking exactly, only time as a whole is present and obtains; only time in its infinite extension in both directions is happening now, if someone should seek precise boundaries for some individual present. But speaking broadly or loosely it is now day, now winter, and now this cosmic cycle, and these presents obtain because they correspond to the world as it is. That there are no precise boundaries for these presents does not undermine their obtaining, and their obtaining does not indicate that there is a sharp distinction between past, present, and future.⁶¹

Scholars have made much of the comparison to predicates. Schofield takes the present time to be parasitic on predicates holding or obtaining of a subject in the world.⁶² And Salles ties the present to predicates through a theory of events as property exemplifications in virtue of which predicates are actualized.⁶³

⁶⁰ But not only the incorporeals, since what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal *subsists*, but according to thought (*kat’ epinoian*). For more about the ontological criteria for *existence* and *subsistence* as Something, see Chapter 2, for more on *subsistence* as the dependent mode of being of incorporeals see Chapter 9. Note that talk of modes of being, just as talk of what there is, does not invoke the technical sense of *being* or *existence*.

⁶¹ As Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 151–2, takes the term.

⁶² Schofield, “Retrenchable,” 358; Mouroutsou, “Plasticity of the Present,” argues that true *lekta* and the present are, rather, codependent.

⁶³ Salles, “Two Classic Problems,” 142–50.

In Chapter 12 I will argue against the account of predicates that these views rely on, namely that predicates are properties or states of affairs that get actualized by inhering in bodies. For the time being I will emphasize that the comparison to predicates in H2 is rather slim. Stobaeus does not report that because predicates obtain, therefore the present does too. Rather, he reports an analogy: just as (in the way that) only the present obtains but past and future merely *subsist*, so too predicates are said to obtain only when the corresponding attributes *exist* or *are* (*eisin*), i.e. when the world really is that way. My proposal is that the present time and true *lekta* are both said to obtain because they correspond to the world's attributes (*sumbebēkota*) as they are occurring. What is happening now corresponds to the world in a way that what has happened and will happen do not; and, likewise, when a predicate is said truly of someone and corresponds to the world as it is, it obtains or holds or is the case (as scholars variously translate "*huparchein*"). The fact that time and true predicates correspond to the world *as* it is happening (*when* it is happening and the *way* it is happening) does not indicate any direct relation between true predicates and the present time; it tells us only that they both have this correspondence relation to the world. So the contrast between *subsisting* and obtaining is not between two alternative (or exclusive) modes of being, but between the ontological status of time (and predicates) as *subsistent* regardless of whether it is past, present, or future (or true or false), and the further fact of corresponding to the world as it is happening. There is something special about the time that is happening now, and about the things we say when they are true, and this is what the language of obtaining captures, a relation to the world as it is happening.

One of the benefits of this account is that it does not make the Stoics subject to a Sorites paradox, as Plutarch charges. The charge presupposes what some commentators have also thought, that incorporeal time is composed of parts that are corporeal, with *huparchein* understood (incorrectly) as *existence*.⁶⁴ As Brunschwig puts the point: "To make a long story short, we might first point out that, although time shares with the void a number of important features (e.g. continuity, infinity, infinite divisibility), it is unlike it in that its parts do not seem to have the same ontological status as its whole, nor as each other."⁶⁵ This is to say that the parts of time undergo a sort of ontological switching from *subsisting* to *existing* and then back to *subsisting* (or from *subsisting* to being actual or real and then back to

⁶⁴ Brunschwig, "Stoic Metaphysics," 214–5 (though in TGS, 103–9, he gives reason to doubt that the parts have a different ontological status from the whole (because the parts inherit their incorporeality from the whole, taking the argument in passage M below as a *modus tollens* rather than *modus ponens* to embrace time as incorporeal rather than as corporeal, on which see n. 68 below)); Goldschmidt, *Système*, 30–45, takes the parts of time to be finite, corporeal existents, while the whole of time is incorporeal and indeterminate; likewise, with respect to *lekta*, at 107, he speaks of corporealizing the effects of which bodies are causes, and at 166 of *lekta* leaving the sphere of abstract thought and becoming bodies, i.e. becoming realized, when they are true; Kahn, "Logic and LOGOS," 165, argues that the past and future are "ontologically restricted" because predicates only obtain now; see also Sorabji, *MSM*, 165–6, and Papazian, "Stoic Ontology," 111–2, 116.

⁶⁵ Brunschwig, "Stoic Metaphysics," 214.

subsisting). In that case, it would make sense to press a Sorites paradox, seeking to know when exactly time switches from incorporeal to corporeal and back. Here is the passage:

- M. Let them [the Stoics] not be angry at being brought to these things by the Little-by-Little Argument, but remember Chrysippus' proceeding to seek as follows in his *Questions on Physics* book 1: "It is not the case that night is a body, and that evening, dawn and midnight are not bodies; neither, surely, can day be a body and not also the first day of the month, and the tenth, fifteenth and thirtieth as well as the summer, autumn and the year be bodies."

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1084C–D (51G)

Notice, first of all, that Plutarch is pressing a Sorites paradox on the Stoics on the basis of a quote from Chrysippus. He does not say that Chrysippus himself poses an argument in the form of a Sorites paradox, nor does the quotation give any such argument.⁶⁶ So it's not that Chrysippus himself is giving a Sorites argument, but that Plutarch is levying a Sorites paradox on the basis of Chrysippus' commitment to the conditional: If night is a body, then so are evening, dawn, and midnight.⁶⁷ Chrysippus is not giving an argument, but simply a conditional. My suggestion is that the conditional is meant to resist precisely this sort of confusion (or attack). Either you can speak of time in corporeal terms, by reference to the underlying body (in which case if night is a body, then so are the others), or you can speak of it as an incorporeal (in which case, if the others are not bodies, then neither is night). Either way, there is no question of some point at which a part of time switches from *existing* as a body to *subsisting* as an incorporeal. Thus it is not necessary to decide whether to take Chrysippus as offering a *modus ponens* or *modus tollens* argument; the conditional supports both equally and that is all Chrysippus has committed to.⁶⁸ Indeed it is not an argument at all. Nor is the Stoic treatment of time heterogeneous, sometimes corporealizing and other times not, as though undecided which way to go.⁶⁹

There is therefore no difficulty in accommodating the various reports of seasons and months in corporeal as well as incorporeal terms. Diogenes reports that winter is the chilling of the air above the earth due to the sun's departure, and likewise that spring is mild air due to the sun's reapproaching, and so on. This is a meteorological report, not a metaphysical account of the difference between bodies and

⁶⁶ As Brunswick, *TGS*, 103, and "Stoic Metaphysics," 215–6, sees it.

⁶⁷ Just as Sextus reports that Carneades does in charging that if Zeus is a god, so is Poseidon, and that if day is a god (the sun), then so is the month, being made up of days, even confirming the commitment to the conditional (*SE*, *M.* 9.182–4 (70E3)).

⁶⁸ Brunswick, *TGS*, 106–9, and "Stoic Metaphysics," 216, argues for a *modus tollens* reading according to which time and its parts are not bodies (hence incorporeal) as a strategy to avoid ontological switching; see n. 64 above.

⁶⁹ Brunswick, *TGS*, 105.

incorporeals; nor is it an indication of Stoic waffling between treating parts of time alternately as bodies and as incorporeals. Stobaeus reports a distinction between a month (*mēn*), defined as the period of the moon's course, and a monthly phase (*meis*), defined alternately as the appearance of the moon to us or the moon having a part that appears to us (Stobaeus 1.219,11–24 (SVF 2.677)). Brunschwig takes these descriptions to be de-corporealizing, de-objectivizing, and objectivizing (respectively), but such divergence is artificial or, at any rate, it is artificial to find any real heterogeneity into the Stoic theory on this basis.

Let us grant that the distinction between *mēn* and *meis* is between an incorporeal period of time, the month, and corporeal phases of the moon. This does not show that the Stoics were confused or of many minds about whether time is corporeal or incorporeal, but that they are distinguishing between different phenomena. Likewise, when Cleomedes reports four senses of “month” (*mēn*) and specifies that two are corporeal and two incorporeal (*Cael.* II.5,95–101 (Todd)), this does not tell us that the Stoics are conflicted about whether time is corporeal or incorporeal. It tells us simply that the word “month” can refer to the natural joints either of the corporeal world or of incorporeal time. It's not that the Stoic theory of time is heterogeneous; on the contrary it's that they are disciplined about which phenomenon is being described. Such charges commit the three-fold error of taking obtaining to be an ontological status, taking it, further, to be the status of *existence*, and taking time to be composed of parts past, present, and future.⁷⁰

We turn now to our final explanandum, what it means for the present to be point-like and why that means it is spoken of broadly. Nowhere is the speciousness of the present more apparent than in its treatment as point-like or as a juncture or joint of time (J2, K4); as Plutarch points out, this makes the present a mere limit. Furthermore, there is evidence that such limits are mental constructs (Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* 3.95,7–15 (Diehl; 51F, passage C/Chapter 13)). So far, we have seen that the speciousness of the present, and of individual times generally, underwrites the report that no time is present exactly (since there are no precise divisions in

⁷⁰ I do not find it productive to bring the Stoic theory of time into contact with contemporary metaphysics of time concerned with McTaggart's A and B theories, or with presentism versus eternalism. It might seem natural to do so, since the Stoics do say that only the present obtains, while the past and future only *subsist*, which sounds like presentism (the view that all and only present objects exist). However, since I do not see the distinction between obtaining and *existing* as an ontological distinction, the contemporary question is a different one. Further, it is not objects like Socrates, but rather portions of time that are said to *subsist* and obtain; there is no question of Socrates ever *subsisting* in contrast to *existing* (in this I differ from Papazian, “Stoic Ontology,” 111–2, who cleaves to *huparxis* as *existence*, which he takes as evidence of presentism, and who takes Chrysippus to recognize temporal parts of objects). Thus the Stoics are not occupied with questions of endurance as opposed to perdurance. McTaggart's argument that time is unreal because it is contradictory for time to be past and future is the sort of argument we find among Stoic critics, and that charge I have answered. If the Stoics had to be characterized as one or the other, they would be A theorists, but the distinction would not help elucidate their position the way that the use of contemporary mereological notions helps us understand the continuum.

time by which to individuate a time exactly). But now the speciousness is explicit. Posidonius affirms first that time conceived of in terms of when (*to pote*) is divisible into parts past and future surrounding the point-like division between them (J1). This is to say that any period of time we choose to carve off in conceiving of a when will be divisible into past, present, and future, and that the present will be no more than a point-like instant between past and future.

Then he adds that the now and such (presumably “when” and other retrenchable expressions) are conceived of broadly and not exactly (J2). This is just to say that even though technically speaking there are no individual times and thus no precise boundaries for any period of time, nevertheless we can speak loosely of such times like the now and when. Finally Posidonius adds that “now” is also sometimes understood as the least perceptible time around the division between past and future (J3). This is a point about usage; since we are speaking broadly, these terms are retrenchable. Sometimes by “now” we mean the point-like division between past and a future, a precise instant; since we are not speaking technically, but rather broadly, we can speak of such things. Other times by “now” we mean the least or smallest perceptible time around the division, something minimally extended rather than point-like. Neither of these nows corresponds to a precise division in reality, and the point-like aspect common to both makes the speciousness plain because everyone knows there are no points in the world.

That the now is point-like is confirmed by Archedemus for whom it is a certain joint or juncture of past and future; as such it is not time but a limit of time (K5). On the assumption that time is composed of times, Plutarch charges him with destroying time altogether. This assumption that leads to the unreality of time is false for the Stoics, as we have seen, but the report that the now is a limit, and to that extent unreal, is true. There are no precise divisions in the continuum, technically speaking, so any limit we impose is to that extent unreal; we are only speaking loosely when we say that there are such divisions. So it is true that the present is a mere limit of time and therefore not itself time, nor *a* time, for the Stoics. As such it is, rather, a product of thought, a division imposed by us corresponding to nothing in the world (whether corporeal or incorporeal).⁷¹

There are no natural joints in the world that minutes and seconds correspond to; they are entirely our impositions on reality, like Fahrenheit and Celsius (though, of course, we are not thereby inventing temperature, i.e. heat and cold). Even in cases where there are robust natural joints, e.g. day and night, the same account holds: we mean “joints” speaking broadly not precisely, because there is no precise boundary between day and night either in the cosmos or in time. We decide when

⁷¹ In Chapter 13 I will argue that idealized limits like the parts of time and geometrical limits like surface, line, and point are also Something for the Stoics, and that these things belong to the ontological category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, which *subsists* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*).

it now counts as day or night, winter or summer. But again, this does not mean that we are creating time or temperature, nor does it show that time and temperature are *lekta* of any kind—the Stoics are realists, not idealists about the physical world. It is precise divisions in the undifferentiated continuum that we impose.⁷²

Thus I can agree with Berrettoni, inquiring from grammatical concerns, that the present is dynamic: “*enestôs* must be interpreted not in the common sense of an unqualified, static, present, but in its original perfect meaning of ‘begun and thus impending’, which fits the Stoics’ view of the present as a mere transition from past into future.”⁷³ To this extent, i.e. to the extent that any precise division between past and future is unavailable, the present is specious and unreal along Aristotelian lines. But, again, this need not commit them to making time unreal. So I disagree with Berrettoni that the Stoic present is an indication that “the *objective* view of time of classical Greek thought [had been] replaced by the subjective view of Hellenistic thought.”⁷⁴ And with Sorabji that the Stoics have embraced the Aristotelian paradox and made time unreal, or at any rate less real.⁷⁵

Long & Sedley fall on both sides of this question: on the one hand they find the Stoics in agreement with Aristotle that time has no existence in its own right because of its infinite divisibility, hence classing it as an incorporeal; on the other hand they see time as dependent solely on the existence of motion (just like place), hence resisting Aristotle’s subjectivism that ties time to measurement.⁷⁶ On the one hand, the present is specious because it is composed of parts past and future; on the other hand, we can speak of the present in a broad sense not to be confused with the exact sense of time as a continuum.⁷⁷ To the extent that Long & Sedley endorse the governing assumption that infinite divisibility is decomposition into parts, I disagree: time is not unreal for the Stoics because of its infinite divisibility, nor is that what makes time an incorporeal. But I agree that time depends

⁷² Schofield, “Retrenchable,” dismisses Archedemus and Posidonius as heterodox in their positions, Aristotelianizing in opposition to Chrysippus who ignores the distinction between a broad present and a durationless instant so that the testimony that no time is present exactly is simply the denial of atomism and does not lead to a specious present. According to Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, 9, however, Archedemus was a conservative Stoic “generally regarded by later Stoics as one of the great authorities of school doctrine,” and, 19, his view here “is likely to have been an updated way to express the traditional view.”

⁷³ Berrettoni, “Aspectual Theory,” 33.

⁷⁴ Berrettoni, “Aspectual Theory,” 57.

⁷⁵ Sorabji, *TCC*, 22–5; I agree that *subsistence* has a “lower degree of reality” to the extent that what *subsists* depends on what *exists*, but I disagree that this is established by the Stoics’ embracing the Aristotelian paradox to arrive at a degree of reality neither too high nor too low (nothing). LS, 306–7, see substantial affinities with Aristotle, like that time has “no existence in its own right” and is therefore incorporeal and that the present is a limit of time; but they also see differences, like the dependence of time on motion rather than on being measured, which makes the theory less subjectivist. I agree with the dependence of time on motion, of course, but I am not sure that the Stoics are following Aristotle in their theory and LS embrace the assumption that past and future are parts or constituents of time, which I reject.

⁷⁶ LS, 164, 307.

⁷⁷ LS, 307–8.

on motion, and add that this is what makes it an incorporeal just like place—all incorporeals *subsist* according to underlying body.

And while the present is specious, it is not because it is composed of parts past and future, but because there are no parts to the continuum. Thus I agree that broadly speaking there is a present and exactly speaking, in terms of the continuum, there is not; but I disagree that the reason there is no present speaking exactly is that infinite divisibility is decomposition into parts that are not present. The speciousness of the present is a function of the continuum being homogeneous and partless, not of having parts of a different kind or different ontological status. The point-like nature of the present is not a threat to the reality of time; it is a feature, not a bug of the Stoic theory of time.

Dependence Vindicated

The dependence of time and the spatial incorporeals on underlying body is thus univocal—space and time are the *diastēma* of body and motion. This dependence has explanatory power. It explains why time is infinite (because the motion according to which it *subsists* is infinitely ongoing), and this in turn explains why the comparison to the number line is apt (because time is linear), as well as why time as a whole is the Stoics' basic notion, not times. It also explains why time is continuous (because the corporeal world from which it inherits its properties is a continuum). Likewise, it explains why time is the same age as the cosmos and what Philo means (C1) in saying that the cosmos is the cause (*aition*) of its coming to be (because time is the extension of motion). And this conception does not leave us without objective coordinates for motion (because time is the *diastēma* of motion at the cosmic level, and this rate of change is the objective coordinate for the speed and slowness of middle-sized bodies).

Further, on a dependence view, we can see that the world is genuinely recurring or repeating, and that whether each world is exactly alike or not is a red herring in the debate. The exact sameness of each world order, if that were the case, would not make time circular since there is motion during the conflagration (hence time is linear) and each world order, whether exactly alike or not, is after the last and before the next (because time is linear). Nor is exact sameness required for numerical identity either within or across worlds, only the exact sameness of the uniquely individuating quality. The dependence of time on the world's motion also dissolves our puzzles of the present. It tells us why infinite divisibility does not make time unreal (because the *subsistence* of time on motion is not a case of composition, but of ontological dependence). It explains why we can speak (broadly) of times, like day and night (because there are such natural joints in the world), even while making such times specious, corresponding to nothing exactly (because there are no exact divisions in the world, even when there are robust natural joints like sunrise and

sunset). And it explains the difference between *subsisting* and obtaining, as well as the relation to predicates (*subsistence* is the ontological status of incorporeals as dependent entities, while obtaining is a correspondence relation between the present time (and likewise true predicates) and the world).

Meeting the *Subsistence* Criterion

The dependence of time on body (the metaphysics of its *subsistence*) also allows us to explain why time counts as Something (how it earns its place in the ontology), i.e. why it is a proper object of thought and discourse. The ontological criterion for *subsistence* developed in Chapter 2, again, is this: All and only those things that are both (1) a proper object of thought, i.e. an *x* that it is possible for anyone to think about, and (2) the referent of significant discourse, i.e. (from the *Outis* test) whatever is non-repeatable such that if it is in Athens, then it is not in Megara. Thanks to its body-less *subsistence* as the rate of corporeal change, time is an incorporeal impressor like the drill sergeant's model in relation to which (*epi*) the commanding faculty can be impressed—it is available for anyone to grasp and think about. This objective availability of time as a proper object of thought is underscored by the fact that time is that by which we measure the speed and slowness of individual bodies (passage B). It's not that time is the measure that we take, but that time is that by or against which we measure speed. It could not play this role if it were not objectively available for us to think about.

Time will also pass the Not Someone test for particularity because of its dependence on body. As with void, which is also infinite, the test will have to be applied at the cosmic level. Now, the time in Athens and Megara (any two places in the cosmos) is the same, so the test fails intra-cosmically. However, we can also consider the question extra-cosmically. Just as void had to be considered at the extra-cosmic level, to ask whether it, as a whole *subsisting* according to this world, could also *subsist* (per impossibile) according to another world; so too with time, we have to ask whether time *subsisting* according to this world's infinitely ongoing motion could ever be over there *subsisting* according to that world's motion. And the answer in both cases is no. If time *subsists* according to this world in its everlasting causal chain, then that same sequence of time or rate of change cannot *subsist* according to another world; if there were another world (which there isn't), it would have its own sequence of time *subsisting* according to its own causal chain.

Thus the form of the Not Someone test (If Something is here, then it is not there) is preserved: the extension of this world's motion (rate of change) here is not the extension of that world's motion over there. Space and time inherit their particularity from underlying body. As with void, too, time can be spoken of both in mass and in count terms. Both are infinite, infinitely divisible, homogeneous, and partless extension (*diastēma*) and so one can speak of *some* time or *some* void. But both are

also individuals: *the* extra-cosmic void and *the* whole of time. And what makes this so is their dependence on underlying body, from which each gets its positive physical characteristics and particularity.

Conclusions

Thus time, just as space, counts as Something *because* it is grounded in body. The ontological criteria that count things in or out only sort their entities into *existents* and *subsistents*, but the principle of incorporeality grounds and orders its entities, transforming the ontology into an ordered metaphysics and completing their response to Plato's Battle of Gods and Giants (Chapters 1, 9). The dependence of the incorporeals on body is what allows the Stoics to give a common explanatory account of bodies and incorporeals, bridging the two worlds to make one.

And as with the spatial incorporeals, we can now conclude with a Real Definition of time in the spirit of Kathrin Koslicki's Feature Dependence. As discussed in Chapter 9, Φ is Feature Dependent on Ψ just in case (i) Ψ is a constituent in a Real Definition of Φ , and (ii) Φ corresponds to a real feature of Ψ .⁷⁸ And her account of a Real Definition, again, is that (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.⁷⁹

Time (Φ) =_{Real Def.} the infinite temporal extension (i.e. the rate of change) that *subsists* according to (is Feature Dependent on) the world's motion (Ψ)

⁷⁸ Koslicki, "Varieties," 209.

⁷⁹ Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201.

The *Lekta*, Why Language is Earthborn Too

λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ
τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον¹

We turn now to the tantalizing *lekta*, or sayables (*lekton*, singular). The Stoics are unique among their peers and predecessors in recognizing these entities, which are what we say when we utter something meaningful; in addition to this semantic function, they have important logical roles to play, being the bearers of truth value and entering logical relations, and psychological (and hence ethical) roles too, as the objects of assent, belief, and impulse. The Stoics distinguish between complete and incomplete *lekta*: “the latter being ones whose linguistic expression is unfinished, e.g. ‘writes’, for we ask ‘Who?’ In complete sayables the linguistic expression is finished, e.g. ‘Socrates writes’.” So incomplete sayables include predicates (*katēgorēmata*), whereas ones that are complete include propositions, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries” (DL 7.63 (33F)). As Diogenes reports, the Stoics recognize many different kinds of *lekta* (as many as there are speech acts); but the most important are propositions, assertibles or judgeables (*axiōmata*; *axiōma*, singular).² As assertibles, *axiōmata* are the bearers of truth value and the terms of logical relations in the Stoics’ sophisticated propositional logic (e.g. as antecedents and consequents in conditionals, SE, PH 2.135–43 (36B)), hence it is natural (even if not entirely accurate) to think of them as propositions. Here I agree with Marion Durand that “[w]hile ‘proposition’ is a loaded term in contemporary philosophy of language, it captures well what the Stoics mean by *axiōma*: the incorporeal meaning of an assertive sentence which is the bearer of truth-value.”³

¹ SE, M. 8.70 (33C, passage C below).

² For a recent treatment of the connection of assertibles to speech acts, see Assaturian, “Children, Parrots, and Actors.” For the translation “judgeables,” see Denyer, “Token Reflexivity”; for “assertibles,” see Barnes, “Meaning”; Bobzien, “Logic.” I will often speak of *lekta* as being true or false, though it is properly speaking only one species of *lekton*, the *axiōma*, or assertible, that is the bearer of truth value.

³ Durand, “Deixis,” n. 3.

Interpretive Landscape

This much about the *lekta*, and their classification as incorporeals, is agreed, but what exactly these entities are, how they play these roles, and even the order in which their roles were developed is a matter of diverging opinion. Roughly speaking, on one way of thinking, the *lekta* are abstract objects, either as Fregean senses or Carnapian intensions, or instead as facts or states of affairs, but in either case as mind-independent entities whose *subsistence* is indifferent to whether we think or say them. Though they have this much in common, these two versions of the abstract entities view are also importantly different: the first takes the *lekta* to be semantic entities, while the second takes them to be “metaphysical” entities. The first camp was established by William and Martha Kneale, Jan Łukasiewicz, and Benson Mates, who brought much insight and attention to Stoic logic in the mid-20th century; the philosophical currency of propositions is established there by reference to Frege, Carnap, Quine, Church, and others.⁴ More recently, Michele Alessandrelli has argued that the *lekta* are linguistic and semantic functions devised by divine *logos*, the Stoics’ immanent god; as such, they depend on language for their *subsistence* (hence they are not independent abstracta in a third realm), but they do not depend on any particular language, since what the divine *logos* devises is common to all languages (hence they are both objective and mind-independent).⁵

The second camp, according to which *lekta* are metaphysical entities like facts or states of affairs, itself falls into two camps. The first subdivision, which was established by Emile Bréhier, endorsed by Pasquale Pasquino, and recently revived by Wolfhart Totschnig, takes the *lekta* to be surface effects at the limit of bodies, epiphenomena with a shadow’s existence, like the Doppler effect.⁶ Here, as with Alessandrelli, the *lekta* are ontologically dependent entities, but now as the surface effects of

⁴ This camp includes Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 44–6; Barnes, “Meaning, Saying and Thinking,” and “Meaning”; Denyer, “Token Reflexivity,” 376–6; Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action*, 93; Kahn, “Logic and LOGOS,” 170, goes so far as to say that *Der Gedanke* could be straight exegesis of Chrysippus (although he also appreciates the comparison to intensions in Lewis and Carnap); W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*; Łukasiewicz, “Aussagenlogik”; Mates, “Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus,” and *Stoic Logic*, 19–26. Note that while Bobzien, “Frege Plagiarized the Stoics,” 9, argues that Frege plagiarized the Stoic theory of *lekta*, she explicitly sets aside the metaphysical question that I am addressing: “I disregard all metaphysical issues concerning these contents”; thus I take what I say here against a Fregean reading of the *lekta* to be compatible with Bobzien’s thesis and more generally with the *lekta* as Fregean in other respects (i.e. other than third realm ontological status); on the other hand, in *Determinism and Freedom*, 21–7, Bobzien treats the *lekta* as states of affairs and is thus a member of the metaphysical camp.

⁵ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 64, 134–5. See also A. A. Long “Stoic linguistics,” 46, for *lekta* construed as semantic, logical structures objectively available to be expressed in various languages but also embracing M. Frede’s view; more recently, in correspondence, Long favors the idea that these structures are grounded in the mind of god, leaning on Cicero, *ND* 2.79; against *lekta* as functions or arguments, see Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 44–6.

⁶ Bréhier, *Théorie*; Pasquino, “Incorporels”; Totschnig, “Effects.” See Chapter 9, n. 5 for additional bibliography and background.

bodies—facts, events, or actions at their surface; unlike Alessandrelli, however, this camp reduces all the incorporeals to the effects of causes, and on those grounds to *lekta*. The second subdivision of the metaphysical camp, argued for by Michael Frede and recently revived by Ada Bronowski, does not reduce all incorporeals to *lekta*, but agrees in taking the *lekta* as effects of bodies.⁷ However, this line understands the causal role of *lekta* not as a case of ontological dependence, but as evidence that the Stoics were committed to the *lekta* as states of affairs, on the model of what is signified by a predicate expression in the tradition of Aristotle's *Categories* or Platonist immanent forms; this Aristotelian notion of predicates as immanent forms is what is meant by the term “metaphysical” in this camp.⁸ In a nearby metaphysical view, Dorothea Frede embraces the *lekta* as states of affairs, and is explicit about their third realm status, but argues that *lekta* are the Stoics' laws of nature, guaranteeing the causal closure of the cosmos.⁹ So, to summarize, on this first way of thinking, the *lekta* are mind-independent abstract entities of one kind or another, whether Fregean senses, as the semantic camp holds, or facts understood as either surface effects, or states of affairs, or laws of nature, as the metaphysical camp holds.

On the opposite way of thinking, that of Johnny Christensen, Andreas Graeser, and Gerard Watson, the *lekta* (and here again *all* the incorporeals, reduced to *lekta*) are not independent abstract objects, but rather subjective and temporary mind-dependent entities with no real referents; they are constructs of the mind that are our own impositions on reality, and hence unreal.¹⁰ This approach to the *lekta* comes at the expense of the objectivity required for their semantic and logical duties (not to mention the physical duties of the other incorporeals), and so it has seemed that the only alternative to mind-dependence is to treat the *lekta* as abstracta. The result is a certain stand-off between the two views, without resolution in either direction. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley have tried to straddle the divide, saying both things about the *lekta*: “Hence although in a logical context sayables may be to some extent thought-dependent (33), in a causal context they subsist objectively.”¹¹ But this is really just an expression of the difficulty, and does not advance the question. The problem, as Dorothea Frede observes, is that the *lekta* “seem to straddle mind-dependence and mind-independence in an awkward enough way.”¹²

⁷ Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 18–27, and “Logic,” 95; Barnes, “Meaning,” 211; Bronowski, *Lekta*; Brunschwig “Stoic Metaphysics,” 219; M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” and “Clear and Distinct”; Gourinat, *Dialectique*, 114–9, 196, “Causes de prédicats” (but in “Ontology and Syntax,” 137, Gourinat pursues an account that recognizes the *lekta* as both metaphysical entities (as the effects of causes) and mind-dependent entities through the process of perception by which they come to *subsist* in the rational impression); Hadot, *Porphyre*, 489; Shogry, “Impressions”; Vogt, “Brutes” and “Unified Notion.”

⁸ It is interesting that M. Frede makes no mention of the ontological dependence of Aristotle's forms.

⁹ D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth.”

¹⁰ Christensen, *Unity*; Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics* and “Theory of Meaning”; Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*.

¹¹ LS, 165.

¹² D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 217.

My suggestion is that these are not the only two interpretive options, and in particular that the Stoics occupy a middle ground that embraces the mind-dependence of *lekta* without giving up on their objectivity. I take the *lekta* to be semantic rather than metaphysical entities; but I do not embrace the idea that as semantic entities they must be mind-independent abstracta. I share scholars' resistance to the subjectivist reading of the Stoics, but I disagree that this is what the mind-dependence of *lekta* must come to, and thus that the only alternative to a subjectivist interpretation is to cast them as independent abstracta. I am in my own turn developing a version of the view of A. A. Long; he argues convincingly that *lekta* are mind-dependent, but concerns about subjectivity persist, curbing the mind-dependence he countenances.¹³ For Long (as for Long & Sedley), *lekta* are dependent on the mind for being said, but not (in the case of truths and in the causal context at least) for *subsisting*; mind-dependence is not ontological dependence.

Some Preliminaries

So let me say something now about what I do and do not mean by "mind-dependent" when I say that the *lekta* are mind-dependent. On the view that I am developing, *lekta* are one kind of incorporeal, coordinate with place, void, and time as species of incorporeal; and what incorporeals all have in common is the way they depend for their *subsistence* on underlying body. I described this ontological dependence in Chapter 9 as a sort of lack, privation, or absence of the body from which the incorporeals inherit their properties; they are thus body-less. Here, the body in question is the rational impression (*phantasia logikē*), i.e. the mind, and what the *lekton* inherits is not spatial or temporal extension like the other incorporeals, but, rather, semantic content. So, when I say that the *lekta* are mind-dependent, I mean that they depend on human rational impressions for their *subsistence* and what they inherit is their content. To say that they are products of the mind is not to deny that the *lekta* are real, but to give an analysis of their *modus essendi* as dependent on body, in this case the mind.

Furthermore, just as being mind-dependent in this way is not tantamount to being unreal, neither does realism about the *lekta* make them either fundamental or independent entities.¹⁴ The Stoics are certainly realists about the *lekta*—this is the starting point of our analysis, but this by itself does not make the *lekta* either fundamental,

¹³ A. A. Long, "Language and Thought" especially, as well as "Representation and the Self," and "Stoic psychology and language," "Stoic linguistics," and in conversation and correspondence; others favoring mind-dependence of one kind or another include Barnouw, "Propositional Perception"; Imbert, "Représentation"; Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*; Papazian, "Stoic Ontology."

¹⁴ For a short introduction to this way of thinking, see Bronowski, Review of Alessandrelli; for a longer illustration of this way of thinking, see Bronowski, *Lekta*. See also D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," but also those in the mind-dependence camp who embrace the *lekta* as subjective and temporary, or as impositions by us on the world.

independent, or, for that matter, ontologically dependent. As I put this point in Chapter 2, counting something in or out of the ontology (deciding *that* something is a Something) is silent with respect to grounding and metaphysics (*how* it is, whether fundamental or dependent). So when I say that *lekta* are mind-dependent, I am saying something about their *modus essendi*, their way of being (namely, ontologically dependent on body) and that the body on which they depend is the mind.

Let me also say something now, at the outset, about another important terminological matter: the word “*lekton*,” a verbal adjective deriving from the verb “*legein*,” to speak or to say something. This will be a slightly longer preliminary, because the view that *lekta* are states of affairs places significant philosophical weight on the grammatical form of this term and draws (undue) metaphysical conclusions from it. As M. Frede observes, verbal adjectives of this sort are typically used in one or more of the following three senses: (i) to indicate a passive state, e.g. unwritten, (ii) to indicate a passive possibility, e.g. as a *haireton* is something that can be chosen, and (iii) an active sense, in the way that what is *dunatos* is capable. These would take the *lekton*, respectively, as what has been said (or is in the state of having been said), what can be said, and what is said.

M. Frede cites and dismisses two texts he takes as evidence that the Stoics used “*lekton*” in an active sense, i.e. as what is said. Both texts equate *lekta* with *phōnai* (plural; *phōnē*, singular), which are the voice or vocal sounds that get uttered. Now, since the Stoics do not equate *lekta* with the words we utter to express them, Frede rejects the texts as mistaken and thus not evidence that “*lekton*” was used in the active sense. But I am not so sure about this. First, given that *lekta* are indeed what is said when we speak (DL 7.55), it strikes me as implausible to deny that the word has this active sense. Second, the texts in question do not really report that the Stoics equate *lekta* with the words that express them, thus the grounds for rejecting these pieces of evidence are not adequate, as I will now argue.

The first text is by Pseudo-Alexander, who reports that because the Stoics make a distinction among beings (*onta*) between *phōnai* and *pragmata* (things; *pragma*, singular, like *res* in Latin), and among *pragmata* a distinction between *lekta* and bearers (*tugchanonta*), the *lekta* are therefore to be identified with *phōnai* and *pragmata* with bearers (Ps.-Alexander, *In Ar. S.E.* 20,27–9 (Kapetanaki & Sharples)). First, this report is not clearly about the Stoics, and, second, it reads more like something the author takes to result for the (pseudo) Stoics than a report of something they avow: because they make these two distinctions, the *phōnai* must be *lekta*. Further, the author’s objective is to align *phōnai* and *pragmata* with the two kinds of fallacy in Aristotle, those that are dependent on language (*para tēn lexin*) and those that are independent of language (*exō tēs lexeōs*) (Aristotle, *S. E.* 4, trans. Edghill & Pickard-Cambridge); and since Aristotle does not recognize the existence of *lekta*, recognizing only the words that express our thoughts and the things in the world our thoughts are about (Aristotle, *De Int.* 1), the author must reduce the *lekta* to one or the other in order to align the theories. Thus this text

does not count as evidence that *the Stoics* equated *lekta* with *phōnai*, or that they did not use “*lekton*” in an active sense.

The second text, from Philoponus, has more weight as evidence that the Stoics used the term in an active sense to mean what is said, and it too does not report that the Stoics equated *lekta* with expressions or words (*In An. pr.* 243,1–10 (Wallies)). Here again we are proceeding in Aristotelian terms, with a three-fold distinction between *pragmata* (i.e. things in the world), thoughts, and *phōnai*. Philoponus reports that the Stoics proceed in novel fashion, in contrast to Aristotle and common custom (*In An. pr.* 242,28–9 (Wallies)), calling *pragmata* bearers (*tugchanonta*), calling thoughts (*noēmata*) expressibles (*ekphorika*), and calling *phōnai lekta*. The commentator is working within a Peripatetic framework, which does not recognize the existence of *lekta*, but he is also explicit in saying that the Stoics *called phōnai lekta*, so this is not an unwelcome consequence he is drawing, but rather an attribution he is making.

Still, we need not dismiss this report as incorrect or as evidence that the Stoics equate *lekta* with verbal expressions, i.e. the words that we utter. Philoponus finds the Stoics in agreement with the Peripatetics in calling thoughts expressibles because they agree that thoughts get expressed externally. And he is correct in this; the Stoics say that thought has the power of expressing what it undergoes (it is *eklalētikē*, DL 7.49 (39A2/33D, passage I below)), and the rational impression is one whose content is expressible in language (SE, M. 8.70, passage C4 below). But, of course, this does not mean we should saddle the Stoics with Aristotle’s theory of meaning, according to which there are only the world, thoughts, and words. On the contrary, we know that the Stoics recognized, in addition, the *lekta* as what gets expressed by our words when we speak; hence the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius complains that “there is no need to conceive of something else beyond these [sc. thought (*noema*) and thing (*pragma*)], which the Stoics postulated and decided to name a sayable” (*In Ar. De int.* 17,24–8 (33N)).

So what are we to make of this report that the Stoics called *phōnai lekta*? If we think of *phōnai* as vocal sounds that get uttered, there is a legitimate sense in which we can say that *phōnai* are *lekta* because the *phōnai* of adult humans are significant and do express *lekta*. Vocal sounds can be either noise, i.e. mere sound; or articulate but not semantic sound, e.g. “*blituri*”; or semantic sound, which expresses *lekta* (DL 7.57 (33A, passage D below)). Sosseh Assaturian has argued that this three-fold distinction between sound, diction, and speech (*phōnē*, *lexis*, and *logos*) is a nested relation such that all speech is diction and sound, and all diction is sound, but not all sound is diction or speech.¹⁵ There is thus nothing wrong with Philoponus’ report that the Stoics call *phōnai lekta*, and in particular we need not take this as a report that the Stoics equate *lekta* with their expressions.¹⁶ It is, thus, evidence of an active sense of *lekton* as what is said, which, again, is to be expected since *lekta* are

¹⁵ Assaturian, “Children, Parrots, and Actors”; BS, 186–7, also argue for a nested understanding.

¹⁶ A point that M. Frede himself, “*Lekton*,” 110, makes in elucidating the relevant sense of “to say.”

indeed what we say when we speak. Finally, that we should attribute an active sense of “*lekton*” to the Stoics is confirmed by Sextus, who reports that “it is necessary that every *lekton* be said, whence it gets its name” (M. 8.80, passage E below), and then argues from the impossibility of uttering semantic *phōnē* to the non-existence of *lekta*.¹⁷ Even if Sextus is wrong that every *lekton* must be said, his report still serves to confirm that the active sense of the term is central to the notion of a *lekton*.

Now, M. Frede needs to exclude the active sense of the term because he is arguing for a developmental account of the *lekta* as facts or states of affairs originally (“metaphysical entities”), and only later as semantic entities, so it can’t be essential or at least original to the *lekton* that it be actively said. This is how he argues for the passive modal sense of the term:

The Stoics clearly use the word in the passive sense for what gets said, rather than for the expression. Moreover, as we will see, the Stoics think that what gets said has some status independently of its actually being said, that it is somehow there to be said, whether or not it actually is said. And this suggests that the word *lekton* in Stoic usage has the passive modal sense of “something which can be said”.¹⁸

It is certainly true that the Stoics do not equate the *lekton* with the expression, but as I have just argued, it does not follow that “*lekton*” is not used in the active sense as what is said, or voiced. More importantly, this argument begs the question insofar as it argues for the passive modal sense on the grounds that the *lekta* are there to be said, which is the thesis for which he is arguing. . . on the grounds that they use the term in the passive modal sense. Likewise, Frede dispenses with the sense of the term as a passive state of being or having been said on the assumption that *lekta* are indifferent to whether they get said or not, leaving only the passive modal sense standing. But, again, the *lekton* certainly is something with the state of being said (when it is said), so this sense is also not out of bounds;¹⁹ furthermore, their indifference to being said is the conclusion toward which Frede is arguing and thus not something on which he can rely.

Now I don’t mean to argue that “*lekton*” should be understood only in an active sense, or only in a passive sense, or even that it should *not* be understood in a passive modal sense as what can be said, what is *sayable*. What I do wish to resist, however, is the slide from this passive modal sense of the word to treating the *lekta* themselves as “metaphysical entities” with the modal status of attributes or states of affairs that get actualized by belonging to bodies and then become available to be said. As Bronowski puts it, pressing Frede’s point: “The verbal adjective ‘*lekton*’,

¹⁷ Pace Bronowski, *Lekta*, 210, who takes Sextus to be mocking the Stoic use of *huparchein* rather than making a point about existence.

¹⁸ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 110.

¹⁹ In fact, Imbert, “Représentation,” 92, following Beneveniste, takes the *-ton* ending to indicate the accomplishment of an action, rather than its possibility.

with its modal connotation, deepens that distinction [sc. between signifiers and what gets said] by indicating that it is possible that something can, but also cannot, be said, and yet be there to be said.”²⁰ However, as I will argue, while there are indeed many observations we *could* make about the world, this does not entail that those observations constitute a metaphysical layer of entities out there waiting for us to think or say them. In fact, one might well think that the modal connotation of the term captures the sense in which *lekta* arise in the mind and are *thence* able to be (or to not be) said.

In support of this thesis, that *lekta* are *sayable* by being in the mind on which they depend, let us consider a text from Augustine, *De Dialectica* 5 (Jackson & Pinborg) which A. A. Long argues is “thoroughly Stoic or at least largely Stoic in ultimate inspiration.”²¹ In the context of a discussion of the use-mention distinction, between a word that is uttered for its own sake (mention), which is a *verbum*, and a word that is spoken for the sake of signifying something else (use), which is a *dictio*, Augustine tells us that a *dicibile* (what is sayable, i.e. a *lekton*) is “whatever the mind but not the ears perceives from a word, and is bounded by the mind itself (*ipso animo tenetur inclusum*)” (*De Dialectica* 5.8,5–6).²² Further, whereas “*dicibile*” does not “signify a word but what is understood in the word and bounded by the mind (*animo continetur*),” the word “*dictio*” signifies both “the word itself and what is brought about in the mind by the word” (5.8,10–3). Long considers the possibility that saying the *dicibile* is contained or bounded by the mind signals that the *lekta* are mind-dependent or psychological entities rather than semantic or logical entities, but turns away from this possibility on the grounds that the claim is too vague.²³ Rather than telling us the metaphysical status of *lekta*, he suggests, Augustine is reporting that *lekta* are purely mental (and hence private) in their content and apprehension, so that the difference between the *dictio* and the *dicibile* is the difference between being entertained publicly and privately.

I would like to pursue an alternative reading of the passage, which embraces the metaphysical implication that *lekta* are mind-dependent (though not that they are reducible to thought). I offer “bounded by the mind” for “*ipso animo tenetur inclusum*” and for “*animo continetur*,” with an ablative of agent for “*animo*” and taking the idea of enclosing or containing as the imposing or setting of boundaries. The idea is that in setting the boundaries, the mind determines the content of

²⁰ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 196; cf. 123, 207–8, 216, 232, 376; M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 112. Cf. D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 117.

²¹ A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics.”

²² Although A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics,” 52–3, doubts that this is a use-mention distinction, I can agree with him that the distinction given here is tantamount to signifying as opposed to uttering. As to equating the *dicibile* with the *lekton*, Long bridges them via SE, M. 8.12 (33B, passage B below); and note the Spanish for *lekton*: decible (BS Chapter 8).

²³ A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics,” 52–3.

the *lekton*.²⁴ This is at least a possible reading, stronger for “*animo continetur*” because “*tenetur inclusum*” could mean so many things, but rendered more plausible by its fitting both cases. If so, this could be read as conveying that the mind is the source of the *dicibile*, in which case the following passage is especially illuminating:

- A. When they [sc. words, *verba*] are perceived by the mind, before being voiced they will be sayables (*dicibilia*); but when they have been put forth in voice, because it is what has been said, they are made into sayings (*dictiones*).

sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia erunt; cum autem propter id quod dixi proruperunt in vocem, dictiones factae sunt.

Augustine, *De Dialectica* 5.8,17–9 (Jackson & Pinborg)

We can see here that the *lekta* are inherently linguistic, since a *dicibile* is a *word* being bounded by the mind. More importantly, the contrast between a *dicibile* and *dictio* not only makes salient the modal force of a *dicibile* as what is capable of being spoken, it even explains in what the modality consists: when words are bounded by the mind but not yet spoken, they are *sayables*, and then when they are actually said they are *sayings*. Thus the passive modal status of the *lekton* is not a matter of being independent of the mind, but rather independent of being said. Being *sayable* is therefore not an indication that *lekta* are mind-independent facts, or states of affairs, etc. Thus the Augustine passage is, after all, evidence of the mind-dependence of *lekta* (since they are bounded by the mind, and it clarifies their modal status as being independent of being said rather than independent of thought). Crucially, to make *lekta* products of thought is not to reduce *lekta* to the mind or to our thoughts (or to words, of course), just as making money a product of thought does not make money private or subjective. Furthermore, as I will argue, this position does not deny that words have meaning independent of our individual thoughts and intentions; it does not collapse into a theory of private language.

So, to conclude these preliminary remarks, I ask the reader not to (pre)judge the metaphysical status of *lekta* based on its passive modal sense as what *can be* said. I have no quarrel with the translation “sayable,” apart from its inelegance, so I will typically transliterate for the sake of prettier prose.²⁵ I will argue that we should understand the *lekta* as things that can be said, but without making them facts, states of affairs, or abstract entities *subsisting* outside of space and time—while *lekta* are not themselves the spatial or temporal dimension of the world, they are

²⁴ In correspondence about this material, A. A. Long says he is now inclined to read “*tenetur inclusum*” as Augustine’s way of expressing the *subsistence* of *lekta* on impressions, and embraces the idea of the mind-determining content.

²⁵ Barnes, “Meaning,” 199: “‘Sayable’ is vile; but English has nothing decent to offer.”

nevertheless spatiotemporal entities in being of this world, earthborn into space and time. Because the states of affairs branch of the metaphysical camp is so entrenched, I will focus on giving negative arguments against it, and in particular on the influential arguments of M. Frede, though I will also give arguments against the surface effects branch. To the extent that I argue against taking the *lekta* as abstracta, I also argue against the semantic branch of interpretation; however, I do take the *lekta* to be semantic entities, but I am agnostic about whether Frege plagiarized the Stoics (i.e. what semantic theory to attribute to the Stoics). And in taking the *lekta* to be products of thought I suggest a mind-dependence view that does not collapse into subjectivism.

The chapter is long, but clearly segmented, and will proceed as follows. I will argue, first, that *lekta* are inalienably what is signified (*sēmainomena*) by our words when we speak, thus that they are inalienably semantic (and not therefore “metaphysical”) entities. Second, that the definition of the *lekton* as what *subsists* according to the rational impression is a statement of the ontological dependence of *lekta* on rational impressions as their host bodies (and not simply an expression of correspondence or covariance). Third, that rational impressions are fit to host *lekta* because rational impressions, of themselves, have semantic content to confer on *lekta*. Thus, fourth, *lekta* are not the *content* of rational impressions, but a distinct product of those thoughts. And this alternative account of *lekta* as products of thought does not come at the cost of their objectivity or the ability to do their semantic, logical, or psychological duties.

Next I will address the causation passages on which the metaphysical camp hangs its hat, and show that the role of *lekta* as “that of which the cause is a cause,” conveniently if misleadingly translated as “effects,” does not make the *lekta* metaphysical entities, either as surface effects or as states of affairs. The role of the *lekta* in this context, I argue, is dialectical or logical rather than physical or metaphysical, and it is not at odds with their other dialectical duties. Further, the resulting account is unified: it applies equally to true and false *lekta*, as much as it applies to oaths, prayers, and questions. Thus we can also see how the Stoics meet Plato’s challenge (viii) *Save the sophist*, and be able to say *what is not* (Chapter 1). Finally, I will offer an analysis of the much-disputed distinction between *hupostasis* (*subsistence*) and *huparxis* (obtaining, or being the case), thereby undermining the last remaining support for the metaphysical view and securing the positive alternative. I will then close with an account of how even the *lekta* can meet the *subsistence* criterion for objective particulars (Chapter 2) and, thus, how the class of incorporeals can be understood univocally as dependent on body, meeting challenge (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and offer a one-world metaphysics. For the Stoics, not only are humans born from the earth, but so is language.²⁶

²⁶ On the earthborn origins of language for the Stoics, see Allen, “Origin of Language.”

Lekta are Sēmainomena

The textual evidence that Stoic *lekta* are what is signified (*sēmainomena*, plural; *sēmainomenon*, singular) is ample, and our two primary sources, Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus, offer complementary reports not only that *lekta* are what is signified when we speak, but also that in *subsisting* according to the rational impression, the *lekta* signified when we speak are products of thought. I will give an analysis of the relevant stretch of text in Diogenes (DL 7.43–63), corroborating with Sextus and addressing interpretive debates along the way.

At 7.43, Diogenes reports that the topic of dialectic, defined as “discoursing (*dialegesthai*) correctly in speech (*logos*) by question and answer,” is subdivided into two topics: what is signified (*sēmainomena*) and voice (*phōnē*), which Sextus reports is what signifies (*sēmainonta*, plural; *sēmainon*, singular) (SE, M. 8.12 (33B, passage B below)). Then the topic of what is signified is itself divided (*diairesthai*) into two sub-topics: “impressions (*phantasiai*, plural; *phantasia*, singular) and the *lekta* subsisting out of (*huphistamena ek*) these,” or, as Hicks puts it, “presentations and the various products *to which they give rise*.”²⁷ Notice straight away, without yet saying anything about what it means to *subsist* out of a rational impression, that this subdivision does not report that impressions are *sēmainomena* themselves, or that we are being given two different kinds of *sēmainomenon*. It is simply a subdivision of one topic into two further topics, not a division into two kinds of *sēmainomenon*.

What is at stake here is that in order to be metaphysical rather than semantic entities, the *lekta* must be severed from their semantic duties. However, the text does not show that impressions are *sēmainomena* too.²⁸ This is confirmed by the context. Just above (7.42), in describing rhetoric as a subdivision of logic, Diogenes first reports that rhetoric is of three kinds or parts (*trimerē*): deliberative, forensic, and panegyric; and then (at 7.43) he reports the subdivision (*diairesis*) of rhetoric into invention, phraseology, arrangement, and delivery. It is clear that kinds and subdivisions are not being treated as the same thing, so the fact that Diogenes does not similarly describe what is signified as being of two *kinds*, but rather as being *divided* into two subtopics, tells us that the rational impression is not reported as a

²⁷ Hicks, *DL: Lives*, *ad loc.*, my emphasis.

²⁸ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 111–2, argues that it is not the primary notion of a *lekton* in the context of the Stoic theory of language to be signified; Bronowski, *Lekta*, in support of Frede’s thesis, devotes chapter 2 to arguing that impressions are a kind of *sēmainomenon*, arguing that if there are many kinds of *sēmainomena*, including both bodies (sc. impressions and qualities) and incorporeals (*lekta*), then not all signifiers (*sēmainonta*) are of *lekta* and the *lekta* cannot be equated with *sēmainomena*. The other reason she gives for severing *lekta* from their role as *sēmainomena*, along lines that Frede gives, is that *lekta* need not be said, thus they can’t be defined as what words signify; but this again is question-begging, since it is ultimately in the service of establishing that *lekta* are not semantic entities but metaphysical entities like facts or states of affairs. For critical remarks on this thesis of Bronowski’s, see Alessandrelli, “Discussion.” On this stretch of text in DL, see Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 63–4, 100, 103–12; A. A. Long, “Stoic psychology and language.”

species of *sēmainomenon*. Nor does Diogenes give any reason to think otherwise when he returns to the topic of what is signified, at 7.63. We are simply told that the account of *lekta* is placed in the topic of things that are what is signified (*pragmata kai sēmainomena*), followed by kinds of *lekta*: complete (assertibles (*axiōmata*), syllogisms, questions, inquiries) and incomplete (predicates (*katēgorēmata*)). The rational impression only comes up again at 7.63 when the *lekton* is defined as what *subsists* according to (*to huphistamenon kata*) the rational impression, after which he returns to the kinds of *lekta*.

I will return to the controversial question of what it means for a *lekton* to *subsist* according to the rational impression, but first let us note that Sextus clearly corroborates the account given so far, with no hint of anything other than *lekta* in the role of what is signified:

- B. (1) But some such was the first difficulty about truth; but there was also another controversy besides this, according to which some placed the true and the false in what is signified (*to sēmainomenon*), others in voice (*phōnē*), and others in the motions of thought. (2) The Stoics in fact defended the first opinion, saying that the three are yoked together: what is signified, what signifies (*sēmainon*), and the bearer (*to tugchanon*), of which what signifies is voice (*phōnē*), e.g. “Dion,” what is signified is the thing itself (*auto to pragma*) revealed by it [sc. *phōnē*], i.e. the thing subsisting in consequence of (*paruphistamenon*) our thought (*dianoia*), which we apprehend but which the barbarians do not understand, though they hear the voice; and the bearer is the external object, for instance Dion himself. (3) And of these, two are bodies, just as the voice and bearer are, but one is incorporeal, as the thing signified (*to sēmainomenon pragma*) is, i.e. what is sayable (*lekton*), which is true or false.

SE, M. 8.11–2 (33B)

- C. (1) Some place the true and the false in what is signified (*to sēmainomenon*), which is the incorporeal *lekton*, others in voice (*phōnē*), and others in the motions of thought. (2) For example, in order to begin with the first, the Stoics maintained the true and the false alike to be (*koinōs einai*) in the *lekton*. (3) And they say that the *lekton* is what subsists according to the rational impression (*to huphistamenon kata logikē phantasia*), and (4) the rational impression is that according to which it is possible to present (*parastēsai*) the content of the impression (*to phantasthen*) in speech (*logos*).

SE, M. 8.69–70 (Bury; 33C+)²⁹

²⁹ I am especially grateful to David Murphy for correspondence on the translation of this passage, in particular on *parastēsai*. I follow IG and LS in taking *to phantasthen* as the content of the impression; in any event, *to phantasthen* should not be confused with the impressor itself, not even as the impressor

Sextus corroborates at B1 that *lekta* are what is signified in placing the true and the false in what is signified, since it is *lekta* (in particular, *axiōmata*) that are true and false; also at B2 in identifying what is signified as the thing itself (*auto to pragma*) revealed by voice, which is clearly distinguished from the referent (Dion himself), and described as *subsisting* in consequence of thought (*paruphistamenon*), echoing the language Diogenes uses to define the *lekton*; and again, explicitly, at B3, where the thing signified (*to sēmainomenon pragma*) is identified as a *lekton*, which is true or false. Passage C, likewise, tells us both that what is signified is the incorporeal *lekton* (C1) and that the true and the false alike, i.e. both, are in the *lekton* (C2). And, like Diogenes, Sextus reports that the *lekton* is what *subsists* according to the rational impression (C3), adding that the rational impression is one whose content (*to phantasthen*) can be expressed in speech (C4).

Lekton Defined

In order to fully appreciate Sextus' (C4) as an elaboration of Diogenes' definition of the *lekton* at 7.63 as what *subsists* according to the rational impression, it will be useful to return to our stretch of text and examine the intervening account of voice (*phōnē*) (the other subdivision of dialectic). At 7.55–6, Diogenes defines voice generically as “air that has been struck, or the proper object of hearing”; then, more specifically, human (as opposed to animal) voice is “articulate (*enarthros*) and sent forth by thought (*apo dianoias ekpempomenē*),” and considered complete at the age of fourteen (when the person becomes rational). Furthermore, Diogenes takes the time to note, voice is considered a body because everything that acts (*pan poioun*) is a body, and voice acts on the hearer. Voice is then contrasted with verbal expression (*lexis*) and with speech (*logos*). The verbal expression is voice that can be committed to writing (*engrammatos*). Speech, on the other hand, is “semantic voice (*phōnē semantikē*) sent forth (*ekpempomenē*) by thought (*dianoia*), e.g. ‘It is day.’” This report that human speech is sent forth by thought already sheds light on Sextus' (C4), which defines the rational impression as one whose content can be expressed in speech. These distinctions are then further elaborated:

- D. Voice (*phōnē*) differs from expression (*lexis*) because while even sound (*hō ēchos*) is voice, expression is only articulate (*enarthros*). Expression differs from speech (*logos*) because speech is always significant (*semantikē*), but expression is also non-semantic (*asēmos*), e.g. blituri, while speech never is.

qua perceived, impressing, as J.-B. Gourinat does, “Discours intérieur.” In taking “*logos*” as speech or language rather than reason, I follow the spirit of BS and LS, who take it as discourse and language, respectively. This translation choice relates to what I will develop below as the first corollary of the de-psychologizing orthodoxy, which equates the propositional content of rational impressions to *lekta* and sees rational impressions as inputs for reason.

And speaking (*to legein*) differs from uttering (*to prophēresthai*); for voice is uttered, but things (*pragmata*), which indeed get the name (*tugchanei*) *lekta*, are said or spoken (*legetai*).

DL 7.57 (33A)

The reference to *pragmata* (plural; *pragma*, singular) in this context should not be overplayed. Totschnig, for example, takes this as evidence that the *lekta* are facts or events. But this word is too varied in meaning to establish that thesis by itself.³⁰ Nor can an ordinary language reading of *pragma* as thing establish the thesis that the *lekta* are things there to be said, as metaphysical entities or states of affairs available but indifferent to us saying them.³¹ Long & Sedley render *pragma* directly as state of affairs, taking on the view that *lekta* are equivalent to facts in a causal context. I propose instead a deflationary reading of *pragma*, which I take to be used here in a broad sense like the Latin *res*. So I will take it as thing, or things, but without taking that to mean anything except that *lekta* are entities the Stoics recognize, semantic things that speakers utter and hearers who know the language apprehend. On my reading, for *lekta* to be *pragmata* simply indicates that there is Something incorporeal distinct from the words and the world, which is what our words signify. More generally, to be a *pragma* in this context is to be a thing, but not in any technical or specific sense that invites further description or definition.³²

So, human voice is articulate and sent forth by thought (7.55), speech is semantic voice sent forth by thought (7.56), and when we speak what we say are *lekta* (7.57). This underscores that *lekta* are what is signified (since they are signified by semantic voice), but also tells us that *lekta* are sent forth by thought, a point Diogenes confirms at 7.59 in saying that “the commanding faculty (*hēgemonikon*) is that from which language (*logos*) is sent up (*anapēmpetai*).” In fact, this was suggested as early as 7.43, when the topic of what is signified was subdivided into the topics of impressions (which are equated with thoughts at 7.51 (passage H below)) and the *lekta* subsisting out of (*ek*) them. And again Sextus corroborates the account:³³

³⁰ Totschnig, “Effects,” 129. Gourinat, *Dialectique*, 117, suggests (with Hadot) that “*pragma*” is another name for the *lekton*, which signals “quite simply, that what is expressible is first of all a fact, and that a fact, is what is expressible.” For analysis of the relation between *pragmata* and *lekta*, with *pragmata* as meanings and *lekta* as speech acts, see Assaturian, “Parrots, Actors, and Children.”

³¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 212–4.

³² Against reading *pragmata* “as a bland and uninformative placeholder, as, say, *things*,” see Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 140; also against thing, see Hadot, “*Pragma*.”

³³ As do Philoponus, *In An. pr.* 243.4 (Wallies), and SE, M. 8.275 (Bury). Bronowski, *Lekta*, 207, argues that *lekta* must be independent on the grounds that producing voice is not the same thing as producing a *lekton*; but, as I am arguing, we need not equate the production of a *lekton* by thought with its being proffered through voice, nor does the possibility of communication require an independent metaphysical entity awaiting our saying. Imbert, “Représentation,” 89, argues that speech is directly delegated by *endiathetos logos*, and that voice ensures the link between interior and exterior discourse.

- E. And it is necessary that every *lekton* be said, whence it even gets its name; but no *lekton* is said, as the doubters establish. Therefore there is no *lekton*. From which it follows that there is no proposition (*axiōma*), either true or false. For speaking (*legein*), as those from the Stoa themselves say, is the uttering of voice (*phōnē*) that is significant of the thing in mind (*noumenon pragma*).

πᾶν τε λεκτὸν λέγεσθαι δεῖ, ὅθεν καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐδὲν δὲ λεκτὸν λέγεται, ὡς παριστᾷσιν οἱ ἀπορητικοί· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ᾧ ἔπεται μὴδὲ ἀξίωμα εἶναι μὴδὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. λέγειν γάρ ἐστι, καθὼς αὐτοὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ τὴν τοῦ νοουμένου πράγματος σημαντικὴν προφέρεισθαι φωνήν.

SE, M. 8.80 (Bury)

With this understanding of speech in hand, it is time to evaluate the definition of the *lekton* as what *subsists* according to the rational impression. First, that this is a definition and not simply a description or classification of the *lekton* is clear from context. Diogenes summarizes the topic of dialectic at 7.43–6, breaking it down into the topics of what is signified (itself consisting of the topics of impressions and the *lekta* subsisting out of them) and voice. Then he addresses each of these topics, beginning in each case with a definition of the entity in question: impression (7.50), voice (7.55), and *lekta* (7.63). Further, Diogenes explains this order of exposition, telling us that they begin with the topic of impression because “impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of utterance expresses what it undergoes by the impression” (7.49). I will return to this passage, but for now it shows that the definition at 7.63 is an elucidation of what was introduced at 7.43 as “impressions and the *lekta* subsisting out of (*ek*) them.”³⁴ Second, the language of *subsistence* in the definition indicates that an ontological point is being made about what is signified, which is to be expected given the fact that Diogenes paused (at 7.56) to call out that voice is a body because it acts on the hearer; and, again, the point is corroborated by Sextus who calls out the incorporeal status of the *lekton* in contrast to voice, which is a body (B3, C1). Further, the language of *subsistence* in the middle-passive voice (*to huphistamenon*) suggests that the *lekton* will be not what underlies the rational impression, but rather what is underlain by it.³⁵ So this underlying is what we should expect “according to (*kata*) the rational impression” to elucidate.

³⁴ For agreement on this point, see Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 63.

³⁵ Contrast with A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 90, who argues that this language is silent with respect to existence; I do not follow his schema of underlying, which takes the *lekton* to underlie the rational impression and the past and future to underlie the present, hence there is no reason to deny that *subsisting kata* indicates ontological dependence. Here I embrace the idea of “residue” that Bronowski, *Lekta*, 113, rejects.

This brings us to the preposition “*kata*,” which is understood variously as correspondent with (A. A. Long, Hicks), correlated with (Brennan), in accordance with (Alessandrelli, LS, Mensch & Miller), in virtue of (Bett), in conformity with (Alessandrelli (also), Boeri & Salles, Bury), and on the basis of (Shogry); more liberally, Bronowski understands it as subsisting in propositional form.³⁶ The mind-dependence view takes *subsisting kata* to be ontological dependence; Claude Imbert, for example, renders the phrase as “owes its existence to.”³⁷ For the abstract objects view, however, *subsisting kata* is a mere covariance between a rational impression and the *lekton*, and not ontological dependence. For most in this camp, the *lekton* gives the rational impression its propositional content, or the *lekton* is the propositional content of the impression. For Alessandrelli, however, *lekta* simply covary with the impression, being available for us to select and voice to express the content of the impression.

Alessandrelli gives three arguments against understanding “*kata*” as signaling the dependence of *lekta* on rational impressions.³⁸ The first is that what is signified is signified by words, not by the mind, so if the *lekta* are to depend on anything, it must be the language that signifies them. To this I reply that *lekta* being signified by words is not what indicates their ontological dependence—they are always said to *subsist* according to the rational impression, and never according to the signifier. The language of *subsistence*, which is what indicates ontological status, is always connected with the rational impressions, and not with words. Furthermore, if, as Augustine reports (passage A above), words get their meaning from thought, it stands to reason that the *lekta* depend on rational impressions for their *subsistence*, as something that can be said (a *dicibile*), and that when they are said, they are what is signified by our words (*dictiones*).³⁹ This response does not detract from the priority of words as signifiers, but it does deprive signifying of any ontological force.

The second argument Alessandrelli gives is that understanding “*kata*” as indicating ontological dependence leads to problems in SE, *M.* 8.70 (passage C, above), where the preposition is used twice in one sentence. This passage reports that the *lekton subsists kata* the rational impression, and then explains that the rational impression is one *kata* (according to) which the content of what is impressed (*to phantasthen*) can be expressed in language. Alessandrelli argues that because the second use of the preposition clearly does not indicate ontological dependence,

³⁶ Alessandrelli, *Problema*; Bett, *Against Logicians*, *ad loc.*; BS 8.2; Brennan, “Moral Psychology,” n. 8; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 102; Bury, SE, *M.* 7–8, *ad loc.*; Hicks, *DL: Lives*, *ad loc.*; A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 82; Shogry, “Impressions,” 9. Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 44–5, takes *kata* to tell us *lekta* are the contents of rational impressions; Totschnig, “Effects,” 139, takes *kata* to indicate that *lekta* are the objects of thought.

³⁷ Imbert, “Représentation,” 97, 102; in this A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” falls on the side of mind-independence, so that *lekta* correspond to rational impressions rather than depend on them for their ontological status, on which see n. 35 above.

³⁸ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 69.

³⁹ Note that this is not to claim (or to depend on the claim) that the Stoics are semantic internalists, though I think that they probably are.

the first cannot either. I agree with this, but I also don't think that "*kata*" is doing the ontological work in the first clause. It is the language of *subsistence* that tells us we are to hear "*kata*" as indicating ontological dependence, and this is not a change of sense for "*kata*" between the two uses. To see how this can be so, let's render "*kata*" neutrally as "in virtue of." In that case, Sextus reports that the *lekton* *subsists* (is an ontologically dependent entity) in virtue of the rational impression (i.e. it depends for its *subsistence* on the rational impression); and then he reports that rational impressions are those in virtue of which what is impressed can be expressed in language (i.e. rational impressions are the ones that have content fit to be expressed in words).

Thus it is not the preposition "*kata*" by itself that bears the ontological load in the first clause, but its being paired with the language of *subsistence*. So in saying that the definition of the *lekton* conveys ontological dependence, I am not claiming that "*kata*" has a distinct ontological sense and that the Stoics were using it here; for that reason, I think the question of translation is not central and cannot settle much (just as for the term "*lekton*" itself). But it is clear that the *kata* clause is meant to elucidate the *ek* clause (7.45–6), and in combination with the evidence that *lekta* are sent forth by thought, the idea that *subsisting kata* indicates dependence is ever harder to resist.

Alessandrelli's third argument is that the rational impression is not described as an ontological support, only as having expressible content. But, of course, the ontological dependence has just been expressed in the previous clause, in the language of *subsistence*—as that in virtue of which there are *lekta*. Furthermore, we should not expect the rational impression to be defined in terms of the *lekton* if, as I will argue in the next section, rational impressions have propositional content prior to and independent of the *lekta*.⁴⁰ On the contrary, it is *lekta* that are defined in terms of the rational impression.

Bronowski also argues against understanding "*kata*" as indicating a dependence relation, urging instead that it indicates distinctness and even independence, on the model of acting in accordance with the laws (*kata tous nomous*); thus "*kata*" in this context indicates that the *lekton* is "distinct from the impression, and coincides with something relative to the impression, by being in accordance with it."⁴¹ The sense of "*kata*," as Bronowski sees it, is to indicate that the *lekton* is something other than the thought, and that we should understand the "*ek*" in DL 7.43 that way too, as indicating otherness rather than source.⁴² Likewise, for the prefix "*para*," when Sextus describes the *lekton* as what *subsists* alongside (*paruphistamenon*) the rational impression (SE, M. 8.12, passage B): "The '*para*-' prefix, more emphatically,

⁴⁰ The Real Definition of a *lekton* will make essential reference to the rational impression, but not vice versa.

⁴¹ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 114, following M. Frede, "*Lekton*," 118.

⁴² "By some downplaying of the Greek," Bronowski, *Lekta*, 114, and by arguing, 113, 115, that 7.43 is "less authoritatively placed" because it is introductory and haphazard, both of which I resist.

sets out the term of the parallel, but distinct relation at an ontological level between a *lekton* and an impression.”⁴³

This is a lot to ask of one prefix, and while coordinate or parallel existence is certainly one meaning of “*parupostasis*,” there is also another readily available: by-product. So one can just as well argue that, on the contrary, this term and its cognates favor a mind-dependence view, telling us that the *lekta* *subsist* in consequence of the rational impression; or as an appendage of as we saw Richard Gaskin render “*parhuphistatai*” in connection with place; or that the *lekta* are entirely dependent and parasitic upon rational impressions, as we saw A. C. Lloyd argue Simplicius uses the term (Chapter 10); or, with Bury, simply as existing in dependence on (*paruphistamenon*).⁴⁴ In addition to the testimony from Sextus that uses this special term to describe the *lekta* (passage B above), Simplicius too describes the *lekta* as *subsisting* in consequence (*paruphistamenon*) of our thoughts (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 397,10 (Kalbfleisch)), as does Syrianus, when he denies that Forms “arise as a byproduct (*huphistatai*) in the intellect analogous to the notorious ‘sayables’” (*In Ar. Met.* 105,25 (Kroll)), as John Dillon and Dominic O’Meara translate.⁴⁵ The dependence conveyed by this stronger term, “*paruphistamenon*” and its cognates is thus strong evidence that the *lekta* are dependent on and inherit their content from rational impressions. With this sense of the prefix “*para-*” in mind, we could even add to our evidence with Sextus’ description of *axiōmata* as “intelligible entities (*noēta*) lying beside or appended to (*paraakeimena*) these [sc. sense-impressions]” (SE, M. 8.10 (Bury)).

To me, these linguistic considerations are intuitive and persuasive, but the bottom line is that prepositions and prefixes cannot settle the matter. So, setting aside for now my linguistic intuition that “*ek-*,” “*kata-*,” and “*para-*” clearly do indicate dependence, I will just say that the ontological context of bodies and incorporeals, as well as the language of *subsistence*, give us reason to expect the

⁴³ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 116; cf. 166–8.

⁴⁴ Gaskin, *Simplicius: In Ar. Cat.*, 361,10–2; Bury, SE, M. 8.12. Note that SE, M. 8.12, does not tell us that the *lekton* *subsists* in consequence of the hearer’s thought, but that the thing *subsisting* in consequence of our thought, the *pragma* itself revealed by voice, is something that we apprehend but the barbarian does not. I leave out of account here SE, M. 8.75: “But then, the skeptics say, whence can we establish (*parastēsai*) the being of some incorporeal *lekton*, which is separate (*kechōristai*) both from the signifying voice, e.g. “Dion,” and from the bearer, as Dion himself?” (translation closest to Bury, Bett, *Against Logicians*). Bronowski, *Lekta*, 168, takes this passage as evidence that the incorporeals have a parallel ontological status, reading *parastēsai* as subsisting alongside and *kechōristai* as evidence of a transformation of Platonic separation from “indicating the above and beyond status of Ideas” to “not an inferior status, but one parallel to and co-constitutive with bodies.” But there are two problems with this argument. First, that *parastēsai* does not mean to subsist alongside; it is the aorist infinitive active of *paristēmi*, not *paruphistēmi* (on which see also Alessandrelli, “Discussione”), hence I rendered it in passage C as to present (see n. 29 above). Second, I don’t think the use of *kechōristai* to describe the *lekton* as distinct from the voice and the bearer is a wink and a nod to Plato’s separateness; Sextus is simply challenging the Stoics to show that there can be *lekta*. For something to be true or false, he argues, it must be a *lekton* that is not only complete but also an *axiōma* (8.74), but how will you even prove that there are *lekta* (8.75)?

⁴⁵ Dillon & O’Meara, *Syrianus*, *ad loc.*

kata clause to convey something more than a mere covariance or correspondence.⁴⁶ More specifically, my suggestion is that the ontological context indicates that the relation between *lekta* and rational impressions will be like the relationship between the other incorporeals (place, room, surface, void, and time) and their underlying bodies, or hosts. That it does will be established by reference to the nature of the rational impression, which I will now show is fit to host *lekta*, i.e. to be the body according to which they *subsist*. Then we can welcome back the linguistic intuitions as confirmation.

Impressions

I will begin with some background on the Stoic conception of soul (*psuchē*) and impressions (*phantasiai*; *phantasia*, singular) generically. Soul is *pneuma*, a portion of fiery breath in a certain state of tension (*tonikē kinēsis*) “moving simultaneously inwards and outwards, the outward movement producing quantities and qualities, and the inward one unity and substance” (Nemesius 70,6–1,4 (47J)). As we saw in Chapter 6, the cosmos is pervaded by *pneuma* as the divine immanent artisan and agent, and each body is what it is in virtue of the particular state of rarity and tension of the *pneuma* that constitutes it. The Stoic *scala naturae* is a function of increasing complexity and unity due to the state of tension of a body’s *pneuma*. A stone, for example, is a solid object that holds together in virtue of the tenor (*hexis*) of its *pneuma* acting on (interacting with) its matter. Plants are alive and are said to have physique (*phusis*) because their *pneuma* is more rarefied and in a greater state of tension than mere *hexis*; plants are therefore more complex entities than stones in that the tension of their *pneuma* is an internal principle of motion and rest rather than of mere unity. Finally, the *pneuma* in animals is yet more rarefied and complex, and is called soul because the internal principle of motion and rest includes the capacity for impression and impulse (*hormē*, singular; *hormai* plural).

The Stoics famously liken the soul to an octopus, with the commanding faculty located in the region of the heart, and seven other parts growing out from it and stretching into the body (Calcidius 220 (53G): DL 7.157 (53N+, passage G below); Aëtius 4.21.1–4 (53H)). Five of these parts are the senses, e.g. sight is *pneuma* that extends from the commanding faculty to the eyes. The other two are the reproductive faculty, or seed (*sperma*), extending from the commanding faculty to the genitals; and, in a deeply innovative move whose implications are at the heart of this chapter, voice (*phōnē*), extending from the commanding faculty of

⁴⁶ For this reason, we should doubt the suggestion of A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” that *lekta* are to rational impressions as the incorporeal predicate “to *phronein*” is to the body *phronesis*; this latter relation is not an ontological dependence relation. More on predicates ahead.

soul to the windpipe and tongue. Again, what is characteristic of soul, in contrast to the mere *physis* of plants, is that it has impression and impulse; these psychic functions make an animal aware of the world, and able to interact with it. These are in effect the input and output faculties of the *hēgemonikon*, a stimulus-response mechanism presupposing a single subject or self that thinks and acts.⁴⁷ Starting from Aëtius' testimony, I will argue that impressions are states of direct, reflexive awareness of the world:

- F. (1)(a) On the one hand, impression (*phantasia*) is affection (*pathos*) coming about in the soul (*psuchē*), revealing (*endeiknumenon*) itself and what has made it (*to pepoiēkos*); for example, whenever through sight (*dia opseōs*) we observe (*theōrein*) what is white (*to leukon*), an affection is what has been engendered in the soul through seeing (*dia horaseōs*). (b) And it is according to this impression (<*kata*> *touto to pathos*) that we are able to say that something white stands behind the motion in us (*hupokeitai kinoun hēmas*); and likewise, too, through touch and smell. (c) The impression is so called from light; for just as light reveals (*deiknusi*) itself and the other things in its compass (*periechomena*), also impression reveals itself and what has made it. (2) On the other hand, an impressor (*phantaston*) is what produces an impression; for example, what is white, and what is cold, and everything able to move (*ho ti an dunētai kinein*) the soul, this is an impressor.

Aëtius 4.12.1–5 (39B)

This passage is part of a four-fold analysis comparing *phantasia* and its objects, impressors (*phantasta*), with imagination (*phantastikon*) and its (merely intentional) objects, apparitions (*phantasmata*). The faculty of *phantasia* is defined in F1a as affection (*pathos*) revealing itself and what has made it, then illustrated by the paradigm case of seeing. Speaking generally, the work of *phantasia* is to receive information from the world: to be impressed by it, or in relation to it (*epi*, as in the case of the drill sergeant providing himself as a model (SE, M. 8.409 (27E, passage D/Chapter 2)), and to produce particular impressions, or states of awareness in reaction to the sensory and non-sensory impressors that move the soul. Speaking more technically, a *phantasia* is a state of awareness, in contrast to the raw sensory data before it reaches the mind. Talk of observing something white through sight reflects this distinction, between the senses considered as arms of the octopus (through sight, through seeing), and the awareness that

⁴⁷ For the relevant notion of self, see Annas, *Mind*, 64; Inwood, "Hierocles," 162–4; A. A. Long, "Representation and the Self," 107, and "Stoic psychology and language," all of which I take to be compatible with cautions from C. Gill, *Structured Self*. For more about the rational soul of humans in comparison and contrast to non-rational souls of animals, see de Harven, "Rational Impressions," much but not all of which is included here.

takes place only at the *hēgemonikon* (observing). I will make use of this distinction in my analysis with the words “sensing” and “sensation” to refer to what takes place in the arms of the octopus and the sense organs (what is through sight and through seeing), “perceiving” and “perception” to refer to any impression that takes place in the *hēgemonikon* (when we observe), and “sense-perception” specifically for sensory impressions (*aisthēseis*; *aisthēsis*, singular), as opposed to non-sensory impressions “obtained through thought (*dianoia*), like those of the incorporeals and of other things acquired by reason” (D.L. 7.51 (39A4)).⁴⁸ The difference between sensation and perception lies in the animal’s awareness of the impressor’s information: the motion that carries raw sensory data from the organ to the *hēgemonikon* (sensation) is not something the animal is aware of; the imprint it makes on the *hēgemonikon*, however, must be a case of awareness (perception)—given the psychic nature of the *hēgemonikon*, its affections can’t fail to be cases of awareness. This is the force of defining *phantasia* in F1a as *pathos* revealing itself and what has made it; revealing is awareness. F1b then confirms that *phantasia* gives us cognitive access to the impressor that moved it, enabling us to say things about it. And F1c elucidates the reflexive dimension. I will take each in turn.

We can get a little clearer on our cognitive access to the impressor by looking at the mechanics of perception. The importance of impression understood as a corporeal *pathos* must not be underestimated; herein lies the transfer of information from impressor to soul:

- G. They [the Stoics] say there are eight parts of soul: the five senses, the principles of procreation, the vocal faculty (*phōnēton*), and the reasoning faculty (*logistikon*) [i.e. the *hēgemonikon*]. Seeing is when the light between sight and what stands behind it [sc. the visual impressor] is stretched in the form of a cone [...] The conical portion of air comes to be at the point of the eye, while the base is at what is seen; thus the thing seen is reported through the stretched air, like a walking stick.

DL 7.157 (Dorandi; 53N+)

⁴⁸ The account I give will proceed in terms of sensory impressions and often just in terms of vision, which are the paradigm cases of impression, but everything I say is meant to be applicable to non-sensory impressions as well, with the soul acting as corporeal agent to generate the *pathos* by being impressed in relation to (*epi*) things with a nature like the incorporeals (what is intelligible vs. sensible), as reported in the drill sergeant passage. For arguments that the Stoics recognize non-perceptual kataleptic impressions, see Schwab, “Kataleptic Impressions.” The Stoics famously use the term “*aisthēsis*” in many ways, sometimes as involving assent, sometimes as a case of *katalēpsis*, sometimes just for the *pneuma* stretching between *hēgemonikon* and sense organs, as well as in other ways (Aëtius 4.8.12; DL 7.52); I will use it generically as Diogenes does in 7.51 (passage H below), to refer to impressions coming from sensory impressors rather than non-sensory impressors, irrespective of their epistemological worth except that they arise from what is the case and are not therefore *phantasmata* or figments of the imagination.

The comparison to a walking stick illustrates that air is no less direct and corporeal a conduit to the *hēgemonikon* than a walking stick; both are conveying their information by touching. So even though the object of sight does not itself touch the eye, seeing remains direct in that the object moves the eyes via the medium of air, and the eyes convey that very motion to the *hēgemonikon*. The air and the walking stick are conduits but not intermediaries; and so too the portions of *pneuma* extending between *hēgemonikon* and sense organs are conduits, but not intermediaries. An intermediary would be something that we see directly, by which we see (or make inferences about) the thing in the world indirectly; to be a conduit is to convey information from the world directly to the commanding faculty. Crucially, the *phantasia* is not an intermediary between the world and the person perceiving it, because the *phantasia* just is the temporary state of the commanding faculty receiving the information.

So, when an impressor strikes the senses it makes an impact that imparts information about itself to the sense organs, and when that motion reaches the *hēgemonikon*, the animal is aware of the impressor. The details of impact and transfer of information are hazy. However, we do know the Stoics embrace an analogy of the impression with wax being stamped and impressed to capture all the idiosyncrasies of a signet ring (SE, M. 7.251 (40E3)).⁴⁹ It is important to note that the Stoics are not comparing the *hēgemonikon* itself with wax, but rather comparing the wax's taking on of the ring's idiosyncrasies with the *hēgemonikon*'s taking on its impressor's idiosyncrasies. Thus the mechanism by which the wax and soul take on their impressors' qualities is not the explicit point of comparison, and their being similarly sensitive to their impressors does not entail that the *hēgemonikon* is itself like wax in any further respect, or that impressions are pictorial or imagistic in any literal way. Although the details of the mechanism elude us, it is clear that there is a direct transfer of information when the impressor strikes the sense organs, creating a motion in the soul that carries the information imprinted on it to the *hēgemonikon*, where it becomes a *pathos* revealing what has made it.

Now to the reflexive dimension of *phantasia* revealing itself as well as its impressor, which is illustrated in F1c in analogy with light revealing itself and what is in its compass. What is salient in the analogy is that light and *phantasia* both serve to *reveal* things, themselves and their objects. In the case of light, revealing is obviously to be understood as illumination, making things visible, so at face value the Stoics have said that light makes itself visible alongside the objects it illuminates. In the case of impression, revealing is to be understood as making aware,

⁴⁹ In this case the analogy is given to illuminate the kataleptic impression in particular, hence we are told the wax captures *all* the idiosyncrasies of the object, but this does not affect the analogy with wax, which will include cases where only some of the idiosyncrasies are captured. I embrace the observations of Shogry, "Expertise," about the contribution of concepts by the mind in the wax analogy; agreement with Shogry, "Impressions," about cognitive penetration and disagreement that the content of a rational impression (whether expert or not) is a *lekton* ahead.

giving cognitive access to; so the analogy taken on its own terms dictates just that *phantasia* makes an animal aware of itself and its impressor.⁵⁰ Sextus Empiricus even makes it explicit that there are two things being grasped in *phantasia*: “one is the alteration itself, this is the *phantasia*; and the second is what made the alteration, and this is what is visible” (SE, M. 7.162 (70A6)).⁵¹

Rational Impressions

The question now will be: in what does the content of the uniquely human rational impression (*phantasia logikē*) consist, such that the rational impression will be fit to host *lekta*, i.e. for *lekta* to depend on rational impressions for their *subsistence* and from which to inherit their semantic content? The short answer, which we have seen above, is that rational impressions have content expressible in speech. What makes our utterances speech, as opposed to mere vocal sound, is that they are significant (*sēmantikē*), and what is signified by the speaker and grasped by the rational hearer is a *lekton*. Hence the question arises: what is the relation between rational impressions and *lekta*? Diogenes, again, offers us some insight, quoting Diocles the Magnesians on rational impressions before turning to the topics of voice and what is signified:

- H. Further, among impressions, there are those that are rational (*logikai*) and those that are irrational (*alogoi*); and rational are those of the rational animals, while irrational are those of the irrational. Thus rational impressions are called thoughts (*noēseis*), while the irrational ones don’t happen to have a name. And there are those that are expert and those that are inexpert; at any rate (*goun*), a statue is viewed one way by an expert and another way by a non-expert.

DL 7.51 (39A6–7); cf. Galen, *Def. med.* (SVF 2.89)

- I. For the impression arises first (*proēgeitai*), and then thought, which has the power of speaking out (*dianoia eklalētikē*), expresses (*ekpherei*) in language (*logos*) what it undergoes by (*ho paschei hupo*) the impression.

DL 7.49 (39A2/33D)

⁵⁰ Note that the causal direction is reversed in these two cases: light makes itself and the things it illuminates visible, but *phantasia* does not make the world intelligible; this difference does not undermine but rather reinforces what is salient in the analogy.

⁵¹ For a more detailed analysis of the reflexive dimension of impression attested for animals by Hierocles, see de Harven, “Rational Impressions”; cf. Helle, “Hierocles.” See A. A. Long “Soul and Body,” and “Language and Thought,” 107, on self-perception, and “*Oikeiosis*,” 96, for a comparison of self-perception to proprioception.

Putting these passages together with the evidence we have seen above shows that what is characteristic of humans is the rationality of their impressions, and that impressions are rational when they are thoughts whose contents can be expressed in words, language, or speech. One might even frame the evidence as an argument for the definition of the *lekton*: rational impressions are thoughts (H); thought is linguistic and semantic, able to express itself in speech by uttering *lekta* (I); therefore *lekta* *subsist* according to the rational impression, whose content is fit to be expressed in language (SE, *M.* 8.70 (33C, passage C above); DL 7.63 (33F)). Now, this much is uncontroversial; but only because it does not yet take a stand on what it means for the *lekton* to *subsist* according to the rational impression. Most everyone takes *lekta* to be the content of rational impressions, and sees the rational impression itself as semantically empty (so here *subsisting kata* indicates merely a covariance or correlation, and is not an indication of any ontological dependence).⁵² I take the opposite position and hold that it is the *lekta* that owe *their* propositional content to the rational impressions, which are semantically rich. We can sloganize the debate by asking whether rational impressions are conduits or causes of *lekta*.⁵³

The most basic presupposition about the rational impression is that in being rational, it is propositional. This also by itself says little, since everything hangs on what it means to be propositional. One sense is practically axiomatic in the literature: to be propositional is to have content that is all and only from *lekta* construed as mind-independent abstract entities, i.e. propositional content comes from thought grasping propositions. It is a corollary of this view that sense-perception reports only bare sensory qualities (e.g. colors, shapes, and sounds), which are not part of the propositional content, on the model of the Trojan horse in Plato's *Theaetetus* (184 B 2–6 A 1). If all propositional content comes from *lekta*, whatever else there is (including the sensory information from the Trojan horse), it doesn't count as propositional content. Another corollary of the view is that impressions are objects or inputs for reason construed as a distinct faculty; the mind that thinks is aware of *phantasiai* as its objects. Since reason is what distinguishes humans from animals, it must be some part of soul in addition to the faculty of impression they have in common.⁵⁴ Call this axiom and its corollaries the de-psychologizing orthodoxy.

⁵² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 104–6, who denies that *lekta* are semantic or linguistic entities, is an exception to this rule, arguing that the articulated content of the rational impression is not a *lekton* or even expressible in language. Alessandrelli, *Problema*, also argues that the *lekton* is not the content of the rational impression, but is available for us to use to express the content.

⁵³ I do not intend the word “cause” in the technical Stoic sense, which requires all causes to be capable of action and passion; by “cause” I mean that because of which, source, host, or grounding body. For Alessandrelli, *Problema*, the rational impression is neither a conduit nor a cause in that he denies *lekta* are the content of the rational impression but also denies that *lekta* are mind-dependent.

⁵⁴ See Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception”; Imbert, “Représentation,” 80–4, as exceptions to this rule in Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 67–8, 82–5; Annas, *Mind*; Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 43–5; Barnes, “Meaning, Saying and Thinking,” and “Meaning,” 211–3; Brennan, “Moral Psychology”; Caston, “Something and Nothing” and “Mental Representation”; M. Frede, “Clear and Distinct”; Inwood,

M. Frede, who did much to establish this picture as the orthodoxy, takes the view that impressions are the *way* that a *lekton* is perceived, but of themselves have no semantic content.⁵⁵ This assumption that all semantic content is from *lekta* plays out in an ongoing debate over the status of non-rational impressions in animals and children. This debate is thought to be instructive on an Aristotelian-style assumption that since animals and humans both have the faculty of impression, their impressions must be the same (corollary one) and reason must be something further receiving those impressions (corollary two). So if we can get clear on what goes on in animals and children, we'll know something about the added ingredient of reason as well.⁵⁶ The problem facing the orthodox view is that if all mental content is propositional and conceptual, then it looks like animals and children (since they are classified as irrational) cannot have semantic contents, only the bare sensory qualities of the Trojan horse; but these are not sufficient to explain complex animal behavior. One solution is to say that content can be propositional (with *lekta* as their contents) without being conceptual, in which case children and animals can have articulable mental contents sufficient to explain behavior without having to grasp that content.⁵⁷ But this is an unfortunate choice: either animals and children have mental content without being able to grasp it, or they have no mental content at all.

My suggestion is that this is a false dichotomy resting on the mistaken axiom and corollaries of the de-psychologizing orthodoxy. So, I propose to suspend the axiom that propositional content only comes from or equates to *lekta* and see where it leads when we take our inquiry to the texts. And I trust that no one will insist that the word "propositional," because it contains "proposition," can only mean that the content of the rational impression is a proposition. I will begin with Sextus.

Ethics and Human Action; Lesses, "Content, Cause"; Gourinat, *Dialectique*, 116; Mates, *Stoic Logic*; Sedley, "Psychophysical Causation"; Sorabji, "Perceptual Content"; and Totschnig, "Effects," 129. Shogry, "Impressions," stands apart in agreeing with most that *lekta* are the propositional content, but disagreeing that impressions have no cognitive content (embracing cognitive penetration), thereby rejecting the corollaries of the majority view; indeed, as he argues in "Expertise," the mind is active in generating impressions by giving them conceptual content. Bronowski, *Lekta*, on the other hand, stands apart in denying that *lekta* are the propositional content of rational impressions, but embracing both corollaries. I agree with Shogry in embracing cognitive penetration, but disagree that the content of the rational impression is a *lekton*; thus I reject the axiom and both its corollaries.

⁵⁵ M. Frede, "Clear and Distinct," 156.

⁵⁶ Cf. Brittain, "Non-Rational Perception," 256–7; Lesses, "Content, Cause," 1–3, for perspicuous summaries of these issues.

⁵⁷ As Caston, "Mental Representation," and Sorabji, "Perceptual Content," suggest; note here the seeds of semantic externalism in being able to have mental content without being able to grasp it, a related orthodoxy established by Annas, *Mind*; M. Frede, "Clear and Distinct"; Striker "κρίτηριον τῆς ἀληθείας." See Nawar, "Apprehension," and Perin, "Externalism," for defenses of internalism. See Reed, "Cognitive Impression," and Vasilou, "Disjunctivism," for defense of the Stoics as disjunctivists.

- J. They say that the human does not differ from irrational animals in respect of uttered speech (*prophorikos logos*) (for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate sounds), but in respect of internal speech (*endiathetos logos*), nor merely by the simple impression (for these too have impressions) but by the transitive (*metabatikē*) and synthetic (*sunthetikē*) impression. Wherefore (*dioper*), having the conception of implication (*akolouthias ennoian echōn*), straightaway one also grasps the thought of a sign, through implication; for, that is, the sign itself is such: “if this, then that.” Therefore the fact that there are signs also (*to kai sēmeion huparchein*) follows from (*hepetai*) the nature and constitution (*kataskēuē*) of the human being.

SE, M. 8.275–6 (53T)⁵⁸

Sextus reports here that humans differ from animals in two ways: internal speech (*endiathetos logos*) and rational impressions. First, it’s not the actual proffering of speech that makes us different from animals, but *endiathetos logos*, which we can think of as the ability to make statements to oneself.⁵⁹ This gap between impression and utterance where internal discourse takes place is what gives us the uniquely human control over assent and impulse, in contrast to birds that utter articulate cries as an automatic response to their impressions.⁶⁰ Origen confirms this picture when he reports that the rational animal “has reason that passes judgment on impressions (*logon. . . ton krinonta tas phantasias*), rejecting some of these and accepting others, in order that the animal may be guided according to them [sc. those they accept]” (*Princ.* 3.1.3 (53A5); cf. Calcidius 220 (53G)).

Passing judgment on impressions does not signal that the mind takes impressions as its objects, but rather that there is a gap between perception and assent where reflection and deliberation take place. Indeed, examination of our impressions is the most important kind of self-perception because it is for the sake of evaluating the way we see the world, analyzing our seeings as before owning them with our assent. In this gap we have the opportunity to evaluate and examine our impressions, and in the process we create and assess various *lekta* before passing judgment on one, choosing the *lekton* we assent to and becoming responsible for

⁵⁸ Cf. SE, M. 8.285 (Bury); PH 1.65 (Bury).

⁵⁹ As A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 88, puts it; see Gourinat, “Discours intérieur,” for additional texts and valuable cautions against assimilating Stoic *endiathetos logos* to the Platonic notion more akin to internal dialogue than declamation (*diexodos*). For the novel suggestion that the difference between humans and animals is not in uttering semantic sounds that convey *lekta*, which children and parrots also do, but in the fact that *logos* is for the human being internal (thus only humans speak), see Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 85–91. For the view that it is *pragmata* rather than *lekta* that make the parrot’s sounds meaningful, so that only humans utter *lekta* and thus speak, see Assaturian, “Children, Parrots, and Actors.”

⁶⁰ This point may be put either in terms of denying assent to animals and introducing it only with humans, or granting animals assent but calling it voluntary only with humans; cf. Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception,” n. 10.

the resulting statement, belief, impulse, or action. Epictetus calls it *parakolouthia* and even personifies the process for rhetorical effect: “Wait for me a bit, *phantasia*; let me see who you are and what you are about, let me test you” (*Diss.* 2.18.24 (Schenkl)). Given this gap between impression and assent, there must be something about the rational impression that makes it available for this kind of examination prior to assenting to a *lekton*.⁶¹

And this is precisely the other thing differentiating us from animals: because impressions are rational they can be examined and evaluated. Sextus explains that our impressions are transitive (*metabatikē*), meaning literally moving from one place to another, and synthetic, i.e. constructive or compositional (*sunthetikē*). We can capture this point by saying they are discursive: being *metabatikē* signals that rational impressions are inferential, and being *sunthetikē* signals that they are compositional—they are *seeings as* (as I put it).⁶² And this is to say that rational impressions are conceptual and thus propositional—but not to say that their content is a proposition (or *lekton* of any other kind). To see something as F is to predicate a concept of it; and since Stoic concepts are analyzed as having content that can be expressed in conditionals, seeing as is inherently inferential (SE, M. 11.8–11 (30I)).⁶³ Note that in saying their content is inferential, I am not suggesting that the content of the impression involves formal conditionals composed of *axiōmata*; rather, it is inferential in the sense that the concept of a human that I predicate of Socrates is connected to the concepts of animal, being mortal, having impressions, and many others. So it’s not that the propositional content of rational impressions is not intimately and indispensably related to *lekta* (on the contrary. . .), but that they are related in the opposite way from what is typically supposed. It’s not that rational impressions have propositional content because their contents are propositions, but, rather, that propositions (i.e. *lekta*) have propositional content because rational impressions are transitive, compositional, conceptual. Rational impressions, of themselves, have the propositional content to give to *lekta*.

The rational impression, being conceptual and discursive, thus looks quite content-ful, with precisely the kind of content whose implications can be evaluated and expressed during internal discourse (*endiathetos logos*). Here we see how the rational impression is at the heart of Stoic moral psychology, as the foundation of appropriation (*oikeiosis*) and choice (*prohairesis*), and the lynchpin of their compatibilist ethics, as the one thing in the cosmos over which we have control. So, to summarize, the content of the rational impression is by its nature

⁶¹ Cf. Brennan, “Moral Psychology,” n. 11, who denies this is a quasi-deliberative process because reflection on the content of the rational impression *presupposes* suspension of judgment; I take the reflection to be prior to assent, rejection, or suspension. For the same reasons I am sympathetic to Bobzien’s notion of the causal chain being in some sense interrupted by this gap, *Determinism and Freedom*, 276–90, which Brennan resists, “Fate and Free Will.”

⁶² For synthesis as combination, see DL 7.53 (39D); SE, M. 8.60 (Bury); Cicero, *Fin.* 3.33–34 (60D). Cf. A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 87 and n. 54; Schwab and Shogry, “Rationality of Perception.”

⁶³ This paraphrasing move is how the Stoics eliminate concepts from the ontology (see Chapter 15).

inferential, conceptual, and semantic—i.e. propositional. I will now use these terms interchangeably—with the axiom suspended, priority among them is not material. Thus, with the benefit of DL 7.49 (passage I), we have seen an alternative sense of “propositional” emerging, which does not make reference to propositions grasped as independent objects of thought.⁶⁴ We see an alternative axiom emerging as well: the content of the rational impression is in the impression. That’s why they are called thoughts (H).

With the help of Cicero’s *Academica*, we can also see an alternative to the first corollary, the Trojan horse model of perception according to which the content is bare sensory data. This passage has been of interest in the animal minds debate, as a sort of loophole to ascribe enough content to animals to account for their behavior without giving them full-fledged rationality. But with the axiom that mental content comes all and only from *lekta* now suspended, there is no reason to seek this loophole. Denying *lekta* to animals need not deny them any mental content whatsoever, nor does it give any reason to think that sense-impressions merely provide raw sensory data.

- K. Those characteristics that belong to those things we say are perceived (*percipi*) by the senses (*sensibus*) are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be perceived not by the senses themselves (*ipsis*) but by them in a certain respect (*quodam modo*), e.g. “That is white,” “This is sweet,” “That is melodious,” “This is fragrant,” “This is bitter.” We have comprehension (*tenemus comprehensa*) of these by the mind now (*animo iam*), not the senses. Next (*deinceps*), “That is a horse,” “That is a dog.” The rest of the series follows next, connecting greater things that are as if to encompass a complete comprehension of things: “If it is a human, it is a mortal, rational animal.” From this class [sc. of things perceived by the mind] conceptions (*notitiae*) of things are imprinted (*imprimuntur*) on us, without which there can be no understanding (*intellegi*) nor discussion (*disputari*) of anything (*quicquam*).

Cicero, *Acad.* 2.21 (39C)

Those things perceived by the senses themselves are colors, tastes, and sounds et al. that get communicated to the soul by the sense organs; this is the raw sensory data. These colors, tastes, and sounds are equally characteristic of, i.e. still present when those things are registered by the senses in a certain respect, i.e. predicatively, as white, sweet, or melodious. The idea here is that the sensory content delivered by the arms of the octopus persists and in that respect is equally characteristic of the content of the impression when it strikes the *hēgemonikon* and is seen as F. The

⁶⁴ I take this sense to be akin to Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception”; Lesses, “Content, Cause.”

force of saying these are comprehended by the mind *now* is to signal the awareness that takes place once the sensory impact reaches the *hēgemonikon* from the arms of the octopus—the mind, but not the walking stick, will be aware of the impressor as F. So much is confirmed by Sextus:

- L. For what grasps the truth in what stands behind it [sc. the impressor] must not only be moved in a white manner (*leukantikōs*) or a sweet manner (*glukantikōs*), but also be led (*achthēnai*) to an impression of such a thing (*pragma*) as “This is white” and “This is sweet.”

οὐ γὰρ μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ληψόμενον
τάληθές ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς φαντασίαν ἀχθῆναι τοῦ τοιοῦτου
πράγματος “τοῦτο λευκὸν ἐστὶ” καὶ “τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἐστὶν.”

SE, M. 7.344 (Bury)⁶⁵

Sextus goes on to confirm that this is no longer the job of sense because sense grasps only color, flavor, and sound, but cannot grasp “This is white.” Thus I take the idea that the mind grasps what the senses offer “in a certain respect” to indicate that rational impressions are inherently conceptual, echoing Sextus’ description of them as synthetic and inferential. I do not find the Trojan horse model in this passage, taking impressions to report only bare sensory qualities to thought as something distinct. Rather, taking the testimony that rational impressions are thoughts (H) at face value, I find the alternative corollary that impressions are inherently conceptual states of mind, which I have sloganized as: all seeing is seeing as.⁶⁶

An alternative to the second corollary that mind or thought is something distinct that takes impressions as its inputs is also discernible in Cicero’s testimony. This passage is in fact describing the Stoics’ developmental account of rationality, according to which reason is constituted by the concepts we acquire through experience (Galen, *Plac.* 5.2.49, 5.3.1 (53V)). For the Stoics, humans have *logos*, or reason, from birth; it is the faculty or capacity for rationality, which develops gradually through our interactions with the world. The Stoics thus start us with a *tabula rasa* fit for writing upon, and equate our rationality with the concepts written on it by the world (Aëtius 4.11.1–4 (39E)).⁶⁷ The initial development of rationality consists in our basic concept acquisition, first of preconceptions (*prolēpseis*) that arise naturally from the world, and then conceptions (*ennoiai*), which are a function of study, art, and convention.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Cf. SE, M. 7.293.

⁶⁶ And here I embrace Shogry, “Expertise,” on the conceptual contribution of the mind.

⁶⁷ Cf. A. A. Long, “Soul and Body,” 51, for whom *logos* is not one faculty among others, but the *mode* of the whole soul’s operation.

⁶⁸ I am in agreement with Sandbach, “Ennoia and Prolēpsis” that *prolēpseis* are not innate ideas; see Dyson, *Prolepsis and Ennoia*, for a more recent defense of such rationalism.

Thus, in passage K we begin to get rationalized with basic sensory concepts like white, sweet, melodious, fragrant, and bitter; next we move to kinds like horse and dog. Then we move from basic predication to connecting our concepts together and appreciating their inferential import, as in: If something is a human, then it is a mortal, rational animal. The human soul is considered rational once it has acquired a complete stock of concepts from experience, and a proper grasp of their inferential import. Only then (at the age of fourteen) is a person considered to have speech, i.e. to be a reliable language user who understands the meanings of her words and is responsible for her actions (as we saw above, DL 7.55). Only then do our impressions become thoughts.⁶⁹

It is important to appreciate the full force of this point, that impressions *are* thoughts. The psychic nature of the *hēgemonikon* makes the impressor's imprint result in a case of awareness, a *pathos* that reveals itself and its cause (F). Now, by that same token, we can appreciate that the rationalized state of the human *hēgemonikon* makes the imprinting propositional in addition. The habituated state of the *hēgemonikon* determines how the incoming information is conceived, i.e. how the patient is affected. And the way the patient is affected is what is impressed (*to phantasthen*), i.e. the content of the rational impression, which is expressible in words. So, in answer to the first question posed in this section, in what does the content of the rational impression consist, the answer is this: incoming information from the impressor, as it is conceived.⁷⁰ This is not two steps or two components, but one; the content of an impression just is the incoming information, the way it is conceived. Another way to make the point is to say that I endorse cognitive penetration, following Simon Shogry's arguments against the Trojan horse model (as I am calling it) and against the second corollary that *phantasiai* are inputs for reason construed as something distinct, rather than instances or episodes of reason.⁷¹

This idea that the state or disposition of a person's soul determines the content of the rational impression is confirmed by the Stoic account of expertise. Earlier, in passage H, rational impressions were subdivided into expert and inexpert. Let's take this at face value, and ask what it means for a rational impression itself, as

⁶⁹ Thus someone might wonder whether, on this account, children and animals can ever see an apple as red or see *that* the apple is red, in which case the impressions themselves will be significantly different from each other, even though they arise from the same objects. This is meant to be a problem, but I embrace this result, as I will for the difference between expert and non-expert impressions. In both cases the content of the impression will be different, and for that reason will be able to generate different *lekta* because of it, but that does not make them categorically different or undo what they have in common.

⁷⁰ Here I am in strong agreement with Shogry, "Expertise," that the mind is active in contributing concepts to rational impressions.

⁷¹ Although Shogry, "Impressions," does ultimately hedge and recognize the possibility of some "non-salient" character or sensory content that is not part of the propositional content, a move that is not necessary on my view. Imbert, "Représentation," 80, suggests the same, perhaps, in saying that no representative content is ever given without the discursive form that makes the rational impression a piece of objective testimony.

opposed to a person or a judgment, to be expert. We know that the Stoics explicitly categorize expertise (e.g. having the art of medicine or, ideally, the art of life) as a tenor (*hexis*) of soul. Further, that “expertise is a system [developed] out of (*ek*) cognitions (*katalēpseōn*) in joint training (*suggegumnasmenōn*) relative to some goal useful in life” (Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Gorg.* 12.1 (42A)).⁷² To be an expert, then, is to have developed one’s rationality with care and attention to some goal. Just as basic human rationality is constituted by the development of our pre-conceptions and conceptions from our interactions with the world, so expertise is just a further habituation or training of the *hēgemonikon* with a certain end in mind, say carpentry, medicine, or virtue (the art of life). As the preposition “*ek*” in the sense of origin signals, expertise is not a new ingredient or part of soul, but soul itself disposed in a certain way (as a *pōs echon*, in the language of the Stoic Categories, Chapters 7 and 8)—*pneuma* that is maximally sensitive to the world’s maximal intelligibility and detail, just as the comparison with wax dictates.

Julia Annas finds it puzzling that the impression itself is characterized as expert or inexperienced, and suggests an interpretive dilemma.⁷³ On the first horn, the expert and the non-expert have the same *phantasiai* with the same content at step one, but assent to different *lekta* at step two because they only take in or accept part of the information contained in the impression. On this picture, the information contained in the *phantasia* is raw sensory data and step two marks the introduction of conceptual or propositional content. On the second horn, the expert and inexperienced have different *phantasiai* with different content, but there is no distinction to be made between perception and assent, only a distinction between the striking of the sense organ (step zero) and what happens at the *hēgemonikon* (step one = step two).⁷⁴ Annas finds no reason to prefer either horn of the dilemma. But notice that the dichotomy rests on the orthodox assumption that the *lekton* assented to is the content of the *phantasia*. If *phantasiai* only have content derivatively in virtue of grasping an external, independent *lekton*, experts and inexperienced can only differ in these two ways: either they have the same raw, non-conceptual data (same *phantasiai*) and assent subsequently to different *lekta*, or they have different *phantasiai* with different conceptual content and by that token assent to different *lekta*. With the orthodoxy suspended, however, there is no reason to accept Annas’ dichotomy.

Rather, a natural alternative emerges that takes the expert and inexperienced to have different *phantasiai* with different propositional content (and not merely different sensory data) at step one, and sees assent (step two) as a distinct phase of cognition on the other side of internal discourse (*endiathetos logos*). The world in all its

⁷² See also Cicero, *Acad.* 2.22 (42B); Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D (61B, passage L/Chapter 8); Stobaeus 2.73,1–13 (60J).

⁷³ Annas, *Mind*, 82–3.

⁷⁴ Cf. Imbert, “Représentation,” 87.

specificity makes a causal impact (*tupōsis*) on our sensory apparatus (step zero); this much is the same in everyone, expert and inexpert alike (assuming comparable eyesight, e.g. neither needs glasses). Then, in analogy with the walking stick, the *tupōsis* imprinted with the impressor's information travels up the arms of the octopus to the *hēgemonikon*, where it becomes a *phantasia*. This is step one, and it is not the same in the expert and inexpert, nor is the content merely raw sensory data, because their souls are differently habituated and so they receive the sensory information differently. An expert soul is sensitive to more of the incoming information, capable of seeing more than the novice. When an arborist looks at a certain tree, she sees a silver birch at a particular stage of its life, in some determinate state of health, etc. I see a tree. When a doctor sees an eye with a certain ring around the edge of the cornea, she sees a symptom of high cholesterol. I see the iris with a ring around it. When artists look at paintings, they see scale, composition, brush strokes, media, and technique, reading the creative process off the canvas. I see a painting. We see the same painting, but we do not see it the same way when it reaches the *hēgemonikon*.⁷⁵ As Cicero puts it just before telling us that things are perceived by the senses *in a certain respect*: “How many things painters see in shadows and in the foreground which we do not see!” (*Acad.* 2.20 (Rackham)). The content of an expert's impression (the expert's seeing as) is different from the non-expert's because the expert soul is habituated by experience and art, a collection of inferential conceptions and maximal sensitivity to detail. There is thus a wealth of semantic and propositional content in the expert's rational impression, which cannot be captured by and does not depend on any one simple *lekton*.⁷⁶ This is why impressions are neither objects of thought for a separate mind (corollary 2) nor reporters of mere sensory data on a Trojan horse model (corollary 1), but thoughts about their impressor—thick with conceptual, linguistic, and inferential content resulting from the impressor making an impact on the *hēgemonikon*.⁷⁷

Lekta—Products of Thought

Having established that rational impressions have propositional content on their own, without reference to *lekta* (or, of course, *axiōmata*), we now return to the questions raised above. What is the relation between the rational impression and

⁷⁵ Thanks to my experts in trees, Rosie McMahan, and in medicine, Mira Gohel, and to my artists Katia Fuentes and Jonah Roll, for consulting on examples.

⁷⁶ And while I am sympathetic to Shogry's strategy, “Impressions,” 22, 26, to build everything into a single propositional content, I do not see the explanatory benefit of building it all into one indefinitely long *lekton*.

⁷⁷ Cf. A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 109–10, who speaks of rational impressions as thick with content and potential judgments; Caston, “Mental Representation,” has recently called into question a thin notion of content and passive model of mind, but remains committed to the orthodox axiom and thus differs only in requiring more propositions (*lekta*) to imbue the impression with its full content.

the *lekton*? What does the preposition “*kata*” convey when we are told that the *lekton* *subsists kata* the rational impression, and what does Sextus add when he tells us that the rational impression is one whose content (*to phantasthen*) can be expressed in speech? The order of explanation in SE, M. 8.69–70 (passage C) suggests that *lekta* expressed in speech depend on the rational impression for their content and *subsistence*: *lekta* *subsist* according to the rational impression (C3), because the rational impression has the resources to give them semantic content (C4). Diogenes confirms this: first we have an impression, and then we express its content (by uttering words) (I). Shogry has argued against reading this passage as a temporal sequence, in support of a cognitive penetration thesis, and against those who take this passage as evidence that conceptualization happens only later, after receiving sensory information, as a second step and distinct contribution to the content of the rational impression. While I share Shogry’s objective and embrace the cognitive penetration thesis, I maintain that passage I *does* present a temporal sequence, giving us the order of events from the rational impression (which I agree is fully conceptual) to a second step in which we speak, or utter a *lekton*. So the temporal order I see here is not from bare sensory data to conceptual content, but from conceptual content to speech.⁷⁸

Seneca echoes the sentiment in *Epistle* 117.13 (33E), where he testifies that first I see Cato walking, then movements of thought, which have a certain something of their own (*proprium quiddam*), enable me to say “Cato is walking,” i.e. to express a *lekton*.⁷⁹ I take the *proprium quiddam* of our movements of thought, that which is unique to us as humans, to be the ability to express our thoughts in language, i.e. to create *lekta* from our thoughts. Passage J also confirms the picture: after telling us that humans have internal discourse and rational impressions, Sextus goes on to infer (and reiterate at M. 8.285) that the existence of signs (not just that we grasp signs, but that they exist) follows from the human nature and constitution. Given that a sign, as the leading proposition (*axiōma*) revelatory of a consequent, is a *lekton*, this conclusion amounts to an explicit claim that *lekta* depend on rational impressions as prior semantically (since they have the conceptual content of themselves) and ontologically (since the fact that there are conditionals follows from the rational impression).

We can now return to Diogenes’ original description of the *lekton* as what *subsists* out of (*ek*) the rational impression (7.43), the definition of it as *subsisting* according to (*kata*) the rational impression (7.63), and Sextus’ report (passage B) that what is signified is grasped *subsisting in consequence* of (*paraphistamenon*) the rational

⁷⁸ Shogry, “Impressions,” 15–6; in fact, it is the temporal sequence that justifies the dialectical priority of the topic of impressions.

⁷⁹ For the suggestion that this passage “requires that an account be given of the relation between the Cato figuring within the *lekton* and Cato the man himself,” where the Cato figuring in the *lekton* is not the person Cato but something else incorporeal, see Bronowski, *Lekta*, 344–6. See Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 99, for the suggestion that the *proprium quiddam* is the *lekton* itself.

impression. In light of all the foregoing evidence in favor of mind-dependence, there is now good reason to embrace the linguistic intuitions about “*ek*,” “*kata*,” and “*para*-” that were set aside earlier. We can take “*ek*” to indicate that rational impressions are the source or origin of *lekta*, “*subsisting kata*” to indicate the ontological dependence of *lekta* on the rational impression, and the prefix “*para*-” to report their status as byproducts of rational impressions.⁸⁰ Pamela Mensch and James Miller even render the topics of dialectic at 7.43 as “impressions and the various things to which they give rise”; and Long & Sedley say “impressions and derivatively subsistent sayables.”⁸¹ Let us not forget that these claims about the meaning of “*ek*,” “*kata*,” and “*para*-” in this context are based on well-established senses of the Greek for each one, whereas “*ek*” and “*kata*” are not so naturally assimilated to the sense of being other than, which Bronowski builds on “*para*-.”⁸²

I will now offer one final piece of support from Galen, who lays bare the Stoic commitment to the dependence of *lekta* on thought, quoting Zeno, Chrysippus, and Diogenes of Babylon and covering several generations. Following is the quote he attributes to Chrysippus, telling us explicitly that words receive their meaning from thought:

- M. [16] It is reasonable (*eulogon*) that that in which (*eis ho*) the meanings (*sēmasiai*) at that point come to be and out of which discourse (*logos*) comes to be, is the ruling (*kurieuon*) part of soul. For the source (*pēgē*) of [internal] discourse (*logos*) is none other than thought (*dianoia*), and the source of voice (*phōnē*) none other than [internal] discourse, and [i.e.] (*kai*) on the whole, simply, the source of voice is none other than the ruling part of soul[. . .][18] For on the whole, whence (*hōthen*) discourse issues must be where reasoning (*dialogismos*), thinkings (*dinanoeseis*) and preparations (*meletas*) of linguistic expressions (*rēseiōn*) come to be, just as I said. [19] And these things clearly come to be around the heart, both voice and [public] discourse issuing from the heart through the windpipe.

[16] ἔυλογον δὲ εἰς ὃ γίγονται αἱ ἐν τούτῳ σημασίαι καὶ ἐξ οὗ λόγος, ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. οὐ ἄλλη μὲν ἢ πηγὴ λόγου ἐστὶν ἄλλη δὲ διανοίας, οὐδὲ ἄλλη μὲν φωνῆς πηγὴ ἄλλη δὲ λόγου, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ἀπλῶς ἄλλη φωνῆς πηγὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος[. . .][18] τὸ

⁸⁰ Cf. Imbert, “Représentation,” 97, who renders “*subsisting kata*” as “owes its existence to,” and 102, where she says the truth conditions of a *lekton* are strictly those of the rational impressions, to which the *lekton* owes its reality.

⁸¹ Mensch & Miller, *Lives*, ad loc.; LS 31A.

⁸² Barnes, “Meaning,” n. 31, admits that “*ek toutōn*” “must express some sort of dependence” and is forced to write off 7.43 as corrupt or a confusion by Diogenes, as Bronowski, *Lekta*, also does (see note 42 above). Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 69, argues that this move is not necessary because “*ek*” can be understood as in accordance with. I am grateful for conversation with Steve White, who suggests that “*ek*” might convey access to the *lekton* rather than its source or origin.

γὰρ ὅλον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἐκπέμπεται ἐκεῖσε δεῖ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν
 γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς διανοήσεις καὶ τὰς μελέτας τῶν ῥήσεων, καθάπερ ἔφην.
 [19] ταῦτα δὲ ἐκφανῶς περὶ τὴν καρδίαν γίνεταί, ἐκ τῆς καρδίας διὰ
 φάρυγγος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ λογοῦ ἐκπεμπομένων.

Galen, *Plac.* 2.5.16–9 (De Lacy)⁸³

Here is a breakdown of the passage as I see it: [16] the commanding faculty is where meanings and discourse or speech (*logos*) come to be. Why? First, because internal discourse has its source in thought, and voice has its source in internal discourse; therefore (simply put) voice comes from the *hēgemonikon* (where thought takes place).⁸⁴ [18] Second, because the source of discourse *must be* (i.e. on principle) the place of reasoning and thinking, and where words (*rēseiōn*) are imbued with meaning. To clarify, when I say that words receive their meaning from thought, I do not mean that every time people speak they are inventing language and meaning from scratch; the words they use have a lexical meaning governed by the relevant linguistic community. The idea is that in the preparations (*meletas*) of linguistic expressions, or, as Augustine put it, the bounding of words (passage A), the mind not only selects certain words to use, but also disambiguates, assigns reference, and indexes to time, place, and anything else needed to establish the specific truth or satisfaction conditions of the *lekton* it creates. To say how exactly this happens and give a full semantic theory is beyond the scope of my work here; it is certainly no small task in its own right, and probably outstrips our evidence. I will be satisfied if I can show that there is strong textual evidence that language and meaning is a product of thought for the Stoics, argue that objections fatal to the subjectivist camp do not apply to this account of mind-dependence, and give outlines to how such a theory might be developed.

When the mind gives meaning to words this is not a case of imposing a private language or inventing language anew, but of selecting words with an existing lexical meaning determined by the linguistic community, and giving the words a fully indexed content eligible for truth or satisfaction. Likewise, when the mind assigns reference, this is not a case of christening the object in the world but of identifying the object about which something is being said. The sentence “Socrates is going to the bank” has a lexical meaning that any competent language user could explain

⁸³ Reading *en toutō(i)* adverbially in the sense of at that point in time/place (LSJ IV), corresponding to *ensēmainesthai* in 20, confirmed by *ekeithen* (thence) in 20, and *hothen* in 18; attributive position signals that they become semantic at that very point; I am grateful to David Crane for discussion of this passage. Cf. Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 91–2; Atherton, *Ambiguity*, 450–6, on Galen, *Plac.* 2.5.

⁸⁴ I treat “*kurieuon*” and “*hēgemonikon*” interchangeably. I disambiguate “*logos*” as internal or external (public) discourse based on context: the salient contrast is between discourse arising in thought, on the one hand, and voice, on the other; since voice, which is clearly public, has its source in discourse—it must be in some other kind, namely internal discourse; therefore, on the assumption that being a source is transitive, the source of voice is the commanding faculty, where thoughts happen and meaningful words come to be.

(in at least two ways), but the sentence by itself does not assert anything; and thus has no truth conditions—it does not express a *lekton*. Only once the mind identifies *this* Socrates as the referent, indexes the assertion to time, place, and linguistic community, and disambiguates “bank,” does a *lekton* with truth conditions come to be. Independent of the mind, no *lekton* is, or can be, expressed by words.⁸⁵ In this I am wholeheartedly in agreement with A. A. Long, who puts the point this way:

By recourse to a dictionary and a grammar book, we can determine that English speakers might utter “It is light” when they wish to express one of at least two different thoughts they might have—either a thought about the time of day or a thought about something’s weight. This combination of words, taken by itself, is significant in the sense that, irrespective of context or a particular speech act, its phonetic properties and grammatical configuration are signs of a meaning that users of English are competent to express and understand. But it is not these properties and syntax as such that confer meaning on the expression; what does so is the fact that English speakers express their thoughts to one another by using such signs and syntax as these. Independently of context, moreover “It is light”, is completely ambiguous. In order to disambiguate these words, we need to identify the speaker’s meaning.⁸⁶

There is no direct textual evidence for this last claim, as Long recognizes, but “it must be what the Stoics theory implies. For although a speaker’s words may be ambiguous, the Stoics never seem to suggest that ambiguity pertains to the semantic content or *lekton* a speaker intends to express.”⁸⁷ Hence, as Diogenes reports, it is by dialectic that “the true and the false are distinguished, and what is plausible and what is said ambiguously are elucidated” (DL 7.47 (31B7)). Let us not forget that logic was a spoken practice, a branch of dialectic, and this shows up in the way the arguments are put, e.g.: “If it is day, it is light; but indeed (*alla mēn*) it is day; therefore it is light” (SE, *P.H.* 2.136). Not all premises are put so emphatically as the second premise here, but they are all meant to be asserted. As Long & Sedley observe, “The Stoic view of argument has a dialectical background in which each premise was posed as a question to an interlocutor and required his agreement (cf. 31A5, B8). Despite the great formality imposed by the logical handbooks, this dialectical aspect was never lost sight of.”⁸⁸ And, after all, the go-to premise “It is day” could never be considered true or false independent of being asserted, without being indexed to a time and place; as Diogenes also reports, “Someone who *says*

⁸⁵ I appreciate Assaturian’s insights, “Children, Parrots, and Actors” about speech acts and rationality being required for *lekta* to be said, but hold back from embracing the speech act view because I do not want a *lekton* to have to be said in order to come to be. More on the passive modal sense of *sayable* ahead. I also appreciate her account of *pragmata* as the lexical meanings of our words, but resist reifying *pragmata* as additional entities in the ontology, opting instead for a deflationary reading of this term.

⁸⁶ A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics,” 45.

⁸⁷ A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics,” n. 21.

⁸⁸ LS, 218.

‘It is day’ seems to propose that it is day. If, then, it is day, the proposition advanced comes out true, but if not it comes out false” (DL 7.65 (34E), my emphasis). To posit that a premise is true is to consider it asserted at a time and place, indexed to its circumstances. In this point about speaker meaning I am in strong agreement with Long.

However, I part ways with Long in his commitment to the *lekta* as truths or facts, semantic or logical structures objective in their availability to anyone to think and express and understand in any language, endorsing M. Frede’s metaphysical notion of the *lekta*.⁸⁹ I think what Long gives us above (but turns away from) is the path to a stronger dependence thesis that makes the *lekta* ontologically dependent on the mind without falling into subjectivism, and thus without having to introduce independent abstracta at odds with the Stoics’ physicalist and nominalist sensibilities. Nevertheless, worries about subjectivism persist, blocking the path to a more robust mind-dependence.

However, I urge, it does not follow from the fact that *lekta* are the bearers of truth value, and hence truths (when they are true), that they are therefore the logical structure of the world. We can say it is true, or a truth, or a fact that a knife cuts flesh, without committing to any additional “metaphysical entities” distinct from the corporeal world as it is. Surface grammar should not mislead us here. If in a nominalist spirit I deny that there are such entities as facts or states of affairs distinct from the world and its concrete properties, I do not thereby deny that the world is objectively as it is. Nor, therefore, in making the *lekta* mind-dependent does the world’s objectivity get undone. In committing to there being truths I need not commit to there being anything more than statements true of the world; truths need not be understood as part of the metaphysical architecture of the world, and the structure of the world does not require that there be *lekta*. There are truths, namely *lekta* that can say things that correspond to the way the world is. But the world and the truths we say and think about them are two different things.

Thus I urge that we take what is in fact substantial textual evidence that the *lekta* are products of thought at its word. The account I offer here is far from complete as a theory of meaning for the Stoics, but the textual evidence in favor of mind-dependence is significant, if only we can set aside subjectivist worries and be open to it. In addition to all the texts marshaled above, Diogenes of Babylon confirms: “discourse is sent forth having been imprinted (*ensesēmasmenon*) and in a way stamped (*hoion ektetupōmenon*) by conceptions in the mind” (Galen, *Plac.* 2.5.12 (De Lacy)). Thus we see that the mind-dependence of *lekta* is attested by a wide variety of sources: a hostile skeptic, neutral doxographer, fussy Platonizing physician, and now by Ammonius, head of the Neoplatonist school in Alexandria:

⁸⁹ A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics,” 46, 52–3.

- N. The Stoics reply [to the Peripatetic] that the nominative case itself has fallen (*peptōken*) from thought (*apo noēmatos*), which is in the soul. For when we wish to reveal (*dēlōsai*) the thought of Socrates that we have in ourselves, we utter (*propherometha*) the name Socrates [i.e. Socrates in the nominative case]. Therefore, just as a pen is said both to have fallen and to have its fall upright if it is released from above and sticks upright, so we claim that the nominative case falls from conception (*apo tēs ennoias*), but is upright because it is the archetype of meaningful utterance (*tēs kata tēn ekphōnēsēn prophoras*).
Ammonius, *In Ar. De int.* 43,9–15 (33K)⁹⁰

This passage is not without difficulties, particularly as concerns the vexed status of Stoic cases (*ptōseis*), but the point I want to make is modest and need not run afoul of interpretive difficulties. What I see in the idea that the nominative case falls from thought, whatever else we make of cases, is confirmation that reference is assigned by thought; and again, this is just to say that the mind identifies the referent, what object in the world it is talking about, and not that the mind christens or fixes reference for the linguistic community each time. Jonathan Barnes has objected to taking this (and several other texts connecting *lekta* with thoughts) as evidence of Stoic semantic theory.⁹¹ He urges that this passage expresses no more than the commonplace that producing someone's name is a good way of telling someone who you are thinking about, and cautions that "[e]ven if Ammonius in this passage is referring to the Old Stoa (which is not clear), and even if he is reporting Stoic views with fidelity (which cannot be taken for granted), nevertheless his report has nothing to do with any theory of meaning. In general, we should not read philosophical theories into platitudes."⁹² As a founder of the de-psychologizing orthodoxy, Barnes' dogma should be taken with a grain of salt. It's doubtful that Ammonius spends his time rehearsing platitudes rather than theory (indeed, he is often taken to be confused about Stoic theory). Further, Barnes' caution about platitudes cuts both ways, since it is equally important that we not allow philosophical theories to upend platitudes, in this case to upend the wealth of clear textual evidence attesting to the mind-dependence of *lekta*.

For example, Barnes writes off Galen's testimony (M) as a physiological comment about the windpipe, which says nothing about words receiving their meaning from thought; then he adds, even if we do have to read this evidence as establishing that thinking causes speaking, it's obviously false that speech is caused by thought because we sometimes speak unreflectively (i.e. without thinking). But the fact that we sometimes speak unreflectively is hardly a counterexample to the general

⁹⁰ Trans. LS with modifications.

⁹¹ Barnes, "Meaning, Saying and Thinking."

⁹² Barnes, "Meaning, Saying and Thinking," 54; Gourinat, in correspondence, is also wary of relying too heavily on the Ammonius passage.

claim that human voice is made semantic by thought. And Barnes' dismissal of Sextus' testimony at *M.* 8.80 (passage E) as telling us that voice is significant because the *pragma* the person has in mind is just a *lekton* is circular, presupposing that rational impressions have semantic content only because they grasp independent *lekta*. The scarcity of our textual evidence makes every passage precious, so Barnes' dismissal of a dozen different passages connecting *lekta* with thoughts is not to be taken lightly. Tossing so much evidence aside is a steep price to pay for any interpretation.⁹³ However, my point is not just that the cost is too high, but that the expense is artificial. With the axiom suspended, there is no need to dismiss all this textual evidence, or to fall on the horns of false dilemmas.

Taking our ample evidence at its word, then, we can see that *lekta* are the products rather than the contents of rational impressions; *lekta* inherit their semantic content from the rational impressions on which they depend for their *subsistence*. I have focused on speech and the temporal sequence from rational impression to speech, uttering a *lekton*, but I take the account to apply equally to assent, belief, and impulse. These are all things we can do with a *lekton* once we create it in *endiathetos logos*, and the mind-dependence of *lekta* as products of thought makes these various jobs easy to explain because they are all psychological jobs. We can say what we have in mind and imprint meaning on voice in the region of the heart because *lekta* are products of the commanding faculty. We can assent to *lekta* and believe them because they are products of *endiathetos logos*, where we examine our impressions and try on different *lekta*; the objects of belief are psychological entities portraying the world a certain way. Likewise for *lekta* as the objects of impulse (*hormē*). Impulse is the motive force resulting from (or possibly identical with) assent, the true locus of responsibility; this is the basis of Charles Kahn's insight that for the Stoics, logic is moral freedom.⁹⁴ And we can act on *lekta* as objects of impulse because they are the proper psychological objects of choice distinct from the state of the world that is worthy of pursuit, as Stobaeus explains:

- O. Choices and desires and wishes, just like impulses, are of predicates (*katēgorēmata*). Yet we choose and wish and likewise desire to *have* goods, and so goods are choiceworthy and wishworthy and desirable. For we choose to *have* prudence and moderation, but not of course [to have] acting prudently and acting moderately, which are incorporeal and predicates.

Stobaeus 2.97,15–8,6 (33J2–3)

⁹³ And the nonchalance of Barnes' approach, "Meaning, Saying and Thinking," 54, hardly makes the cost easier to bear; after summarily dismissing five different texts unfriendly to his view, he offers no more defense than the following imaginary exchange: "So we should discard most of the texts which inform us about Stoic sayables?" -Yes.—"Surely that is not methodologically defensible?"—"Yes; it is."

⁹⁴ But also why Kahn's insights about logic and moral freedom do not require seeing the *lekta* as Fregean thoughts, "Logic and LOGOS," 171; on the central role of *phantasia* in logic and moral freedom, see also A. A. Long, "Stoic psychology and language," Meyer, "Passion, Impulse, and Action in Stoicism."

According to my account, then, *lekta* come to be in the gap between rational impression and speech (or assent, or belief, or impulse), where we examine and consider our rational impressions. I argued above that this gap between impression and utterance where internal discourse takes place is what gives us the uniquely human control over assent and impulse; the gap is where we analyze our seeings as before owning them with our assent. What I am arguing now is that the *lekta* are products of *endiathetos logos*, where we conduct the analysis of our impressions. And because the rational impression is itself propositional (i.e. conceptual, inferential, and linguistic), we need not worry about getting something propositional (the *lekton*) out of something non-propositional (the impression).⁹⁵ Nor is there pressure to correlate the content of the impression with a single *lekton*. A single rational impression can host indefinitely many *lekta*, e.g. that these olives are green, unpleasant to eat, good for making oil, indifferent to my happiness, etc. So, while it is true that we believe, assent to, and act on individual *lekta*, it is not true that any individual *lekton* either is or exhausts the content of the rational impression, nor are *lekta* the objects of impression (except of course when they are in the role of non-sensory impressor). Further, the fact that the rational impression outstrips a *lekton* in its richness and content does not mean that the rational impression has some other kind of content, sensory but not propositional.⁹⁶ It means that a rational impression can be the source or grounding body of any number of *lekta*.⁹⁷

Birth of a *Lekton*

In summary of my proposal that the *lekta* are mind-dependent products of thought and, nevertheless, objectively available for thought and reference as Something incorporeal, I will describe here the birth and identity conditions of a *lekton*. As we saw above in the analysis of rational impressions, humans are born with a *tabula rasa*, and our rationality, which is our store of concepts, is developed through our interactions with the world. We are rationalized by the world, first by having pre-conceptions that arise naturally from our interactions with the world, and then by having conceptions that arise as a function of study, art, and convention. Note, first, that the world by which we are rationalized includes not only bodies, but also the incorporeals; certainly both are among what there is. Thus, our rationalizing

⁹⁵ Shogry, "Impressions," 2–3. And, again, in describing rational impressions as propositional I still do not invoke propositions (*axiōmata*) as their content; rational impressions are propositional insofar as they are inferential (*metabatikē*) and compositional (*sunthetikē*).

⁹⁶ E.g. Brennan, "Moral Psychology," and the de-psychologizing orthodoxy generally.

⁹⁷ In support of this I cite SE, M. 7.244 (39G7), where true impressions are described as those out of which (*ek!*) a true assertion can be made; thus it is not, strictly speaking, the impression that is true, on which see Shields, "Phantasias"; Vogt, *Belief and Truth*, 158–82.

influences will include not only bodies, but also time, place, void, and *lekta*. Note, further, that our linguistic community will be a rationalizing influence as well.⁹⁸ The things people say, the lexical meanings of our words, and the standards of correctness for the languages we speak are all rationalizing influences. Thus in becoming rational the soul becomes at once conceptual and linguistic, reflecting the world around it and accountable to it as a standard of correctness. Indeed, as we saw above, to become rational is to become a reliable language user live to the inferential import and correct use of one's words. This is the first part of the origin story of the *lekton*, then, the rationalized soul.

Because our rationality is a reflection of the world itself, including the use of language, the contribution that we make to our rational impressions should not be considered unduly subjective, unreliable, or opaque. After all, we are built, as rational animals, to be nature's exegetes and to find our highest happiness in getting that exegesis right. And while the sage who always gets it right may be rare, meaning and reference are not. The concepts that constitute our rationality are not subjective; indeed, they are established in a rational mind that is fit to reflect the world as it is, they are governed by standards of correctness, and they are the subjects of definition by which we discover the truth (DL 7.41–4 (31A)). And let us not forget that for the Stoics the criterion of truth is the infallible *kataleptic* impression, and impression is defined as what reveals itself and its cause, affirming the normal reliability of our interactions with the world.⁹⁹ So the fact that our rationality is developed through impressions in the mind does not make our conceptual contributions to the rational impression subjective. On the contrary, our rationality is a reflection of the world as it is. This is the second part of the origin story of the *lekton*, then, the rational impression in the rationalized soul.

Furthermore, because language is itself among the rationalizing influences, our conceptual contributions to the rational impression will also be linguistic. I am in agreement with Durand that “learning a concept and learning the word for it are, as it were, one and the same process.”¹⁰⁰ We learn language from the linguistic communities around us, so when I say that the rational impression gives meaning to the words we utter, this does not suggest that we are inventing language from scratch every time we speak, or that this is an inherently private or subjective exercise. On the contrary, language is an objective phenomenon impressed on us from birth, meaning and reference are public enterprises, and there are standards of correctness that govern it.

⁹⁸ Whether this is natural or conventional or a little bit of both I leave to the side here, along with questions about Stoic interest in etymology, on which see A. A. Long, “Stoic linguistics.”

⁹⁹ LS, 240.

¹⁰⁰ Durand, “Deixis,” n. 49.

Alessandrelli focuses on the linguistic community to argue that the mind is made linguistic in such a way that when we have a rational impression we can access the *lekta* subsisting alongside it to express the content of the impression, and that in this process we also leave our mark on language.¹⁰¹ While I don't follow Alessandrelli in positing an objective and subjective side to *lekta*, I appreciate the attention he brings to the ways in which, on the one hand, we are rationalized by our linguistic community, and, on the other hand, meaning is a function of our use, and as a result language is objective but fluid. We differ insofar as I do not feel the threat of subjectivity in taking *phōnē* to arise from the speaker's thought. The objectivity of the propositional content, and of our very rationality, is supplied by our interactions with the world around us, including the linguistic community of which we are a part.

We do not invent the meaning of our words every time we speak, even if we also contribute to its fluidity. Rather, when we prepare our words and generate a *lekton* we work with the lexical meanings to give them particular truth or satisfaction conditions. The sentence "Shut the door" has a lexical meaning, but it is not a command until someone prepares the words in the mind, indexing them to have particular satisfaction conditions (like who, and which door); likewise, "It is day" has a lexical meaning, but no truth conditions until it is prepared by the mind and indexed to time and place. Invoking A. A. Long again, we can only determine so much by reference to a dictionary and grammar book; "It is day" cannot have truth conditions without the time and place being assigned to the utterance by the one creating the *lekton*). This is the third part of the origin story: *endiathetos logos*, or internal discourse, where words are chosen, terms disambiguated, reference fixed, and satisfaction conditions indexed to time and place.

This is where we examine our impressions and where the *lekton* comes to be, in the space between impression and assent, speech, or impulse. It is in *endiathetos logos*, with the preparation of our words, that *lekta* are born and can then be said, believed, or acted upon. This preparation of our words attested by Galen, I have suggested, is not just a matter of word choice, but also of assigning reference and indexing to time, place, linguistic community, and anything else relevant to fixing truth or satisfaction conditions. It is here that the mind gives the *lekton* its content or, what comes to the same, gives rise to the *lekton*. But the *lekton* does not thereby have *all* the content of the rational impression, as though the hearer were supposed to get every idiosyncrasy of the speaker's thinking or all the richness of the rational impressions, or as though all that content would be the antecedent of a conditional. A single sentence can only be expected to convey so much information, and language users know that. If the speaker is a reliable language user, then the content stamped onto the words by the mind will not be some private meaning

¹⁰¹ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 91–4. See Cimatti, "Λεκτόν and Use," for a certain understanding of the *lekta* according to Wittgenstein's meaning is use doctrine.

deviating from local practice, or too fine-grained for the words to bear. Meanings and truth conditions are not fixed by the speaker alone, in isolation from their linguistic community, as though their words can mean whatever they wish and have truth conditions of any sort they please.

One might now wonder, what are the identity conditions of a *lekton*? According to my account, a *lekton* comes to be during internal discourse, *endiathetos logos*, when the mind formulates or prepares a sentence and gives it the remainder of its truth or satisfaction conditions. So, to *subsist* according to the rational impression is for the *lekton* to inherit its semantic content from the rational impression. Recall from Chapter 9 that this notion of inheriting is a case of lack or privation of body, and that nothing I say here implies that the underling body has incorporeal properties; on the contrary, in being body-less the incorporeals are lacking properties that the bodies have. In this case the *lekton* has some but not all of the rich semantic content of the rational impression and, of course, none of its solidity. This account of *subsistence* as ontological dependence or grounding in the underlying body makes the *lekton* a particular, inheriting its particularity from the rational impression on which it depends, just as the other incorporeals have inherited their *subsistence* and particularity from their underlying bodies. Strictly speaking, this means that no two *lekta* arising from two different rational impressions are one and the same.

But then the question arises, how is it possible for two people to share the same *lekton*, either in communication or by saying the same thing? Surely two people can say and understand the same thing, and if not, how is communication even possible? My response is that the mind-dependence and particularity of the *lekta* need not threaten either the objectivity of their content (as argued above) or the ability for us to understand each other and say the same things. The identity conditions of a *lekton* consist of (i) its originating body, as a sort of origin essentialism; (ii) the words by which it has been prepared, which make it *sayable*; and (iii) its truth or satisfaction conditions. To the extent that the words and truth conditions of two *lekta* are the same, we can say that the two people say the same thing. But the sameness of two *lekta* will never be numerical sameness, only at most a case of maximal similarity. I will take the cases of communication between speaker and hearer and of two people saying the same thing separately to illustrate these identity conditions.

Imagine a person generates a *lekton* by preparing the words and assigning them satisfaction conditions during internal discourse. At this point the *lekton* *subsists* as Something sayable (and as a possible object of assent or impulse to be believed or acted upon, though I will continue to use speaking as the paradigm case). Nothing more need happen for the *lekton* to *subsist*, nor must the *lekton* be thought about in order to *subsist*. Thought gives rise to the *lekton*, but not because it is something being thought *about*, i.e. not because it is either the object or the content of the rational impression that has been picked out from among the abstracta; being

thought about is not among the *subsistence* conditions of a *lekton*. Now imagine the person speaks, stamping meaning onto the words in the area of the windpipe and uttering a meaningful sentence. The *lekton subsisting* according to the rational impression is now in some sense “carried” by the air from the speaker’s mouth to the hearer’s ears, not in the sense that the air interacts with the *lekton* (hence the scare quotes) but as the signifying body. That vocal sounds convey *lekta* is beyond dispute, and the mechanism by which this happens is hazy for all accounts.

Once the sound of the speaker’s words reaches the hearer’s *hēgemonikon*, the hearer has a rational impression of the *lekton*, a non-sensory impressor. This happens by *metabasis*, or transition, whereby the soul impresses itself in relation to (*epi*) the *lekton* rather than by (*hupo*) it, and thereby understands what was said. As Diogenes reports, quoting Diocles the Magnesians: “Thus it is by (*kata*) direct contact (*periptōsis*) that sensibles are thought about [...] and some things are conceived by transition (*metabasis*), such as *lekta* and place” (DL 7.53 (39D)). Mensch & Miller even render “*metabasis*” as “deduction,” which is glossed as “inference from things evident to the senses”; this suggests that it is from hearing the words in context that one transitions from being impressed by a body (voice) to being impressed in relation to (*epi*) an incorporeal (the *lekton*), from sensory to non-sensory impressor.¹⁰²

At this point, the *lekton* still *subsists* according to the speaker’s rational impression (even if the speaker has gone on to consider other things); its original meta-physical status has not changed. The only thing that has changed is that the hearer has now been impressed in relation to (*epi*) the *lekton subsisting* according to the speaker’s rational impression, and the hearer now has a rational impression of what the speaker said. This is not a case of the *lekton* now *subsisting* according to the hearer’s rational impression instead of the speaker’s; it is simply a case of the very *lekton* that the speaker said being grasped by the hearer. The speaker may then go on to think about the *lekton* she created in her own *endiathetos logos*, and she may assent to, believe, or act on that *lekton*, but that will not affect the meta-physical status of the original *lekton*. The *lekton* generated by the speaker’s rational impression, which is then said, and then understood by the hearer, is numerically one and the same *lekton*, meeting all three identity conditions (origin, words, and satisfaction conditions) throughout the communication process. Throughout this process one *lekton subsists* according to the speaker’s rational impression, and our story tracks the transmission of this *lekton* from speaker to hearer.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Mensch & Miller, *Lives*, *ad loc.* Consider the drill sergeant: what is evident to the senses are the drill sergeant’s motions, and from those we make the transition to the incorporeal pattern of those motions. These are not cases of communication, but they are cases of grasping incorporeals, and thus help to explain how we come to have such things in mind when we encounter them. The same account might perhaps be given for place, void, and time, that they are grasped by *metabasis* from sense-perception of their grounding bodies.

¹⁰³ One might think that SE, *M.* 8.12 (passage B) speaks against this picture because, as LS translate: “the signification is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought”; likewise, Gourinat, “Ontology and Syntax,” 140–3.

Let us now take the case in which two different people utter a *lekton*, and give an analysis of their identity conditions and the respect in which our speakers do and do not say the same thing. Let's start with a simple case of two members of the same linguistic community in the same place, at the same time, in reference to the same object saying "The bottle is on the table." Surely they must be saying the same thing, the objection goes; and if not, if even these people are not saying the same thing, then how could anyone ever understand anyone else? The answer is that while these two *lekta* are indeed numerically distinct, arising as they do from two distinct rational impressions (failing the first identity condition), they are expressed by the same words, with the same lexical meanings, and they have the same truth conditions (meeting the second and third identity conditions). Thus these two *lekta* are maximally similar but not strictly speaking the same, or identical, because they do not arise from the same rational impression. Their similarity is secured by the sameness of the linguistic community of each speaker, by the standards of correctness governing the use of lexical meanings in that community, and by the fact that each speaker is referring to the same bottle. Thus being numerically distinct but maximally similar explains the respect in which these people do say the same thing.

Let us now take a slightly more complicated case, where an expert and a non-expert utter the same words at the same time and place. If an expert and a non-expert both say "This is a car," their *lekta* will have the same words and truth conditions, even though one is a mechanic with much more knowledge about cars than the other. To this extent, and for the same reasons as the previous case, they say the same thing. When a *lekton* inherits its content from a rational impression, it does not thereby acquire *all* the content of the rational impression; the mechanic could not reasonably expect her use of the word "car" to convey all that she knows about cars in a sentence like that. What people can mean by their words is constrained by the linguistic community. Thus the twin worries that same-saying is impossible and misunderstanding is all but guaranteed by mind-dependence are ill founded.

And we can observe that as things get more complicated, e.g. "You need a new carburetor," "There is a problem with your torque converter," these worries become more pressing. But how does a view that posits independent abstracta do better with this problem, if it even is a problem? Cases of miscommunication will be understood as cases where the hearer grasps the wrong proposition, and communication as cases where the right proposition is grasped. But how does this help? It may be simpler to posit abstracta as what we share in communication

However, grammatically speaking the language of *subsistence* does not describe what goes on in the hearer, but describes rather the *object* of the hearer's grasp (*hou . . . paruphistamenou*); hence I translate as follows: "what is signified is the thing itself revealed by it [voice], i.e. that thing *subsisting* in consequence of our thought, which we grasp and the barbarians do not."

and miss in miscommunication, but the appeal to abstracta can also be seen as a kind of magical thinking, a certain allergy to the complexities of human discourse. Misunderstandings are everywhere, it is a wonder how often we do succeed in communicating.

But the mind-dependence thesis does not bring on this complexity, nor do abstracta make it go away. Just as the realist about universals will demand that something be literally shared when two things are red, or human, or whatever, and argue that it is simplest to posit universals to explain their similarity (which brings its own host of problems), and the nominalist will not be moved by the demand or the posit, so here, on behalf of the Stoics, I am not moved by the demand that when two people say the same thing there must be some one entity literally said by both, nor therefore by the posit of abstracta to play that role. The similarity of *lekta* arising from distinct rational impressions and governed by the same linguistic community is sufficient to explain how two people say the same thing. And a resemblance or similarity account seems better positioned to capture the ways in which people, at once, succeed and fail at communication.

Let us take another slightly more complicated case of same-saying where two speakers utter the same words, but now in slightly different linguistic communities. Maybe each one says "Bottles are beautiful." To the extent that words like "bottle" and "beautiful" have different connotations or norms in each linguistic community, their lexical meanings and associated truth conditions will also be different. But that does not undo the remaining similarities by which we say that they do say the same thing, e.g. what counts as a bottle is the same, or largely the same, and "beautiful" is a word indicating that something is aesthetically pleasing, say. That speakers from sufficiently different linguistic communities would have difficulty understanding each other is not a problem for the account, but an explanatory virtue. We see here, then, that the sameness of lexical meanings and satisfaction conditions (the second and third identity conditions) comes in degrees.

Finally, let's consider a case in which two speakers say the same thing in different languages. Here, again, the speakers do not strictly speaking utter the same *lekton*; they are numerically distinct. And, as in the last case, the linguistic communities differ. But now the words they use will be different, as will their linguistic communities, and yet it still seems that "La neige est blanche" and "Snow is white" should say the same thing. Here, again, the change of language and linguistic community will make what they say less similar than in the other cases, but to the extent that the truth conditions of their statements remain the same (meeting the third identity condition), we need not worry that making the *lekta* language- and mind-dependent as I do undermines the respect in which these two people do say the same thing. In summary, I hope to have offered a response to Barnes' assessment of the Stoics:

The twin strengths of the Stoic theory are plain: meanings are explained in terms of saying and thus placed firmly in the public realm—no hint of the "private

thoughts” which bedevilled the history of semantics for two millennia; and at the same time, the theory is ontologically parsimonious—it does not invent entities (not even sayables, which do not exist). The weakness is this. The Stoic theory rests heavily on the notion of saying—and yet it offers no account of the identity conditions for sayables, it does not explain when you and I say the same thing.¹⁰⁴

I have argued, first, that meanings are both mind-dependent and public, and that the dependence of *lekta* on rational impressions need not bedevil the Stoics in the manner of private thoughts; second, that the Stoics are not in fact ontologically parsimonious about the *lekta*, since they count as Something incorporeal and are thus very much part of the ontology; and in so doing the Stoics absolutely are inventing entities, in fact they stand alone in doing so. And, finally, that there is no weakness in the account over same-saying; for one thing, sameness of lexical meaning and truth conditions are sufficient to account for the way in which we do say the same thing; and, for another, since the *lekta* are fully particular, the Stoics are not moved by the demand for identity conditions to determine when you and I say numerically the same thing. Similarity of lexical content and of truth conditions is sufficient to determine how far and in what respects we say the same thing.

I rest here my positive account of the *lekta* as products of thought, establishing that for the Stoics, language is earthborn too. Next, in order that this positive account may stand, I will give a negative account of what *lekta* are not, arguing against the deeply entrenched view that *lekta* are the effects of causes and therefore facts or states of affairs, as the metaphysical view holds. This will take us into the role of *lekta* in the causal context, which will take us into a nest of puzzles concerning the distinction between *subsistence* (*hupostasis*) and obtaining (*huparxis*). Having cleared that ground, I will then close the chapter with an account of the *lekta* as objective particulars that meet the *subsistence* criterion for *subsistence*, thus completing a univocal account of Stoic incorporeals as grounded in body.

***Lekta* in the Causal Context**

It is time now to address the elephant in the room: the role of *lekta* in the causal context, where predicates (*katēgorēmata*; *katēgorēma*, singular), which are incomplete *lekta*, are described as that of which a cause is a cause. It is natural enough to render this awkward phrase as “effect,” and certainly easier to use in a sentence. However, the idea that *lekta* are the effects of causes is also misleading if taken as

¹⁰⁴ Barnes, “Meaning,” 213.

evidence that *lekta* are items somehow in the causal chain, thereby motivating the metaphysical reading of *lekta* as a way of making sense of this strange datum. But this, as I will argue, is the wrong reading of these passages: there is no such datum, and the metaphysical reading is misguided in pursuing it as an explanandum. The following passages are the central evidence offered by the metaphysical camp, which takes the *lekta* either as surface effects or as facts or states of affairs:¹⁰⁵

- P. The Stoics say that every cause (*aition*) is a body that becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal. For instance the knife, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate (*katēgorēma*) “being cut.” And again, fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate “being burnt.”

SE, *M.* 9.211 (55B)

- Q. Therefore, coming to be and being cut, those things of which he [sc. the sculptor] is the cause (*aition*), being activities (*energeiai*), are incorporeal. In which account, causes are of predicates (*katēgorēmata*) or, as some say, of *lekta* (for Cleanthes and Archdemus call predicates *lekta*); or, even better, some will be said to be of predicates, e.g. of “being cut,” and others of propositions (*axiōmata*), of “A ship comes to be,” whose case (*ptosis*) in turn (*palin*) is “the ship’s coming about.”

Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.26.3–4 (55C)

- R. (1) Causes (*aitiai*) are not causes of each other, but causes to each other. For the spleen’s preexisting condition is the cause, not of fever, but of “fever coming about”; and the pre-existing fever is the cause, not of the spleen, but of “the condition increasing.” (2) Thusly, too, the virtues are causes to each other of “not being separable,” because of their inter-entailment, and the stones are causes to each other in the vault of the predicate “remaining,” but they are not causes of each other, and the teacher and the student are causes to each other of the predicate “making progress.” (3) And causes are said to be of each other (a) sometimes of the same [predicate], as the merchant and the retailer are causes to each other of making a profit, (b) but other times of different [predicates], just as the knife and flesh; for the one is [cause] to the flesh of being cut, while the flesh [is cause] to knife of cutting.

Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.30.1–3 (55D)

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Gourinat, “Ontology and Syntax,” who argues that the causation passages respond to another doctrine found in Plato’s *Sophist*, the asymmetry of nouns and verbs; casting causes as the causes of predicates, he argues, responds to the syntax of agent and patient in the noun-verb distinction, which the Stoics mirror in giving predicates a distinctive ontological status as events, processes, facts, and, generally, “what happens to bodies.”

We see here that there are three elements to the causal analysis: the *cause* (*aition*), which is a body, e.g. knife, fire, spleen; that *to which* it is the cause (indicated by the dative case), another body, e.g. flesh, wood, fever; and that *of which* it is the cause (indicated by the genitive case), an incorporeal predicate, e.g. “being cut,” “being burnt,” “fever coming about.” The *cause to* relation is an agent-patient relation between two bodies, e.g. between knife and flesh, fire and wood, the spleen and fever. Indeed, this is how the Stoics characterize the two fundamental principles of the cosmos, as the divine rational agent and its patient, matter. However, Clement also reports that Stoic causes are causes *to each other*, indicating a reciprocal relation (R). This is in fact to be expected, since the nature of Stoic resistance (*antitupia*) as pushback rather than ricochet dictates that all action is interaction, or as I put it in Chapter 3, all *pathos* is *sumpatheia*. As Clement explains (R3), this reciprocal causation is spoken of in two ways: (a) bodies are *causes to* each other of a joint predicate, e.g. the stones in the vault are *causes to* each other of the shared predicate, “remaining,” and the teacher and student are *causes to* each other of the joint predicate “making progress”; or (b) bodies are *causes to* each other of two different predicates, e.g. the knife is *cause to* the flesh of the predicate “being cut,” while the flesh is *cause to* the knife of the predicate “cutting.” In either event, the *cause to* relation is restricted to bodies, while the *cause of* relation holds between the *cause*, a body, and a predicate, an incorporeal.

What this *cause of* relation comes to has been a matter of scholarly perplexity. Totschnig puts the perplexity most clearly, saying this is a “highly peculiar conception of causation,” for four reasons: (1) because cause and effect are of entirely different ontological categories, which is strange in its own right, but also (2) because it means we cannot think of Stoic causation as a series of causal chains; furthermore, (3) the causal relation is (at least) a three-fold relation, rather than a two-fold agent-patient relation as one would expect; and, finally, (4) the fact that bodies are causes *to each other* indicates that Stoic causation is symmetrical and thus not directional as one would expect.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, it is not clear how the *lekta* are supposed to play this strange causal role as effects in addition to their roles in language (as what is signified), in psychology (as the content of rational impressions), and in action (as the objects of impulse). Totschnig finds the answer in the idea that *lekta*, as the surface effects of causes, are events, and since events are what is signified by utterance, what is reflected by thought, and what is aimed at by action, a single entity can play all these disparate roles at once.¹⁰⁷ The primary

¹⁰⁶ Totschnig, “Effects,” 120–4. Vogt, “Unified Notion,” argues for a minimal, unified notion of a cause according to which a Stoic cause is that because of which (*di’ ho*), a rational maker different in kind from its effects.

¹⁰⁷ Totschnig, “Effects,” 130.

evidence he gives that *lekta* are facts or events is that they are called *pragmata* (SE, M. 8.11–2, passage B).¹⁰⁸

But, as we have seen when considering the *lekton* as the thing (*pragma*) that gets said, a word as variable as “*pragma*,” like “*res*” or “thing,” cannot bear this load by itself. Furthermore, I now suggest, we can avoid being puzzled in these various ways. These puzzles are generated by thinking of that *of which* a cause is a cause as an effect, i.e. as part of the causal chain. It would indeed be puzzling if this were what the Stoics meant, given their corporealist commitments. What could it even mean for an incorporeal to be part of the causal chain in a system that restricts causal interaction to bodies? The metaphysical view offers an answer to this question. But another solution is available, namely that the *lekta* in this context are *not* effects, at least not in any sense that places them in the causal chain.

Rather, the role of *lekta* as what causes are *of* can be understood as logical or dialectical rather than physical or metaphysical, concerned with explanation rather than with efficient causation. It is a mistake to think of predicates as a part of the causal chain at all, and to think of the *cause of* relation as causal, physical, or metaphysical. The context of these passages is, rather, logical in the sense that the *cause of* relation is between the world and all its causal interactions, on the one hand, and the things we say about the world’s causal interactions, the predications we make, on the other, which are made true by the world. This is a difficult point to make because the metaphysical camp agrees that predicates are being made true, but understands the predicates as metaphysical entities and their being made true as getting actualized. But this is not the only way or, to my mind, the most natural way to understand the idea of predicates being made true.

What makes the predicate “being cut” true is that the knife cuts the flesh, and this is to invoke nothing more than the Stoics’ well-attested correspondence theory of truth—no Aristotelian or metaphysical notions of predicates or truth as being actualized are required to understand these passages.¹⁰⁹ In effect I am saying that so much attention to the causation passages, as giving us a puzzling account of causation that can only be explained by reference to metaphysical entities, is much ado about nothing; neither the explanandum (that predicates are effects in the causal chain) nor, therefore, the solution (that they are metaphysical entities getting actualized) is apposite. The logical reading takes these passages to convey simply that the *cause to* relation between bodies (the way the world is) explains why the *cause of* relation holds, why certain predications are true of the world (and others false). The world makes our statements about it either true or false. The flesh is cut by the knife and that state of the world makes the predicate “being cut” (among various

¹⁰⁸ Likewise Gourinat (following Hadot), *Dialectique*, 117–9.

¹⁰⁹ DL 7.60 (32C), 7.65 (34E); Galen, *Meth. med* 19.348,17–49,4 (32D); SE, M. 8.85–6 (34D), 8.100 (34I). I will have more to say about truth and correspondence ahead, when I address the Stoic account of obtaining (*huparxis*).

others) true, but this does not make the predicate itself a metaphysical truth in the heavyweight sense that the metaphysical camp holds. The context of these passages, I urge, is logical or dialectical, concerned with explanation and speaking well, i.e. saying what is true and fitting (Alexander, *In Ar. Top.* 1,8–14 (31D); DL 7.83 (31C)), rather than with the physics or metaphysics of causation. One piece of evidence that the context of this casual schema is dialectical and explanatory rather than metaphysical comes from Clement himself:

- S. Every cause (*aition*) that is grasped by the mind as a cause is twofold, since it is conceived as being of something and relative to (*pros*) something: of something, the result (*apotelesma*), just as the sword is the cause of cutting; and relative to something that has the relevant capacity, as fire is relative to wood.

πᾶν αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον <διπλῇ> διανοίᾳ ληπτὸν τυγχάνει, ἐπεὶ τινὸς καὶ πρὸς τινι νοεῖται, τινὸς μὲν, τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, [καθάπερ] ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ τέμνειν, πρὸς τινι δέ, καθάπερ τῷ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντι, καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ξύλῳ.

Clement, *Strom.* 8.9.29.1–2 (Stählin)

Clement tells us here that being the *cause* of something is a matter of being *conceived* of a certain way, which establishes the logical context of his reports. And above, in passage R3, he tells us that “causes are *said to be* of each other” in two ways, perhaps also indicating a dialectical context rather than a physical one. At any rate, there is no mention of *sumpatheia* or *pneuma* in any of these passages, as one might expect from an account of the mechanics of causation. Stobaeus makes the concern for explanation more explicit:

- T. (1) Zeno says that a cause (*aition*) is that because of which (*di' ho*), and that of which (*hou*) it is the cause is an attribute (*sumbebēkos*); and while the cause is a body, that of which it is the cause is a predicate (*katēgorēma*). And it is impossible for the cause to be present, but that of which it is the cause not to obtain (*huparchein*). (2) And what is said has the following force; a cause is that because of which (*di' ho*) something comes about, like because of wisdom being wise comes about, and because of soul being alive comes about and because of temperance, being temperate comes about. (3) Chrysippus says a cause is that because of which (*di' ho*); and while the cause is a being (*on*) and a body, that of which it is the cause is neither a being nor a body; and while the cause is the because (*hoti*), that of which it is the cause is the why (*dia ti*). (4) And an explanation (*aitia*) is the account of the cause (*aition*), or the account of the cause insofar as it is a cause.

Stobaeus 1.138,14–139,4 (55A)

According to Stobaeus, both Zeno and Chrysippus call the cause, a body, that *because of which* (*di' ho*) and they say that *of which* it is the cause is an incorporeal predicate. Stobaeus does not use the *cause to* language, but it is explicit that that *because of which* is a body, just as in the *cause to* relation. In this passage Stobaeus is focused specifically on the *cause of* relation between the agent and the resulting predicate, rather than on the reciprocal *cause to* relation between the bodies. That the focus is on the *cause of* relation is confirmed in T2, where he illustrates the point by the relation between wisdom (a body) and “being wise” (an incorporeal predicate), soul (a body) and “being alive” (a predicate), and (likewise) temperance and “being temperate.” Stobaeus also reports that whereas the cause is the *because* (*hoti*), that *of which* it is the cause is the *why* (*dia ti*); thus that *of which* a cause is a cause is the explanandum (T3). He then adds that an explanation (*aitia*) is an account (*logos*) of the cause (*aition*) (T4).

A word now about the translation “explanation” for “*aitia*” and “account” for “*logos*.” Susanne Bobzien has argued against understanding the *aitia* here as a propositional item or a kind of causal explanation, classing an *aitia* as an incorporeal.¹¹⁰ Instead, she argues, we should understand the *aitia* as a corporeal cause, in particular as the divine rational agent responsible for the world order, taking Stobaeus to report in T4 that the *aitia* is *logos*, i.e. the active principle.¹¹¹ I am in strong agreement that an *aitia* is not a propositional item or an incorporeal of some kind; indeed, as Bobzien emphasizes, this is not a term of art we find anywhere except this passage. By that same token, however, I am also resistant to giving “*aitia*” doctrinal import as the active cause and thus taking it to be a corporeal entity. I urge instead a deflationary reading of both “*aitia*” and “*logos*” in this context. I think we can render “*aitia*” as “explanation,” in contrast to “*aition*” as “cause,” without giving it the status of a *lekton* or other incorporeal. To say that an *aitia* is a *logos* of the cause is just to say in rather ordinary language that an explanation is an account of the cause. And the fact that an explanation will be given in *lekta* does not hypostatize the *aitia* into a *lekton*.

Thus neither of these terms is a technical term in this context, except to the extent that “*aitia*” is being used here, locally, in contrast to “*aition*.” Given the contrast between the *because* (*di' ho*) and the *why* (*dia ti*) in T3, which tells us that the incorporeal predicate is treated as an explanandum, followed immediately by the gloss of the *aitia* as an account of the cause (T4), we have good grounds to say that the context is merely explanatory rather than physical or metaphysical. Thus we can render “*aitia*” as “explanation” without introducing new causal entities of the sort Bobzien rightly rejects; furthermore, this rendering of the text is compatible

¹¹⁰ Bobzien, “Causes,” 198–9.

¹¹¹ Bobzien, “Causes,” 200–3.

with Bobzien's further insight that the *because* (*di' ho*) the Stoics are concerned with is a narrow notion of agency and responsibility.¹¹²

So the causal context does not put us in the branch of physics, but of logic; it is a category mistake to think of predicates as part of the causal chain. Further, as we saw in Chapter 9, the *lekta* do not appear in Diogenes' list of the topics of physics, though causation does (7.132).¹¹³ This is not an omission, in the way that time is omitted on the list but accounted for later in the section on physics; it is, rather, a reflection of the fact that *lekta* are not a part of physics, but of logic. As evidence that this is so, consider that the whole of Section II, *Bodies*, including the cosmology, makes no reference to *lekta* as entities with a physical role to play. And if I cannot be my own witness, I point out that Robert J. Hankinson has given a throughgoing account of Stoic causation without fussing over the presence of incorporeal *lekta* or predicates; this is not an oversight, but a recognition that the presence of *lekta* as that of *which* a cause is a cause is not a deep metaphysical matter, or even central to the Stoics' storied account of causation.¹¹⁴

Thus, to return to the worries as expressed by Totschnig, the difference in ontological status of causes and their "effects" is not so peculiar after all. Nor is the causal chain absent or supplanted in the schema; it is captured in bodies being *causes to* each other. That of *which* the cause is a cause is thus clearly *not* the effect in any way that should cause perplexity about the difference in their ontological status, or worry that the Stoics don't recognize causal chains. It is clear that the Stoics do recognize causal chains; in fact, every world order is a closed system of causal chains, an "inescapable ordering and interconnection" (Aëtius 1.28.4 (55J)). Nor, further, is there any worry about the directionality of causation.

First, being causes *to each other*—whether of a joint predicate when the bodies are both agent and patient, or of different predicates when one is agent and the other patient—is not a threat to the directionality of causation any more than flesh causing the knife to be bloody undoes the directionality of the knife's cutting. In fact, when the predicates differ, the one is active, "cutting," and the other passive, "being cut," thus underscoring the directionality of the causal relation. And, with the logical or dialectical reading of the *cause of* relation, there is nothing disruptive about causation being a three- or four-fold relation between two bodies and several incorporeal predicates. With the logical reading, too, there is no puzzle about how *lekta* can play their various roles at once, because the causal role is no longer at odds with their roles in language, psychology, and action that Totschnig seeks for them. On the contrary, the mind-dependence of the *lekta* is what enables them to

¹¹² Bobzien, "Causes," 203; for arguments in favor of a general or broad notion of *di' ho*, see Vogt, "Unified Notion."

¹¹³ See Gourinat, "Ontology and Syntax," for the view that causes and effects should, despite their conspicuous absence on the list, be considered "one of the main 'metaphysical' issues" alongside those that are listed.

¹¹⁴ Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation*, and "Explanation and Causation."

play these various roles at once; and the logical reading of the causation passages shows us that the roles are not really so varied after all. The causal role for *lekta* is not some outlier completely different from the others they play, because they are all dialectical roles, and as such, a part of logic rather than physics.

Nor is there any reason to assimilate the other incorporeals to *lekta* in their role as “effects” in order to appreciate them as epiphenomena with a shadow’s existence (as Bréhier first puts it). I am in some ways sympathetic to the surface effects view, but with important caveats. I appreciate the idea that the incorporeals are results or epiphenomena arising from or grounded in the corporeal world—that is what I take *subsistence* to be—but not on the basis of these causation passages. I do not see in these texts evidence of any kind of ontological dependence, least of all dependence of the *lekta* on the world as its effects rather than on rational impressions. There is not even any language of *subsistence* in the causal context.

I am also resistant to making the other incorporeals into *lekta*, i.e. treating them as the effects of bodies as captured in these causation passages. None of the other incorporeals is ever described as that *of which* a cause is a cause. Assimilating the other incorporeals to *lekta* conflates being the product of a body (which all the incorporeals are) with being the “effect” of a body, i.e. that *of which* a cause is a cause (which only predicates are); it thereby makes *lekta* products of the world rather than of the mind. Hence, while I agree that incorporeals are all products or results of body, even that they have a sort of shadow’s existence, I disagree that this has anything to do with the causal context. These passages, to my mind, have caused too much fuss about what is not a deep metaphysical commitment, but a dialectical commitment to causal analysis and explanation. In recognizing *lekta* as dependent on the rational impression for their *subsistence* (as our texts attest widely) and releasing the other incorporeals from the causal context as effects (where they do not in fact appear), we can give a univocal account of the incorporeals as epiphenomena of bodies after all. I rest here my case against the surface effects view.

I turn now to the nearby facts or states of affairs view, very much the dominant view of *lekta*, which also takes the causal passages as evidence for a metaphysical reading of the *lekta*. M. Frede contrasts the *basic* notion of a *lekton* in the Stoic theory of meaning, as a thing to say, with what he takes to be the *original* notion of a *lekton* as “a metaphysical notion, the notion of a fact, of an incorporeal item to be contrasted with the body it is a fact about, and [argues that] that the notion only in a second step got modified or construed in such a way as to serve both in metaphysical and in logical or linguistic contexts.”¹¹⁵ He argues for this metaphysical reading on the basis of passage Q, which reports that Cleanthes and Archedemus took predicates (*katēgorēmata*) to be *lekta*. Wondering why a predicate should be considered a thing to say, Frede urges that we see it like the metaphysical notion of

¹¹⁵ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 113.

an attribute on the model of what is signified by a predicate expression in the tradition of Aristotle's *Categories*. As he puts it:

[T]he notion of a predicate here really is the metaphysical notion of an attribute [...] The idea seems to be this: there are not only objects, but there are also further entities introduced by truths about the objects [...] there are not only items like Socrates and Fido and a tree in our ontology; there must also be items like the species man or wisdom, because it is true to say of Socrates that he is wise or that he is a man.¹¹⁶

But what reason is there to accept Frede's inference that because it is true when we say that Socrates is wise, there must therefore be some further entity, an Aristotelian attribute or Platonist immanent form, to which we refer when we say such a thing? The schema of the *Categories* is already up to this task on its own corporealist terms. Perhaps the force of Cleanthes and Archedemus specifying that predicates are *lekta* is to clarify and caution that Stoic predicates are *not* Aristotelian attributes, in response to this very kind of interpretation.¹¹⁷ And if so, there is no reason to think that Cleanthes and Archedemus are inventing or evolving Stoic theory by saying this, rather than invoking *lekta* to defend the Stoic account of predicates as semantic entities from misinterpretation as metaphysical entities. Frede pauses to observe that the mention of Cleanthes in this passage may or may not signal an innovation as opposed to a clarification of Zeno's original view, but is not deterred from pressing a developmental account:

But however we interpret this [sc. whether as an innovation over Zeno or not], here we have a metaphysical notion of a *lekton*. We are not concerned with the meaning of expressions, or intentional objects or contents of thoughts, but with facts; whether or not anybody has thought of them or will ever think of them, whether or not they get stated is completely irrelevant. The point is the metaphysical point that there is an item like Socrates' being wise which is not to be confused with either Socrates or wisdom, but which, though not a body, nevertheless has some ontological status, since it is the kind of item of which a cause, properly speaking, is the cause. Here the notion of a *lekton* seems to be the notion of a true

¹¹⁶ M. Frede, "Lekton," 114.

¹¹⁷ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 26–8, 47–8, also argues for a developmental account: Cleanthes takes *lekta* to be actualized predicates, Chrysippus innovates by making predicates *subsistent* whether they are actualized or not, which Archedemus endorses and develops with the further distinction between predicates and facts. Gourinat, *Dialectique*, 118–9, cites this as evidence that Cleanthes is the first to introduce *lekta*; cf. Barnes, "Meaning," 210. LS suggest that predicates are aspects of bodies, "which we abstract in order to propose a proper causal analysis," and that this move was motivated by the concern to avoid saying that one body replaces another when there is change, lest there be nothing persisting through the change; if it is just a predicate that comes to be true of the body, then the body itself has not changed. However as my analysis of the Stoic *Categories* (Chapters 7 and 8) shows, there is no trouble finding a body to persist through the change; it is the peculiarly qualified individual (*poion*).

thing to say, just as the notion of a predicate had been the notion of a something truthfully predicated of something. And one can see why the term *lekton* would have been appropriate. We do not understand the world properly unless we take into account that there are not only bodies, but also truths about bodies, which themselves are incorporeal. But, again, one readily sees how one could move (or slide) from the notion of a true thing to say to the notion of a thing to say which is true or false, and how then this notion would get naturally extended to cover things to say quite generally [sc. oaths, questions, prayers].¹¹⁸

My goal in quoting at length is to show, with all due respect to Frede and all those who follow him, that this is not so much an *argument* as it is an assertion of the view. The crucial point of contact where our views meet is the inalienable fact that a *lekton* is a thing to say, and sometimes it is true. But Frede moves directly to take the *lekton* as a true thing to say, from which he concludes that this is a metaphysical notion and thus that *lekta* are not originally logical or linguistic entities, but rather a metaphysical layer of truths in the world that we can grasp or say.

Notice how uncharitable this view of the Stoics really is. First they are taken to proceed just as their predecessors do, albeit with some minor adjustments (from objects to events), but not in any genuinely innovative way; then the Stoics are taken to back themselves into seeing the *lekta* (even though they are called *lekta*!) as logical and linguistic entities. So the *lekta* start as facts or states of affairs that are available to get said, Aristotelian attributes truly predicated of the things in the world, or a metaphysical layer of truths about the world. Then the Stoics slide into treating them as things we say that might be true or false. Frede invokes the *Sophist* here, comparing the Stoics to the unreformed Giants committed to bodies as the only *existents*—but ignores the topic of how false speaking is possible. Instead, he explains that because “the Stoics also realize that their theory makes reference to items like the void, space, time, and *lekta* which are not bodies,” they introduce the genus Something and the notion of *subsistence* to accommodate the incorporeals. The Stoics are not masters of their own theory on this picture; it takes them recognizing that they recognize incorporeals for them to introduce their highest ontological genus. And, again, it seems they are not being guided by the logical and linguistic challenges of the *Sophist* in all this.

What Frede wants to know next is why the Stoics wanted to attribute to *lekta* an ontological status and what kind of status that *subsistence* is. The answer to the first question is simple: the point of “introducing the notion of a predicate and a *lekton* was the metaphysical one that reality is not just constituted by bodies, that in addition to bodies there are also predicates true of bodies, propositions true about bodies. So it is not surprising that *lekta* should be accorded some status.”¹¹⁹ But,

¹¹⁸ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 115–6; likewise, Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 401.

¹¹⁹ M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 117.

again, this is only going to be moving to someone who already embraces this metaphysical notion of a *lekton*. Frede's answer to the second question about *subsistence* is more complicated, given the slide from things true of bodies to things that can be true or false of bodies. False *lekta* are given the status of *subsistence* (*hupostasis*), while facts are given the stronger ontological status of being present or being there, or (in the spirit of Aristotle) belonging to something (*huparxis*). So, he reasons, while it is clear that the Stoics want to attribute some ontological status to *lekta* because they want to attribute some status to facts and attributes, this does not explain why they give an ontological status to *lekta* generally, including those that are not true (either because they are false or because they are not the sort of thing to be true or false, e.g. questions, oaths, and prayers).

Here Frede does at least consider the possibility that the Stoics are responding to concerns in the *Sophist* about false speaking, but only to reject it: "the assumption of subsistent *lekta* even in these cases would immediately take care of such problems. But, again, the explanation might be much more metaphysical."¹²⁰ He argues that what is false gets its status from being the contradictory of what is true (which is metaphysical), from which he concludes that the *lekta* are not mind-dependent but, rather, "that they only exist as the actual or even the possible contents of thought."¹²¹ So, despite the immediate interpretive benefits of taking *lekta* to be developed in response to the problem of false speaking in the *Sophist*, Frede insists that *lekta* are originally metaphysical, and not semantic, entities. Again Frede's argument for a metaphysical reading goes by rather too quickly to be persuasive to those not already on board, and the resulting view according to which the Stoics slide into a logical and linguistic view of the *lekta*, having to assign a different ontological status to true and false *lekta*, is not especially charitable or satisfying.

Now, two things do stand out in *prima facie* support for an Aristotelian reading in the report of Stobaeus (passage T) that predicates obtain (*huparchein*) only when their attributes (*sumbebēkota*; *sumbebēkos*, singular) *are* or *exist*: one is that the predicate seems to be identified with an attribute, and the other is the idea that this attribute or predicate obtains (*huparchein*), which scholars have understood as the attribute being actualized or holding of the subject. However, against this, it is important first of all to note that the language of attributes is not Stoic language; and in the context of the Stoic Categories, where the Stoics explain what makes something F, we find that qualities (or, as an Aristotelian would say, attributes) are never referred to as predicates and, most importantly, we find that they are bodies. So this errant use of the term "attribute" should not lead us to think of Stoic predicates on Aristotelian lines.¹²² It is more likely that the order of explanation

¹²⁰ M. Frede, "Lekton," 117–8.

¹²¹ M. Frede, "Lekton," 118.

¹²² Cf. Alessandrilli, *Problema*, 24–8, 153; Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 21–7; Bronowski, *Lekta*, 333–4; M. Frede, "Lekton," 127.

is reversed: it is because that *of which* a cause is a cause is identified as a predicate that it gets called an attribute. Second, there is reason to doubt that the term “*huparchein*” indicates the ontological status of being actual as opposed to merely possible, or an attribute’s being had, or state of affairs holding and thus being a fact. It could just as well, and indeed more likely, mean simply that the predicate is true of the subject, thus indicating a truth value rather than an ontological status (more on *huparxis* as indicating truth value momentarily).

And neither does their use of the word “*katēgorēma*” in the context of *lekta* confirm that the Stoics were embracing Aristotle’s metaphysics in the *Categories*; after all, the Stoics also use the language of participation (*metechein*) while clearly rejecting the existence of Plato’s Forms (Stobaeus 1.136,21–7,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15)). The inference from truths about the world to Aristotelian attributes is therefore doubly suspect. First because it does not follow from there being truths about the world that there must be some kind of entity for the predicate expressions to refer to (it’s not for nothing that the Stoics are often referred to as nominalists). And second, even if the Stoics were to accept that predicate expressions in true statements must refer, it would not follow that they must refer to facts or states of affairs understood as metaphysical entities (especially with the *Categories* in view).

We find again, as with A. A. Long’s subjectivist worries about Augustine (passage A), the background presupposition that our being able to say true things about the world means there must be a metaphysical layer of truths about the world that in some sense holds it together and guarantees its objectivity, or, at any rate, the idea that truth is a feature of reality. But, of course, the world’s being as it is, and such that we can say true and false things about it, does not establish the existence of truths as an additional layer of metaphysical entities in the world. Nor, therefore, does it justify putting *lekta* in the role of truths as a feature of the world, rather than as a subset of the assertions we make about the world (the ones that correspond to the world as it is).

Bronowski’s view is an extension of M. Frede’s, taking the *lekta* as “real items in the ontology” that are independent of language and thought but available to us for saying and thinking; she resists the developmental aspect of Frede’s account, however, and presses the *lekta* as states of affairs to the extreme, as the very structure of reality.¹²³ Thus to grasp the structure of the world is to grasp *lekta*, which is to say that they are constitutive of reality and therefore mind-independent.¹²⁴ While it is clear enough that to be real is to be constitutive of reality, it is far from clear that being real by itself entails being mind-independent. Here, too, the arguments go by a little too quickly, and are subject to the same objections made above to Frede’s view. What Bronowski brings in addition is a novel emphasis on the Stoic

¹²³ Bronowski, *Lekta*, e.g. 229, 340, 343, 360–1, 364–5, describes the *lekta* quite variously, in ways that are suggestive but, for me, elusive.

¹²⁴ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 13–4.

notion of a *systema*, which she takes to be a fine-tuned cosmic and philosophical structure with the *lekta* at its heart.¹²⁵ The idea, if I have understood it correctly, is that the *systema* is the connective structure of the world, and because change to any one area has consequences for all the others, developmental accounts of Stoic theory are thereby ruled out. If one is not convinced that the Stoics embraced such a *systema*, however, there is little left in the way of evidence that *lekta* are the structure of reality.

Another benefit of this robust realism about the Stoic *systema* (and hence an argument in its favor), as Bronowski sees it, is that it explains the diversity of roles played by the *lekta*.¹²⁶ Bronowski identifies four “cardinal directions” for the *lekta*, one entity with four points of view: (1) being an incorporeal thing constitutive of reality, (2) corresponding to thought contents, (3) being the effects of causes, and (4) being what gets said.¹²⁷ Because the *lekta* are everywhere in the structure of reality, she argues, they are everywhere in philosophy, so we need not wonder at how disparate their roles are. Indeed, the disparity among these roles confirms that the *lekta* are not linguistic entities or meanings. Their role as incorporeals establishes that they are independent ontological entities; their role as thought contents shows they are not linguistic, and as bearers of truth value they are distinct from both language and thought; as the effects of causes, they are a part of ontology and physics, not language or mental operations; and as what can get said they are indifferent to thought and language, hence they are metaphysical entities four times over. Thus, again, one need not wonder at the variety of roles they play.

However, if the various roles are not at odds with each other or one does not agree in imputing these roles to the Stoics, the evidence that *lekta* are the structure of reality is considerably weaker. As I argued in Chapter 9 on the incorporeals as a class, there is no reason to think that the Stoics saw the ontological independence of Plato’s Forms as a job that needs filling, or that incorporeality is tantamount to independence. Further, for the *lekta* to *subsist* according to the rational impression, as I have argued here, does not make them the content of the rational impression or establish their independence from language, nor does their being bearers of truth value make them independent of thought (or language); indeed, I have argued that they are inherently conceptual and linguistic and ineligible for a truth value without the mind. And, with the logical reading of the causation passages that I have suggested, we need not see *lekta* as “items in ontology and physics”—though they do, of course, have ontological and physical status as incorporeal Somethings. Therefore the causal context does not make the variety of roles the *lekta* play so motley as to justify the posit of a *systema*. And, again, making it an explanandum that the *lekta* are there to get said is to presume the result.

¹²⁵ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 6–8, and Ch. 1.

¹²⁶ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 1–2.

¹²⁷ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 5–6.

Finally, Dorothea Frede also argues for the independence of *lekta* as states of affairs, but on different grounds. First, because they are in the company of place, void, and time, which are clearly not mind-dependent.¹²⁸ To this I reply that while *lekta* certainly should be considered as real as the other incorporeals, their being mind-dependent is not tantamount to being unreal; what the incorporeals all have in common is their dependence on body. Then she argues on the basis of their role in the causal context that the *lekta* are laws of nature that guarantee the stability of the physical order (thereby underwriting the Stoics' inference from future truth to fatalism). "Since they were the first to assign a special ontological status to such regular connections between states of affairs, the Stoics were, thus, to give it a high-flying name, the inventors of the *concept of a law of nature* in the sense that they postulated omnitemporally subsisting *lawlike regularities*."¹²⁹ Indeed, they "*had* to assume such eternally valid causal principles that obtain even if nothing actually corresponds to the hypothetical state of affairs at a particular moment," because if all that is real is corporeal, and hence limited to the here and now, there is no guarantee of the continued existence of the cosmos, let alone its eternal recurrence.¹³⁰ Thus it is because these true causal propositions, the laws of nature, are *not* physical entities subject to generation and corruption that they can "maintain the permanent validity of those causal connections."¹³¹ This account of the *lekta* goes well beyond classing them as states of affairs, to giving them a role in the cosmology and guaranteeing the causal closure of the cosmos. However, as I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, the Stoics deliver a completely corporealist cosmology out of nothing more than two fundamental bodies, the *archai*. In particular, *logos*, the divine artisan, is a body whose own existence and corporeal providence goes well beyond the here and now; so Stoic corporealism does not demand the existence of physical principles in a third realm to guarantee the stability, existence, or recurrence of the cosmos. The physical principles are very much corporeal and the artisan immanent, with no third realm required.

In addition to this robust causal role, D. Frede offers four other reasons the Stoics need *lekta* to be metaphysical rather than linguistic entities.¹³² (1) So as not to collapse into the uncouth realism of Plato's original Giants, who drag everything down to earth and insist that *being* is body. (2) If there were only bodies, there would be no discourse about anything beyond our immediate experience, no discourse about the future or past, and our immediate experience would be only of sensory impressors. (3) In order to be able to say what is not, "there must be an

¹²⁸ D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," 214–5.

¹²⁹ D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," 220–1, original emphasis.

¹³⁰ D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," 220, my emphasis; Frede, n. 51, takes obtaining and subsisting as equivalent, and takes true *lekta* to obtain or subsist as "some-thing" while false *lekta* are merely their "conceivable counterparts" (*ennoēmata*), and as such are "no-things" (*outina*).

¹³¹ D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," 221.

¹³² D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," 218–9.

intelligible object subsisting in the world that provides the content of our mind,” on the model of Fregean thoughts in a third realm.¹³³ (4) If there were no intendable objects, but only bodies, there could be no intersubjectivity, because we could only talk about our own impressions, which would be qualitatively quite unlike. Hence *lekta* had to be independent from any actual thinker, “or even from the existence of human beings at all: even if there were no rational beings, the subsistent ‘states of affairs’ would in principle be ‘sayable.’”¹³⁴

I reply that (1) to resist the uncouth realism of the original Giants does not require Platonizing this way; in fact, by embracing *lekta* as independent metaphysical entities alongside bodies, the Stoics would be no better than the civilized Giants, who give up on their commitment to *being* as body and fall back into a two-worlds metaphysics. So, while I agree that the Stoics are responding to the challenge of the Battle of Gods and Giants to be inclusive, challenge (vi), I think they are also responding to the Visitor’s further challenge (vii) to be principled about this inclusivity and offer a one-world metaphysics for bodies and incorporeals.¹³⁵ Taking now (2) and (4) together, I agree that if there were no *lekta* there would be no discourse beyond our immediate experience, but that’s because there would be no discourse at all. The fact that *lekta* are necessary for discourse does not establish that they are independent states of affairs in a third realm. Nor does their absence as “intendable objects” mean that we could only talk about our own impressions, as though our linguistic and cognitive access to the world were cut off without *lekta* as inputs or referents. Our thoughts are very much about the world, prior to *lekta*. Finally, with (3) I agree wholeheartedly that the Stoics were concerned to give an account of saying *what is not*, challenge (viii), but I resist the assimilation to Frege holding “that there must be an intelligible object subsisting in the world that provides the content of the mind,” i.e. I resist the de-psychologizing orthodoxy.

So the various arguments adduced for seeing *lekta* as states of affairs do not stand up to scrutiny either. And with the dialectical reading of the causation passages still in view, we can reiterate that the *lekta* are not correctly cast as effects in a causal chain, thus there is no strange metaphysical datum by which to motivate the metaphysical reading nor any problematic diversity among their dialectical roles. We can thus put the metaphysical camp to rest. Almost.

Subsisting and Obtaining

It is time now to take these vexed terms head on. I argued in Chapter 9 that despite having an ordinary language sense of existing or being real, “*subsistence*”

¹³³ D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 218–9.

¹³⁴ D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 219–20.

¹³⁵ See Chapter 1 for Plato’s challenges.

("hupostasis") and its cognates are technical terms that convey ontological dependence on body. All the incorporeals are described by this term (or its cognates), so we can take it to apply to the ontological status of the class; and, as it conveys the idea of one thing depending on another, it is apt for capturing this dependence. The cluster of Greek terms "*huparxis*" (noun), "*huparchein*" (verb, infinitive), and "*to huparchon*" (substantive participle) also have an ordinary language sense of existence, which many commentators adopt in one form or another. But, again, the Stoics' introduction of technical terms dictates that we proceed with caution. Chrysippus is even described by Plutarch as wishing to be artful, or wishing to invent or devise (*boulomenos philotechnein*) in applying this term to time (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1081F (51C5, passage K/Chapter 11)).

Now, crucially, "*huparxis*" is *only* used in connection with true *lekta* and the present time. This, to my mind, is an insurmountable datum for those who would characterize *all* the incorporeals as having *huparxis* in one way or another.¹³⁶ The first step in understanding what the Stoics mean in characterizing true *lekta* and the present as obtaining in contrast to *subsisting* is to respect the scope of the terms: "*hupostasis*" applies to *all* incorporeals, "*huparxis*" applies *only* to the present time and true *lekta*.¹³⁷

There is a range of views among those who recognize the distinction between *hupostasis* and *huparxis*.¹³⁸ Alessandrelli takes it to be a Chrysippean advance to

¹³⁶ E.g. Bailey, "Structure"; Bréhier, *Théorie*; Hadot, "ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ"; Pasquino, "Incorporeals"; Totschnig, "Effects." Note that the evidence of Plutarch, "For they say that these things (*tauta*) [sc. void, time, place, and *lekta*], although on the one hand non-existent (*onta men mē einai*), are on the other hand something (*tina*), and they continue to make use of them, in life and philosophizing, as subsistent (*huphestos*) and obtaining (*huparchos*)" (*Adv. Col.* 1116B–C (Einarson & De Lacy)), does not undo this point, since it can be true that the Stoics make use of incorporeals as *subsistent* and obtaining without it having to be true that *all* incorporeals both *subsist* and obtain; all the passage commits the Stoics to is that *hupostasis* and *huparxis* are unique to the incorporeals, which is unproblematic. Alternatively, instead of reading the group of canonical incorporeals just listed as the antecedent of "these things" (*tauta*) and "them" (*autois*), one could read *lekta* as the antecedent so that Plutarch reports that the Stoics make use of the *lekta* in life and philosophy as both *subsistent* and obtaining; as the objects of assent in action and belief (ethics and epistemology); nothing in the Greek requires a "both. . .and" reading.

¹³⁷ For agreement on this point, see Bronowski, *Lekta*, 333, 338.

¹³⁸ Among those who do not recognize the distinction are: Aubenque, "Occasion Manquée"; Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom*, 23–5, who renders "*huparchein*" as "subsisting" and takes this to be equivalent to being actualized, and in "Logic," 95, takes *huparxis* as being real, both as true propositions and as states of affairs that obtain, and takes false *lekta* to be unreal since the Stoics did not allow anything like "states of affairs that do not obtain"; D. Frede, "Fatalism and Future Truth," n. 53, renders "*hupostasis*" and "*huparxis*" as "subsisting as something," attributes that mode of being to true *lekta*, and takes false *lekta* to be *ennoēmata* and hence *outina*; Ju, "Limits," 375, equates the terms and takes them to apply to both bodies and incorporeals as their genus and to incorporeals as a species; Rist, "Categories and their Uses," translates "*huparxis*" as "fully real," takes "*hupostasis*" to be orthodox terminology, but also "*huparxis*"; Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics*, 79–80, denies that "*hupostasis*" and "*huparxis*" are technical terms at all for the Stoics, renders "*huparchein*" as "really there" and "*huphestēke*" as "really exists," and denies that they signal the ontological distinction between corporeal and incorporeal; Vogt, "Brutes," n. 36, renders "*huparchein*" as "subsist," and in "Unified Notion," 75, says "(both English verbs [sc. 'subsist' and 'obtain'] translate the technical term of the Stoics, *huparchein*), which refers to the ontological status of incorporeals"; Watson, *Theory of Knowledge*, 40, renders both terms as "subsistence," but "*huparxis*" also as "being real." Other treatments

introduce “*subsistence*” to indicate the *modus essendi* of the incorporeals, which for Zeno were simply Something *non-existent*, and hence vulnerable to the charge of being nothing at all.¹³⁹ By elevating Something to the highest ontological genus set over bodies that *exist* and incorporeals that, now, are said to *subsist*, Chrysippus alleviates these Zenonian worries and responds to challenges from their critics about what bodies and incorporeals have in common (being Something objectively real). So with Alessandrelli “*subsistence*” is a term that serves as a sort of ontological marker, but as such it is silent on the incorporeals’ way of being, i.e. on the metaphysics of the incorporeals. The term “*huparxis*,” on the other hand, does not indicate an ontological status for Alessandrelli, but refers, rather, to what really has the status of *existing*, i.e. bodies.¹⁴⁰

Totschnig argues that there are two ways of being an incorporeal: *huparxis* is the way of being of effects, which includes true *lekta*, the present time (assimilated to the set of true *lekta*), and place understood as the effect of body occupying void;

of “*hupostasis*” and “*huparxis*” (and their cognates) as different include the following: Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals,” 731, following M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” and resisting Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” chooses “subsisting” for “*hupostasis*” as the intermediate mode of being an incorporeal something, and “being there” or “being present” for “*huparxis*” as the mode of the present time; Brunschwig, “TGS,” 95–109, “Stoic Metaphysics,” 214–5, chooses “subsistence” for “*hupostasis*” as the mode of incorporeal reality, and “being the case” for “*huparxis*” as corporeal existence and actuality; Denyer, “Token Reflexivity,” 393–6, renders “*huparxis*” as “being actual”; M. Frede, “*Lekton*,” 117, chooses “subsisting” for “*hupostasis*” and attributes that mode of being to false *lekta* and the other incorporeals (eventually), and “being present” or “being there” for “*huparxis*” as the stronger status of being a fact or attribute; Goldschmidt, *Système*, 30–45, and “Υπάρχειν et ὑφίστάσθαι,” takes “*hupostasis*” as “incorporeal subsistence in thought” and “*huparxis*” as “actual, corporeal existence”; Gourinat, *Dialectique*, 116, 196, takes “*hupostasis*” as “being real but non-existent” and “*huparxis*” as “existence” and, following Hadot, takes it to be clear that this term should be understood as an Aristotelian predicate belonging or holding of a subject; Graeser, “Theory of Meaning,” 89–90, selects “subsists” and “is real,” not in an existential sense but in the sense of being true; Hadot, *Porphyre*, 489, “ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ,” 115–27, takes “*hupostasis*” as “corporeal existence” and “*huparxis*” as the mode of all incorporeals, understood as events, processes, or activities, i.e. *lekta*; Kahn, “Logic and LOGOS,” 165, 169, takes *hupostasis* as incorporeality understood as a pattern of change, not capable of *huparxis*, which is “existing or belonging as an actual determination”; Kerferd, “Synkatathesis,” 127–8, takes *hupostasis* as the relation of *lekta* to the mind, and *huparxis* as “what is the case for some particular thing, a material object qua *idiōs poion*,” E. Lewis, “Identity and Individuation,” 90, renders “*huparxis*” as “existence”; A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 89–94, chooses “subsisting” for “*hupostasis*,” characterizing it as a state subordinate to *huparxis*, which he renders as “obtaining” in application to *lekta*, and as “existing” in application to the sensible world; in “Stoic psychology and language,” 241, n. 12, he describes *subsistence* as “the quasi-existence accorded to incorporeals”; Pasquino, “Incorporeals,” 345, takes *huparxis* as the existence of the *ouk onta*; Reesor, “Poion and Poiotes,” 283, renders “*huparchein*” as “exists” and “*huphestanai*” as “subsists,” which she says “has the connotation ‘dependent upon’”; Schofield, “Retrenchable,” 349–58, takes *hupostasis* as the incorporeals’ being something without existing and renders “*huparxis*” as “being the case” (following A. A. Long, “Language and Thought”) or “obtaining,” now the standard translation; Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 398, takes *hupostasis* as the incorporeal mode of being, and renders “*huparxis*” as “being real but falling short of actual being”; Sorabji, *TCC*, 23–4, renders “*hupostasis*” as “subsistence,” which he understands as “intermediate reality,” with *huparxis* understood as “existence in the sense of being actual (but not corporeal)”; Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 540, renders “*huparxis*” as “actually existing.”

¹³⁹ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 24–8, “Qualcosa,” 16–9, 27–9.

¹⁴⁰ Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 67, 79–81, “Qualcosa,” 21–2, “Discussione”; cf. Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics.”

hupostasis, on the other hand, is the way of being an object of thought, as false *lekta* and the past and future that *subsist* merely in our memory and anticipation are. All incorporeals *can* have *hupostasis*, but only some have *huparxis* on this view, and void turns out to be the odd one out, as it is prior to body and hence not an effect; thus, although Totschnig seeks a univocal account for the incorporeals, he does not find one.

Totschnig provides intriguing evidence that *hupostasis* is the mode of being of intentional objects, but it does not stick. First is testimony from Proclus that limits and time “subsist in mere thought (*kat’ epinoian*)” (*In Eucl. El.* I 89,15–21 (50D, passage B/Chapter 13), *In Plat. Tim.* 3.95,7–15 (Diehl; 51F, passage C/Chapter 13)). I will address these passages in detail in Chapter 13, so I will just say here that while the Stoics *do* recognize a kind of *subsistence* that is according to thought (*kat’ epinoian*), this is not the *subsistence* of the incorporeals. It is, rather, the way that idealized limits and creatures of fiction *subsist*, i.e. the *modus essendi* of certain products of thought, which are neither corporeal nor incorporeal.

Another piece of evidence that Totschnig cites is from Sextus Empiricus (*M.* 1.15. . .17 (27C, passage C/Chapter 2)), who reports that what is not Something is not *subsistent* (*anupostatos*) for the mind. I addressed this passage in detail in Chapter 2, where I argued that availability for thought is criterial for being Something, but not in a Meinongian spirit concerned with intentional objects. Rather, the relevant sense of availability lies with the world: it is not because I think something that it must be real, but because something is real that it is available to be thought about. So, being *subsistent* for the mind in this Sextus passage does not indicate that *subsistence* is mind-dependence, but that what is *subsistent* is available to be thought about; things that are *subsistent* for the mind are impressors. Finally, Totschnig also reads the passages defining the *lekta* as what *subsists* according to the rational impression as evidence that *subsistence* is the mode of being of intentional objects. This, again, is an interesting suggestion, but mistaken in two ways: one, in taking the *subsistence* of *lekta* on rational impressions to capture the relation of thought to its intentional objects; and, two, in taking all *subsistence* to be the relation of *lekta* to rational impressions.

With respect to “*huparxis*,” Totschnig’s thesis that this term captures the ontological status of true *lekta*, the present time, and place understood as an effect of bodies also faces challenges. First, there is no textual evidence either that place obtains or that we should think of the *subsistence* of past and future in terms of being anticipated or remembered. Only true *lekta* and the present time are said to obtain, and there is no text linking the present time to true *lekta*—or, at any rate, no evidence apart from the fact that both are said to obtain. Most importantly, it is not really correct to say that the true *lekton* is *defined* as what obtains, at least not correct in the way that Totschnig needs it to be. What I mean is this: it is correct that in Stoic logic the true *axiōma* is defined as “what obtains and is contradictory to something, and a false *axiōma* is what does not obtain and is contradictory,”

but the context of the passage shows that this is not an ontological statement nor a statement about *lekta* generally (SE, M. 8.85 (34D1), 8.88 (Bury)).

Starting at M. 8.75 (Bury) Sextus is raising objections to the Stoic view (described at M. 8.11–2 (passage B) and 8.69–70 (passage C)) which places the true and false alike in what is signified (*to sēmainomenon*). The first objection is that the Stoics cannot establish the existence of the *lekton* as something distinct from both voice (*phōnē*) and thought, and the second is that they cannot establish the existence of the *axiōmata* in particular (on the grounds that they are composite, and no incorporeal is composite (8.79));¹⁴¹ and that they cannot be said, but all *lekta* must be said (8.80–4)). Then, at 8.85–6, a third objection is raised that grants the existence of *axiōmata*, but argues that none will be either true or false (on the grounds that the Stoics argue in a circle, by defining a true *axiōma* as what obtains and contradicts something, and when asked what obtains, they say it is what excites a *kataleptic* impression, but then they say the *kataleptic* impression is what arises from what obtains and according to what obtains). The point I am making is that, having just granted the existence of *axiōmata*, it is not likely that talk about what obtains in this third objection is meant to indicate ontological status; on the contrary, that question is now explicitly set aside. Nor do the arguments that follow (8.87–90) give us reason to think the context is ontological as opposed to logical.

Bronowski, on the other hand, takes the language of *subsistence* to signal that the incorporeals are not only mind-independent, but on a metaphysical par with bodies; bodies and incorporeals are co-constitutive of reality, because of their ontological status.¹⁴² On this view bodies and incorporeals are interdependent: “existence and subsistence are parallel and correlated modes of reality. . . that is to say, things cannot exist without other things subsisting and vice versa.”¹⁴³ Bronowski’s account of the *lekta* is that they are states of affairs that hold together the structure of reality, or perhaps are the structure of reality, akin to Russellian facts, but with two modes of being real.¹⁴⁴ Thus the *lekta* on the one hand *subsist* independently of the physical world, waiting to be actualized by the causal interactions of bodies; then, when these are actualized by the physical world, they have a different ontological status, they now (in addition) obtain (*huparchein*) as facts and now figure in states of affairs. D. T. J. Bailey is also focused on *hupostasis* and *huparxis* as different ways of being, and takes *huparxis* to be an actualizing relation; unlike Bronowski, however, Bailey takes this actualizing relation to establish that all the incorporeals

¹⁴¹ Cf. A. A. Long, “Language and Thought,” 88, who takes Sextus to ask how the Stoics can establish that an incorporeal *lekton* is Something.

¹⁴² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 167–9, 225, and Ch. 7; cf. Boeri, “Bodies and Incorporeals,” who argues that bodies and incorporeals are reciprocally dependent.

¹⁴³ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 339; cf. 330–1. There is a certain tension in Bronowski between the status of incorporeals as independent entities, as assigned by this division of Plato’s labor, and the commitment to incorporeals as codependent.

¹⁴⁴ Bronowski, *Lekta*, 294–5, 324–40, 407–8.

are metaphysically dependent on, or grounded in bodies, insofar as incorporeals are offices or roles that depend on bodies to be occupied, and hence actualized.¹⁴⁵

I will now revisit Stobaeus' testimony about Chrysippus that we saw in the context of time to clarify the nature of *huparxis*, make my positive proposal, and argue against the views just canvassed:

- U. He [Chrysippus] also says that only the present obtains (*huparchein*), and that the past and future subsist (*huphestanai*) but in no way obtain, just as predicates (*katēgorēmata*) also are said to obtain (*huparchein*) only when the attributes (*sumbebēkota*) are (*eisin*), for example *walking* obtains of me when I am walking, and does not obtain when I am lying down or sitting.

Stobaeus 1.106,18–23 (51B4, passage H2/Chapter 11)

We are told here that only the present obtains (*huparchein*) in contrast to the past and future, which merely *subsist* (*huphestanai*), just as (in the way that) predicates obtain only when the corresponding attributes *exist* or *are* (*eisin*), i.e. when the world really is that way. So, when I am walking, the predicate “walking” is true of me, or is the case, in which case the predicate is said to obtain; and likewise when a portion of time is present, or happening now, it obtains. My proposal is that these are said to *obtain* because they correspond to the world's corporeal attributes as they are occurring, and that this is not a change of ontological status. Coming to have *huparxis* is not a case of ontological switching, from *subsisting* to *existing*, from incorporeal to corporeal, or from possible states of affairs to actual facts, from the weaker status of a proposition, predicate, or case to the stronger status of fact, attribute, or quality. To obtain is simply to correspond to the world as it is—it is a *relation*, not a *modus essendi*. All sayables and all of time always have the ontological status of *subsisting* according to their underlying bodies (rational impressions and the world in motion, respectively). In addition to (and not instead of) that ontological status, when they correspond to the world *as* it is occurring—in *the manner* that is occurring, in the case of sayables, and *when* it is occurring, in the case of time, i.e. when sayables are true and some time is present—they *obtain*. Thus what *obtains* can be thought of as what is actually happening, but only in the innocent sense of “actual” as being occurrent, “In action or existence at the time; present, current”; not in the metaphysically loaded sense “opposed to potential, possible, virtual, theoretical, ideal.”¹⁴⁶

The corporeal attributes or properties there are in the world (*ta sumbebēkota*) will make *lekta*, which *subsist* according to rational impressions, obtain or hold

¹⁴⁵ Bailey, “Structure,” 255.

¹⁴⁶ OED, “Actual,” defs. 4 and 3, respectively. Cf. Bailey, “Structure”; Bronowski, *Lekta*; M. Frede, “Lekton.”

true whenever the *lekta* state things as they are. There is good evidence that the Stoics embraced a correspondence theory of truth: "Someone who says 'It is day' seems to propose that it is day. If, then, it is day, the proposition advanced comes out true, but if not it comes out false" (DL 7.65 (34E)).¹⁴⁷ So the world makes certain *lekta* true, and when it does, they are said to obtain; but *lekta* have the ontological status of *subsistence* whether they are true or false, whether they obtain or not. As A. A. Long puts it: "The *huparxis* of a *lekton* indicates its truth-value, not its ontological status."¹⁴⁸

There is a certain ambiguity to the word "*huparchein*" that it is important to address before moving on.¹⁴⁹ We saw Sextus complain above that the Stoics argue in a circle, from defining a true *axiōma* as what obtains and contradicts something, and when asked what obtains, they say it is what excites a *kataleptic* impression, but then they say the *kataleptic* impression is what arises from what obtains and according to what obtains (SE, M. 8.85). The translation of this term as "obtaining," "holding," or "being the case" is similarly ambiguous. One way for something to be the case is for it to be true, i.e. to *say* it like it is, and another way for something to be the case is for it to *be* as it is. *Lekta* are true in the first, veridical sense of *huparchein*, while what excites the rational impression is the world being as it is, in the second, existential sense.¹⁵⁰ Sextus is not wrong that the Stoics say both of these things, but it is not likely that they put them together this way in explanation of each other; being what excites a rational impression (i.e. things being as they are) does not explain what it means for an *axiōma* to obtain (i.e. to say things as they are).¹⁵¹

Thus we should not infer, with Bronowski, that what excites a rational impression is "something which is the case, or true about an object of perception rather than that object itself."¹⁵² Impressions (*phantasiai*) are contrasted with figments (*phantasmata*) in that impressions are always from real impressors, i.e. from what is the case, whereas figments are products of the imagination corresponding to no real impressor (Aëtius 1.10.5 (30B); DL 7.49–51 (39A), 7.60–1 (30C); Stobaeus

¹⁴⁷ Hankinson, "Stoic Epistemology," 78; LS, 206. See also the report that for the Stoics "A definition is a statement of analysis matchingly expressed" (Galen, *Meth. med.* 19.348, 17–49, 4 (32D)); likewise, DL 7.60 (32C); SE, M. 8.85–6 (34D), 8.100 (34I).

¹⁴⁸ A. A. Long, "Language and Thought," 93; see Alessandrelli, "Discussion," for helpful arguments against *huparxis* as ontological status and in favor of its being "a privileged relationship to the present state of the world."

¹⁴⁹ On which see also Kerferd, "Synkatathesis," 125–8, A. A. Long, "Language and Thought," 89–95; Schofield, "Retrenchable," 351–8; Schwab, "Kataleptic Impressions."

¹⁵⁰ In calling this sense existential I don't mean to equate *huparxis* to the *existence* of bodies in particular, but to what there is; cf. Alessandrelli, *Problema*, 66–7; A. A. Long, "Language and Thought," 88–94; Schofield, "Retrenchable," n. 25 (who takes there to be just one sense of "*huparchein*" throughout).

¹⁵¹ Thus, in response to Schofield, "Retrenchable," n. 25, I take there to be some muddle or sophistry on the part of Sextus, and not that the Stoics were unscrupulous or confused; it is possible they welcomed the appearance of paradox, but even if not there need be no problem with their use of this term in both ordinary and technical senses, much as there need be no problem with some uses of the verb "to be" being technical, e.g. in reference to the being of Plato's Forms, while others are not.

¹⁵² Bronowski, *Lekta*, 336–7; and M. Frede, "Stoic Epistemology," 302.

1.136,21–37,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15)). For an impression to arise from *to huparchon* means only this much, that it arises from the world as it is; it does not mean that impressions arise from *lekta* instead of the objects themselves. Thus I am in agreement with A. A. Long, against G. B. Kerferd and Malcolm Schofield, that there is more than one sense of “*huparxis*” in play, but I do not take it to signal in particular the *existence* of bodies when the impression is said to arise from what obtains or is the case. I take the relevant sense of *huparxis* in that case to be the generic sense of reality or existence, in contrast to the technical sense applied to true *lekta* and the present time, which indicates a correspondence to the world as it is.

In another example of equivocation between senses of “*huparchein*,” Marcus Aurelius says that “the things that are (*ta onta*) hold (*echei*) in their own way relative to all the things that obtain (*pros ta huparchonta panta oikieiōs echei*)” (*Meditations*, 9.1.2). Pierre Hadot finds here evidence of an ontological distinction between bodies, characterized as *onta*, and incorporeals, which he takes to be the *huparchonta*.¹⁵³ However, rather than an ontological distinction between two different modes of reality, Marcus is making use of a different kind of distinction, namely between the world as it holds or obtains, and the things it makes true. The context of the passage supports this conjecture, since Marcus moves from talking about the nature of the cosmos being the nature of things that *are* (*onta*, i.e. bodies), in the previous sentence, to the statement quoted concerning the relation between things that *are* and things that obtain, and then in the next sentence to nature as “the primary explanation (*prōtē aitia*) of all truths” (which are *lekta*, SE, PH 2.81 (33P2)). And all this is in the context of the injustice and impiety of the liar, who is carried into the opposite of truth. The context is thus clearly not metaphysical, but rather dialectical and ethical, making use of the truth-maker relation between the world as it is and the *lekta* that obtain when one is in tune with nature and sees the world aright. There is no reason for Marcus to invoke the ontological distinction between bodies and incorporeals in this context, and every reason for him to invoke the correspondence relation that must hold in order for the sage to be happy.

So the ambiguity of “*huparchein*” does not threaten the consistency of the Stoic position, or dictate that the *huparxis* of true *lekta* and the present time is an ontological status. The ontological picture and the distinction between *being* (*einai, to on, ousia*), *subsisting* (*huphestanai*, having *hupostasis*), and *obtaining* (*huparchein*, having *huparxis*) is, after all, quite simple. Bodies have the ontological status of *being* (the two *archai* fundamentally, all other bodies being composed out of them), while incorporeals have the ontological status of *subsisting* (inheriting their properties and *subsistence* from underlying body). Time *subsists* according to the world’s motion,

¹⁵³ Hadot, “ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ” Goldschmidt, “Υπάρχειν et ὑφίστασθαι,” 332, resists this point with Galen’s testimony about the Stoics’ linguistic quibbling over *being* (*to on*) and *subsistence* (*to huphestos*), but does not reject the idea that Marcus makes an ontological distinction. For a clear and concise statement of the relation, see Hensley, “Separability and Inseparability,” 194.

and *lekta* *subsist* according to rational impressions. When time and *lekta* correspond to the world as (when or in the manner) it is occurring, they are said to obtain. But obtaining is not an alternative to *subsisting*, it is a correspondence that certain *lekta* and portions of time and the whole of time have to the world—obtaining is a relation, not an ontological status. With this I put to rest the metaphysical camp.

Meeting the *Subsistence* Criterion

Just as each of the other incorporeals has counted as Something because it is grounded in body, so too will the *lekta*. They will be available for thought and pass the Not Someone test because they inherit their properties from the rational impression. The *lekton* characterized as the thing that is signified, which we apprehend but the barbarian does not, gives us the relevant availability for thought (SE, M. 8.11–2).¹⁵⁴ It is not the fact that *lekta* are products of thought that makes them available for thought in the relevant way, but their status as non-sensory impressors that we can grasp by *metabasis* (DL 7.53 (39D)). This was the whole point of the drill sergeant passage, to show how something incorporeal could serve as a bona fide impressor (SE, M. 8.409 (27E, passage D/Chapter 2)). The availability of *lekta* for thought is due to their inheriting semantic content from the rational impression, but the availability and the inheriting are two different things.

Likewise, the *lekta* will inherit their particularity from the rational impression as well, because the rational impression makes each *lekton* complete and gives it the token reflexive content required for being truth evaluable (or having other conditions of success). As a result, the *lekta* can even pass the Not Someone test. If “It is raining” is uttered in Athens, its truth conditions will not be the same as “It is raining” uttered in Megara; the *lekton* arising from an impression in Athens cannot be arising from an impression in Megara. Since this comes out true, we can see that the *lekton* is a proper object of thought and reference as required by the *subsistence* criterion; and if *lekta* meet the *subsistence* criterion that admits only bona fide individuals to the ontology, our grounds for taking *lekta* described as *pragmata* as semantic things or entities is even stronger. Even two people in Athens uttering “It’s raining” at the same time will not have expressed numerically the same *lekton*, notwithstanding that the *lekta* they express will have the same truth conditions and be maximally similar.

So while the Athens-Megara case makes the point more perspicuously, I mean for it to hold for all *lekta*. The *lekton* expressed by “It is raining,” stamped with meaning in the region of the heart by one person (here), is numerically distinct from the *lekton* expressed by “It is raining,” stamped with meaning in the region

¹⁵⁴ I resist the reading of Bronowski, *Lekta*, 347, who takes the fact that barbarians don’t understand the *lekton* as evidence of ontological independence.

of the heart by another person (there). It is numerically distinct because its host body is numerically distinct, just as the place of this car is distinct from the place of that car. There is thus some truth to saying that *lekta* are therefore located, as spatiotemporal entities, but there is no paradox to this unless one assumes the *lekta* are abstracta outside of space and time.

Conclusions

Having argued that *lekta* depend for their *subsistence* on the rational impression, inheriting their content from the mind, and that their role in the causal context is not metaphysical but dialectical, I can now lay down the Real Definition of a *lekton*, according to which (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.¹⁵⁵

Lekton (Φ) =_{Real Def.} a semantic entity (*pragma*) that *subsists* according to (is Feature Dependent on) the rational impression (Ψ)

The *lekton* and the rational impression are both entities (the one an incorporeal, the other a body, in particular a body disposed (*pōs echon*), in the language of the Categories); the relation between them is a posteriori (there is no logical necessity to their being related this way); and the definition in terms of the rational impression explains the semantic nature of the *lekton*. It's not just that rational impressions are necessary and sufficient conditions for there being *lekta*, but that rational impressions are the source of *lekta* (causes, not conduits) and for that reason explanatory of the *lekton* as a semantic thing (*sēmainomenon pragma*). Thus all the incorporeals (spatial, temporal, and semantic) have been defined as *subsisting* according to an underlying body, inheriting their properties from their hosts. The dependence thesis applies univocally to the class of incorporeals, with no odd one out. And *subsistence* is not simply an ontological marker indicating something more than nothing, but the language of ontological dependence. And this dependence is not simply the dependence of getting actualized, but the genuine ontological dependence of each incorporeal on underlying body for its *subsistence*, i.e. for being Something.

Returning now to the *Sophist* as discussed in Chapter 1, we can see how the Stoics meet Plato's last three challenges: (vi) *Be inclusive*, and recognize both bodies and incorporeals; (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and find the common ground to give a one-world metaphysics; and (viii) *Say what is not*, and give an account of saying something, even if it is false. I argued in Chapter 2 that the

¹⁵⁵ Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201; see Introduction and Chapter 9 for explication.

Stoics recognize two distinct ontological criteria, one for *being* and one for being Something *subsistent*; and that in this they successfully respond to Parmenides' challenge (i) *Commit the patricide*, prise apart *something* from *being*, and show that *what is not* is still a countable individual and proper object of thought and discourse. Challenges (ii)–(v) were the work of Section II, *Bodies*. And now, in Section III, *Incorporeals*, I have shown how the *subsistence* criterion applies to all the incorporeals alike: place, room, surface, void, time, and even the *lekta*. So the challenge represented by the Battle of Gods and Giants itself, (vi) *Be inclusive* and do not “drag all things down from the heavens and the invisible to earth,” has been met as well.

And so has the seemingly insurmountable challenge to offer a one-world metaphysics for such seemingly contradictory entities. Each of the incorporeals depends on underlying body for its properties and *subsistence*, or rather, to *subsist* is to inherit your incorporeal and hence intelligible properties from underlying body. Far from Platonizing with their incorporeals, the Stoics are offering us an innovative non-reductive physicalism. They are non-reductive insofar as the incorporeals are never cast as nothing but body, and physicalist insofar as the incorporeals are spatiotemporal entities dependent on body for their properties and *subsistence*. What bodies and incorporeals have in common to which the Stoics look when they say that both are—i.e. are Something—then, is not just that they both meet an ontological criterion, or that both are objectively real, but that both are spatiotemporal inhabitants of this one physical world.

The picture is, after all, quite simple. *All* the incorporeals *subsist* according to, or in virtue of (*kata*), underlying body: place and room subsist on occupying and delimiting bodies, limits on individual bodies, void on the cosmos as a whole, time on the motion of the cosmos as a whole, and *lekta* on rational impressions. *One* of the incorporeals is mind-dependent because its underlying body just is the mind, but this does not mean that *all* incorporeals are mind-dependent;¹⁵⁶ nor are all incorporeals to be understood as *lekta* construed as surface effects, facts, or states of affairs. Rather, the *lekta* are a coordinate species of incorporeal alongside place, room, limits, void, and time. In addition to their ontological status as entities that *subsist*, two of the incorporeals sometimes stand in a correspondence relation to the world as it is, and are then said to obtain: time when it is present, or happening now, and *lekta* when they say true things, or state things as they actually are. Sometimes the Stoics are considered quite baroque or extravagant in their theories; for example, Bailey argues as follows:

The appeal of the analogy with offices should by now be fully apparent. For only something of its like will account for the fact that in Stoicism we have three

¹⁵⁶ For agreement on this point, see Sorabji, *MSM*, 92.

different ways to be: (i) being (*einai*), (ii) subsisting (*huphistanai*), and (iii) obtaining (*huparchein*). Only some story as logically complex as this will do, giving us as it does (i) potential occupants of (ii) various offices, and (iii) their occupying or vacating those offices.¹⁵⁷

But there is nothing especially outlandish or complicated to the posit of bodies that *exist* alongside incorporeals that *subsist* and obtain, once we recognize that obtaining is not an ontological status and *lekta* are not effects in a causal chain. In this the Stoics respond to the Visitor's challenge (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and be able to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common to which you look in saying that both are Something. They are both objective particulars in this one, spatiotemporal world. Finally, we can see how the Stoics respond to the Sophist's challenge (viii) *Say what is not*. First in showing that the incorporeals are *non-existent* Somethings available for us to speak and think about; and second, in the theory of *lekta*, which *subsist* whether true or false. Thus *what is not* can nevertheless be Something, and saying *what is not* does not imply the truth or existence of what is said.

I have endeavored to show the reader why I see the Stoics this way, arguing from evidence of general metaphysical principles that for the Stoics only bodies are fundamental, and all incorporeals are dependent, as well as from evidence for each incorporeal specifically that the Stoics are grounding these entities in body. Perhaps none of the arguments I offer is decisive, nor even the gross sum of all this evidence. But what could settle the matter? I can invoke here the principle of maximal charity I laid out in my methodological remarks (Introduction). First, other things being equal—namely being compatible with the textual evidence, which is what I do take myself to have shown here—an interpretation that renders Stoic thought coherent and sophisticated, i.e. artful, is to be preferred over one that makes them brutish or baroque. Otherwise, the Stoics' dominance as a school looks like a collective intellectual shortcoming: for the Stoics in thinking incoherently, for their critics in making so much hay of their bad arguments, and for their followers in being taken in by so much philosophical bumbling or chicanery (or something).

Further, other things being equal, an account that finds the Stoics in theoretical equipoise with their predecessors and neighbors is also to be preferred; if the Stoics were not innovating and forging new ground, again their prominence as a school is not well explained. Finally, other things being equal, an account that finds the Stoics in agreement with each other on basic doctrinal matters is to be preferred as explanatory of what it is to be a Stoic. The orthodoxy I have advocated is

¹⁵⁷ Bailey, "Structure," 268–9; in this context Bailey, n. 48, also argues that "if we are to understand the Stoics, there is nothing else [sc. than 'highly sophisticated developments in 20th-cent. analytic philosophy'] to which to turn"; then, invoking the causation passages that cast predicates as incorporeal effects, he adds: "I know of no other resource besides the revived metaphysics of the second half of 20th-cent. analytic philosophy that could even begin to make such an outlandish claim plausible."

broad and coarse-grained, asking that we see it as standard Stoic doctrine that only bodies are fundamental and incorporeals are dependent; this not only unifies the school, and does justice to their place in history, but gives greater point to the internal debates we do find. I am not sure what could settle the matter; our evidence is too sparse for certainty. I can only offer my own reasoned picture. The Stoics that I see are non-reductive physicalists in lively debate with their predecessors and competitors. Far from being the victims of their own philosophical brutishness, the Stoics have an artful response to Plato, and offer a sophisticated alternative to Epicurean materialism.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ I leave the Academics out of account since I am dwelling on metaphysics rather than epistemology.

SECTION IV

NEITHER CORPOREAL NOR
INCORPOREAL

κατ' ἐπίνοιαν
kat' epinoian

This section argues in support of a tripartite ontology: the ontological genus Something includes not only bodies and incorporeals, but also a third class of entities that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. These entities are products of thought that do not correspond to anything in the physical world, including idealized limits, mathematical entities, and creatures of fiction. For example, there are no geometrical (i.e. perfect) cones or pyramids in the physical world; nor are there any minutes or seconds in the world, or Fahrenheits, nor centaurs and giants. These entities are idealized in the sense that there are no such things or divisions in the world, but they are not therefore ideal in any Meinongian or Platonic sense that puts them in a separate realm. Rather, they are products of thought, and this remains a physicalist program that grounds its entities in body. To be Something that *subsists* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) is to be a social construct, something that is invented and takes on a public life of its own through the words and drawings that depict it, becoming Something about which we can say true and false things. For example, because we have invented and depicted them as we have, it is true that centaurs are half horse, false that pyramids have five sides, and true that there are sixty seconds in a minute. Thus what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is Something in a univocal sense, according to thought (*kat' epinoian*), underwriting the posit of a tripartite ontology. Chapter 13 takes up the case of limits (both geometrical limits and the limits of the continuum), and Chapter 14 of creatures of fiction, as attested in Seneca's *Epistle* 58.

13

Limits

ἐπιφάνεια δὲ Ποσειδώνιος...
καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἀπολείπει¹

A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley have suggested that the Stoics recognize a third category of Something, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, to accommodate pure thought constructs, figments (creatures of fiction), and limits.² The idea behind the label is that “If something is a purely mental construct—an invention or an idealization—the question of its corporeality might be held not to arise: it would be odd to say of Mickey Mouse either that he is corporeal or that he is incorporeal,” and the license they give for the category is that “such trichotomies are characteristically Stoic.”³ This chapter and the next will argue in favor of the tripartite ontology, showing that the category of Something that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is unified by the principle of *subsistence* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*). I will embrace the idea that the Stoics recognize limits of the continuum, geometrical limits, and creatures of fiction as pure products of thought that *subsist* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*); but I will resist the idea that *all* limits are products of thought, standing by the idea that the limits of bodies, in contrast to idealized limits, are incorporeal (as argued in Chapter 10).

Note that in saying that what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is a pure product of thought I do not thereby deny that these idealized entities also depend on body, since thought is itself a body; on the contrary, I am arguing for a thoroughly physicalist system according to which everything that is Something is either itself a body or dependent on body for its *subsistence*, and I intend for that apply here too. To emphasize that incorporeal limits are the limits of bodies, as Diogenes puts it (DL 7.135 (50E, passage A below)), in contrast to those that are pure products of thought, is just to emphasize that they are physical features of the world, e.g. the surface of my desk, in contrast to those idealized entities that we invent and that correspond to no physical feature of the world. By the same token, the way in which *lekta* are products of thought will not be the same way that idealized entities are products of thought.

¹ DL 7.135 (50E, passage A below).

² LS, 163–5.

³ LS, 165; see Nolan, “Stoic Trichotomies,” for an illuminating discussion of this *modus operandi*.

My focus in this chapter will be on a positive account of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, arguing, first, from evidence about limits to the metaphysical principle of *subsistence kat' epinoian*. Then, in Chapter 14, I will argue from Seneca's *Epistle* 58 to fill in that principle and say something about how pure products of thought can become Something in their own right. Then, in Section V, I will return to the topic of Not-Somethings, and argue that there is no need to posit such a category for the Stoics. With figments and limits squared away as neither corporeal nor incorporeal, the only remaining candidate for the class is concepts (*ennoēmata*), which I will argue in Chapter 15 are off the ontological map altogether.

Interpretive Landscape

Michael J. White has given valuable supporting evidence and argumentation for the view that Stoic limits are mental constructs, geometers' fictions that involve a degree of *misrepresentation* of physical reality.⁴ Hence, for the point-like now (taking an example from the discussion of time in Chapter 11), the question whether the division between past and future is corporeal or incorporeal does not arise; the point-like now corresponds to no natural joint in the world, either corporeal or incorporeal, and to the extent that talk of the present says there is such a joint, it misrepresents physical reality (which is continuous and hence without any such limits or differentiations). Others, however, dissent both from the tripartite ontology and from the idea that limits are products of thought. For example, David Robertson argues that geometrical limits should really be considered incorporeal, and denies that they are thought constructs at all, while Anna Ju argues for a developmental account of geometrical limits that finds the Stoics stumbling around between thought constructs, incorporeals, and bodies.⁵

My view, on the incorporeal side, is closer to Robertson's insofar as he takes the incorporeals all to be "metaphysical consequences of bodies," and classes limits among the incorporeals. I also appreciate his "cheap and cheerful" strategy to say of limits that the question of their equality or inequality simply does not arise.⁶ However, I disagree on two important points. One is that pure products of thought are without any being at all, and hence that the tripartite ontology is false.⁷ On the contrary, as I will argue, the Stoics *do* recognize these products of thought as Something; these include not only the limits of the continuum, but also geometrical limits, and creatures of fiction,

⁴ M. J. White, "The Stoic Model," 286, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 150; he does not, however, embrace the tripartite ontology.

⁵ Robertson, "Mathematical Objects"; Ju, "Geometrical Limits." S. White, "Posidonius," 51–3, also argues that limits are incorporeal, but does not engage with the question of geometrical limits.

⁶ Robertson, "Mathematical Objects," 178.

⁷ Robertson, "Mathematical Objects," 171; cf. n. 8, where he explicitly agrees with Caston, "Something and Nothing," that the genus Something into bodies and incorporeals is exhaustive.

like centaurs and giants. The other point of disagreement concerns the availability of the cheap and cheerful solution if limits are all incorporeal. In fact, Robertson's solution seems to me to *require* a tripartite ontology to get off the ground; it cannot succeed if all limits are incorporeal. As we have seen (and Robertson should agree, in light of his taking incorporeals as consequences of bodies), incorporeals like place, surface, and room are finite and extended, so it's not clear on what basis one can deny that incorporeal limits have a size and shape by which to be judged equal or unequal. Robertson argues that since incorporeals can't have corporeal qualities (like size and shape), let alone be equal to one another in having those qualities, it follows that incorporeal surfaces are neither equal nor unequal.

However, we need not attribute a corporeal quality to an incorporeal in taking it to have a certain size, even the same size as its host body; after all, the qualities of bodies are corporeal, the qualities of incorporeals incorporeal (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 217,32–8,1 (28L, passage B/Chapter 9), 222,34–3,2 (Kalbfleisch)). As argued in Chapter 9, the incorporeals inherit their properties from the underlying body, but they do not literally share one and the same property with the body.⁸ In speaking of the size of a surface we do not thereby attribute solidity or causal power to the incorporeal, but a certain non-solid extension that will be finite and definite, and hence comparable to other such extensions, i.e. equal or unequal to them. Thus, I appreciate the form of the move, to say that the question of equality or inequality simply does not arise, but I take this solution to be available only with the third category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. It's not that geometrical limits are *really* incorporeal, but that the limits *of bodies* are incorporeal, while geometrical limits and limits of the continuum are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Only with the *tertium quid* (neither corporeal nor incorporeal) in view can the cheap and cheerful response (neither equal nor unequal) really be given.

Lingering in the interpretive vicinity is the persistent view that the Stoics were committed to a category of entities called Not-Somethings (*outina*), which lie in "metaphysical limbo" between Something and nothing at all.⁹ This ontological monster is not inherently at odds with a tripartite ontology; indeed, Long & Sedley retain Not-Somethings to accommodate Stoic concepts. However, most scholars take the category of Something to be exhausted by bodies and incorporeals, and choose to banish creatures of fiction, limits, and concepts to the metaphysical limbo of Not-Somethings. I argued in Chapter 2 that the famous Not Someone (*Outis*) sophism is not, as scholars have taken it, evidence for a class of Not-Somethings between Something and nothing at all (note the hyphen to signal the

⁸ Thus inheritance is not best put in terms of overlap; see Chapter 9, n. 37.

⁹ The phrase is Sedley's, "Universals," 89, LS, 181. Brunschwig, *TGS*, is a leading proponent of the category of Not-Somethings, followed by most; Caston, "Something and Nothing," is the primary (only other?) detractor.

class of entities that I am arguing against); the Not Someone sophism does not screen for Not-Somethings, but rather for Somethings.

Returning to limits, the interpretive options that have been offered to date face a common challenge: by taking one side (either incorporeal or products of thought) to the exclusion of the other, they strain the textual evidence that speaks to the other side. An account that makes all limits incorporeal has no good account for the texts that say they *subsist* in thought, while an account that makes all limits products of thought has no good account for the texts that speak in favor of limits as genuinely spatial. Both accounts in isolation are inadequate, and a developmentalist thesis makes the Stoics look incompetent. I suggest, instead, that the Stoics recognize an important distinction between the limits of bodies, which are incorporeal, and idealized limits that are products of thought and, thus, neither corporeal nor incorporeal. We do not have far to go to find textual evidence in support of this thesis—Diogenes Laertius 7.135 tells us this explicitly, although scholars have not read the passage this way.

If we take Diogenes' testimony that Posidonius retains limits *both* according to incorporeal *subsistence* and according to thought as recognizing two kinds of limit, the interpretive difficulties about limits are dissolved, and a metaphysical principle of *subsistence* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*) can be seen to underwrite Long & Sedley's controversial posit of third ontological category. As in the case of incorporeal *subsistence*, this principle of *subsistence* will explain why creatures of fiction and idealized limits count as Something, grounding them in body to maintain a rigorous non-reductive physicalism. So, although the last of Plato's challenges in the *Sophist* have been answered by the incorporeals, that is not the end of the Stoic response. Challenges (vi) *Be inclusive*, (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and (viii) *Say what is not* are answered a second time over with what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.

Both—Diogenes Laertius 7.135

I will take the testimony of Diogenes at 7.135 as my starting point, so let me note that there are no difficulties with this text being corrupted, or with the manuscript tradition, as there is for other testimony in Diogenes.¹⁰ The evidence is "clean," so to speak, so the focus will be on translation and context. This report appeared as passage N in Chapter 10, but I repeat it here for further inspection:

¹⁰ Notably the variant reading of the *archai* as incorporeal rather than corporeal, cf. Chapter 3. Here the apparatus is unproblematic (cf. Dorandi, DL): Hermann deletes *sōma*, perhaps understanding these passages as mathematical and revealing a certain bias; variations in order with the *Suda* are inconsequential; and no one has questioned the two occurrences of *kai* that my argument emphasizes.

- A. Surface (*epiphaneia*) is the limit (*peras*) of body, or what has only length and breadth without depth. This Posidonius in his *On celestial phenomena* book 5 retains (*apoleipein*) both according to thought and according to subsistence (*kai kat' epinoian kai kath' hupostasis*). A line is the limit of a surface or a length with no breadth, or that which has only length. A point is the limit of a line, and it is the smallest mark.

DL 7.135 (50E)

Most commentators have understood *kai kat' epinoian kai kath' hupostasin* as both in conception (or thought) and in reality, setting up a dichotomy between what is real on the one hand, and products of thought as unreal on the other.¹¹ As I argued in Chapter 10 in the context of the incorporeal limits of body, although the prepositional phrase "*kath' hupostasin*" is non-standard for the incorporeals, the term "*hupostasis*" is not, and there is no reason to think the prepositional phrase invokes anything other than the standard Stoic technical sense of *subsistence*. Long & Sedley render the phrase best, as both in thought and as *subsistent*. They do not address the conjunction, but in arguing that all limits are purely mental constructs for the Stoics, they must be taking the conjunction to say that limits are products of thought that *subsist*. However, in so doing, they write off Plutarch's testimony that limits are incorporeal (*Comm. not.* 1080E (50C7–8)) as too polemical to be reliable,¹² and pay no mind to the non-standard lists of incorporeals that feature surface and line alongside the "canonical" incorporeals.¹³

Commentators who take *kath' hupostasin* as being real take Posidonius to be heterodox in holding limits *kath' hupostasin*, in contrast to a Stoic orthodoxy that takes them to be only or merely conceptual (and hence, presumably, Not-Somethings).¹⁴

¹¹ E.g. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation*, 329; Inwood, *Later Stoicism*; IG; Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. III (see below); Mansfeld, "Zeno of Citium," 160, 162; Mensch & Miller, *ad loc.*; M. J. White, "The Stoic Model" and "Stoic Natural Philosophy." Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 206, reads Posidonius as saying that the objects of mathematics are "both concepts and existentially real," and that the shape of the world, for example, is "both a geometrical and a physical and material entity."

¹² LS, 301.

¹³ Ignoring, e.g. Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3), where surface, line, and place are classed together as "comparable to bodies," and Cleomedes, *Cael.* I.1,139–42, where time, surface, and *lekta* are classed together; other times (266–7) sweeping such testimony under the rug, e.g. by classing limits, place, and void at the end of DL 7.132 as "non-bodies" rather than as incorporeals (on which see Chapter 9). M. J. White, "The Stoic Model," 286, raises the possibility that limits could be both incorporeal and products of thought, but follows LS down the one-sided path of mental constructs.

¹⁴ M. J. White, "Stoic Natural Philosophy," 150, takes the report to suggest that the Stoic orthodoxy is *in intellectu*; Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation*, 329, also takes Posidonius as contrary to Stoic orthodoxy in stressing the physical reality of limits. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 203–8, says directly that Diogenes reports Posidonius as heterodox in taking geometrical surfaces to exist both in thought and reality, citing Proclus for evidence of the orthodox view of limits as concepts, then takes the real existence of a surface to violate the Stoic commitment to infinite divisibility, and concludes that God is "a physical body ringing the outside of the world and giving it spherical form."

But why, exactly? I. G. Kidd reasons as follows in this synopsis of the context of this passage (EK fragment 16).

Context: Occurs in a section dealing with ‘body,’ immediately after ‘body’ is defined as three-dimensional extension, and so solid body. So, Stoics thought that mathematical limits, like surface, were not corporeal but merely conceptual. Therefore Posidonius’ suggestion here is heretical.¹⁵

It is not entirely clear what governs Kidd’s first inference; he seems to be moving from the idea that the Stoics have a purely mathematical account of body to the idea that limits must be merely conceptual as well. Posidonius then comes out heretical for making limits real as opposed to being only conceptual (on the testimony of Proclus that limits subsist in mere thought, passage B below).¹⁶ However, the context of this passage is not purely mathematical; in fact, it is squarely in the domain of physics, and not out of place in being there (as I argued in Chapter 3). Furthermore, the context is not what shows us the orthodoxy that limits are conceptual—it’s the fact that they are explicitly described, here and elsewhere, as being *kat’ epinoian*. With respect to the heterodox addition of limits *kath’ hupostasin*, Kidd speculates that the sense in which limits exist in reality for Posidonius is that they are corporeal containing limits, in a sense inspired by Plato and related to his own views on shape as corporeal; however, this heterodoxy “appears to have had no subsequent influence on the School.”¹⁷

Brad Inwood takes a similar position but with an opposite approach to the text.¹⁸ Again *kath’ hupostasin* is understood as in reality and again Posidonius is heterodox in giving limits something more than their usual conceptual reality, but this time it is the *incorporeals* that are characterized as *kat’ epinoian*. Inwood then wonders what it means to say that, being conceptual, they also exist in reality (*kath’ hupostasin*), taking the conjunction as Long & Sedley do to say that limits are characterized both ways at once. He suggests that “[p]erhaps what is intended is that such limits do not exist in mere conception as might a fiction,” but then puzzles over what sort of ontological status they are being given in being characterized as *kath’ hupostasin*. This puzzle does not arise when one takes the “both. . .and” construction to indicate a distinction between two kinds of thing (some surfaces are *kath’ hupostasin* and others are *kat’ epinoian*), as opposed to two characterizations of one kind of thing (every surface is both *kath’ hupostasin* and *kat’ epinoian*). To that extent one might prefer Kidd’s view to Inwood’s, but only within the assumption that Posidonius is heterodox.

¹⁵ Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. III, 78; cf. *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 126–7 and EK frs. 92, 196.

¹⁶ Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 126, also cites passages from Plutarch, Stobaeus, and Cleomedes as evidence that limits are conceptual, but I do not see the evidence there.

¹⁷ Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 126.

¹⁸ Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, 100.

With respect to the charges of heterodoxy, I agree that the Stoics take limits to be products of thought or conceptual, and that this is orthodox, but I resist the idea that Posidonius recognizing them as *kath' hupostasin* (in addition to *kat' epinoian*) is heterodox, and that this is to be understood as being real in either of the two senses canvassed above. There is convincing textual evidence that the Stoics *did* see limits as products of thought, which I will review (and embrace) in the next section; I do not intend to question the status of limits as products of thought. My target is the three-fold assumption that (1) Posidonius is heterodox in making limits both *kath' hupostasin* and *kat' epinoian*, (2) that this conjunction tells us that all limits have these two properties (as opposed to there being two kinds of limits), and (3) that *kath' hupostasin* here is being real. First, on a general note, although there was a time when Posidonius was often cast as a rogue Stoic, Stephen White has argued persuasively that Posidonius was a Stoic authority, arguing in defense of orthodox doctrines rather than against them.¹⁹ More recently, Inwood has argued that Posidonius is systematically consolidating Stoic doctrine rather than overturning it.²⁰ So there is no background reason to suspect that he is being heterodox in this commitment.

Second, specific to this passage, Diogenes reports that Posidonius *retains* (*apoleipei*) surface both in thought and as *subsistent*. This verb, “*apoleipō*,” can be rendered as innocuously as to say or hold, with a doxographer’s sense of bequeathing to posterity; or, with a little more force, it can also be rendered as to allow, grant, admit, or retain. Standing behind these terms, however, there is a more literal translation of the term, to leave undisputed or, with S. White, to leave.²¹ On my reading, Posidonius is not heterodox but, rather, preserving or *retaining* the Stoic orthodoxy.²² In fact, the fragment occurs in the *Suda* as well, but without the reference to Posidonius.²³ The fact that this testimony appears in Diogenes’ chapter dedicated to Zeno, the founding Stoic, might also support Posidonius’ orthodoxy. More importantly, as we have seen, Diogenes is explicit at 7.160 that his foregoing report of Stoic physics is of the orthodoxy, before going on to give the heterodox views.

So what is the orthodoxy that I propose, and what does it mean to say that limits are *kath' hupostasin*, if not that they are real in contrast to figments of thought? The orthodoxy I propose is that the Stoics recognize two kinds of limit: the limits of bodies, which are incorporeal, and idealized limits, which are neither corporeal

¹⁹ S. White, “Posidonius.”

²⁰ Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, 84–153.

²¹ LSJ I.4; S. White, “Posidonius,” 52. Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, fr. 16, goes with admitted and Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, II–27, with concedes.

²² For an extended account of Posidonius as Diogenes’ primary Stoic source or authority, and his orthodoxy, see S. White, “Posidonius”; Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 713, comments that 7.135 in particular is “very Posidonian.” See Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence*, Ch. 2, for an extended treatment of Posidonius in comparison and contrast to Platonists and the early Stoics.

²³ Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 127.

nor incorporeal. On this reading, for Posidonius to retain limits *kath' hupostasin* is simply to retain them as incorporeal; and for him to retain them *kat' epinoian* is simply to retain them as products of thought that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Thus I appreciate Kidd's reading of the "both. . .and" construction as a contrast between two kinds of limit, but I resist the idea that being *kath' hupostasin* in addition is heterodox and that it means being corporeal—which certainly *would* be heterodox. Rather, being *kath' hupostasin* is simply being incorporeal (nothing heterodox there), and being *kat' epinoian* means being a product of thought (nothing heterodox there either). And I also resist Inwood's understanding of *kat' epinoian* as an incorporeal conception, as well as the resulting puzzle over what it means for limits to be *kath' hupostasin*—if not incorporeal. The "both. . .and" construction gives us alternative phenomena, not two descriptions of one phenomenon, thus there is no puzzle about what it means for something to be, at once, *kat' epinoian* and *kath' hupostasin*. Nor, again, is there any mystery about what it means for a limit to be *kath' hupostasin*, or any reason to think that limits must only be either conceptual or incorporeal, rather than there being two kinds.

Subsistence according to Thought

With an open mind to Diogenes' report that Posidonius retains an orthodox commitment to limits both as incorporeal and according to thought, we can now turn to the rest of the textual evidence attesting to the *subsistence* (*hupostasis*) of limits *kat' epinoian*. I will begin with three passages from Proclus, which scholars in pursuit of a monolithic "Theory of Limits" have worried are at odds with each other.

- B. But one ought to hold not that such limits, I mean of bodies, subsist (*huphestanai*) according to mere thought (*kat' epinoian psilēn*), just as the Stoics accept, but that [they are integral to the physical world].

Proclus, *In Eucl. El.* I 89,15–21 (50D)

The context of this passage tells us that Proclus takes the Stoics to task for removing limit entities from the world, taking them to *subsist* according to thought since they cannot interact with the physical world. The language of the passage tells us that the Stoics did indeed speak of *subsistence* according to thought (*kat' epinoian huphestanai*).²⁴ What is odd about the passage is that it says it is the limits *of bodies* that *subsist kat' epinoian*. According to my account, the limits of bodies

²⁴ Thus, I disagree with Ju, "Geometrical Limits," 379, that "Proclus' expression 'in mere thought' can be taken to reflect a standard Stoic language of limit, while his word 'subsist,' linked with this expression, is a non-Stoic insertion by Proclus' own hand," and that we should take this report as evidence only of early Stoics.

are meant to be incorporeal, not products of thought. There are two avenues of response available here. One is that Proclus is just conflating the Stoics' two kinds of limit, so that it is true they recognize incorporeal limits of bodies, as well as true that they recognize limits that *subsist* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*), but not true that the limits of bodies *subsist* according to thought; Proclus' point would stand, regardless of this conflation, since the Stoics would indeed still be removing limit entities from the world.

The other avenue of response available may be more charitable to Proclus and can take the report at its face value, without finding any conflation. There is one important sense in which the limits of bodies *do* subsist according to thought for the Stoics, namely the limits imposed on bodies in the context of infinite divisibility. Just as, strictly speaking, there are no parts of time because there is no precise division between past, present, and future (as argued in Chapter 11), so too there are no parts of corporeal masses, strictly speaking, because there are no differentiations or limits to a homogeneous mass (it is partless, not gunky, as argued in Chapter 3). The limits of bodies, understood in terms of infinite divisibility, correspond to no actual distinction in the mass (either actual or potential), and are thus products of thought projected by us. Recall that this does not make time or the continuum unreal in any way; it merely preserves and emphasizes the continuous nature. Whether the Stoics actively classed the partitions of body as idealized limits subsisting *kat' epinoian*, I do not know; I am inclined to think they did not carve out a spot in the ontology for partitions of body (even if they used "*morion*" to signal such partitions, as suggested in Chapter 3) since they would have been eliminative (or at any rate dismissive) of such entities altogether.²⁵ When it comes to the limits of time, on the other hand, common sense does call on the Stoics to be able to say something about the past, present, and future as "parts" of time, and of minutes and seconds. Either way, to the extent that the Stoics do indeed see such partitions of infinite divisibility as not corresponding to any natural joint, Proclus could be right in putting things this way. And on either of these two avenues of response, we have evidence that the Stoics spoke of *subsistence* according to thought. The next piece of evidence I will consider is also from Proclus:

- C. [The Stoics] establish it [sc. time] according to mere thought (*kat' epinoian psilēn*), feeble and on the point of non-being (for time, according to them, was one among the incorporeals, which, indeed, are disparaged by them as inactive (*adranē*) and not being (*ouk onta*) and subsisting in mere thoughts (*en epinoias huphistamena psilais*)).

Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* 3.95,7–15 (Diehl; 51F)

²⁵ One might, in a similar spirit, ask whether the Forms, about which the Stoics are eliminative, could be classed as figments; in both cases the answer would be that there is room in the system to say that, but no evidence that they did say that.

This passage gives us, first of all, additional confirmation that the phrase “*subsistence* according to thought” is Stoic terminology.²⁶ Here again, the testimony may not be entirely accurate, but we can proceed with caution. According to the account I am offering, which has the Stoics recognize two kinds of limits (those of bodies, which are incorporeal, and those of the continuum and geometry, which are neither corporeal nor incorporeal), Proclus seems to be conflating time itself, which is an incorporeal, with the limits of time, which are products of thought (perhaps this gives us reason to choose the less charitable, but simpler, solution to passage B above). Proclus is correct in saying that time as an incorporeal is feeble or inactive, and (thus) on the point of *non-being*, but incorrect in saying that time itself, as an incorporeal, *subsists* according to thought.²⁷ It is true, however, that the Stoics do recognize limits of time, e.g. the now but presumably also minutes, seconds, and hours, as products of thought corresponding to no natural joint in the continuum. So it is not hard to see how someone might confuse these two aspects of Stoic theory. But if we are confident that time itself as an incorporeal is not a product of thought for the Stoics (as most scholars are), then it seems we have rather strong evidence that it is the *limits* of time that *subsist* according to thought. This diagnosis of Proclus’ confusion (whether he was conscious of it or not) allows us to make the most of our scant testimony; rather than writing off deviant reports as too polemical to be of use, I urge that we pursue a diagnosis of the critic to squeeze more out of each text.²⁸ I offer one final report from Proclus now, which has tempted scholars (like Kidd) to think that the Stoics saw limits as corporeal:²⁹

- D. And Posidonius defines shape (*schēma*) as enclosing limit (*peras sugkeion*), separating the account of shape from that of quantity (*posotēs*) and positing it to be the cause (*aition*) of being defined and being limited, and of containing. For what encloses is different from what is enclosed, and limit (is different from) what is limited.

²⁶ I welcome Stobaeus 1.132,27–3,11, 133,18–23 (28q; EK fr. 92), which reports that “substance differs from matter only according to the subsistence of thought,” as additional testimony that the Stoics spoke of *subsistence* according to thought, but leave aside discussion of this notoriously complicated passage. For an extended discussion of this text as well as DL 7.132 ff., see S. White, “Posidonius,” 44–7, who argues that this phrase invokes the incorporeal *subsistence* of *lekta*. Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, 100, takes *kat’ epinoian* as incorporeal conceptions. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation*, finds Posidonius wishing to underline the conceptual separability of active and passive; cf. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 202–4, and Graeser, “Theory of Meaning,” 98–9.

²⁷ Thus I agree with Papazian, “Stoic Ontology,” 106–8, that Proclus is right in saying time *subsists* and is therefore *non-existent* and inactive, since incorporeals cannot act or undergo and therefore do not exist, and that time is not mind-dependent.

²⁸ In contrast to Brunschwig; TGS; Robertson, “Mathematical Objects”; Ju, “Geometrical Limits,” who takes this to be the mainstream Stoic view, and their best option to avoid saying that the shape of the world is a mental construct. This is a common practice, which I have urged we should treat as a last resort, according to the principle of maximal charity developed in the Introduction.

²⁹ Ju, “Geometrical Limits,” 384; Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 714.

ὁ δὲ Ποσειδώνιος πέρασ συγκλείον ἀφορίζεται τὸ σχῆμα τὸν λόγον τοῦ σχήματος χωρίζων τῆς ποσότητος καὶ αἴτιον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθέμενος τοῦ ὠρίσθαι καὶ πεπεράσθαι καὶ τῆς περιοχῆς. τὸ γὰρ κλείον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ συγκλειομένου καὶ τὸ πέρασ τοῦ πεπερασμένου.

Proclus, *In Eucl. El.* I 143,5–4.5 (EK fr. 196)

As Kidd remarks, it is clear from this report (and its immediate context) that Proclus takes Posidonius to be defining shape as a two-dimensional limit, like the circumference of a sphere, as distinct from the quantity, or three-dimensionality of a sphere (whereas Euclid defines shape in terms of the quantity that is shaped).³⁰ Although this is quite clearly a mathematical context, we can see how this distinction can apply as well to a physical context: there is a difference between a solid body in a certain shape, limited internally by the tension of *pneuma*, and its two-dimensional surface area or shape. Now, the rub, in either the mathematical or the physical case, is that limit is described as the *aition*, or “cause,” of the three-dimensional or solid body’s being defined and limited. From this datum, Ju, following remarks by Kidd, infers that it makes sense to attribute to Posidonius a corporeal conception of limit (corresponding to Diogenes’ report that he makes surface real (*kath’ hupostasin*)).³¹

However, this is not a sound inference. First of all, the Greek “*aition*” need not always be used to capture a strict sense of cause, which for the Stoics would indeed be corporeal. For example, Philo speaks of the cosmos as the cause (*aition*) of time (because it gives rise to, or is the source of time) without suggesting any corporeal interaction between the cosmos and time (Philo, *Aet. mundi* 52–4, passage C/Chapter 11). Furthermore, the present context is clearly geometrical, with Proclus comparing Euclid’s and Posidonius’ definitions of shape; there is no question of limits being corporeal in the mathematical context. In that case, for shape to be defined as an enclosing limit and characterized as the cause of being defined and limited is simply for shape to be that in virtue of which something is defined and delimited as it is, e.g. as a circle (or sphere). Nor in the physical context is shape a corporeal cause, or external agent of body being limited (which is the internal job of *pneuma*); it is not a shaping force of any kind here (because it is a two-dimensional incorporeal). Rather, in both cases, a thing’s shape is *aition* of its being defined and limited as the thing that it is. Why is this thing a circle? Because it has a round circumference. This account applies to the shapes of bodies and to the shapes of geometrical entities alike.³² Thus, there is no reason to equivocate

³⁰ Kidd, *Posidonius*, Vol. III, 259; cf. *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 126.

³¹ Ju, “Geometrical Limits,” 384.

³² Without making geometrical entities be abstractions from bodies or reducing truths about geometrical entities to truths about bodies, in the way they paraphrase away Forms, as Robertson, “Mathematical Objects,” does.

cause with agency here. Not that the Stoics don't have the resources to speak of shapes in corporeal terms. In fact, they do speak that way in the following passage from Simplicius (and others).

- E. But neither does the opinion of the Stoics agree with Aristotle's opinion about shapes (*schēmata*), when they say that shapes too, like the other qualified things (*ta alla poia*), are bodies.

Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 271,20–2 (28K)

Here we are in the context of the *Categories*, which for the Stoics are indeed corporeal (on which see Chapters 7 and 8). However shape is not a limit here, but a qualified individual. The thing to see is that in recognizing limits as two-dimensional (whether as the incorporeal limits of bodies or as idealized geometrical limits that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal), the Stoics do not preclude themselves from being able to characterize shapes in corporeal terms as well. So, when they do, we should not infer that the Stoics were confused or conflicted in their "Theory of Limits"; rather, we should consider that they recognize several distinct but compatible phenomena. When Simplicius reports that shape for the Stoics is a body, it is not to be construed as a limit (and then inferred that limits are "really" body). Simplicius himself is not making such a point, nor is he concerned with limits generally. So, there is no reason to see this text as suggesting anything about a Stoic "Theory of Limits," let alone that they are corporeal.³³

What we have seen is that when we take Diogenes Laertius' testimony that Posidonius retained surface *both* in thought (*kat' epinoian*) and as *subsistent* (*kath' hupostasin*) as an orthodox category distinction between two kinds of limit, then our conflicting testimony falls into place and a simple picture is revealed. The intuitions and arguments of those who see limits as incorporeal as well as of those who see them as products of thought are correct on this view, so long as they are not conceived of as competing accounts. The two kinds of limit are not in tension, and so long as one does not seek a monolithic "Theory of Limits" there is no need to resort to complicated developmental accounts that see the Stoics as evolving their theory from thoughts to incorporeals to bodies. Through this review of the textual evidence about limits *kat' epinoian*, I take myself to have shown that, in addition

³³ Nor do we need to see Posidonius as unorthodox in emphasizing the two-dimensionality of surface since there is no Stoic orthodoxy that shape is corporeal, as Kidd argues, *Posidonius*, Vol. II, 706, citing this passage and others that *do* attest to shape being spoken of in corporeal terms but do not, for all that, show that *limits* are corporeal. Posidonius may have had a special interest in surface and limits, and for that reason Diogenes would be right to call out that Posidonius *retains* surface both according to thought and as *subsistent*. On this picture, then, there is no orthodoxy that limits are bodies, and Posidonius is not "going rogue" in focusing on the two-dimensionality of surface. That the Stoics spoke of shapes this way, without any association with limits, is confirmed by Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.1.27,18–27 (Armstrong), who complains that the Stoics cannot say that the dancer is substrate (*hupoikeimenon*) of the shapes he mimes (because then the shapes would no longer be distinct).

to the *subsistence* of the incorporeals according to underlying body (as argued in Section III), there is good reason to think that the Stoics recognized a second mode of *subsistence*, this one according to thought (*kat' epinoian*).

One might still hesitate over the unfamiliar prepositional phrase "*kath' hupostasin*." We can explain the preposition as either Diogenes or Posidonius seeking symmetry with "*kat' epinoian*." However, the fact that what is *kat' epinoian* is contrasted with what *subsists* might induce a new doubt over whether what is *kat' epinoian* is *subsistent* or not. Perhaps only the incorporeals are *subsistent*, and this gives evidence that what is *kat' epinoian* is not Something after all—not even something *subsistent*, but rather Not-Something. However, the three passages just surveyed consistently say "*subsistence* according to thought," which confirms that what is *kat' epinoian* is also *subsistent*. In that case, the language in Diogenes should be read as shorthand for the contrast between incorporeal *subsistence* and *subsistence* according to thought.

And there are other reasons to think that what is *kat' epinoian* *subsists*, though none decisive. One is Galen's criticism of the Stoic division into *existent* and *subsistent*, suggesting that there are only these two *modi essendi* (Galen, *Meth. med.* 10.155, 1–8 (27G)); so if what is *kat' epinoian* is a kind of Something (as we will see Seneca confirm in Chapter 14), then these things are *subsistent*.³⁴ Another is Sextus' report that for the Stoics what is Something must be *subsistent* for the mind (SE, *M.* 1.17 (27C, passage C/Chapter 2)), the first piece of evidence for what I call the thinkability criterion for being Something. And yet, even if it should be doubted that what is *kat' epinoian* has the ontological status of *subsistence* for Posidonius, it would not change the substance of the account. Nothing hinges on whether being *kat' epinoian* is a kind of *subsistence*, or being *kat' epinoian* is its own ontological status in contrast to *subsistence* (and, of course, *existence*). And if there were evidence of such debate or evolution in the school, it would not count as any great heterodoxy.

Neither Corporeal nor Incorporeal

The testimony we have seen so far for *subsistence kat' epinoian* has centered on limits of the continuum, e.g. the parts of time (and, perhaps, partitions of continuous bodies). Although much of the evidence above is offered in geometrical contexts, we have not yet encountered geometrical limits proper, i.e. the limits of geometrical entities, or seen any direct textual reason to think that idealized limits

³⁴ Pace Robertson, "Mathematical Objects," n. 27; I also disagree that saying concepts are not Something (Stobaeus 1.136, 21–3 (30A1, passage A1/Chapter 15)) and that figments are empty attractions from no impressor (Aëtius 4.12.1–5 (39B, passage F/Chapter 12)) tells us that no thought constructs are *subsistents*.

are characterized as neither corporeal nor incorporeal.³⁵ For that I turn now to Plutarch's recounting of a puzzle attributed to Democritus:

- F. (1) If a cone should be cut by a plane parallel to its base, what must one think of the surfaces (*epiphaneiai*) of the segments (*tmēmata*): that they are produced equal or unequal? For [the surfaces], on the one hand, being unequal they will render the cone uneven (*anōmalon*), exacting many steplike incisions and rough edges; but, on the other hand, [the surfaces] being equal, the segments will be equal and it appears the cones has suffered the condition of a cylinder, being composed of equal, and not [i.e. rather than] unequal, circles, which indeed is most absurd. (2) Now here, declaring Democritus to go wrong (*agnoounta*), he [sc. Chrysippus] says that, on the one hand, (a) the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal while, on the other hand, (b) the bodies are unequal, (c) in light of the surfaces being neither equal nor unequal.

Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1079E (50C5)

On this topic, there is a substantial literature debating the details of the puzzle, which I will largely bypass. Debates concern the number of cuts being made, where they are made, whether we should think there is one surface that is shared, two separate but adjacent surfaces, or even the top and bottom surfaces of a single segment, whether the cone is physical or geometrical, and whether mathematical atomism is assumed (or required).³⁶ Rather than engaging with the details of Democritus' puzzle, I would like to focus on the context of the passage, which will show that such details are not required in order to understand Chrysippus' response that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal, while the bodies are unequal.

Having offered a series of absurdities that follow from the Stoic commitment to blending (*krasis di' holou*) (1077E–1078E (Cherniss)), Plutarch turns to the

³⁵ Indeed, the phrase "geometrical limits" has been used rather haphazardly, or, at any rate, unreflectively, as the subject of the Stoic "Theory of Limits"; further, Sedley, "Physics and Metaphysics," 393–4, does not think the Stoics are even interested in geometry, so that the category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal would concern only the limits of the continuum.

³⁶ Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 820–2, takes Chrysippus to respond that the surfaces are neither corporeal nor incorporeal because there is really only *one* geometrical plane surface, which is the incorporeal limit of their meeting, while the bodies are unequal and create nicks because an intervening segment has been removed, not because the surfaces are different in size. Hahm, "Dilemma of the Cone," takes the cone as physical, assumes many cuts, and takes the upper and lower surfaces of each segment to be at issue; he takes Chrysippus to reject both horns of the dilemma (equal or unequal) because he rejects mathematical atomism, just as he rejects the dilemma between finite and infinite parts in rejecting ultimate parts altogether; being greater but not exceeding indicates a greater area to the surface, without protruding on the side. LS take the cone as physical, rejecting mathematical atomism, and finding in "greater without exceeding" the mathematics of the limit. Robertson, "Mathematical Objects," takes the cone to be physical, embraces Hahm's assumptions, but pursues a response in terms of the incorporeality of the surface in contrast to the corporeality of the cone (I embrace this kind of

absurdity of the Stoic continuum. He poses the atomist challenge that if there are no minima in which division terminates, and every body is composed of infinitely many smaller bodies, then the Stoics destroy equality and inequality altogether (1078E–1079B). For example, on the assumption of infinite divisibility, “the human is not made out of more parts than the finger, nor the cosmos than the human” (1079A). As Cherniss points out, this “is not Stoic doctrine, however, but an argument against the Stoics based on the supposed implication of their doctrine, an argument used by Lucretius also (i.615–27) to prove that there must be minima.”³⁷

In response to the atomist challenge to continuum physics, we are told, Chrysippus introduces a distinction between the rough and inexact question, on the one hand, and the precise question on the other. To the rough and inexact question, of how many parts we consist, the answer is easy: head, trunk, and limbs; on these grounds the human does consist of more parts than the finger, and is indeed bigger. Equality and inequality are preserved. However, to the precise question, of how many *ultimate* parts we consist, invoking infinite divisibility, the response is to be silent, saying neither of which parts nor of how many a body consists (passage H/Chapter 3). The reason for this silence (as I argued in Chapter 3 and revisited in Chapter 11) is that with respect to the infinite divisibility of the continuum, there are no parts at all (not just no *ultimate* parts, but no *parts* at all)—to be continuous is to be *partless*. But this does not eliminate equality and inequality because it rejects the atomist assumption that size can only be a function of the size of component parts; we do not measure a lump of clay by breaking it down into its clay parts. This distinction that Chrysippus introduces in response to concerns about the continuum shows that such concerns trade on a category mistake between two different domains, or two senses of the word “body.” There is the fuzzy middle-sized world of individual bodies with parts and natural joints available for rough discourse about composition;

move, for Chrysippus to say there was a category mistake, but not the move to treat the surfaces as incorporeal). Sambursky, *Physics*, 92–6, 140–1, takes Chrysippus to be the first to grasp the concept of the limit (albeit without the explicit mathematical formulation) in saying that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal (and that the sides of the pyramid are greater without exceeding), embracing the excluded middle with a dynamic approach to zero; in saying that the *bodies* are unequal, he finds Chrysippus rejecting altogether the static notion of surfaces or boundaries between bodies (lest there be something preventing their corporeal contact). Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” also takes the cone to be physical, emphasizing that this is required for there to be *two* surfaces, as there plainly are (since if the cone were geometrical there would only be one plane), and (as in LS) takes Chrysippus to be puzzled about how to respond, finding neither equal nor unequal and larger yet not exceeding inadequate as solutions. Finally, M. J. White, “The Stoic Model,” argues simply that limits are mental constructs and hence cannot be either equal or unequal (a move that I endorse), but also endorses LS’ idea that Chrysippus is just puzzled; although he embraces LS and Sambursky in attributing the notion of the limit, he is also (wisely) qualified in what modern mathematical notions he is willing to attribute to Chrysippus, and resists Sambursky’s idea that the Stoics were eliminating surfaces altogether.

³⁷ Cherniss, *Plutarch: Moralia*, 814.

and then there is the technical domain of body as such, solid homogeneous mass for which infinite divisibility is not decomposition into parts and limits are imposed by us.³⁸

So when Chrysippus says that in the context of infinite divisibility we must say neither of which nor of how many parts we consist, he is not introducing a trichotomy, although Plutarch takes him that way. Chrysippus is simply declining either to specify or to enumerate the parts of the continuum at all—because there are no parts. Thus he is not subject to Plutarch's demand that he produce a number that is intermediate between finite and infinite, like what is indifferent is intermediate between good and bad. He is not subject to this demand, first, because Chrysippus is not offering a trichotomy at all, and, second, because (as is well known) what is indifferent is *not* intermediate between good and bad, but a different kind of value altogether. Thus Plutarch commits a category mistake twice over, demanding a number (or value same in kind), and demanding that it be intermediate. So, when Plutarch goes on to cast the move as saying the number of parts is neither finite nor infinite and likens it to saying that an argument is made up of premises that are neither true nor false, we can see that a category mistake is being made, and the Stoics are not committed to an intermediate truth value, or to the suspension of bivalence. Just as the number of parts is neither finite nor infinite because there is no number of parts at all, it is available to the Stoics to say that a premise is neither true nor false because it is not a premise at all—perhaps in being mentioned rather than used, and hence having a lexical meaning but not the full truth conditions associated with a particular utterance that *subsists* according to the rational impression (as argued in Chapter 12).³⁹ Not that the Stoics did say this—while good-bad-indifferent is a bona fide Stoic trichotomy of value (misapplied by Plutarch), true-false-neither true nor false is not

³⁸ I take this to be compatible with but not to require M. J. White's fuzzy account of the corporeal world, "The Stoic Model." Scade, "Cosmological Limits," 143–4, sees the ambiguity between mathematical and physical paradigms in this context, but pursues the notion of Stoic limits down a Platonic path according to which limits are to be assimilated to ratio and play an important role in cosmology. Cf. Drozdek, "Infinity," who takes all limits to subsist only in the mind, and hence all whole/part distinctions to be up to us.

³⁹ Unfortunately, Nolan, "Stoic Trichotomies," does not address this part of Plutarch; he exemplifies the trichotomy true, false, and neither true nor false with predicates and subjects, genera and species, and question, oaths, prayers, et al. and ultimately doubts whether these cases are really part of the dialectical pattern of Stoic trichotomies. Plutarch's case is interesting because talk of premises puts it outside all these cases, since the premise of an argument will always be (or be composed of) *axiōmata*, which are complete assertoric *lekta*. My conjecture, which preserves the form of Nolan's response, is that such premises would be neither true nor false because they would not yet be eligible for truth value, for example if they were merely mentioned rather than used. This solution is perhaps akin to the "missing assertible" strategy Nolan considers (attributed to Bobzien and to Caston), according to which there is a failure to achieve a truth value because a proposition is not expressed, but rejects for reasons I do not follow ("Stoic Trichotomies," 226–7). There is no reason to suppose that in recognizing *some* propositions to be neither true nor false without violating bivalence, and hence conforming to and confirming the pattern of trichotomies, one is thereby committed to treating propositions *about*

a trichotomy of *axiōmata* or premises, just as finite-infinite-neither finite nor infinite is not a trichotomy of numbers.⁴⁰

Next, at 1079D, Plutarch introduces a further response Chrysippus makes to the atomist challenge that the continuum theorist does away with equality and inequality. This one takes the case of a pyramid, which Chrysippus says has faces that are “unequal without exceeding where they are larger.”⁴¹ He is thereby committed to there being equality and inequality, albeit without excess and defect (I will return to what it means for something to be larger without exceeding). From this possibility Plutarch deduces the contradictions that “what is unequal will be equal, what is larger will not be larger, and smaller smaller.” Note that the form of this case is also not a trichotomy. The commitment to being larger without exceeding does not have the same “neither. . .nor” structure, and the problem Plutarch presses is not about finding the (putative) intermediate, but the contradiction that the equal is made unequal. It is easy, but by no means obligatory, to move from “larger without exceeding” to “neither equal (since larger) nor unequal (since not exceeding)” as scholars have.⁴²

A parallel case suggests that resisting the move to a trichotomy is correct. Earlier, from the positive thesis of blending, which we might characterize in parallel form as coextension without fusion, or addition without increase (to capture the puzzles from volume, Chapter 4), Plutarch generates absurdities like three is four, the impossibility of being in or encompassed, and a naval battle with a leg dissolved in the sea (1078A–E); now, again, from the positive thesis that the edges of the pyramid are greater without exceeding, Plutarch generates the result that the equal will be unequal. So not only is there no reason to press “greater without exceeding” into a “neither. . .nor” form, there is in addition good reason to emphasize its standing as a positive physical thesis on par with blending.

This brings us to the cone passage itself now. The dilemma, again (F1), is: if a cone is cut parallel to its base, will the surfaces of the segments be equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone will be uneven, with steps up the side; and if they are equal, then the cone has become a cylinder. Chrysippus’ response is that the surfaces, on the one hand, will be neither equal nor unequal (F2a), while the

trichotomies as being themselves neither true nor false. Regarding the trichotomy that Caston discusses, “Something and Nothing,” 192–5, that the genus Something is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, there need not be a paradox or other problem here (by which to generate a developmental account); to say that Something is the highest ontological genus is not to render it as a concept itself (this seems to conflate the object language with the meta language).

⁴⁰ There is evidence of impressions that are neither true nor false, generic impressions involving kinds, e.g. the generic human is neither Greek nor barbarian (SE, *M.* 7.246 (30F)), but not that there are *axiōmata* that are neither true nor false; see previous note.

⁴¹ ἀνίσος μὲν εἶναι μὴ ὑπερέχειν δὲ ἢ μείζοντες εἶσιν.

⁴² E.g. Sedley, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 393, who is explicit about it.

bodies will be unequal (F2b), in light of the surfaces being neither (F2c). Just as in the first case, where Chrysippus makes a category distinction between the rough question (according to which there are parts and magnitude) and the precise question invoking infinite divisibility (according to which there are no parts and composition is not at issue), here again he responds with a category distinction. This time it is a distinction between mathematical or geometrical and physical domains, whether the question is put about an idealized cone or a physical cone.

When Chrysippus says that Democritus is mistaken (*agnooun*), he means this in two ways. First in thinking that the dilemma between equal and unequal is exhaustive. One can say, instead, that the surfaces of the cut cone in the mathematical domain are neither equal nor unequal, i.e. the question of their equality does not arise, because geometrical objects are neither corporeal nor incorporeal and thus not extended at all. As idealized entities that *subsist kat' epinoian*, geometrical cones (and their surfaces) have no size and therefore cannot be equal or unequal. In this third response, we do have a genuine trichotomy in play: the geometrical surfaces are neither equal nor unequal because they are neither corporeal nor incorporeal.⁴³ This is our most direct evidence that geometrical limits *subsisting kat' epinoian* are considered neither corporeal nor incorporeal.⁴⁴

The other way Chrysippus takes Democritus to be mistaken is in thinking that in the physical context the dilemma is fatal on both horns. Whereas the surfaces of a geometrical cone will be neither equal nor unequal because they have no extension to measure, the two halves at the each physical cut will be unequal where they are cut apart—without resulting in step-like notches. This is how Chrysippus rescues equality and inequality in response to the atomist challenge. The reason this option is available to Chrysippus but not to Democritus is that continuum physics accommodates the possibility that a body (or incorporeal surface) can be larger without exceeding—as in the case of the pyramid. An atomist, on the other hand, proceeds by indivisible units so that anything larger will always exceed by at least one unit. It is here that the work scholars have done in terms of infinitesimals and the mathematics of limit is most valuable, in explaining how a body can be larger without exceeding.⁴⁵ It is not, however, necessary for understanding why the surfaces of the geometrical cone are neither equal nor unequal.

Nor, I suggest, is it necessary to delve into interpretive debates about whether the puzzle presupposes atomism, whether the cone is physical or geometrical, or the number of cuts and surfaces in order to understand Democritus' dilemma, or

⁴³ LS, 165, 301, do list this passage among their cases of characteristically Stoic trichotomies, but do not take it as being *about* geometrical limits or in support of the thesis that limits are products of thought.

⁴⁴ Thus I resist the idea of Robertson, "Mathematical Objects," n. 17, following Bréhier and Cherniss against Hahm, that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal because (or maybe since) as incorporeals they are *non-existent* and can't have corporeal properties like size. I am arguing that the spatial incorporeals *do* have size, i.e. they are extended; it is geometrical limits that have no size.

⁴⁵ See n. 36 above for bibliography.

Chrysippus' response. The Democritean dilemma is certainly subject to all these ways of filling in, but the dilemma might well be posed as an open-ended puzzle; Democritus need not have made all these decisions in order to put the puzzle.⁴⁶ And Chrysippus, likewise, need not take a stand on all these questions in order to make the distinction between the geometrical cone for which the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal, and the physical cone for which the resulting bodies are unequal in the sense of being larger without exceeding. Chrysippus takes the case of the cone, which is neutral in its set-up, and gives it two different (and compatible) readings: on the geometrical reading, the answer to the puzzle is that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal because they are not extended entities; on the physical reading, he takes the first horn of the dilemma, and says that the bodies are unequal, but without giving in to the result that it has step-like incisions. Thus, Democritus is mistaken on two counts, in thinking that his dichotomy is exhaustive, and in thinking that the first horn leads to jagged edges.

That this is the dialectic can be confirmed by Plutarch's criticism of Chrysippus' response (1080A–B), which I paraphrase here:

This makes no sense! (1) If the bodies are unequal, then so are their surfaces (unless you want to leave a little piece of body without a surface and hence limitless, which is absurd). (2) For, if he thinks he's solving the cone puzzle, he refutes himself in saying: "For the nicks which he [sc. Democritus] suspects in the case of the cone, the inequality of the bodies produces, and not the inequality of the surfaces." It is ridiculous, therefore, to exclude the surfaces and leave the body convicted of inequality. (3) There is no legitimate account of what it means to be neither equal nor unequal because there is nothing intermediate between equal and unequal.

The first point Plutarch makes is that it is impossible for the size of a body and its surface to differ in size (on pain of leaving a piece of the body to be limitless, or infinite). He takes this to follow for Chrysippus because in responding to Democritus he says that the bodies are unequal and the surfaces are not unequal. What Plutarch ignores, of course, is that Chrysippus does *not* take the incorporeal surface of a body to differ in size from the body according to which it *subsists*; on the contrary, he would agree that this is absurd. He ignores the category distinction that Chrysippus makes between a physical cone, for which the size of the bodies and their incorporeal surfaces alike will be unequal, and a geometrical cone for which the surfaces have no size at all and are therefore neither equal nor unequal

⁴⁶ That said, I have made some elementary commitments in my analysis: I take the puzzle to be open-ended this way; I take Chrysippus' response to be given by Stoic lights against Chrysippus rather than atomistic lights; I recognize that multiple cuts are required to generate several notches or a cylinder, but take the problem to get off the ground with one cut.

(which, it should be noted, is not tantamount to saying they are both unequal and equal). There is no entity that is both unequal and neither equal nor unequal.

The second point Plutarch makes is that Chrysippus doesn't even solve the puzzle of the cone by saying the bodies are unequal; indeed he refutes himself and makes himself subject to the steps horn of the dilemma insofar as he explicitly calls out Democritus for failing to see that the unequal bodies are what create the jagged edges. So the strategy of saying that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal is useless as a solution to the dilemma, since he still leaves himself subject to the steps horn of the dilemma in making the bodies unequal.

The third point then turns to the absurdity of maintaining that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal. If two surfaces are neither equal nor unequal then size and number are too, and there is no equality or inequality at all. The structure of Plutarch's criticism is that (1) Chrysippus can't give both answers at once (which is true if they are taken to apply to the same domain rather than as a category distinction), nor can he give either one of the answers on its own: (2) saying the bodies are unequal does not solve the problem, indeed it impales him on the step-like horn; and (3) saying they are neither is absurd, because there is no intermediate between equal and unequal.

But Plutarch is wrong that Chrysippus can't give both answers at once, because he is making a distinction between two different phenomena, not saying that one thing is both unequal and neither equal nor unequal. Hence Democritus is mistaken that his dichotomy is exhaustive; there is the option to say the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal in the geometrical case. Plutarch is also wrong that Chrysippus is subject to the steps horn of the dilemma in saying the bodies are unequal because he, in contrast to the atomist, has the option to say that they are unequal without exceeding. So the move to quote Chrysippus back to himself fails. Finally, there is no absurdity in saying that the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal because this is not the claim that there is some intermediate, but the claim that these surfaces have no size at all. The trichotomy corporeal-incorporeal-neither corporeal nor incorporeal, like good-bad-indifferent, does not involve an intermediate; these are differences in kind. Thus Chrysippus does solve Democritus' puzzle, twice over.

One might yet be puzzled about two things in Chrysippus' response: the slide from saying in F2a that the *surfaces* are neither equal nor unequal to saying in F2b that the *bodies* are unequal, and how exactly the first answer licenses the second, as explained in F2c. My hunch is that the reason Chrysippus moves from saying the *surfaces* are neither equal nor unequal to saying the *bodies* are unequal is to highlight the contrast between the geometrical and the physical domains. To the extent that the bodies are unequal, their incorporeal surfaces will certainly be unequal as well, so the slide in language is not a denial that the *incorporeal* surfaces would be equal or unequal but a denial that the geometrical surfaces would be either equal or unequal. As to the second question, how the surfaces being neither equal nor unequal licenses saying the bodies are unequal, it is indeed puzzling what to make

of the “in light of” locution in F2c, which Long & Sedley render as “thanks to,” and Michael White has as “because of the fact that.” These are equally good ways of translating the dative clause that ties the inequality of the bodies to the surfaces’ being neither equal nor unequal, and equally uninformative about what underwrites the inference.⁴⁷

My hunch is that if the geometrical cone were treated as extended, and thus having size, then the Democritean dilemma would threaten because in the mathematical context, where divisions are precise, there could not be anything larger without exceeding. This larger-without-exceeding option is only available where there is infinite divisibility, and infinite divisibility is a physical thesis that does not apply to idealized entities or products of thought. Part of the Stoic lesson may be, perhaps in resistance to Plato’s *Timaeus*, that physics is not geometry. Now, someone might object here with evidence in Stobaeus that surface and line *are* divisible to infinity for the Stoics: “Chrysippus said that bodies are divisible to infinity (*eis apeiron temnesthai*), as well as things comparable (*ta proseiokota*) to bodies, such as surface, line, place, void, and time” (Stobaeus 1.142,2–6 (50A, passage G/Chapter 3)).

However, in this context it is clearly body and the incorporeals that are treated as divisible to infinity; surface and line appear unremarkably alongside place, void, and time on this list. It is incorporeal limits that have size and are divisible to infinity, not geometrical limits that lack extension altogether. The concept of larger without exceeding, which is a function of the continuum, would not apply in the geometrical domain and the Democritean dilemma would threaten; but since geometrical objects are not extended, the problem does not arise. So my suggestion about the inference (F2c) from the surfaces being neither equal nor unequal (F2a) to the bodies being unequal (F2b) is that having dodged the dilemma in the geometrical domain by saying the surfaces are neither equal nor unequal, Chrysippus can now answer for the physical domain, where infinite divisibility does apply and bodies can be unequal without exceeding. It’s not that mathematical surfaces being neither equal nor unequal *makes* the bodies unequal; it’s the much weaker dialectical inference that with the geometrical context handled, he can now complete his response to Democritus and embrace the unequal horn of the dilemma without falling into step-like notches.

Conclusions

If I am right in this analysis, we are in a position to connect this testimony that uses the “neither. . .nor” locution to Stoic limits that *subsist* according to thought. We

⁴⁷ Robertson, “Mathematical Objects,” n. 16, following Hahm and Cherniss, denies there is any inference at all; this option is appealing, at least as a fallback position, but I will hazard a guess anyway.

saw in the last section good evidence that the limits of the continuum *subsist kat' epinoian*, and now we see that geometrical limits are characterized as neither equal nor unequal. The reason is not hard to find: those things that *subsist kat' epinoian* have no extension to measure—they are neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Thus, we find that Long & Sedley's posit of a tripartite ontology already has much to recommend it. Recognizing a class of *subsistent* entities that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, which *subsist* according to thought (*kat' epinoian*), alongside and complementary to the incorporeals that *subsist* according to underlying body, allows us to defuse and dissolve persistent interpretive difficulties about the status of limits in Stoicism, to make the most of our scant textual evidence, and to reveal a principled and coherent orthodoxy.

Although the details are still slim, we can see at least in broad outline how this will remain a physicalist account. Because our thoughts and diagrams are themselves bodies, products of thought that *subsist kat' epinoian* will also be grounded in body. They will not be grounded in body the way the incorporeals are, to be sure. Indeed, how could they be privations when pure products of thought correspond to nothing in the physical (corporeal and incorporeal) world; this is M. J. White's insight in observing that limit entities that are mental constructions *kat' epinoian* *mis*-represent the world. This is a different grounding relation, now, no longer a case of privation or abstraction, but of construction.

Creatures of Fiction

*et quicquid aliud falso cogitatione formatum habere
aliquam imaginem coepit quamvis non habeat substantiam*¹

To get a better understanding of this grounding relation (*subsistence* according to thought, or *kat' epinoian*), which underwrites the third category of Something (what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal), I turn now to Seneca's *Epistle* 58, where we encounter mental constructs of a different kind: creatures of fiction, e.g. centaurs and giants. This is a famously vexed text, which commentators have put to work in varied ways, with varying results for the Stoic ontology. This chapter will pursue a close textual reading of the central passage in order to elucidate and fill in the principle of *subsistence kat' epinoian* established in connection with idealized limits in the last chapter. This principle, which explains how pure products of thought can become Something, will be filled in and applied univocally to creatures of fiction and idealized limits, thus confirming Long & Sedley's posit of a tripartite ontology.

Before I present and analyze the passage, let me say a little bit about Seneca as a Stoic and a reporter of Stoic doctrine. As I mentioned in the Introduction, evidence of Stoicism in (and from) the Roman era must be handled with care. It is hard to determine who the Roman Stoics are and which views to understand as orthodox, and these decisions are inextricable, as we will see here with Seneca. Do Seneca's departures from orthodox Stoicism tell us that Stoicism is evolving, or that Seneca is not orthodox? During a time when philosophical schools were in active conversation, there was widespread syncretizing, which makes it especially hard to judge the boundaries of Stoic doctrine. David Sedley addresses this topic directly, and finds Stoicism evolving with Seneca into a more Platonic metaphysics.² So, too, Ricardo Salles, who argues against the idea that the differences between Roman Stoics "and their early predecessors were not understood as genuinely Stoic developments, but as the expression of external influences alien to the true spirit of Stoicism."³ I will

¹ Seneca, *Ep.* 58.15 (27A, passage A below).

² Sedley, "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome"; Ju, "Geometrical Limits," follows Sedley in this, endorsing a strongly developmental account that finds the Stoics disjointed in their treatment of limits. Cf. Brunschwig, *TGS*, "Stoic Metaphysics"; Graver & Long, *Seneca*, xvii; Mansfeld, "Substance, Being and Division."

³ Salles, "Roman Stoicism," 541.

argue that Seneca's disavowal of Something as the highest genus in *Epistle* 58 is not a genuinely Stoic development. Seneca's avowedly anti-Stoic commitments are good evidence in support of a genuine orthodoxy from which Seneca departs. In fact, it is when Seneca self-identifies as a Stoic and puts forth positive doctrine, when he Stoicizes, that his testimony should be considered more suspect. Accordingly, his hostile reports concerning the genus Something serve to confirm the orthodoxy rather than modify, develop, or cloud the ontology. Seneca counts as a Stoic because he says so, and in many respects he is a Stoic, but insofar as he explicitly sets himself apart from the Stoics in rejecting the genus Something and given that he is the only Stoic to do so, we do not have here evidence of an evolving orthodoxy, but of heterodoxy. The denial of Something as the highest genus is thus not a part of the coarse-grained orthodoxy that I find in the Stoics; more on these issues in Chapter 16.

In contrast to those who confidently take *Epistle* 58 as evidence of an evolving Stoic orthodoxy, Brad Inwood has expressed important "doubts about our ability to use this text as a reliable source for mainstream Stoic theories."⁴ In a salutary discussion in his commentary on Seneca's letters, Inwood emphasizes the distance between Seneca's own ontology and the mainstream Stoic view of Something, as well as the respects in which Seneca remains orthodox in his commitments to the coarse tenets of Stoic corporealism in *Epistle* 58.⁵ Although he is ultimately skeptical that Seneca's heterodoxy about the genus is sufficient to "de-list" him as a Stoic (commitments to Something not being criterial in that way),⁶ Inwood's cautions here on *Epistle* 58 (as with those questioning the systematicity of Stoicism found in Cicero)⁷ are essential to a balanced picture.

Seneca, *Epistle* 58

These important words of caution notwithstanding, I think we can learn more from the passage than Inwood allows. Here is the target text.

- A. The Stoics want to place above this [sc. the existent (*quod est*)] yet another, more primary genus [. . .] Some Stoics see "something" (*quid*) as the primary genus; and I will suggest why they see it so. "In the world's nature (*in rerum natura*)," they say, "some things exist (*quaedam sunt*) and some things do not exist (*quaedam non sunt*). Moreover (*autem*), also included in the world's nature, are those things that do not exist (*quae non sunt*) that are things which the mind has access to (*animo succurrunt*), such as centaurs, giants

⁴ Inwood, *Seneca*, 121.

⁵ For dissent on this particular point, on the basis that Seneca is concerned with *being* and *non-being* whereas the early and orthodox Stoics are not metaphysically minded, see Vogt, "Brutes," 147.

⁶ Inwood, *Seneca*, and in correspondence.

⁷ Inwood, "Unified."

and whatever else falsely formed by thought (*quicquid aliud falso cogitatione formatum*) begins to take on some image (*habere aliquam imaginem coepit*), despite not having substance (*quamvis non habeat substantiam*)."

Seneca, *Ep.* 58.13...15 (27A)

The central puzzle with this text is that where one might expect Seneca to list the incorporeals as things that do not *exist*, he lists instead centaurs and giants—for which there is no other supporting textual evidence. Understanding why he does this is key to unlocking the text as testimony for Stoic doctrine. For that, we need to situate the passage in its full context; I take the structure and dialectic of Seneca's letter to be as follows:

- i. I will have to render "to on" by "*quod est*" (and "ousia" by "*essential*"), given the tremendous poverty of Latin next to Greek (1–7)⁸
- ii. There are six ways Plato speaks of *quod est*, but first I want to tell you about genus and species, which are arrived at by reckoning up from the particulars (8)
 - a. Introduction of Seneca's own genera of being, reckoning up to *quod est* as highest genus set over bodies (*corporalia*) and incorporeals (*incorporalea*) (9–12)
 - b. Forecast that the Stoics put Something (*quid*) above *quod est* (13; first sentence of passage A)
 - c. Proof by top-down reckoning that Seneca's own ontology is correct—*nihil tertium est* (14)⁹
 - d. As opposed to some Stoics, who want to put Something above *quod est* to make room for (otiose) entities such as centaurs and giants (15; rest of Passage G)
- iii. Return to the topic of Plato's taxonomy of things that are (*quaedam sunt*) (16–24)¹⁰
- iv. Relevance of such distinctions to living the good life (to get your priorities straight!) (25–37)

⁸ Vogt, "Brutes," 147–9, argues that these opening reflections show Seneca "is setting his philosophizing into the framework of the study of being, and he is aware that he needs to do some explaining," which proves the early Stoics were not engaged in metaphysics; however, one could also take Seneca's bemoaning the poverty of Latin to say that Latin is impoverished relative to Greek in its ability to capture metaphysical distinctions. For thoughts along these lines, see Boethius, *Contra Eutychen et Nesotirus* 3.30–5, 59–79.

⁹ Inwood, *Seneca*, 120, takes 14 to confirm Plato's classificatory division rather than Seneca's own, which is clearly distinct given how explicitly Seneca marks his departure from and return to Plato's; this point also seems at odds with Inwood's own observation that Seneca's ontology is incompatible with Plato's.

¹⁰ I do not address this part of the text, as I take it to be Seneca's syncretized account of Plato, and I think it is misguided to take this taxonomy as evidence of Stoic thought, as Hadot, *Porphyre*, 159–61, does.

What the context shows is that Seneca himself takes *quod est*, or *what is*, to be the highest ontological genus, set over bodies and incorporeals alone, and that in this he stands explicitly against “some Stoics” who see Something as the highest genus. Seneca’s strategy is to show that with bodies and incorporeals accounted for as species of *quod est*, the higher genus is useful only for creatures of fiction, which makes the genus look otiose. What this context does not show is that Seneca is speaking as an orthodox Stoic when he says such things. In fact, he explicitly sets himself apart from the Stoics, and, in that respect, he is a valuable source of information about what the Stoic orthodoxy is. I suggest that “some Stoics” refers not to a late-breaking deviant line of thinkers who discover creatures of fiction and (in ad hoc fashion) slap on a new highest genus (a line that I will argue in Chapter 16 does not exist), but to Stoics other than Seneca himself. In fact, his first report about the genus Something in 13 is attributed to the Stoics generically. Seneca is clear in his departures from Stoicism and authoritative about what he departs from. Crucially, if there is no reason to think of the move to Something as the work of a few rogue Stoics, rather than established orthodoxy, then Seneca’s report that the genus includes centaurs, giants, and other products of thought need not go that way either.¹¹

Seneca’s heterodoxy begins with his classing incorporeals under the heading of *quod est*, and culminates with his rejection of Something as highest genus introduced only to cover things that clearly do not exist. The reason Seneca lists centaurs and giants as cases of *what is not*, where we would expect incorporeals, then, is that he is trying to do away with Something as the highest genus; his strategy is to reclassify the incorporeals under *quod est* and leave only the most improbable products of thought to speak for the genus Something.¹² Whether being devised just to cover creatures of fiction would render the genus Something otiose or not, the crucial point for my purposes is that Seneca’s dialectical strategy testifies to creatures of fiction in the tripartite ontology as a matter of Stoic orthodoxy. I take it that Seneca is *rearranging* orthodox entities within the orthodox ontology, leaving only centaurs and giants to recommend the highest genus Something. If this were his strategy it would make sense for Seneca to choose figments to represent the category, rather than geometrical limits or limits of the continuum, which might seem more serious and worthy of consideration. Thus, I take Seneca’s report as evidence that creatures of fiction are orthodox Somethings.

With this commitment to creatures of fiction as Something in hand, I propose to look more closely at passage A to see what we can glean from Seneca about these products of thought; as always, the devil is in the details. First we are told that some Stoics see Something as the highest genus, and that he will suggest why

¹¹ That Something is original to Zeno has been argued by Brunschwig, *TGS*, developed by me here in Chapter 2, and will be completed in Chapter 16.

¹² As Inwood, *Seneca*, 123, also sees it.

they think so. Next he explains, with a caricature, that “in the world’s nature (*in rerum natura*). . . some things exist (*quaedam sunt*) and some things do not exist (*quaedam non sunt*).”¹³ This is an orthodox division to the extent that anything that is not a body is *non-existent* (as in Chapter 2); it may be a dialectical advantage for Seneca to put things that way, to make the category less appealing.

Next we are told: “Moreover, included in the world’s nature are even those things-that-are-not (*quae non sunt*) that the mind has access to (*quae animo succurrunt*), such as centaurs, giants, and whatever else falsely formed by thought (*et quicquid aliud falso cogitatione formatum*) begins to take on some image, despite not having substance.” I hyphenate things-that-are-not (i.e. things that do not *exist*) to make the syntax of the *quae*. . . *quae* construction and its sense transparent. The idea is that further to (“moreover”) the division of what there is (“in the world’s nature”) into things that *exist* and things that do not *exist*, these Stoics include under the division into *non-existent* even *non-existent* entities like centaurs and giants. This leaves open that there might be other things that do not *exist* and are part of what there is; technically it says only that there are creatures of fiction among things that do not *exist*.¹⁴

Now, being included in the world’s nature does not, of course, mean literally that there are centaurs and giants walking around in nature,¹⁵ but neither does it admit entities of any kind at all; in particular it need not admit Meinongian or Platonic abstracta for the Stoics. The phrase “the world’s nature” is a generic way of making reference to what there is, whatever one admits to the ontology; Seneca may even intend it this way, since he is portraying the Stoics as introducing Something in order to cover these entities that have been recognized among what there is. For our purposes, the point is that because what there is for the Stoics is Something, we can expect that only what meets the *subsistence* criterion (as described in Chapter 2) will be part of the world’s nature. This criterion already excludes Plato’s Forms and other abstracta that do not pass the Not Someone (*Outis*) test: If *x* is in Athens, then it is not in Megara (if this statement comes out false, then *x* is not Something). And we have reason to expect that the world’s nature will continue to be a one-world metaphysics, with not only the incorporeals grounded in body but also what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Including creatures of fiction as Something that does not *exist* need not be a violation of Stoic physicalism.¹⁶ In

¹³ That this is a caricature and not a quote is evidenced by the fact that no one is named, and Seneca says that “they say” these things.

¹⁴ According to this weak reading, then, there is room for other things that do not *exist*, whereas on a stronger reading things that do not *exist* would be equated with creatures of fiction. BS 2.1 translate the stronger way: “these things that do not exist. . . are those that present themselves to the mind. . .”

¹⁵ Pace Elorduy, *ap. Caston*, “Nothing and Something,” n. 57.

¹⁶ Perhaps *this* is Xenocrates’ legacy to Zeno, via Polemo: to give everything alike its place in the universe. Whereas Hunt, *Physical Interpretation*, 11–3, suggests that Xenocrates (via Polemo) awakened Zeno’s interest in physical theory (i.e. physics and cosmology), I would suggest that it was his interest in physicalism (i.e. a one-world metaphysics) that was awakened.

fact, I think the description Seneca gives can tell us quite a bit about how the Stoics accommodate these entities in a physicalist system. Let us take each part of this description individually.

quae animo succurrunt—What does it mean for these entities to be described as things that enter the mind, occur to the mind, present themselves to, or strike the mind, as scholars have understood it?¹⁷ One might think this indicates that they are products of thought. However, that is what the next part of the description does. This part is registering these entities as *objects* of thought, intelligible impressors (to invoke again the drill sergeant passage that distinguishes between sensory and non-sensory impressors, Passage D/Chapter 2).¹⁸ Most recently, Inwood has rendered the phrase as “things which the mind has access to,” and I follow him in this because it captures this intuition so well.¹⁹ As things that strike the mind or enter the mind, they are impressors the mind can access; indeed, this is why they count as Something.²⁰ What follows is an account of how they get to be intelligible impressors.

quicquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum—The next part of the report gives us the examples of centaurs and giants, and then generalizes to “whatever else is falsely formed by thought” (trans. LS). Here we *are* told that creatures of fiction are products of thought.²¹ On this scholars agree, even while details in the translations vary.²² This idea of being falsely formed by thought lines up with M. J. White’s insight that limits *kat’ epinoian* mis-represent the world; they are akin in that limits of the continuum are also falsely formed by thought. There are no precise divisions of the continuum, nor any perfect cones, whether corporeal or incorporeal; nor, likewise, are there any centaurs and giants. Seneca has singled out creatures of fiction to exemplify Somethings that do not *exist*, since his goal is to show that the genus Something is otiose, but the door is open for the orthodox Stoic to admit

¹⁷ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 54; Graver & Long, *Seneca*; Inwood, *Seneca*; LS; Mansfeld, *Heresiography*, 100; Sedley, “Stoic Metaphysics at Rome,” 124. Contrast with Gummere, *Seneca*: “what these are will readily occur to the mind.”

¹⁸ See also DL 7.53 (39D) for figments as impressors.

¹⁹ Inwood, *Later Stoicism*, IV–14.

²⁰ Thus I go part way with the suggestion of Graver & Long, *Seneca*, n. 58.15, that centaurs and the like are Something because we have an image of them in our minds and can speak coherently about them; I embrace this in the spirit of being proper objects of thought and discourse as described in Chapter 2, with the caveat that having an image in our minds should correspond to them being impressors, not to their being products of thought, or needing to be someone’s mental image in order to *subsist* (if that means they go in and out of *subsistence* as people do and don’t have those mental images); in this caveat, and in resisting their Meinongian interpretation, I differ also from LS, 164.

²¹ I do not think that this description is meant to include concepts as things falsely formed by thought, as Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 175–6 argues. Concepts are excluded here because they are not things that enter the mind, or that the mind has access to as impressors, as I will argue in Chapter 15.

²² E.g. “whatever else is devised by fictive thinking” (Graver & Long, *Seneca*); “all other figments of unsound reasoning” (Gummere, *Seneca*); “whatever else is shaped by an erroneous thought process” (Inwood, *Seneca*); “anything else that takes shape because of a false thought process” (Inwood, *Later Stoicism*).

other such entities. And (as we saw in the last chapter) limits of the continuum fit the description; they are falsely formed by thought, corresponding to no impressor (Aëtius, 4.12.1–5 (39B, passage F/Chapter 12)). This explains how entities of such different domains—physics (limits of the continuum), geometry (geometrical limits), and creatures of fiction (e.g. centaurs, giants)—can be comfortable bedfellows. They are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, like the surfaces of a geometrical cone, because certain physical questions about them simply do not arise, e.g. whether they are equal or unequal, how much a centaur weighs, or how many Fahrenheits there are in a room.²³ They correspond to no object or natural joint in the physical world—which does not banish them to another world, but does invite an account of how products of thought can be part of the physical world. For this we turn to the next piece of the description.

habere aliquam imaginem coepit—Seneca tells us that these products of thought begin to have or take on some image, or imagistic consistency, or appearance.²⁴ Inwood more recently goes with “creates an appearance,” and Gummere “which have begun to have a definite shape.”²⁵ These latter two translations especially convey the idea of the creation or construction of something definite. Victor Caston argues that we should understand all of the foregoing as a case of concept formation, and align these products of thought with the concepts of the early Stoa; the idea is that to be something falsely formed by thought just is to be a figment (*phantasma*), and concepts (*ennoēmata*) are *phantasmata*, so if centaurs and giants are in the world’s nature as Something, then concepts must be Something too; thus, he argues, “some Stoics” refers to Zeno and Cleanthes.²⁶ I am not convinced that concept formation is invoked anywhere in this passage. It is true that the mental products of the imagination (the *phantastikon*) are figments (*phantasmata*), and that concepts are figments (Aëtius 4.12.1–5 (39B, passage F/Chapter 12), 1.10.5 (30B); DL 7.49–51 (39A), 7.60 (30C); Stobaeus 1.136,21–7,6 (30A, passage A/Chapter 15))—but not all figments are concepts. Figments of fictive thought are, rather, coordinate with *ennoēmata* as kinds of *phantasmata*. Concepts are a reflection of the world, they constitute our rationality, and they are epistemologically respectable; creatures of fiction, on the other hand, do not correspond to the world

²³ Note that this is true even if it is part of the characterization of centaurs that they have a certain weight; the fictional entity qua product of thought has no size or shape, although the character may have such characteristics. There is an affinity here with van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,” for whom creatures of fiction both exemplify properties (e.g. being a creature of fiction) and have properties as ascribed to them (as centaur has the property of being half horse ascribed to it).

²⁴ Sedley, “Stoic Metaphysics at Rome”; Inwood, *Seneca*; Graver & Long, *Seneca*, for the first; Brunschwig, *TGS*, and Caston, “Something and Nothing,” for the next, respectively.

²⁵ Inwood, *Later Stoicism*; Gummere, *Seneca*.

²⁶ Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 175–6. Inwood, *Seneca*, 121, expresses some doubts about Caston’s thesis, but adds that “even sceptics must concede that in this passage Seneca does use some language drawn from the Stoic theory of concept development to talk about the Centaurs and Giants”; cf. Bailey, “Structure.”

this way or play anything like the epistemological role that concepts play (on which more in the next chapter).

Furthermore, creatures of fiction are not figments. What I mean is that figments reside in the mind, as intentional objects falsely formed by thought, but creatures of fiction are public; they are what you get once those figments have begun to take on some image outside the mind. Beginning to take on some image does not describe what goes on in the mind; it describes how products of thought get their extra-mental reality. At some point, once a figment has been portrayed enough times in stories and, perhaps, illustrations, it takes on a certain life of its own and becomes Something that the mind has access to, a proper object of thought and discourse. This life of its own is what "*imaginem*" conveys; taking on some image is how a product of thought can become a proper object of thought and discourse, i.e. Something in its own right.²⁷

This is how entities that *subsist kat' epinoian* are grounded in body. Taking on some imagistic consistency is to be understood as the construction of an entity that is not spatiotemporally continuous like the incorporeals are, but is nonetheless an individual. The stories, texts, and illustrations are corporeal, and the mind that produces them is also corporeal; and what *subsists* according to these bodies is a creature that has taken on a life of its own to become a proper object of thought and discourse in its own right. Not unlike the drill sergeant's pattern that emerges from the sergeant's movements, the centaur emerges from the texts, stories, and illustrations that portray centaurs.²⁸ Grounding *kat' epinoian* is when a product of thought takes on a life of its own and becomes Something.²⁹

The Stoics do have the resources to make this point. The Stoics characterize dialects in terms of the way people speak in certain places, as a sort of meaning is use doctrine: "dialect is speech (*lexis*) that has been stamped or sealed (*kecharagmenē*) ethnically and Hellenically, or speech of a certain place, i.e. it is qualified according to dialect" (DL 7.56 (33H)).³⁰ The idea is that what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is also grounded in convention or local practice. This account applies as well to creatures of fiction as it does to limits. For example, at a certain point, Doge

²⁷ The Latin "*imaginem*" is properly translated as "image" but it is important to recognize that this need not imply that the image is a picture, copy, or otherwise literal likeness; the term can also be translated "representation," "echo," "shadow," or "conception."

²⁸ Thus, I do not think it is necessary or any more effective to treat centaurs as individual characters (as LS do in 27 and Brunschwig, *TGS*, 31), e.g. Chiron as a distinct individual from Lapithus; the individuality of the centaur does not come from its being one centaur as opposed to another (on this score the generic centaur and Chiron are on equal footing). Rather, the particularity of the centaur (and of Chiron in particular) is a function of the individual bodies in which it is grounded. Cf. Thein, "Stoic Fictions."

²⁹ Notice that it would not do simply for a sufficiently large number of people to imagine the same creature coincidentally; there must be something sufficiently public and objective to ground the entity, which merely intentional objects are not. I will argue in the next chapter that concepts are not Something for this very reason, namely that they violate the thinkability criterion (not, as one might expect, the particularity criterion).

³⁰ For the suggestion that the *lekta* follow a certain Wittgensteinian meaning is use model, see Cimatti, "Λεκτόν and Use."

went from being a mere figment first thought up, to being portrayed in various memes, to becoming “a thing,” and even the face of the cryptocurrency Dogecoin.³¹ Geometrical objects and their limits, representing or corresponding to nothing in the world, are created by thought too, and then they count as Something according to the definitions, axioms, and illustrations that portray them. Thus different things come out true according to Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry.

Likewise, limits of the continuum are constructed by us and become Something by the definitions and descriptions we give them. Things like minutes and seconds are social constructs that *subsist* because we have invented them and adhere to these conventions; just as there are no Fahrenheits out there for us to tally up, neither are there any minutes or seconds as parts of time that we are tallying up. And the same goes for the divisions between day and night, months and years, the natural joints of sunrise and sunset notwithstanding (as argued in Chapter 11). In all these cases, the commitment to what counts as *now*, and to frameworks like seconds, minutes, and time, or Fahrenheit and Celsius, and to the axioms of geometry that make pyramids and cones what they are, is a function of convention, just as centaurs and giants are. There are no perfect triangles, either corporeal or incorporeal, there are no minutes, and there are no centaurs in the physical world. These are ways that we carve up and misrepresent the physical world. Nevertheless, they are among the things that are because they take on some imagistic consistency although they have no substance. . . a further point of contention.

quamvis non habeat substantiam—This brings me to the last exegetical thorn of the passage, what Seneca means in saying that centaurs and giants have no substance. We are told at the beginning of the letter that Seneca will render “*ousia*,” which we normally translate in English as “substance,” by “*essentia*,” so “*substantia*” cannot here be translated as “substance.” David Sedley argues that Seneca’s own technical coinage, “*substantia*,” corresponds to the Greek it literally renders, “*hupostasis*,” and infers that what we are really being told by Seneca is that centaurs and giants do not even have *subsistence*, i.e. they are not Somethings at all (but rather Not-Somethings). This is not innocuous; in this move, Sedley seems to offer evidence against the Long & Sedley commitment to figments as Something neither corporeal nor incorporeal.³²

In response, I would argue that while it is true that “*substantia*” renders the Greek “*hupostasis*,” this does not necessarily translate to the technical Stoic sense of “*hupostasis*.” In Seneca, it is more likely to be a Platonizing sense of the term, closer to the notion of corporeal existence that the church fathers make current

³¹ <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/doge>.

³² It is not clear whether Sedley means to reject the tripartite ontology altogether, or just to place figments outside Something with concepts as Not-Somethings. Ju, “Geometrical Limits,” 377–8, though she follows Sedley on *substantia*, takes this as evidence in favor of a tripartite ontology that includes figments as neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Bailey, “Structure,” argues from the non-*subsistence* of figments to Not-Somethings.

than to the ontological status of Stoic *non-existents*. As Sedley emphasizes, Seneca is emblematic of the syncretism of the era, so his transliteration of “*hupostasis*” into Latin may not be intended to conjure Stoic *subsistence* but, rather, the current Platonizing sense of his time. Further, because the quoted words are a caricature rather than a direct quotation of any Stoic, we need not take the term in any orthodox or technical Stoic sense.

Boethius may be of assistance in seeing this.³³ In *Contra Eutychem* 3.44–79 (Stewart, Rand & Tester), Boethius reports that what the Greeks mean by “*ousiōsis*” is what they mean in Latin by “*subsistentia*,” while what the Greeks mean by “*hupostasis*” is what they mean in Latin by “*substantia*.” He goes on to say that a thing has *substantia* (i.e. *hupostasis*) when it provides a substrate enabling other things to be, and is their subject. This is clearly not the Stoic notion of *subsistence*, and in fact is best rendered in line with Boethius’ report as “substance,” with all its implications of corporeality, fundamentality, and existence. Jacques Brunschwig renders “*substantia*” simply as “existence,” which captures both Seneca’s meaning and the Stoics’ perfectly well.³⁴ But “substance” does too: centaurs and giants are Something because, although they are falsely formed by thought, they have taken on some image, taken on a life of their own, and thus are Something in their own right, despite not having corporeal *substance*, despite not *existing*.³⁵ Inwood offers “reality” for “*substantia*”; to the extent that this excludes centaurs and giants from the ontology altogether I reject this along with Sedley’s “*subsistence*.”³⁶ The fact that figments have no material correlate in the world does not show that they lack all reality. Indeed, if Seneca is arguing that the genus Something is otiose because it includes only things that clearly *are not* (as Inwood thinks and I agree), it would be strange for him to portray these very Stoics as denying that they are Something. I conclude that Seneca’s testimony does not deny that centaurs and giants *subsist* in the technical Stoic sense.

Conclusions

In sum, what Seneca reports is that for the orthodox Stoics (“some Stoics,” i.e. those other than Seneca), among the *non-existent* Somethings in the world’s nature there are entities like centaurs and giants, which are accessible to the mind (*quae animo succurrunt*); these are non-sensory impressors. What follows is an account

³³ I am indebted to conversation and correspondence with Andrew Arlig on Boethius and the evolution of the term “*hupostasis*.”

³⁴ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 54.

³⁵ Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division,” 100, goes with “substance” and glosses it as “the Stoic οὐσία or ὑποκείμενον, i.e. corporeal existence in the external world.” Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, goes with “reality” and equates *substantia* with *ousia*.

³⁶ Inwood, *Seneca*, 121–3. I also do not agree that *what is not* equates to incorporeal, or that having no material correlate can be accounted for entirely by an error theory.

of how what is falsely formed by thought (*falso cogitatione formatum*) gets to be Something like this, namely by beginning to take on some image (*habere aliquam imaginem coepit*), i.e. taking on a life of its own such that we can say true and false things about it. At some point Doge became a thing, just as Sherlock Holmes, Mickey Mouse, and, of course, centaurs and giants became a thing. And, I hasten to add, as did the Fahrenheit and Celsius scales; seconds, minutes, hours; cones and pyramids and their surfaces, lines, and points; and countless other social constructs. The dependence of these entities on the thoughts, stories, texts, and illustrations that portray them is their *subsistence kat' epinoian*, and this principle of *subsistence* is what unifies the category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal and underwrites the tripartite ontology.

Just as the incorporeals (spatial, temporal, and semantic) are all akin in being privations of underlying body, now we see that these entities that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal are all akin in being constructed by underlying body, i.e. falsely formed by thought. This is what I mean in calling these idealized entities pure products of thought, that they are constructs of the imagination (*phantastikon*) corresponding to no impressor in the world. In this they differ from *lekta*, which are also products of thought (*logistikon*), but by the privation of the grounding body, the rational impression, which does correspond to an impressor (on which see Chapter 12). Not only are privation and construction opposite metaphysical operations (the one subtracting, the other adding), but the mental operations of the grounding body are opposite as well (the one observing the world, the other making things up). And yet both are physicalist accounts.

This *subsistence* or grounding *kat' epinoian* also explains why these entities count as Something. We saw above that “*animo succurrunt*” signals that they are intelligible impressors that meet the thinkability criterion, that being falsely formed by thought indicates their grounds, and that taking on some image explains how they become Something distinct from their grounds. In addition to meeting the first part of the *subsistence* criterion, this grounding can now explain how such entities pass the Not Someone (*Outis*) test in addition: If *x* is in Athens, then it is not in Megara (if this statement comes out false, then *x* is not Something). The centaur *subsists* according to a certain set of texts and illustrations that portray it (in the role of Athens); that same centaur does not *subsist* according to a different set of texts and illustrations (in the role of Megara) without being a different individual.³⁷ Perhaps two cultures could create centaurs with the same characteristics independently of each other, in which case those would be two distinct centaurs that are alike.

And while the centaur may *subsist* in both Athens and Megara, if it is depicted in both places and becomes Something, the centaur is not being repeated in Athens

³⁷ And if the texts and illustrations in Athens and Megara should be said to portray the same centaur, then we would have misidentified the grounding bodies, not found a counterexample.

and Megara, as a Platonic entity would be, but is constructed out of thoughts, texts, and illustrations in both places. Because the grounding bodies are in several places, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal are not spatiotemporally continuous the way bodies and incorporeals are, but they are spatiotemporal phenomena and the Stoic account remains physicalist. Along the same lines, the Celsius and Fahrenheit scales by which we measure temperature, and the metric and imperial time units by which we limit the continuum of time, will be grounded in the writings that express the scales and systems. Geometrical entities and all their properties, too, will be grounded in the axioms of the relevant system. The entities that result from different systems, e.g. Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry, will be correspondingly different and particular. These are not universals repeated here and there, or abstracta smuggled in from another world, but non-spatiotemporally continuous individuals that are grounded in body.³⁸

If I am right about this, then we have good reason to embrace the Long & Sedley posit of a tripartite ontology, with Something set over bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. We now have a principle of *subsistence* or grounding *kat' epinoian*, which was recovered from testimony running consistently through limits of the continuum, geometrical limits, and creatures of fiction. This principle explains (at least in outline) why these entities count as Something in the physical world, and shows the way to a coherent and comprehensive one-world metaphysics.

Let us return to Kathrin Koslicki's varieties of ontological dependence to complete the account. Koslicki makes a distinction between Constituent Dependence, according to which entities are built up from their constituents, and Feature Dependence, according to which entities correspond to certain features of the grounding body. I have recommended that Constituent Dependence be thought of as coming in two kinds: the composition of a body out of several parts (that we find in the cosmology), and the constitution of a body out of one other part (that we find in the Categories), as described in Section II. Now I recommend that we think of Feature Dependence as coming in two kinds as well. To refresh: for Koslicki Φ is Feature Dependent on Ψ just in case (i) Ψ is a constituent in a Real Definition of Φ , and (ii) Φ corresponds to a real feature of Ψ .³⁹

As we saw in Section III, the Feature Dependence of the incorporeals is a kind of abstraction, an absence or privation of body; hence they are body-less. Here we find a different kind of Feature Dependence that is not a case of abstraction, but a case of construction, a reification. What *subsists kat' epinoian* is constructed from thoughts, stories, texts, and illustrations—not as a matter of subtracting from what

³⁸ Many of the grounding bodies, whether spoken or written words, will express *lekta*; thus it might be true that what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal depends on incorporeal *lekta* as well as on bodies. This is no slight to Stoic physicalism, however, because the *lekta* themselves are grounded in body.

³⁹ Koslicki, "Varieties," 209.

there already is, but as a matter of adding to it. We are now in a position to give the Real Definitions of these entities. Koslicki's account of a Real Definition, again, is that (i) the definiens and definiendum are entities (not propositions), (ii) the relation between these entities is a posteriori, and (iii) the definiens must provide more than just necessary and sufficient conditions: it must be explanatory of the essential nature of the definiendum.⁴⁰

- Creatures of Fiction (Φ) =_{Real Def.} products of thought, falsely formed, that *subsist* according to (are Feature Dependent on) the thoughts, stories, texts, illustrations, and, generally, conventions that portray them (Ψ)
- Geometrical Objects and their Limits (Φ) =_{Real Def.} idealized mathematical objects and their surfaces, lines, and points that *subsist* according to (are Feature Dependent on) the thoughts, definitions, axioms, illustrations, and, generally, conventions that portray them (Ψ)
- Limits of the Continuum (Φ) =_{Real Def.} precise divisions of the continuum (body, space, and time) corresponding to no impressor, which *subsist* according to (are Feature Dependent on) our thoughts, definitions, and, generally, conventions that portray them (Ψ)

Returning to the theme of Plato's *Sophist* introduced in Chapter 1, we can now see that the Stoics respond to Plato's last three challenges twice over, once with the incorporeals and now again with what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. These challenges are, again, (vi) *Be inclusive*, and "do not drag all things down from the heavens and the invisible to earth," (vii) *Be principled about your inclusivity*, and bridge the two worlds, and (viii) *Say what is not*, and be able to say something even if it does not represent the world as it is. Insofar as what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal meets the *subsistence* criterion, the Stoics are certainly being inclusive, far from the savage corporealism of the earthborn Giants. And insofar as what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal *subsists kat' epinoian*, the Stoics are principled about their inclusivity, and far more sophisticated than the hypothetical civilized Giants who cave on their commitment to body and give up on a one-world metaphysics without much of a fight. Finally, insofar as the Stoics accommodate pure products of thought corresponding to nothing in the physical world, they deliver the ability not only to say what is false (as they do with the *lekta*) but to say true and false things about *what is not*.

⁴⁰ Koslicki, "Varieties," 196–201.

SECTION V

EVERYTHING

tí
ti

This section returns to the Stoic ontology, arguing against the nearly universal view that there is a further class of entities, Not-Somethings (*outina*), in metaphysical limbo between Something and nothing at all. Chapter 15 argues that concepts (*ennoēmata*) are off the ontological map altogether. It's not that we can't talk about concepts, or that they can't do their dialectical duties as genus and species and the objects of definition, but that concepts do not meet the ontological criterion for being Something. With the tripartite ontology in hand (covering limits and creatures of fiction), and concepts off the ontological map, Chapter 16 argues that the Stoic ontology is complete and comprehensive as it is, with Something set over bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. There are no left-over entities and thus no reason to impose a class of Not-Somethings—everything is Something. Nor is there reason to impose a developmental narrative that finds the Stoics innovating or changing their mind about the ontology. Rather, the tripartite ontology stands as a coarse-grained orthodoxy against which, as shared background, more fine-grained debates take place.

15

Concepts

STILPO: And being so terribly great in eristic arguments, he used to confute even the Ideas; and he used to say that someone saying “human” is saying nothing; for he speaks of neither this one nor that one. For why would he mean this one rather than that one? Therefore, neither is it this one. And again.¹

The account is almost complete. Having rehabilitated corporealism, defended the unity of Stoic incorporeals, and now underwritten the third category of what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, I have shown that the ontology is principled in its inclusivity. It remains to show that the Stoic ontology is coherent, not recognizing a competing ontological genus of Not-Somethings, and comprehensive as well, leaving nothing out. Having classed idealized limits and creatures of fiction as neither corporeal nor incorporeal, the only outstanding candidate for the persistent category of Not-Somethings is concepts (*ennoēmata*; *ennoēma*, singular).² Concepts are a complicated matter for Stoic interpreters because the Stoics famously say that Plato’s Forms are really just concepts, but they also say that there are no Forms and concepts are just figments, apparitions, or phantasms (*phantasmata*) of the mind. Furthermore, they take these figments to be extensional and assign them important dialectical work as the objects of definition and the genus and species of things.

D. T. J. Bailey has recently renewed the argument in favor of concepts as Not-Somethings, in tandem with his Platonizing interpretation of the incorporeals.³ I will renew the case against Not-Somethings, upholding Victor Caston’s forceful arguments against the category, but departing from his developmental picture, which classes concepts as Somethings only in the early Stoa (Zeno and Cleanthes). I will argue, instead, that concepts for the Stoics, as a matter of orthodoxy, are not Somethings because they are not proper objects of thought and discourse. Since concepts do the work of universals, one might expect for concepts to

¹ DL 2.119 (Dorandi).

² Brunschwig, *TGS*, 31–3, considers the all (*to pan*) as evidence for the class of Not-Somethings on the grounds that in being a mere sum with no unity it is a mental construct with no objective reality. However, the all is not an invention of the imagination corresponding to nothing in the world, like centaurs and giants; rather, as a mere sum or aggregate, the all is simply not an ordered whole (with a qualitative *perigraphē*) and therefore unity does not arise from this plurality (as described in the digression on Stoic mereology in Chapter 3); it is thus no real evidence for the class and comfortably cast as nothing at all without casting irrationalism on its members, the cosmos and the void.

³ See Scade, “Limits, Parts and Wholes,” for another variety of Platonizing account.

straightforwardly fail the Not Someone (*Outis*) test for particularity by which the Stoics eliminate Plato's Forms; however, the reason *ennoēmata* fail to be Something is that they are not available to thought.⁴ This may sound strange, since concepts are obviously mental. But recall from Chapter 2 that availability for thought is understood in a restricted sense, not admitting just anything at all that can be thought (as a Meinongian would), but, rather, screening for objectivity, i.e. publicly available entities that are non-sensory impressors (as illustrated by the pattern of the drill sergeant); these are entities that anyone, in principle, can be impressed in relation to (*epi*). Concepts, however, are not publicly available that way.

Although concepts do not count as Something nor, as I am arguing, find themselves a place in “metaphysical limbo” as Not-Somethings, nevertheless this is not an anti-realist strategy on the Stoics' part.⁵ Concepts are the intentional objects of our corporeal conceptions (*ennoiai*), so they are grounded in body. Here the reflective equilibrium of counting and grounding described in the Introduction comes into play. Concepts are grounded in body, but they do not meet the ontological criterion for being Something.⁶ Thus, when I say that the Stoics do not admit concepts to the ontology, I mean only that they do not count as Somethings. This does not mean they cannot be given an account; in fact, their account of concepts explains *how* they are not Something. In other words, in considering *whether* concepts are Something, the Stoics start from an account of *what* these candidates are, namely figments of the mind (*phantasmata*). And just as Real Definitions explain why each entity counts as Something, now too the account of what concepts are (though not a Real Definition, since concepts are not entities) will explain why they are not Something.

In addition, the account will explain how, despite not being Something, concepts are fit to do their dialectical duties. Here I embrace Bailey's image of concepts as shadows cast by our mind, which as such are dependent entities, but also objective in being cast by the world itself.⁷ I think it is likely that concepts are this kind of shadow, and it is undoubtedly true that they are importantly different from the mere *phantasmata* of the melancholic and mad in this respect (and, likewise, different from the products of fictive thought as well). These are all different ways to be falsely formed by thought: in madness, by imagination, in the process of concept-formation, when dividing time (and the continuum generally) into parts, in constructing geometrical objects, and many more. Concepts stand apart from

⁴ In fact, they might pass the *Outis* test, since my concept here in my mind (in Athens) cannot be there in your mind (in Megara), as discussed in Chapter 12 on the *lekta*.

⁵ The phrase, again, comes from Sedley, “Universals,” 89.

⁶ To this extent at least the Stoics would reject the priority thesis that Varzi calls into question, according to which one “must first of all figure out what things exist (or might exist); then one can attend to the further question of what they are, specify their nature, speculate on those features that make each thing the thing it is” (“Ontology without Metaphysics,” 408); the Stoics are at least willing to consider some “possible citizenship applications” for the ontology (419).

⁷ Bailey, “Structure,” 303.

the others as reflections or shadows of the world; this is what gives them their dialectical credentials. But as shadows of the mind with no public access, they are not sufficiently objective to count as Something. I have my concepts, and you yours; probably they are very similar, being impressed on us by the world itself. However, I cannot show you my concepts nor can you show me yours. We can express the content of our thoughts in *lekta*, but concepts as merely intentional objects are not the kind of thing that is available for thought and reference.⁸

Interpretive Landscape

Just as the interpretive options concerning limits and creatures of fiction were sparser than the hive of views about the incorporeals, so too, when it comes to concepts, the interpretive options are few. The first is represented by David Sedley, arguing that the Stoics are best understood as Lockean conceptualists about universals. Stoic universals on this account are mental constructs compounded out of our experience of pre-existing individuals, and corresponding to nothing in reality.⁹ As mental constructs of a generic nature, they are merely “quasi-individuals,” not particular enough to be Something (in the way that centaurs nevertheless are), but also indispensable to Stoic epistemology, and for that reason preserved in “metaphysical limbo” between Something and nothing at all as Not-Somethings. Although concepts are our own projections on the world, they are not arbitrary divisions imposed on a chaotic world, as Sedley puts it, but an empirical recognition of the world’s natural joints.¹⁰ On this view, the Stoics see in Plato a lesson not to hypostatize such entities as independent items of furniture in the world; thus, concepts can be seen as convenient, if not indispensable, fictions.

Another interpretive option comes from Caston, who argues against a conceptualist understanding of Stoic concepts.¹¹ The guiding question of Caston’s inquiry is

⁸ For helpful arguments that concepts are not demonstrable by *deixis*, see Bailey, “Structure,” 291–4; I do not agree, however, that figments like centaurs and giants are to be assimilated to concepts; nor do I agree that concepts are “quasi-Somethings” that are suitable subjects of quantification outside the genus Something.

⁹ Sedley, “Universals”; LS30.

¹⁰ Sedley, “Universals,” 89.

¹¹ Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 161–2, has sought to clarify whether Sedley’s view of the Stoics is really conceptualism, and hence a form of realism about Not-Somethings, or rather a more sophisticated form of fictionalism or instrumentalism, and hence an anti-realist position with respect to the class of *outina*; in personal correspondence with Caston (“Something and Nothing,” n. 35), Sedley clarifies that he does not mean to countenance a discrete class of entities called Not-Somethings, so much as to indicate that subject terms like “human,” in being called *outina*, are non-referring terms; to be Not-Something is to be not a particular. Perhaps Bronowski, “Universals,” 81, agrees: “To say that they are ‘quasi-things’ is more a manner of speaking than an ontological category, because in fact there can be no ‘quasi ontological status.’” To the extent that others have supported the realist position (e.g. Bréhier, *Théorie*, 18; Brunschwig, *TGS*; D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth,” 216; Hadot, *Porphyre*; Mansfeld, “Substance, Being and Division”; Pasquino, “Incorporels”; Tzamalikos, “Origen,” 540), Caston, “Something and Nothing,” stalks the “vulgate” interpretation according to which *outina* form a discrete class of entities, and I will do the same.

this: why would the Stoics have introduced concepts only to banish them from the ontology?¹² Caston's answer is that they (Zeno and Cleanthes, the early Stoics) did not, but rather classed concepts as Something; later Stoics, as early as Chrysippus, rejected concepts and introduced instead *lekta*, which explains why *ennoēmata* are not part of the Stoic "canon." My response to this important question is one that Caston himself has the materials to give, if we put aside the developmental account and commitment to concepts as Something. The Stoics could well have equated Forms with concepts and then banished concepts from the ontology precisely for the sake of walking Forms out of the ontology. Thus, the Stoics as I see them (as a matter of orthodoxy, starting with Zeno, not Chrysippus (Aëtius 1.10.5 (30B)) are eliminative about Forms, as Caston argues, and do not in any way recognize a class of entities called Not-Somethings, as Caston also establishes clearly.

More recently Bailey has argued for a hybrid view according to which the Stoics are both realists and anti-realists about concepts, embracing on the one hand Caston's realism, yet denying they are Somethings, and embracing the anti-realism of Not-Somethings. On this view, concepts, as genus and species, are objective and mind-independent but at the same time these "strange creatures" are "disconcertingly unfamiliar and mind-dependent, perhaps even weirdly private, insofar as they are somehow mental while not being themselves any kind of individual."¹³ As with the view of incorporeals as independent immaterial "offices" that are dependent on body for being "occupied" (addressed in Chapter 9), I am resistant to this kind of hybrid view that (to my mind) portrays the Stoics as begging for both Platonism and materialism, yielding at most a sorted two-worlds ontology that makes no real advance in response to the Battle of Gods and Giants. In this they would be like the hypothetically civilized Giants, folding on their commitment to body and foregoing a common account for their bodies and incorporeals. I will argue that concepts are figments of the mind, and as such they are neither Something nor Not-Something; but although concepts are off the ontological map, they are nevertheless fit, and even specially designed, for their dialectical duties.

What Concepts Are

To establish a positive account of what Stoic concepts are, I turn to the textual evidence, which centers around parallel reports from Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius:

- A. Zeno says that concepts (*ennoēmata*) are (1) neither somethings (*tina*) nor qualified individuals (*poia*), but (2) figments (*phantasmata*) in the soul

¹² Caston, "Something and Nothing," 147, 150, 158.

¹³ Bailey, "Structure," 288.

that are (3) as if (*hōsanei*) they were somethings and as if qualified individuals (*poia*); and these were called ideas by the ancients. (4) For ideas are of those things that are classified (*hupopiptontōn*) according to concepts, e.g. of humans, of horses, and, speaking more generally, of all the animals and all other such things they say ideas are of. And (5) these [sc. the ideas] the Stoic philosophers say are not real (*anhuparktous*), and (they say that) (6) what we share in (*metechein*) are concepts, on the one hand, while what we bear (*tugchanein*) are cases (*ptōseōn*), which, in fact, they call appellatives (*prosēgorias*).

Stobaeus 1.136,21–7,6 (30A)

There is much to consider here. First (A1), we are told that concepts are neither Something nor qualified individuals, which I hear as reporting that concepts are outside the ontology altogether and, in that respect, nothing at all. They are not Something (either incorporeal or neither corporeal nor incorporeal), nor are they qualified individuals, i.e. bodies of a certain sort. This, at any rate, is the most literal reading of the text.¹⁴ We saw in the defense of Stoic corporealism in Section II, *Bodies*, that the Stoics divide the labor of Plato's Forms between the cosmology of the physics, by which they deliver unity, making one out of many by the blend of active and passive bodies, and the Categories of Stoic logic, by which they account for the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of individual bodies in completely corporeal terms. Now we see a further division of labor between these accounts of what makes something F, on the one hand, and the remaining job of being attributable to many things, as Caston puts it, on the other. As Caston observes, "The genius of the Stoic response...consists precisely in separating these two conditions, by holding different entities responsible for each. What is the same in each case is a concept or, later, an expressible. But what makes each thing what it is, is something corporeal."¹⁵ I agree that this division of labor is the Stoic genius in responding to Plato, and hope to show in this section that the Stoics can appeal to concepts to do the labor of being attributable to many things without being Something and without being replaced by *lekta* for this job. On this reading, what is the same in each case, i.e. the one set over the many, as Plato would put it, is not a thing at all; and this is just to say that there is nothing literally common to all cases, i.e. there is no one set over the many. In this, at least, the Stoics are rightly described as nominalists.

¹⁴ Caston, "Something and Nothing," argues on the basis of DL 7.61 (30C, passage B below), whose construction varies from the Stobaeus report, that the Stoics deny here that concepts are either of the first two Categories: existent or qualified individual; I do not object to aligning corporeality and hence existence with the *hupokeimenon*, but I do not think this is what the passage says. I will come to this shortly.

¹⁵ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 212–3.

Having been told what concepts are not, we are then told what concepts are: figments of soul, which is to say that they are mental entities corresponding to no impressor; they are made up by the mind (Aëtius 4.12.1–5 (39B, passage F/Chapter 12); DL 7.49–51 (39A)).¹⁶ They are, as scholars have seen and agreed, the merely intentional objects of our conceptions (*ennoiai*), of our acts of conceiving or reflection, which are themselves corporeal states of soul (the pneumatic soul *pōs echon*, to be precise). It is useful here to introduce the parallel passage from Diogenes, which tells us a little more about what concepts are and what role they play for the Stoics.

- B. (1) And a genus is a compendium (*sullēpsis*) of several inextricable (*anaphairetōn*) concepts (*ennoēmata*), e.g. animal; for this comprehends the particular animals. And (2) a concept is a figment (*phantasma*) of thought (*dianoia*), being neither something (*ti*) nor a qualified individual (*poion*), but (3) being as if (*hōsanei*) something and as if a qualified individual), e.g. a reimpressing (*anatupōma*) of a horse comes about although not present.

DL 7.60–1 (30C1–2)¹⁷

Diogenes confirms that a concept is a figment of the mind, and that it is neither Something nor a qualified individual. The locution is slightly different from the Stobaeus report, using the participle “*on*” in the place of the infinitive “*einai*,” which I have reflected in my translation. I take the participial phrase to be explanatory of why the concept is a figment: in being neither Something nor a qualified individual, but rather being (*on*) merely as if (it were) Something and as if (it were) a qualified individual, it is a figment. There is something awkward about the phrasing, and Caston presses on it to argue that the Stoic commitment is to denying that concepts are Something *existent* (*ti on*) (rather than simply that they are Something) and that they are qualified, i.e. of either of the first two Categories. However, this reading is equally awkward in the other direction, taking Stobaeus’ “*einai*” in line with this “*on*.” Caston argues that only his reading makes sense of the dual denial (that concepts are neither Something nor qualified), and this is indeed a significant hurdle for those who wish to use these passages as evidence that

¹⁶ Again, they are unlike the hallucinations of the mad and unlike fictive thinking, however, in that they *do* correspond to the world’s natural joints and are thus far from abnormal and untrustworthy; the point of calling them *phantasmata* is to emphasize that there are no entities in the world like horseness or humanity in relation to which we are impressed (as Plato would have it); rather, our impressions and hence our concepts arise from individual horses and humans around us, in which there is no such pattern or paradigm entity (as we have seen in Chapter 8, qualities do not even have their own *perigraphē*). This is why they are also classed as impressions (*phantasiai*) that are neither true nor false SE, M. 7.246 (30F). Thus, I do not agree with Caston’s Meinongian treatment of these entities as real in virtue of being intentional objects, “Something and Nothing,” 172, n. 58; cf. Thein, “Stoic Fictions.”

¹⁷ Indirect discourse in the Stobaeus passage explains the use “*on*” vs. “*einai*,” which undermines the suggestion that “*ti on*” be read as “Something existent” rather than as “being Something.”

concepts are classed as *outina*.¹⁸ I suggest that my reading makes equally good, or better, sense of the dual denial: it walks concepts right out of the ontology, because they are neither individual bodies nor Something, and that's all there is. In fact, to construe the dual denial as the suggestion that they are really a third thing seems a stretch of the text; "neither this nor that" does not easily translate to a "Not-this."

With this textual debate set to the side, we can see that passage B gives us important new information about what concepts are: they serve as genus and species in our classification of the world. They are the objects and elements of definition for the Stoics no less than the Forms are for Plato. This is widely confirmed; as Augustine reports, the Stoics say that "the mind forms conceptions—*ennoiai*, as they call them—of those things, that is, which they articulate by definition. The entire method of learning and teaching, they say, stems and spreads from here" (*Civ. dei* 8.7 (32F, trans. LS)). More specifically, Diogenes reports that a genus is "a compendium (*sullēpsis*) of several inextricable (*anaphaireton*) concepts." Caston takes this phrase as evidence that the Stoics quantify over concepts, rendering "*sullēpsis*" as "conjunction" and taking the Stoics to recognize a "plurality" of countable concepts.¹⁹ However, there is no independent reason to think that concepts are objects of reference. In fact, apparent reference to universals, as in "Human is rational animal," are explicitly paraphrased away: If something is a human, then it is a rational animal (*SE, M.* 11.8–11 (30I)).

This practice of paraphrase is attributed to Chrysippus, and Caston takes that to signal doctrinal development, but there is no real reason to think this is new with Chrysippus. Diogenes' report draws widely from among the Stoics with no indication of dissent or development in the school: in the immediate context of this passage (i.e. all of 7.60–1), which is found in a chapter on Zeno, he reports the views of Posidonius, Antipater, and Chrysippus and does not take care to note disagreement among these thinkers. He is thematic in his exposition rather than chronological. There is, thus, no indication that the views he reports are anything less than standard or mainstream Stoic theory, i.e. orthodox. I am also not convinced that "*sullēpsis*" is really a counting word, in contrast to a term like "*athroisma*," which does convey an assemblage (of atoms) or aggregation of individuals. At any rate, this "*sullēpsis*" alone is not enough for me to agree that the early Stoics took concepts as countable Somethings in contrast to Chrysippus later. All this portion of Diogenes' text really shows is that genus and species are complex concepts for the Stoics, and that concepts are figments of thought.

Next, in both our passages (A3, B3), the apparitions are characterized "as if (*hōsanei*) they were Something and as if (*hōsanei*) they were qualified individuals."

¹⁸ See Rist, "Categories and Their Uses," 156, 165, for the view that the "as if" locution is meant to include *likenesses* of existents, e.g. fictional characters that resemble existing characters.

¹⁹ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 159, followed by Bailey, "Structure," 290–4; IG choose "conjunction" as well, while LS opt for "collection."

Here, again, there are two directions to take; one rendering of “*hōsanei*” favors a class of Not-Somethings and one does not. Many scholars understand this to say that concepts are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified.²⁰ Speaking this way, of quasi-individuals, favors a view of Not-Somethings as a class with a certain extension of pseudo-individuals. However, there is no real talk of quasi-individuals here, or of Not-Somethings. The Greek quite clearly says that the apparitions are neither Somethings (*mēte tina*) nor qualified individuals (*mēte poia*) (there is thus no question of reading in *outina*), but as if they were Somethings and as if they were qualified individuals.²¹

Passage B is helpful in giving us an example of something that is as if something and as if qualified: a reimpresing, or a second impression (*anatupōma*) of a horse that comes about although no such horse present.²² The idea is that a concept is a generic entity in the mind, like a phantasm insofar as it corresponds to no such generic entity in the world, but it is not, for all that, the product of madness and melancholy. There really are commonly qualified individuals, e.g. horses and humans, in the world and they give us our horse and human concepts. This may be what stands behind the concept being called an impression, or a reimpresing. Caston’s account of being “as if” is applicable here as a positive account; he argues that we hear these passages as telling us that the “relevant qualities *determine* the nature of their respective concepts, even though they are not literally *exemplified* by them.”²³ Saying that the concept of a horse is horse-like, has four legs and a mane, is to say that it is determined by those qualities, without attributing those properties to it as one would a corporeal horse. I think one can embrace this insight of Caston’s even while denying that concepts are as if they were in the first two Categories, and even while refraining from Meinongian realism about concepts.

²⁰ Bailey, “Structure”; Bronowski, “Universals” and *Lekta*, 163–5; IG; LS; Sedley, “Universals.” Classing these as figments, one might expect to find them in Long & Sedley’s tripartite ontology, but as generic entities they do not “conform to the elementary laws of logic” and are not even Something; hence they are quasi-individuals, in contrast even to centaurs and giants as full-fledged individuals. See Chapter 2, n. 58.

²¹ *Einai* is readily supplied to the *hōsanei* clause, and *hōsanei* does not act as a prefix the way quasi- does.

²² Caston, “Something and Nothing,” renders “*anatupōma*” as “image,” along with many others, but the language of impression, “*tupōma*,” is not to be ignored; I have chosen “reimpresing,” even though it is unappealing English. Long & Sedley choose “pattern,” which suits the context and captures the idea of outlining present in the Greek, but elides the language of impression. IG and BS use “impression,” but BS, 128, read the passage in a different sense, taking the figment (or fiction, as they put it) to be “the result of an impression of a horse when it [sc. the horse] is not present,” and this as an example of non-sensory impressions. But it’s not that we have an impression of the horse once it’s gone, which sounds more like a memory, but rather that when we see a horse we have a second impression of a pattern of horse even though there is no such thing in the horse.

²³ Caston, “Something and Nothing,” 173, original emphasis. A similar account of centaurs and giants is available for the Stoics, as suggested above, along the lines of van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction.”

The next thing passage A tells us is that concepts were called ideas by the ancients, followed by an explanation of that fact. Here I take the Stoics to be giving an error theory for Plato's Forms (ideas). What Plato is really talking about with the language of Forms, Stobaeus reports, is concepts. The explanation begins by saying what concepts and Forms have in common: they are both extensional (A4): "For ideas are of those things that are classified (*hupopiptontōn*) according to concepts, e.g. of humans," which is confirmed by B1, reporting that the genus comprehends the particulars. But, the explanation continues (A5), ideas are not real (*anuparktos*), and (A6) what we *really* share in (by being in their extension) are concepts (which are not even Something).²⁴ Caston and Bailly infer from the Stoics' willingness to speak of particulars as falling under and participating in concepts that they must have been Something.²⁵ However, according to the Stoic strategy that I propose, it's the very fact that concepts are not Something that allows the Stoics to do their eliminative work with Forms, and there is no danger of undermining their extensionality in doing so, as I will now explain.

What Concepts Do

The true genius of the Stoic response to Plato is not just the division of labor between bodies and concepts, but the full turning of the tables to say that Forms and concepts are in the mind, as suggested in Plato's *Parmenides* (132 B 3–C 11). I urge that we take more seriously the Stoic caution not to hypostatize such entities, and not seek work-arounds to make concepts either Not-Somethings or full-blown Somethings. One way the Stoics turn the tables on Plato (apart from co-opting the *dunamis* proposal in service of corporealism, on which see Chapters 1 and 2) is by making perception the criterion of truth (with the famous kataleptic impression) and knowledge a corporeal state of soul (*pōs echon*). Here we see the full depth of the Stoic response to Plato's challenge (iii) *Reform the Giants*, and dare to say that the soul and its virtues are bodies. For the Stoics even knowledge itself, the master virtue, is a body according to the schema of the Categories, rejecting Plato's incorporeal soul and all its affinities to other-worldly Forms. As for the objects of

²⁴ Thus, I disagree with Bronowski, "Universals," 82–3, that the ideas' being *anuparktos* signals the status of concepts as *outina*. I agree that this is a privative alpha and that, accordingly, ideas cannot be incorporeal, but that is because they are not real at all on this reading; also, *anuparktos* is not correctly assimilated to *anupostatos*, suggesting they are not even *subsistent* (as in Seneca, *Ep.* 58, Chapter 14) but also not nothing.

²⁵ "Something and Nothing," 160; Bailey follows Caston in this, "Structure," 298: "If something has an extension, it is part of the furniture of the universe"; however, he departs from Caston in rejecting concepts as capable of this role at all: "it is hard to see how anything so insufficiently objective could have anything as mind-independent as an *extension*," 299, original emphasis. As Bailey reasons, being mind-dependent disqualifies concepts from being extensional, so even a Meinongian reading would not be enough to secure an extension (n. 111); nothing mind-dependent could possibly carve nature at its joints, and so the Stoics follow Plato in "having universals as objective species and *genera*" (301).

knowledge, here too, the Stoics turn Plato's schema on its head: it is the corporeal world in its fully rational structure that is the highest knowable reality.²⁶

With the active and passive bodies doing the work of unity and generation in the cosmology, with the Categories doing the job of explaining in corporeal terms what makes something F, including having knowledge, and with the physical world as the object of knowledge, there is only one job left to fill: being the objects of definition, the genus and species by which we do the dialectical work of collection and division. By filling this job with concepts understood as figments, the Stoics are able to walk the Forms out of the ontology altogether. In this the Stoics take seriously the suggestion in Plato's *Parmenides* that Forms are really thoughts, and turn the tables on Plato once again. Recall that things go wrong for Socrates there because the causal role of Forms entails that the world itself will be ideal: "Given your claim that other things partake of forms, won't you necessarily think either that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?" (132 C 9–11, trans. Gill & Ryan). But with the role of Forms in making things F in the various ways they are having been handled by the Stoic Categories, this result does not follow for the Stoics when they equate universals with concepts. Universals do not play that metaphysical role for the Stoics. Thus, casting Forms as concepts is to embrace the suggestion of the *Parmenides*, and to see the implications through to the elimination of Forms altogether, without impugning the reality or objectivity of the corporeal world and its natural joints. Not only have the Stoics dared to say that the soul and its virtues are bodies, they say, further, that knowledge and its objects are bodies, and that Forms are nothing but concepts, which is to say, they are nothing at all.²⁷

Thus, the division of labor of Plato's Forms is not as simple as the division into metaphysical labor and epistemological labor. In addition to assigning the physical labor of Forms to bodies, the epistemological labor is itself divided and distributed. First, the role of Forms as objects of knowledge is given to bodies, as the objects of kataleptic impressions; there is no evidence that the Stoics think that the objects of knowledge are concepts.²⁸ Second, even their role as objects of definition is given

²⁶ Not that there can't be knowledge of incorporeals and even what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but these are in no way the explanatorily prior entities that Plato's Forms are, nor are they the paradigm case of kataleptic impressions; for arguments in favor of kataleptic impressions of non-sensory impressors, see Schwab, "Kataleptic Impressions."

²⁷ Thus, I depart from Caston, "Something and Nothing," 179–82, who appeals to the *Parmenides* as evidence that the Stoics sought a work-around to show that concepts really are Something along Meinongian lines. However, the "punchline" of this argument is that the world is made of Forms, and *this* is what the Stoics address and evade. With respect to being Something, the Stoic response is the eliminative one: Forms are just concepts and concepts are not Something (nor are they Not-Something).

²⁸ Incorporeals and even what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal are also, as intelligible impressors, the objects of kataleptic impressions; this does not threaten the point that concepts are not bona fide intelligible impressors, or, more generally, the division of labor that I advocate here. I leave out the non-sensory impressors only for simplicity. Cf. Schwab, "Kataleptic Impressions."

to bodies insofar as apparent reference to universals by the subject terms of definitions is paraphrased away so that what we quantify over are always individual horses and humans, rather than concepts or even the corporeal qualities themselves; so this role, too, is given to bodies in substance and only nominally to concepts and their subject terms, which serve as placeholders for genuine particulars. Third, their extensional role is also, in a sense, divided: between the individual humans, horses, and other commonly qualified individuals, on the one hand, and the concepts by which we conduct our analysis and carve the world at these natural joints, on the other; so here, again, the substantial extensional role is played by body, leaving only the nominal job of analysis and definition for concepts.

To elaborate, *which* things are human, which things have the common quality of being human, is entirely indifferent to our concepts. However, which things we *call* human, and hence which things fall in the extension of the term, is a function of our concepts. The extension of our terms is determined by a concept, but the quality itself is not (in contrast to the role of Plato's Forms). Concepts don't *make* anything F; rather, things that are F make our concepts what they are and our concepts in turn are what we use to determine the extension of our terms; here again the Stoics show a healthy nominalism.²⁹ We saw this interplay between concepts and qualities in Chapters 7 and 8, where I argued that qualities for the Stoics have no *idia perigraphē*, and thus are not parts of the individual. Here we have confirmation that it is not the quality itself that a concept is meant to individuate, but rather the extension of entities that fall under it. Which entities we take for horses and humans is determined by our concepts, which are themselves developed out of our interactions with the world, impressing its natural (and conventional) joints and qualitative suchness on us. After we see many individual horses, the image, or pattern, or re-impressing of a horse arises in the mind, but there is

²⁹ Bailey, "Structure," comes this far, in seeing that concepts must be different from the figments of animals and madmen insofar as they have objective correlates in the world (304), but misses the boat (namely, that the Stoic Categories are the objective correlates in question) in suggesting that money captures the way in which something "can be in a way dependent on the free creation of human rational thought, but at the same time tied down to objective facts that are not dependent on the whims of creating minds" (305); he says that universals are only useful to the extent that they carve at the joints (and I agree with this), but then takes money to be an example of carving at the joints. However, money does not *carve* at the joints, it *creates* or even *is* the joint. Money is not invented in response to objective monetary correlates in the world (nor does the Fahrenheit scale measure Fahrehns); it is only once money has been established by convention that it is there as a joint in the world. And when one uses money once it is an established practice, it is no longer, then, an act of creation (except insofar as practice reinforces social constructs). So, the idea that money is *at once* mind-dependent and carving at the joints is misguided: the mind-dependence of money is its being created by us, and when we *do that* we are not carving at the joints, we are inventing something new that corresponds to no natural joints; once invented and in practice, money can be considered a genuine joint, but in recognizing *that*, we are not inventing. I do not think the image is salvageable for concepts either; natural kinds, i.e. common qualities, are not invented by us. More importantly, though, it is not necessary to see things through this lens, i.e. to seek some way for concepts to be "double-faceted" in this way. The division of labor is a genuine and legitimate division between bodies and concepts; there is no reason to insist that concepts themselves be both, which, after all, is not much of a division of labor.

no such horse in nature, only resemblance and similarity among the instances. Hence these generic mental entities are classified as *phantasmata*, mental states that arise from no impressor at all. This is no vicious circle, however, since it is never meant to be the case that concepts are or determine qualities, but only the extension of a term.

To say that the intrinsic suchness terminates in a concept (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 222,30–3 (28H, passage H/Chapter 8)), then, is to reflect the fact that qualities do not have an *idia perigraphē*—they are not individuals or parts of individuals by whose presence something is in or out of a class on the model of Forms, which *are* the qualities. Accordingly, the precise boundaries of their class, which are in and which are out, will be a function of the concept we use in the dialectical activity of collection and division. Which things are human? Those that are qualified in such a way that we class them together under that concept, calling them “human.” This is an easy case, presumably, since there is not often doubt as to whether something is a human or not. But if there were borderline cases, and one were unsure whether to say that *x* is an *F*, then the vagueness in nature would license an arbitrary decision and the Stoics would be happy to say that classes are in some sense a matter of convention, what our concepts dictate. They are prepared to speak broadly and inexactly. Note, again, that this does not make the cosmos in any way dependent on us. As Jonathan Barnes observes, while it is true that parts and wholes depend on us, and necks are parts, it does not follow that necks depend on us.³⁰

This is just another straightforward result of the Stoic commitment to continuum physics. The world as it is, in its continuous nature with natural joints and structure, makes its imprint on us, giving rise to concepts, which reflect that world. In fact, our very rationality is constituted by these concepts, once they are sufficiently developed and interconnected, i.e. once we appreciate their inferential import.³¹ For the Stoics, humans have *logos*, or reason, from birth; it is the faculty or capacity for rationality, which develops gradually through our interactions with the world. Our rationality is a reflection of the world’s structure. Thus, we should not be surprised to find that the objectivity of the world and its effects on our rational minds should make our concepts able to individuate classes and their extensions. Hence, I embrace Bailey’s image of concepts as the world’s shadows, and am happy to see them as carving at the world’s joints, but resist the idea of giving concepts the job of being or creating those joints.³² The heavy metaphysical lifting of Forms is still and always done by body.

³⁰ Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 249–59, on which see Chapter 3, “Digression on Mereology.”

³¹ Galen, *Plac.* 5.2.49, 5.3.1 (53V). The initial development of rationality consists in our basic concept acquisition, first of preconceptions (*prolēpseis*) that arise naturally from the world, and then conceptions (*ennoiai*), which are a function of study, art, and convention. For an account of how rational impressions get their semantic content from the world, see Chapter 12.

³² As his competing image of concepts on the model of money seems to say; see n. 29 above.

Thus, concepts are fit to do their dialectical duties (determining the extension of our terms and serving as the objects of definition) after all, because those duties are, in the end, after the full division of Plato's labor, quite thin; they are merely dialectical, and not metaphysical. It is true that Stoic concepts could never do the work of Plato's epistemology, but, then, the Stoics are not giving us Plato's epistemology. This may seem obvious, and yet the guiding principle of much commentary *is* to find the Stoics conforming (or to take them to task for not conforming) to Plato and Aristotle. We saw in Chapters 7 and 8 that hylomorphic presuppositions have prompted interpreters to craft complicated accounts of the Categories in order to "save" the Stoics from violating these presuppositions; but once those presuppositions are set to the side, a literal reading of the texts falls into place and the Stoics can be seen as coherent and sophisticated thinkers worthy of their place in history. Here, too, I suggest that if we set aside those same presuppositions about the nature of qualities—namely that they are abstract individuals inhering in matter and insofar as they are numerically the same in each case they determine the extension of the term—then a literal, face value reading of the texts falls into place. The literal reading is that concepts are figments of soul, neither qualified individuals nor Something, and hence nothing at all as far as the Stoic ontology is concerned.

This is not, however, fictionalism or instrumentalism about concepts, since we are not making up that there are concepts or kinds; concepts really are the intentional objects of our conceptions (*ennoiai*) corresponding to no impressor, i.e. representing no such generic thing in the world.³³ Yet, for all that, concepts do not arise the way centaurs, giants, and Doge do (Chapter 14). On the contrary, the impressors standing behind our concepts (and our very rationality) are the fully particular corporeal and incorporeal individuals of the cosmos. For this reason, since they have been stamped on us by the world itself, concepts are the right tool for carving at nature's joints. Some limits of the continuum are arbitrary, corresponding to no natural joint, e.g. minutes and seconds; others, however, do correspond to certain natural joints in the world, not joints that are precise, but real features of the world. For example, day and night and the seasons do correspond to the sun being up or down and the chill in the air, but when we say that sunrise is at a certain time, or that it is winter upon the equinox, we create a precise division that is not there. Just as these limits of time correspond roughly to natural joints but precisely to none, so, too, Stoic concepts correspond roughly to the common qualities in the world as natural joints, but precisely to none—because there is no one thing that is metaphysically the same in all cases.

Nothing is literally shared by all horses, they merely resemble each other in certain ways; there are no universals, and common qualities are not universal, or necessarily even exactly alike in all cases. We have seen before that in the Stoics'

³³ Which, I agree with Caston, "Something and Nothing," 162, would be a non-starter in response to the Forms.

continuum physics the world is fuzzy, perhaps even the boundaries of individual bodies are fuzzy. Certainly there is no present time with precise boundaries, not divisible into past and future; the present is specious, but time is not. And as we saw in Chapter 8, qualities themselves cannot be isolated or individuated like pebbles in an urn; the Stoics may be the first to treat qualities in purely qualitative terms, like “intrinsic suchness,” resisting the hylomorphic urge to hypostatize them. The common quality cannot be isolated from the peculiar quality of an individual, and will surely vary from case to case, not just by the peculiarities of the individual but even in the traits of the common quality itself; there will be a family resemblance among the horses, not some one thing exactly the same in each. The upshot is that the exact boundaries of a term’s extension are determined by us, by our concepts, because there is no one thing shared by all things that are of a kind. But this does not mean that our carving in any way *makes* horses be as they are; this is only a worry for the Platonizer who assigns metaphysical labor to concepts.

So, to conclude this section, what concepts do for the Stoics is carve the world at its natural joints, and in that they serve as the objects of definition that determine the extension of our terms. Even that, however, is misleading to the extent that concepts don’t themselves *do* anything; they are strictly placeholders for our practice of collection and division, definition and analysis, resulting in conditionals that quantify over individuals, e.g. If something is a human, then it a mortal rational animal. Strictly speaking, there are no genera, only individuals that fit certain descriptions.

What Concepts Are Not

According to my view, then, Stoic concepts are nothing at all in that they are not part of the objective furniture of the world; they are off the ontological map. Concepts are neither Something nor qualified individuals, neither *subsistent* nor *existent* and therefore nothing, but figments of the mind that are merely as if they were Something or qualified. The only labor left for concepts to do is a job that we should, after all, expect to be allocated to the mind: carving at nature’s joints. In so carving we are responsive to nature’s joints, but also imposing precise divisions where there are none. This, again, is the full force of the Stoic commitment to continuum physics. Hence concepts are figments in that there is no corresponding impressor that is similarly generic; all impressors are particular, even in their common qualities. But there is no threat here to Stoic realism—we are in no way *creating* the world by carving it with the mind. This point bears emphasis because, in connection with the *lekta*, it has often been assumed that if the *lekta* are mind-dependent, then an inexorable subjectivism follows. As I argued in Chapter 12, this is the spurious sticking point of the debate over *lekta*, the idea that nothing mind-dependent could possibly be the bearer of truth value, an entity that enters

logical relations, or something shared in communication—let alone a state of affairs in the world. We see here, with concepts, a similar assumption at work in the background, that nothing mind-dependent could possibly be the object of definition or the kind of thing to determine an extension. But neither *lekta* nor concepts have metaphysical work to do; their roles are dialectical.

Further, as A. A. Long has shown so well: “Because human beings are providentially designed to be exegetes of nature (recall Epictetus) and to organize their lives on the basis of knowledge and truth, they are endowed with the evidence-gathering and logico/linguistic faculties that such a life requires.”³⁴ The ability to form concepts and constitute our rationality through our interactions with the world is not epistemologically suspect for the Stoics. Nevertheless, as I argue, concepts are off the ontological map; but this is not because they are misleading or otherwise epistemically defective (as Plato or someone in his grips would certainly have it). It is because they are the inherently private intentional objects of our conceptions; many objects of thought are public and shared, but objects of conceptions are not. Nevertheless, we can certainly express the conceptual content of our thoughts by uttering *lekta*. When we do that we tell each other what we think, but do not (and could not) literally show anyone the beetle in our box, as Wittgenstein might put it.³⁵ The beetle is not Something.

Thus, the Stoics are eliminative about Forms by being eliminative about concepts, without harm to their dialectical duties. Concepts are not Somethings, but neither are they Not-Somethings. As Caston has observed, a view that recognizes a distinct class of entities between Something and nothing at all is not genuinely deflationary of Forms, creating, as it does, a whole new class with its own set of difficulties, not least of which is that it renders Something incoherent as the highest genus. It undermines evidence that Something is the highest genus, and that it is comprehensive—both bad options for a coherent ontology. Against this latter point of Caston’s, that the genus fails to be comprehensive, Bailey argues that the added category of Not-Somethings is not amiss because Something is only the highest genus of *individuals* and their offices (which are also individuals), whereas universals are only quasi-individuals. The genus is comprehensive of individuals, but not of these other quasi-things that there are.

This reply to Caston is only moving, of course, if one is already inclined to think that there are quasi-individuals, which I argue there are not. So, while this might make someone so committed feel better about saddling the Stoics with such a class of entities, it is not going to move anyone who does not already think there are Not-Somethings to believe there are, or be willing to set aside the explicit textual evidence that the genus Something is meant to be comprehensive and unique. Caston is also correct in arguing that quantifying over Not-Somethings effectively

³⁴ A. A. Long, “Stoic psychology and language,” 246, original emphasis.

³⁵ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* 1.293.

renders them Somethings, yielding a contradiction (everything is something but not everything is something). To be Something is to be the quantity of a bound variable, the Stoics can say in a Quinean spirit.

Another piece of evidence relevant to the question of Not-Somethings is Sextus' report that *outina* have no *subsistence* for the mind (*M.* 1.17 (27C, passage C/Chapter 2)). Now, the context of this passage confirms that Sextus' division is into things that are and things that are not, i.e. something and nothing, so it is not evidence in favor of Not-Somethings as a class.³⁶ Caston takes this passage to entail that concepts would be entirely unthinkable, and, therefore, as evidence that availability to thought is criterial for being Something, and I agree with that; however, as I argued in Chapter 2, the relevant availability for thought is not Meinongian, such that any and every intentional object comes out as Something.³⁷ Rather, my far less permissive "thinkability" criterion admits only those entities that are publicly or objectively available for thought, to anyone whosoever.³⁸ So, on this score, concepts, as merely intentional objects, are not available for thought in the way that Something must be. However, this does not entail that concepts are unthinkable, full stop. Concepts by their nature *are* objects of thought; but they are private objects of thought, *merely* intentional objects with no corresponding impressor. My less permissive criterion is no problem for having concepts, only for sharing them. So, concepts are still not Somethings.

But, again, neither are they Not-Somethings. Bailey argues, against this point of Caston's, that since Not-Somethings make no claim to *subsistence*, Sextus' evidence that Not-Somethings have no *subsistence* for the mind has no bearing.³⁹ But this move is also question-begging; only someone already committed to Not-Somethings as a class will find here, first of all, evidence about Not-Somethings, and secondly the avowal that they lack *subsistence*. In fact, I am skeptical, following Caston, that "*outi*" is a technical term at all, with any sense distinct from nothing at all.⁴⁰ Only the Not Someone sophism clearly uses it as a singular term and there, in a fallacious context, we should expect such a thing to be gerrymandered; furthermore, the Not Someone sophism does not screen for Not-Somethings, but rather for Somethings. So even that piece of evidence does not support the idea that the Stoics recognize an ontological category in metaphysical limbo between Something and nothing at all.

³⁶ As, most recently, Bronowski, *Lekta*, 161–2, takes it; see Chapter 2 for further detail.

³⁷ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 164–5.

³⁸ Note that on my less permissive approach there is no problem with talk about Forms committing the Stoics to their existence, as there is for Caston, "Something and Nothing," 178–9. There is still, of course, room for the Stoics to treat the Forms as fictions that have taken on a certain life of their own. But they are not compelled to do so by any of their own commitments to thinkability.

³⁹ Bailey, "Structure," 294; Bailey follows Sedley in rendering "*substantiam*" in Seneca's *Ep.* 58 as "*subsistence*."

⁴⁰ Caston, "Something and Nothing," 165–8; see Bronowski, "Universals," for arguments in favor of "*outi*" as a technical term (even while "being" is not, see Chapter 1, n. 3).

Likewise, Simplicius' report (*In Ar. Cat.* 105,11 (Kalbflesich)) that for the Stoics universals (*koina*) are nothing (*outina*), which he gives immediately before the Not Someone test, can also be understood as reporting their eliminativism about universals of all kinds, both Plato's Forms and their own concepts. So, too, Origen's testimony (*In Ioan.* 2.1.3.93.68.29 (Preuschen)) that genera and species are among what are not (*tōn ou tinōn*) can be seen straightforwardly as a report that they are nothing at all. Here I rest my case (or, rather, my defense of Caston's case) not only that concepts are not Not-Somethings, but that there is no such category recognized by the Stoics, nor is "*outi*" even a piece of technical terminology different in sense from nothing. There can be no textual evidence that the Stoics denied there are Not-Somethings if they were never a posit, of course; I can only show that the textual evidence given by those in favor of Not-Somethings does not support the posit. My evidence that there are no Not-Somethings is that there is no evidence that there were.

Conclusions

The central conclusion is simple: concepts are not Something but rather nothing; they are off the ontological map. Yet even while not being Something, they are able to perform their dialectical duties, so there is no motivation left for positing the category of Not-Something. Neither idealized limits, nor figments, nor concepts are looking for a home in metaphysical limbo. There is nothing left to recommend it, and still plenty to recommend against it, so I propose we let that one go and revisit the resulting ontology.

Everything is Something

A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: “What is there?” It can be answered, moreover, in a word—“Everything”—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so, the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.¹

With Not-Somethings set aside in the last chapter, I return now to the ontology itself and the influence of Seneca’s *Epistle* 58 on scholars’ understanding of the genus Something. I will defend Something as the highest genus set over bodies, incorporeals, and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, resist developmental accounts that undermine not just the orthodoxy of Something as the highest genus but the very idea of an orthodoxy, and I will show that this Stoic ontology is principled, coherent, and comprehensive as it is, with no Not-Somethings—everything there is for the Stoics is Something.

Something

Recall from Chapter 14 that Seneca reports in *Epistle* 58 that the Stoics recognize Something as the highest genus set over *existent* entities and *non-existent* entities, including centaurs and giants. As we have seen, A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley take the letter as evidence that in addition to incorporeals, figments are also *non-existent* Somethings for the Stoics.² Others take it as evidence that the Stoics countenance Not-Somethings (*outina*) as *non-subsistent* entities,³ either by saying Seneca made a mistake in his list or by tendentious translation (as I see it). David Sedley, Anna Ju, and D. T. J. Bailey argue that we should read the passage as saying that nature

¹ Quine, “On What There Is.”

² LS, 164; as Rist also does, *Stoic Philosophy*, 156, in arguing against Zeller’s thesis that the genus Something was introduced later by Chrysippus to describe *non-existing* things like centaurs (note that while I appreciate this particular developmental point, that Something was original to Zeno, I do not follow Rist in equating *to on* and Something with the first Category, *hupokeimenon*).

³ E.g. Bailey, “Structure”; Bronowski, “Universals”; D. Frede, “Fatalism and Future Truth”; Ju, “Geometrical Limits”; Pasquino, “Incorporeals”; Sedley, “Stoic Metaphysics at Rome.”

includes even those things like centaurs and giants that lack *subsistence*, thereby showing the Stoics countenanced *non-subsistent* entities and underwriting the category of Not-Somethings. John M. Rist argues we should take it to show that nature includes whatever else can be constructed by the mind but lacks *reality*.⁴ This is on the right track, however, as argued above, “*substantia*” is in fact properly translated “substance” and it conveys corporeal *existence*—just as we would expect for the corporealist Stoics for whom, as we saw in Chapter 3, *ousia* is body.⁵ The results of this one translation for the Stoic ontology have been fatal in various ways, positing either internal disagreement or evolution of the genus such that the Stoics are seen, in any event, as backing themselves into an ontology with little to recommend it.

For example, on the basis of reading “*substantia*” as “*subsistence*,” Ju aligns *existence* with *subsistence* (as well as *huparxis* with *hupostasis*), and then divides Something into the *subsistent* and the *non-subsistent*; the *subsistent* then divides into the *existent*, i.e. corporeals, and the “merely *subsistent*,” i.e. incorporeals, as in Fig. 16.1, below. But this schema is not only not well supported by the texts, it places Not-Somethings under Something, which does indeed look incoherent.




Fig. 16.1 Ju's Ontology

Jacques Brunschwig, on the other hand, argues that Seneca puts forth fictitious individuals as *non-existents* because incorporeals have been made *quasi-existents*, thus a species of *existent*; and Seneca couldn't call himself a Stoic, even an unorthodox one, if he did not countenance *non-existent* Somethings.⁶ See Fig. 16.2 below.

The problem with Brunschwig's reading is that Seneca explicitly disowns the Stoic schema, and in particular Something, so it is out of place to say he is motivated to fill the *non-existent* Something slot. What we get from *Epistle* 58 is two competing ontologies, Seneca's own (Fig. 16.3) and that of "some Stoics" (Fig. 16.4), which I have suggested we read as indicating the orthodox Stoics from whom Seneca is explicitly distancing himself.

⁴ Rist, "Categories and their Uses," 39.

⁵ I also disagree that "*quaedam sunt*" corresponds to "*tina huparchei*"; the Latin "*quaedam sunt*" corresponds to the Greek "*to on*," what *exists*. Again, we can see how tangled the threads are, in this case with *huparxis*, on which see Chapter 12.

⁶ Brunschwig, *TGS*, 51 ff., "Stoic Metaphysics," 220 ff.; see also Mansfeld, "Substance, Being and Division," n. 22, 84–5; n. 48, 98–100, who thinks Seneca rejects Fig. 16.2; and Caston, "Something and Nothing," who endorses Fig. 16.2




Fig. 16.2 Brunschwig's Account of Seneca and the Stoics




Fig. 16.3 Seneca's Own Ontology




Fig. 16.4 Seneca's Account of Stoic Ontology

Fig. 16.3 illustrates the ontology Seneca endorses for himself in section 14 of *Epistle* 58. In section 13 he flags the fact that the Stoics would set above *quod est* another, more primary genus. But for Seneca to say the Stoics place *quid* above *quod est* is not to attribute to them the division of *quod est* into corporeals and incorporeals as in Fig. 16.3, nor to accept for himself the Stoic division he gives of *quid* into *quaedam sunt* and *non sunt*, as in Fig. 16.4. Brunschwig must be assuming both these things to argue that the combined view (Fig. 16.2) represents the considered Stoic position. Clear of these unlicensed assumptions, *Epistle* 58 tells us just what we find in Fig. 16.4—as Pasquale Pasquino says, “on ne peut pas y trouver d’avantage.”⁷ Thus I take Jaap Mansfeld to be on the right track with his ontology, Fig. 16.5, except insofar as he takes Seneca to be confused in trying to convey and endorse the Stoic ontology faithfully; thus, Mansfeld leaves room for the incorporeals in Seneca’s Stoic ontology, even though he clearly does not put

⁷ Pasquino, “Incorporeals,” 336.




Fig. 16.5 Mansfeld's Account of Seneca's Stoic Ontology

them there himself.⁸ I take this schema to be correct for the Stoics, but incorrect as an account of Seneca's discussion in *Epistle* 58; Mansfeld does not find Seneca rejecting Something (or, as he renders *quid*, Anything⁹) as the highest genus.

Pierre Hadot also argues for a compatibilist approach, according to which the commitment to *quid* is not genuinely opposed to *quod est* or to Plato's six modes of being; *quid* is, rather, beyond *being* and *non-being*, and such talk is to be construed loosely.¹⁰ Thus, when Seneca mentions centaurs and giants instead of the incorporeals, we should take this as an error in exposition. However, I do not take Seneca to have made a mistake, but to be making a dialectical move, which supports the likelihood that centaurs and giants were recognized in the ontology by mainstream Stoics. An error like this does not come out of thin air, so it must point to a mix-up of entities that were already on the table. Creatures of fiction must have been *tina* too, if Seneca is to have made this error. In either event we have evidence of creatures of fiction in the Stoic ontology. On my view, Seneca is at least artful and intentional in his report, allowing us to be maximally charitable as well as to squeeze out as much information as possible.

Finally, there is the picture that Ricardo Salles offers of three competing ontologies of uncertain chronology, evincing competing ontological criteria. The first (O_1 , Fig. 16.6) places Something over bodies and incorporeals, and recognizes in addition a class of Nothings (as Salles renders "*outina*"), which includes natural and fictitious universals (e.g. horse and the sirens). These entities are nothing at all, and being Nothing is not itself an ontological category (since the members of its extension are not real), yet there are Nothings alongside Somethings.




Fig. 16.6 Salles' *scala entis* O_1

⁸ Mansfeld, "Substance, Being and Division."

⁹ Cf. Mates, *Stoic Logic*, 18, "the indefinite something," set over the four Categories.

¹⁰ Hadot, *Porphyre*, 159–61.

According to this ontology, which follows Brunschwig, the Stoics work with two criteria: having extra-mental reality, which is criterial for being Something, and being a body, which is criterial for *being*. Bodies meet both criteria, incorporeals meet only the first, and those that meet neither are Nothings, the universals that for Plato were most real and substantial. The second (O_2) is Seneca's ontology (Fig. 16.3), which reinstates Plato's ontology and sets *quod est* over bodies and incorporeals, with incorporeals understood as *quasi-beings*. Here Salles finds the ontological criteria evolving in that Seneca is rejecting corporeality as criterial for *existence* (since incorporeals are classed under *quod est*), in contrast to O_1 .

Finally, the third ontology (O_3 , Fig. 16.7) returns to Something as the highest genus, but still subsumes incorporeals under *quod est*. This hybrid ontology of unknown origin agrees with O_2 in rejecting corporeality as the mark of *being* in order to class incorporeals as some kind of *being*, and disagrees with O_1 that extra-mental reality is criterial for being Something, admitting now creatures of fiction as individuals, and more generally all intentional objects (following Caston), but not the additional category of Nothings to cover universals.




Fig. 16.7 Salles' *scala entis* O_3

Here again the developmentalist perspective among scholars is strong, and here again I think it is to be resisted. As I argued in Chapter 14, Seneca's avowed rejection of Something as the highest genus need not constitute any genuine evolution in Stoic ontology (even if he takes his cue from Cornutus, as David Sedley argues).¹¹ Insofar as Seneca tells us that his ontology with *quod est* at the top is the right one in contrast to the Stoics who want to place Something above *quod est* (58.13), we can see that he is not speaking as a Stoic; it shows that Seneca was heterodox in this commitment. He is however authoritative about what he rejects, both that Something is the highest ontological genus and that centaurs and giants are Something for the other Stoics; the power of Seneca's testimony here is in what he denies. Therefore Something remains integral to the coarse-grained Stoic orthodoxy I describe, and it is unnecessary to devise so many divergent and competing ontologies for the Stoics on the basis of Seneca, *Epistle* 58.

¹¹ Sedley, "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome."

Everything

If I am right in what I have been arguing, then the Stoics recognized a single ontology that serves as a coarse-grained orthodoxy against which, as background, various debates took place. I take this ontology to have been developed early, in conscious response to Plato's *Sophist*, and to have persisted as orthodox. Thus, when we find Seneca distancing himself from the genus Something as he explicitly does, we can take this as evidence of an orthodoxy and take his word that he is heterodox in placing *quod est* at the top. With creatures of fiction settled as neither corporeal nor incorporeal, and concepts rejected from the ontology altogether, we can now see a tripartite ontology that is principled, coherent, and comprehensive.

Let us review where things stand using Fig. 16.8. I developed the *subsistence* criterion for *subsistence* in two steps: one, as a measure of objectivity; and two, as a measure of particularity. The measure of objectivity—whether something is a proper object of thought—is met both by entities that *subsist* according to body (the incorporeals) and by those that have taken on some imagistic consistency despite lacking substance and therefore *subsist* according to thought (what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal). Each of these entities is publicly accessible to the mind. The measure of particularity, the Not Someone test, dictates that only fully determinate individuals will be Something. Incorporeals are properly determinate in virtue of their *subsistence* according to body: they inherit their properties in all their particularity from the bodies on which they depend.

The spatial incorporeals inherit their extension from underlying body and are therefore particular individuals: infinite extra-cosmic void is an individual *subsisting* according to the cosmos as a whole, from the outside out; places *subsist* according to their occupying or delimiting bodies, from the inside out or outside in; and likewise the room inside the wine jar *subsists* according to its occupying and delimiting bodies. Two-dimensional incorporeal limits, like the surface and edge of my desk, are determinate portions of spatial extension that *subsist*




Fig. 16.8 A Principled, Coherent, and Comprehensive Stoic Ontology

according to underlying body; even points find a place among the incorporeals, not as extensionless entities like mathematical points but as the smallest possible marker of a body. Time, too, is an individual: the infinite temporal extension *subsisting* according to the everlasting recurrence of this one and only cosmos. Even the *lekta* count as individuals, *subsisting* according to the individual rational impressions that give them their fully indexical content, without compromising their objectivity.

What *subsists kat' epinoian* is properly determinate in virtue of having taken on some imagistic consistency, a life of its own now independent of any particular thought but still grounded in the corporeal thoughts in virtue of which they are determinately characterized as they are (in our words and drawings). Idealized limits of the continuum and of geometrical objects have determinate properties constructed from the features of their grounding bodies: the texts, illustrations, and mathematical conventions that portray them. Likewise, creatures of fiction are constructed by taking on some image from their various portrayals. These accounts are not intended to give all the details of how centaurs and geometrical surfaces are born; rather, they are intended to show that the Stoic account is physicalist, a one-world metaphysics. However we fill in the details, they will not appeal to Forms, Meinongian entities, or any other kind of other-worldly abstracta. I realize there is more to say, but hope I have said enough for this.

Let us turn to the left side of the stemma, bodies. While the rest of Fig. 16.8 gives us a taxonomy of entities, showing us only what counts as Something (which things are Something) without portraying the metaphysics or grounding structure (how they are Something), the left side gives a grounding map for the Stoic Categories. One reason to do this is to modify slightly Long & Sedley's stemma in chapter 27 to make clear that the four Categories are not coordinate species of body like the various incorporeals are coordinate species, but four metaphysical aspects of every individual body. The four Categories stand in a nested one-to-one relation, according to which each is substrate to the next. Thus the *hupokeimenon* is the substrate proper, and it constitutes a qualified individual, like clay constitutes a statue; the qualified individual is in turn substrate for the individual disposed, like the hand to a fist it constitutes, or Socrates running; and the individual disposed is itself the substrate for, i.e. constitutes, the individual relatively disposed, e.g. the fist held high, or Socrates to the left of Plato.

Developing Long & Sedley's tripartite ontology as I have removes two of the usual temptations to posit Not-Something as an intermediate category between Something and nothing at all: creatures of fiction and idealized limits. My contribution, that the Stoics may have been operating with a systematic distinction between reality *kath' hupostasias* and *kat' epinoian*, supports the tripartite ontology by giving a principled account of *subsistence* falling into two kinds. Incorporeals, on the one hand, have positive physical characteristics (spatial and temporal extension, semantic content) inherited from underlying body as a matter of privation.

What is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, on the other hand, has only reality *kat' epinoian* because they correspond to no body in nature. The physical reality of such figments is due to the token thoughts, texts, and illustrations that construct those products of thought.

Thus testimony about surface and limits no longer makes the Stoics look conflicted about their ontology. When we speak of the surface of a body, like the surface of a table, we speak of something incorporeal. When, on the other hand, we speak of geometrical limits we speak of something that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. So, it's not that the Stoics were confused about surface and limit, but that there are two different phenomena at issue. Both have a perfectly good treatment in the tripartite ontology so there is no fuel for positing Not-Somethings for figments and limits. Another benefit to the ontology of Fig. 16.8 is that an open-ended list of incorporeals is no threat to the canon or to the ontological category of incorporeals. I have indicated this result with an "*et al.*" below the canonical incorporeals. The phenomenon of incorporeality is found throughout the natural world, so it makes sense that the Stoics would highlight a core group of cases while acknowledging the phenomenon more generally. The orthodoxy of the *subsistence* criterion is thus upheld by principled variations in the list of incorporeals (without going so far as to seek absolute discord, as Brunschwig does).¹²

The resulting Stoic ontology is principled in operating with two criteria of reality instead of one and in adhering to principles of *subsistence* according to body and according to thought. The Stoic ontology is also coherent. The Stoics are not closet Platonists, and they do not undo their hard-won progress by positing Not-Somethings between Something and nothing at all. To posit Not-Somethings is to deny that Something is the highest genus and comprehensive of what there is. Crucially, it is unnecessary to posit the category when problem cases like creatures of fiction and idealized limits have a natural place in the tripartite ontology, and the other problem case, concepts, is comfortably walked out of the ontology altogether. Stoic metaphysics is principled, coherent, and comprehensive—everything is Something, and nothing is not.

Conclusions

The unity of Stoic metaphysics, I submit, consists in the equilibrium of counting and grounding resulting in a tightly ordered one-world ontology. Everything there is, everything that is Something, is either itself a fundamental body (the *archai*, or principles) or it is grounded in body (everything else). The logical criteria by which entities are counted in or out of the ontology reveal what many have called

¹² Brunschwig, *TGS*, 26.

Stoic nominalism, a commitment to counting only individuals (and explicitly rejecting Forms). But this is only one edge of the razor they bring to Plato's beard. The other edge consists in the metaphysical principles by which the Stoics ground their entities in body, revealing the substance of Stoic physicalism: a thoroughgoing commitment to a one-world metaphysics.

In this the Stoics offer a complete response to the challenges of the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato's *Sophist*, replacing cosmology with metaphysics and ontology, as described in Chapter 1. We saw in Chapter 2 how the Stoics (i) *Commit the patricide*, (1) prising apart Something from *being* and showing that *what is not* is still (2) a countable individual, and (3) a proper object of thought and discourse. They do this with two ontological criteria, one for *existence* and one for being Something *subsistent*, which answers to (1), and by crafting the *subsistence* criterion to screen for (2) and (3). We saw in Chapters 2–6 how the Stoics (ii) *Defend the Giants*, not only maintaining that only bodies *exist* but now saying what it is to be body (solid three-dimensional extension), and delivering a completely corporealist cosmology without Form. Chapters 7 and 8 showed how the Stoics work with the Gods to (iii) *Reform the Giants*, daring to corporealize not only the virtues, but all kinds and qualities with the schema of the Categories. The Categories also meet challenge (iv) *Reconcile the Gods and Giants*, and make *being* capable of both rest and change. They do this with opposite individuation and persistence conditions for the substrate and the qualified individual: the substrate is subject to no quantitative change (no addition to or subtraction from its mass), but all manner of qualitative change (it is indifferent to its arrangement); and the qualified individual is subject to growth and diminution (quantitative change), but no qualitative change as a uniquely and commonly qualified individual. And the Categories also meet challenge (v) *Silence the Late Learners*, and show how one thing can be called many (i.e. be F in indefinitely many ways), even while remaining one (the same uniquely qualified individual, or *idiōs poion*).

The remaining three challenges are met by the incorporeals, and then again by what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. The Battle itself calls for the Stoics to (vi) *Be inclusive*, and recognize both the corporeal and the incorporeal. The Visitor appeals to the Giants to (vii) *Be principled* about this inclusivity, and be able to say what bodies and incorporeals have in common, bridging the two worlds. And finally, there is the sophist himself, who challenges us all to (viii) *Say what is not*, and be able to say something even if it is false. The challenge to be inclusive is met both by the incorporeals and by what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Plato's challenge does not concern the Stoic incorporeals, obviously, but whatever is immaterial or not corporeal. So both the stoic incorporeals and what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal fit this description. And even if Plato is not explicitly concerned with including creatures of fiction, the Stoics can be yet more inclusive.

The challenge to be principled about their inclusivity is also met twice over, first by *subsistence* according to body, which is a case of abstraction or privation of body,

and again by *subsistence* according to thought, which a case of construction by the underlying body. These two kinds of grounding bridge the two worlds by ordering them in a dependence relation rather than treating them as contrary (or merely sorting them into separate realms). This one-world metaphysics is also aptly characterized as non-reductive physicalism. It is non-reductive in that these entities are explicitly admitted to the ontology, so our task is not to eliminate these entities or reduce them to body but to explain how they are Something. And it is physicalist insofar as they are all Something because they are grounded in body. This non-reductive physicalism constitutes the full, deep reply to the Battle of Gods and Giants, and it shows the Stoics to be far more competent and in control of their own destiny than even Brunschwig saw.

Finally, the challenge to say *what is not* is straightforwardly met by the *lekta*, which *subsist* whether true or false. But the challenge is also met by figments. The idealized limits of the continuum, as we have seen, mis-represent the world: there is no point-like now, nor are the partitions of infinite divisibility (whether corporeal or incorporeal) really there. Likewise, no geometrical cone corresponds to any such entity in the world; perfect geometrical figures do not *exist*. And, of course, centaurs and giants do not *exist* either. What they all have in common as things that are neither corporeal nor incorporeal is that they are falsely formed by thought, thus they are *what is not*, but having taken on some image they become proper objects of thought and discourse, so we can speak of them and say *what is not*. In the end, the Stoics admit many kinds of things that *are not*, but always on physicalist terms.

However, the Stoics do not let Plato's beard grow wild. The double-edged razor they bring trims generic entities like concepts (even though they are admittedly this-worldly), counting them out for their failure to be publicly available for anyone to think about. On the other side, it cuts away anything other-worldly (even if it were somehow a perfect particular), by metaphysical principles that recognize "citizenship applications" only from what is grounded in body. This is the unity of Stoic metaphysics, as I see it. These are the Stoics as I see them. I see a coarse-grained orthodoxy that unifies the school, and I see it in a literal, face value reading of the texts. I have endeavored to show why I see the Stoics this way, as sophisticated non-reductive physicalists, and how their status in the history of philosophy is well earned, if underappreciated, for its innovative responses to Plato. Our evidence is too slim to confirm any picture, and intuitions vary too widely to hope for consensus, but with an open mind and active principle of charity, I hope to have made a compelling case that the Stoics were not victims of their own theoretical shortcomings, but models (then and now) of elegant philosophical thinking.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 2 vols., J. Barnes, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Armstrong, A. H. *Plotinus. Ennead VI. 1–5 [Enn. 1.1–5]* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Armstrong, A. H. *Plotinus. Ennead II. 1–9 [Enn. 2.1–9]*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Babbitt, F. C. *Plutarch. Moralia*, Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936.
- Bett, R. *Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians [Against Logicians]*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Bett, R. *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists [Against Physicists]*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Bett, R. *Sextus Empiricus. Against Those in the Disciplines [Against Disciplines]*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Boeri, M. D. and Salles, R. *Los Filósofos Estoicos, Ontología, Lógica, Física y Ética [BS]*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2014.
- Burnet, J. *Plato. Platonis Opera*, Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901.
- Bury, R. G. *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Professors [SE, M. 1–6]*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.
- Bury, R. G. *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists [SE, M. 9–10]. Against the Ethicists [SE, M. 11]*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936.
- Bury, R. G. *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians [SE, M. 7–8]*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935.
- Bury, R. G. *Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism [SE, PH]*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
- Campbell, L. *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a revised text and English notes [Sophistes]*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1867.
- Cherniss, H. *Plutarch: Moralia*, Vol. XIII, Part II [*Plutarch: Moralia*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Colson, F. H. *Philo*, Vol. IX. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941.
- de Haas, F. A. J. and Fleet, B. *Simplicius: On Aristotle's Categories 5–6*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- De Lacy, P. *Galen: De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis [Plac.]*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981.
- Diehl, E. *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, 3 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–06.
- Diels, H. and Kranz, W. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker [DK]*. Berlin: Weidmann, 1906.
- Dillon, J. *Dexippus: On Aristotle Categories [Dexippus]*. London: Duckworth Books, 1990.
- Dillon, J. and O'Meara, D. *Syrianus, On Aristotle Metaphysics 13–14 [Syrianus]*. London: Bloomsbury, 2006.
- Dorandi, T. *Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers [DL]*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Dufour, R. *Chrysippe. Oeuvre philosophique [Chrysippe]*, 2 vols. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004.
- Duke, E. A., Hicken, W. F., Nicoll, W. S. M., Robinson, D. B. and Strachan, J. C. G., eds. *Platonis Opera*, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Edelstein, L. and Kidd, I. G. *Posidonius: Vol. I, The Fragments [EK]*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Edghill, E. M. and Pickard-Cambridge, W. A. *Categories, On Interpretation, and On Sophistical Refutations by Aristotle*. Stilwell, KS: Digireads.com, 2006.

- Einarson, B. and De Lacy, P. *Plutarch: Moralia*, Vol. XIV. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Fleet, B. *Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 7–8* [*In Ar. Cat.*]. London: A&C Black, 2014.
- Gaskin, R. *Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 9–15*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2014.
- Graver, M. and Long, A. A. *Seneca: Letters on Ethics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015.
- Gummere, R. M. *Seneca: Epistles 1–65* [*Seneca*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917.
- Hicks, R. D. *Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol. II [*DL: Lives*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
- Hubbell, H. M. *Cicero: On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics* [*Top.*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.
- Inwood, B. *Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters: Translated with Introduction and Commentary* [*Seneca*]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
- Inwood, B. and Gerson, L. P. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, 2 ed. [IG]. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1988.
- Inwood, B. *Later Stoicism 155 BC to AD 200: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
- Jackson, B. D. and Pinborg, J. *Augustine, De Dialectica* [*De Dialectica*]. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975.
- Kalbfleisch, C. *Simplicii In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. VIII [*In Ar. Cat.*]. Berlin: Reimer, 1907.
- Kapetanaki, S. and Sharples, R. W. *Pseudo Aristoteles (Pseudo Alexander), Supplementa Problematorum* [*In Ar. S. E.*]. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006.
- Kidd, I. G. *Posidonius, Vol. II, The Commentary*. [*Posidonius, Vol. II*]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Kidd, I. G. *Posidonius, Vol. III, The Translation of the Fragments* [*Posidonius, Vol. III*]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Koetschau, P. *Origenes Werke: Contra Celsum*, 2 vols. [*Contra Cels.*]. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899.
- Kroll, W. *Syriani in Metaphysica Commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. VI, part I [*In Ar. Met.*]. Berlin: Reimer, 1902.
- Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols. [LS]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Long, H. S. *Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum: Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit* [*DL: vitae*]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.
- Magee, J. *On Plato's Timaeus/Calcidius* [*In Tim.*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D. T. *Aëtius Placita* [*Aëtius*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2023.
- Marcovich, M. *Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1999.
- May, M. T. *Galen. On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body: peri chreias moriōn de usu partium* [*On the Usefulness of the Parts*]. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968.
- Mensch, P. trans. and Miller, J. ed. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius* [*Lives*]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Plato. *Plato: Complete Works*. J. Cooper, ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
- Plato, *Sophist*. N. P. White trans. In *Plato: Complete Works*, J. Cooper ed. 235–93. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
- Plato, *Parmenides*. M. L. Gill and P. Ryan, trans. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1996.
- Preuschen, E. *Origen, Johanneskommentar* [*In Ioan.*]. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903.
- Rackham, H. *Cicero: De Natura Deorum* [*Nat. deor.*]. *Academica* [*Acad.*]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.
- Ramelli, I. *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts* [*Hierocles*]. Society of Biblical Literature, 2009.
- Reinhardt, T. *Cicero's Topica*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Schenkl, H. *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* [*Diss.*]. Leipzig: Teubner, 1916.
- Sharples, R. W. *Alexander Aphrodisiensis. "De Animi libri mantissa." A new edition of the Greek text with introduction and commentary* [*Mant.*]. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2008.

- Stählin, O. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, Vol. III. *Stromata*, Buch VII-VIII, *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, *Eclogae prophetica* [Strom.]. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909.
- Stewart, H. F., Rand, E. K., and Tester, S. J. *Boethius. The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, London: Heinemann, 1973.
- Todd, R. B. *Cleomedes Caelestia (Meteora)* [Cael.]. Leipzig: Teubner, 1990.
- Todd, R. B. *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary* [De Mixtione]. Leiden: Brill, 1976.
- Vitelli, H. *Ioannis Philoponi, In Aristotelis Physicorum, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. XVI-XVII [In Ar. Phys.]. Berlin: Reimer, 1887–88.
- von Arnim, H. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* [SVF], 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1924.
- Wachsmuth, C. and Hense, O. *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii*, Vol. I [Stobaeus]. Berolini: Weidmannos, 1884.
- Wallies, M. *Ioannis Philoponi, In Aristotelis Analytica priora, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Vol. XIII, part II [In Ar. An. pr.]. Berlin: Reimer, 1905.

Secondary Literature

- Alessandrelli, M. *Il problema del λεκτόν nello stoicismo antico: origine e statuto di una nozione controversa* [Problema]. Firenze: L. S. Olschki Editore, 2013.
- Alessandrelli, M. “Aspects and Problems of Chrysippus’ Conception of Space” [“Aspects and Problems”]. In *Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics*, C. Horn, C. Helmig, G. Ranocchia, eds. 53–68. Berlin, München, Boston: De Gruyter, 2014.
- Alessandrelli, M. “L’ontologia Stoica del Qualcosa, corpi, incorporei e concetti” [“Qualcosa”]. *ILIESI digitale. Memorie* 2 (2016): 1–43.
- Alessandrelli, M. “Reconstructing Chrysippus’ Cosmological Hypothesis. On Plut. *Stoic. rep.* 1054c–d” [“Reconstructing”]. *Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico* 40, no. 1 (2019): 67–98.
- Alessandrelli, M. “Discussione di Ada Bronowski” [“Discussione”]. *Gnomon* 94, no. 8 (2022): 676–86.
- Algra, K. “Posidonius’ Conception of the Extra-Cosmic Void. The Evidence and the Arguments” [“Posidonius on Void”]. *Mnemosyne* 46, no. 4 (1993): 473–505.
- Algra, K. *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought* [Concepts of Space]. Leiden: Brill, 1995.
- Algra, K. “Stoic Theology.” In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, B. Inwood, ed. 153–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfeld, J. and Schofield, M., eds. *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Allen, J. “The Stoics on the Origin of Language and the Foundations of Etymology” [“Origin of Language”]. In *Language and Learning, Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*, D. Frede, B. Inwood, eds. 14–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Annas, J. *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* [Mind]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Assaturian, S. “Why Children, Parrots, and Actors Cannot Speak: The Stoics on Genuine and Superficial Speech” [“Children, Parrots, and Actors”]. *Apeiron* 55, no. 1 (2022): 1–34.
- Atherton, C. *The Stoics on Ambiguity* [Ambiguity]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Aubenque, P. “Une Occasion Manquée: la genèse avortée de la distinction entre l’*étant* et le ‘quelque chose’” [“Occasion Manquée”]. In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, P. Aubenque, M. Narcy, eds. 365–85. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1991.
- Aubenque, P. “Relativity or Aporicity of Ontology? From Quine to Aristotle” [“Relativity or Aporicity?”]. In *The Furniture of the World: Essays in Ontology and Metaphysics*, G. Hurtado, O. Nudler, eds. 19–32. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Augustin, M. *Self-Instantiation in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist* [Self-Instantiation]. Diss. University of California, Santa Barbara, 2018.
- Azzouni, J. “Simple metaphysics and ‘ontological dependence.’” In *Metaphysical Grounding*, F. Correia, B. Schnieder, eds. 234–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Babut, D. *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969.
- Bailey, D. T. J., “The Structure of Stoic Metaphysics” [“Structure”]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 46 (2014): 253–309.

- Baker, L. R. *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Baltussen, H. *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator [Simplicius]*. London: Duckworth, 2008.
- Baltzly, D. "Stoic Pantheism." *Sophia* 42, no. 2 (2003): 3–33.
- Barnes, J. "Bits and Pieces." In *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Barnes, M. Mignucci, eds. 225–94. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Barnes, J. "Meaning, Saying and Thinking." In *Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Philosophie der Antike* 1, K. Döring, T. Ebert, eds. 47–61. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993.
- Barnes, J. "Aristotle and Stoic Logic." In *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, K. Ierodiakonou, ed. 23–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Barnes, J. "Meaning." In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 193–213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Barnes, J. "La doctrine du retour éternel" ["Retour éternel"]. In *Les Stoïciens et leur logique*, 2, J. Brunschwig, ed. 421–39. Paris: Vrin, 2006.
- Barnes, J. and Mignucci, M., eds. *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Barnouw, J. *Propositional Perception: Phantasia, Predication and Sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002.
- Bennett, K. "Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology." In *Metametaphysics*, D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman, eds. 38–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Bennett, K. "Construction area (no hard hat required)" ["Construction area"]. *Philosophical Studies* 154, no. 1 (2011): 79–104.
- Berrettoni, P. "An Idol of the School: The Aspectual Theory of The Stoics" ["Aspectual Theory"]. *Rivista di linguistica* 1, no. 1 (1989): 33–68.
- Betegh, G. "Colocation." In *ΣΩΜΑ. Körperkonzepte und körperliche Existenz in der antiken Philosophie und Literatur*, T. Buchheim, D. Meissner, N. Wachsmann, eds. 393–421. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2016.
- Bobzien, S. "Chrysippus' modal logic and its relation to Philo and Diodorus" ["Chrysippus' modal logic"]. In *Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Philosophie der Antike* 1, K. Döring, T. Ebert, eds. 63–84. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993.
- Bobzien, S. *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy [Determinism and Freedom]*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Bobzien, S. "Chrysippus' Theory of Causes" ["Causes"]. In *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, K. Ierodiakonou, ed. 196–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Bobzien, S. "Logic: The Stoics" ["Logic"]. In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 83–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Bobzien, S. "Stoic Logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Stoic Philosophy*, B. Inwood, ed. 85–123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Bobzien, S. "How to Give Someone Horns: Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity" ["Horns"]. *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis* 15, no. 1 (2012): 159–84.
- Bobzien, S. "Frege Plagiarized the Stoics." In *Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy, Keeling Lectures 2011–2018*, F. Leigh, ed. 149–206. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021.
- Boeri, M. "The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals" ["Bodies and Incorporeals"]. *The Review of Metaphysics* 54, no. 4 (2001): 723–52.
- Boys-Stones, G. R. "Locating the Cosmos: An Academic Argument against Chrysippus" ["Locating the Cosmos"]. *Mnemosyne* 50, no. 5 (1997), 577–85.
- Bréhier, E. *La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'Ancien Stoïcisme [Théorie]*. Paris: Vrin, 1908.
- Bréhier, E. *Chrysippe et l'Ancien Stoïcisme [Chrysippe]*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris, 1910.
- Bréhier, E. *Les Stoïciens*, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1962.
- Brennan, T. "Fate and Free Will in Stoicism: A Discussion of Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy" ["Fate and Free Will"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 21 (2001): 259–86.

- Brennan, T. "Stoic Moral Psychology" ["Moral Psychology"]. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, B. Inwood, ed. 257–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Brittain, C. "Non-Rational Perception in the Stoics and Augustine" ["Non-Rational Perception"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22 (2002): 253–308.
- Brochard, V. "Sur la Logique des Stoïciens." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 5, no. 4 (1892): 449–68.
- Bronowski, A. "The Stoic View on Universals" ["Universals"]. *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 18 (2007): 71–87.
- Bronowski, A. "Review of *Il problema del λεκτόν nello stoicismo antico: origine e statuto di una nozione controversa* by M. Alessandrelli" [Review of Alessandrelli]. *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*. August 31, 2014. <https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2014/2014.08.31/>
- Bronowski, A. *The Stoics on Lekta: All There Is To Say [Lekta]*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Brown, L. "Being in the *Sophist*: A Syntactical Enquiry" ["Being in the *Sophist*"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1986): 44–70, reprinted in *Plato: I, Metaphysics and Epistemology*, G. Fine, ed. 455–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Brown, L. "The verb 'to be' in Greek philosophy: some remarks" ["The verb 'to be'"]. In *Companions to Ancient Thought* 3, S. Everson, ed. 212–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Brown, L. "Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, *Sophist* 245–249" ["Innovation and Continuity"]. In *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, J. Gentzler, ed. 181–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Brunschwig, J. "La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne" [TGS]. In *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Barnes, M. Mignucci, eds. 21–127. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Brunschwig, J. "Stoic Metaphysics." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, B. Inwood, ed. 206–33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Brunschwig, J., ed. *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, 2 ed. Paris: Vrin, 2006.
- Casati, R. and Varzi, A. C. *Holes and Other Superficialities*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.
- Castelli, L. M. "Note sulla nozione di δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν in *Soph.* 247 D–E: alcuni spunti aristotelici" ["Nota sulla nozione"]. *Elenchos* 28, no. 2 (2007): 415–34.
- Caston, V. "Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals" ["Something and Nothing"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 17 (1999): 145–213.
- Caston, V. "The Stoics on Mental Representation" ["Mental Representation"]. In *Oxford Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy*, J. Klein, N. Powers, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025.
- Chalmers, D. J. "Ontological Anti-Realism." In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman, eds. 77–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Christensen, J. *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy [Unity]*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1962.
- Cimatti, F. "Λεκτόν and Use. Wittgenstein and the Incorporeal" ["Λεκτόν and Use"]. *JoLMA. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts* 3, no. 1 (2022): 103–18.
- Clarke, T. "The Problem of Being in Plato's *Sophist*" ["Problem of Being"]. (Unpublished.)
- Collette-Dučić, B. "Colloquium 6: On the Chrysippean Thesis that the Virtues are Poia" ["Virtues are Poia"]. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 25, no. 1 (2009): 193–241.
- Collette-Dučić, B. and Delcomminette, S. "La théorie stoïcienne du mélange total" ["Mélange"]. *Revue de philosophie ancienne* 24, no. 2 (2006): 5–60.
- Cooper, J. "Chrysippus on Physical Elements" ["Physical Elements"]. In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, R. Salles, ed. 93–117. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Cornford, F. M. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge [PTK]*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935.
- Crivelli, P. "The Stoics on Definitions and Universals." *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 18 (2007): 89–122.

- de Harven, V. "How Nothing Can Be Something: The Stoic Theory of Void." *Ancient Philosophy* 35, no. 2 (2015): 405–29.
- de Harven, V. "Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought" ["Necessity, Possibility"]. In *Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity*, M. Cresswell, E. Mares, A. Rini, eds. 70–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- de Harven, V. "Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind" ["Rational Impressions"]. In *Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity*, J. Sisko, ed. Vol. 1 of *The History of the Philosophy of Mind*, 6 vols., R. Copenhaver and C. Shields, eds. 215–35. New York: Routledge, 2018.
- de Harven, V. "The Resistance to Stoic Blending" ["Resistance"]. In *Themes in Stoic Metaphysics*, R. Salles, A. Marmodoro, eds. *Rhizomata* 6, no. 1 (2018): 1–23.
- de Harven, V. "The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism." *Apeiron* 55, no. 2 (2022): 219–45.
- de Harven, V. "Something Stoic in Plato's *Sophist*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 63 (2024): 237–97.
- de Harven, V. "The Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Hellenistic Era." In *Oxford Philosophical Concepts: PSR*, M. Della Rocca and F. Amijee, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- De Lacy, P. "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles" ["Categories"]. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 76 (1945): 246–63.
- Deleuze, G. *The Logic of Sense*. London: Bloomsbury, 1990.
- Denyer, N. "Stoicism and Token Reflexivity" ["Token Reflexivity"]. In *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Barnes and M. Mignucci, eds. 376–96. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Drozdek, A. "Infinity in Chrysippus" ["Infinity"]. *Hermes* 130 (2002): 404–15.
- Duhot, J.-J. *La conception de la causalité stoïcienne* [Causalité]. Paris: Vrin, 1989.
- Duncombe, M. *Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics* [Ancient Relativity]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Durand, M. "What Does 'This' Mean? Deixis and the Semantics of Demonstratives in Stoic Propositions" ["Deixis"]. *Méthodos* 19, 2019.
- Dyson, H. *Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa* [Prolepsis and Ennoia]. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009.
- Fine, K. "Compounds and aggregates." *Noûs* 28, no. 2 (1994): 137–58.
- Fine, K. "Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture" ["Essence and Modality"]. *Philosophical perspectives* 8 (1994): 1–16.
- Fine, K. "The Question of Ontology" ["Question"]. In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman, eds. 157–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Frede, D. "Fatalism and Future Truth." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 6, no. 1 (1990): 195–239.
- Frede, M. *Die Stoische Logik*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1974.
- Frede, M. "The Stoics on Clear and Distinct Impressions" ["Clear and Distinct"]. In *The Skeptical Tradition*, M. Burnyeat, ed. 65–93. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, reprinted in M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*. 151–76. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- Frede, M. "The Stoic Notion of a *lekton*" ["Lekton"]. In *Language, Companions to Ancient Thought* 3, S. Everson, ed. 109–28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Frede, M. "Stoic Epistemology." In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 295–322. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Frede, M. "La théologie stoïcienne" ["Théologie"]. In *Les stoïciens*, G. Romeyer Dherbey, J.-B. Gourinat, eds. 213–32. Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Furley, D. "Cosmology." In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 412–51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Gill, C. *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought* [Structured Self]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

- Gill, C. "Galen and the Stoics: Mortal Enemies or Blood Brothers?" ["Galen and the Stoics"]. *Phronesis* 52, no. 1 (2007): 88–120.
- Gill, M. L. *Philosophos*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Goldschmidt, V. *Le Système Stoïcien et l'Idée de Temps* [Système]. Paris: Vrin, 1969.
- Goldschmidt, V. "Υπάρχειν et ὑφιστάσθαι dans la philosophie stoïcienne" ["Υπάρχειν et ὑφιστάσθαι"]. *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 85 (1972): 331–44.
- Gourinat, J.-B. *La Dialectique des Stoïciens* [Dialectique]. Paris: Vrin, 2000.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "Éternel retour et temps périodique dans la philosophie stoïcienne" ["Éternel retour"]. *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 192, no. 2 (2002): 213–27.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "La disparition et la reconstruction du stoïcisme: Éléments pour une histoire" ["Disparition et reconstruction"]. In *Les stoïciens*, G. R. Dherbey, J.-B. Gourinat, eds. 13–28. Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: 'Corporealism' and the Imprint of Plato's *Timaeus*" ["Matter and Prime Matter"]. In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, R. Salles, ed. 46–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "Le discours intérieur de l'âme dans la philosophie stoïcienne" ["Discours intérieur"]. *Chôra* 11, (2013): 11–22.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "Les causes sont causes de prédicats: sur un aspect de la théorie stoïcienne de la cause" ["Causes de prédicats"]. In *Aitia II avec ou sans Aristote: Le débat sur les causes à l'âge hellénistique et imperial*, C. Natali, C. Viano, eds. 65–93. Leuven: Peeters, 2014.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "Les stoïciens et le dualisme." *Chôra* 13 (2015): 165–84.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "The Ontology and Syntax of Stoic Causes and Effects" ["Ontology and Syntax"]. *Rhizomata* 6, no. 1 (2018): 87–108.
- Gourinat, J.-B. "Stoic dialectic and its objects" ["Stoic dialectic"]. In *Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle*, T. Bénatouïl, K. Ierodiakonou, eds. 134–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Graeser, A. *Plotinus and the Stoics, a preliminary study* [Plotinus and the Stoics]. Leiden: Brill, 1972.
- Graeser, A. *Zenon von Kition: Positionen und Probleme* [Zenon von Kition]. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975.
- Graeser, A. "The Stoic Categories" ["Categories"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, 2 ed. J. Brunschwig, ed. 347–67. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Graeser, A. "The Stoic Theory of Meaning" ["Theory of Meaning"]. In *The Stoics*, J. M. Rist, ed. 77–100. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Grote, G. *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, Vol. 3. London: J. Murray, 1888.
- Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, S. and McKenzie, R. eds. *Greek-English Lexicon. Revised Supplement* [LSJ]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- Hadot, P. *Porphyre et Victorinus* [Porphyre]. Paris: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes, 1968.
- Hadot, P. "Zur Vorgeschichte des Begriffs 'Existenz,' ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ bei den Stoikern" ["ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ"]. *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 13 (1969): 115–27.
- Hadot, P. "Sur les divers sens du mot *pragma* dans la tradition philosophique grecque" ["Pragma"]. In *Concepts et Catégories dans la Pensée Antique*, P. Aubenque, ed. 309–19. Paris: Vrin, 1980.
- Hahn, D. *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* [Origins]. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1978.
- Hankinson, R. J. *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought* [Cause and Explanation]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Hankinson, R. J. "Explanation and Causation." In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 479–512. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Hankinson, R. J. "Stoic Epistemology." In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, B. Inwood, ed. 59–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Harte, V. *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure* [Plato on Parts and Wholes]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

- Helle, R. "Hierocles and the Stoic Theory of Blending" ["Hierocles"]. *Phronesis* 63, no. 1 (2018): 87–116.
- Helle, R. "Self-Causation and Unity in Stoicism" ["Self-Causation"]. *Phronesis* 66, no. 2 (2021): 178–213.
- Helle, R. "Colocation and the Stoic Definition of Blending" ["Colocation"]. *Phronesis* 67, no. 4 (2022): 462–97.
- Hensley, I. "On the Separability and Inseparability of the Stoic Principles" ["Separability and Inseparability"]. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 56, no. 2 (2018): 187–214.
- Hunt, H. A. K. *A Physical Interpretation of the Universe: The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic* [Physical Interpretation]. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1976.
- Ierodiakonou, K. ed. *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
- Ierodiakonou, K. "Ancient Thought Experiments." *Ancient Philosophy* 25, no. 1 (2005): 125–40.
- Imbert, C. "Théorie de la Représentation et Doctrine Logique" ["Représentation"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 79–108. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Inwood, B. "Hierocles: Theory and argument in the second century AD" ["Hierocles"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984): 151–84.
- Inwood, B. *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* [Ethics and Human Action]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
- Inwood, B. "Chrysippus on Extension and the Void" ["Extension and the Void"]. *Revue internationale de philosophie* 45, no. 178(3) (1991): 245–66.
- Inwood, B. "Why Physics?" In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, R. Salles, ed. 201–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Inwood, B. "How Unified Is Stoicism Anyway?" ["Unified"]. In *Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honour of Julia Annas*, R. Kamtekar, ed. 223–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Irani, T. "Perfect Change in Plato's *Sophist*" ["Perfect Change"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 60, (2022): 45–93.
- Irwin, T. "Stoic Individuals." *Philosophical Perspectives* 10, *Metaphysics* (1996): 459–80.
- Isnardi Parente, M. "La notion d'incorporel chez les stoïciens" ["Incorporel"]. In *Les stoïciens*, G. R. Dherbey, J.-B. Gourinat, eds. 175–85. Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Johnson, B. E. "Commentary on Collette-Dučić." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 25 (2010): 224–39.
- Ju, A. "The Stoic Ontology of Geometrical Limits" ["Geometrical Limits"]. *Phronesis* 54, no. 4/5 (2009): 371–89.
- Kahn, C. "Stoic Logic and Stoic LOGOS" ["Logic and LOGOS"]. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 51 (1959): 158–72.
- Kahn, C. "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976): 323–34.
- Kahn, C. "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to be' in Plato," *Phronesis* 26, no. 2 (1981): 105–34.
- Kerferd, G. B. "The Problem of Synkatathesis and Katalepsis in Stoic Doctrine" ["Synkatathesis"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 109–30. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Keyt, D. "Plato's Paradox That the Immutable is Unknowable" ["Plato's Paradox"]. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 19, no. 74 (1969): 1–14.
- Kim, J. "Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence." *Philosophical Issues* 5 (1994): 51–69.
- Kneale, W. and M. Kneale. *The Development of Logic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- Konstan, D. "Epicurus on the Void." In *Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics*, C. Horn, C. Helmig, G. Ranocchia, eds. 83–100. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.
- Konstan, D. "Stoic Intervals of Space and Time." (Unpublished.)
- Koslicki, K. "Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy." *The Journal of Philosophy* 102, no. 2 (2005): 55–77.
- Koslicki, K. "Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology." *Dialectica* 61, no. 1 (2007): 127–59.
- Koslicki, K. *The Structure of Objects* [Structure]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Koslicki, K. "Varieties of Ontological Dependence" ["Varieties"]. In *Metaphysical Grounding, Understanding the Structure of Reality*, F. Correia, B. Schneider, eds. 186–213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

- Kripke, S. "Identity and Necessity." In *Identity and Individuation*, M. K. Muniz, ed. 135–64. New York: New York University Press, 1971.
- Kripke, S. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Lampe, K. "Kristeva, Stoicism, and the 'True Life of Interpretations.'" *SubStance* 45, no. 1 (2016): 22–43.
- Lapidge, M. "ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology" ["ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα"]. *Phronesis* 18, no. 3 (1973): 240–78.
- Lapidge, M. "Stoic Cosmology." In *The Stoics*, J. M. Rist, ed. 161–86. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Leigh, F. "Being and Power in Plato's *Sophist*" ["Being and Power"]. *Apeiron* 43, no. 1 (2010): 63–85.
- Leonard, H. S. and Goodman, N. "The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses." *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 5, no. 2 (1940): 45–55.
- Leonard, M. "Locating Gunky Water and Wine." *Ratio* 27, no. 3 (2014): 306–15.
- Leśniewski, S. "Podstawy ogólnej teorii mnogości I" ["Foundations of the General Theory of Sets I"]. *Prace Polskiego Koła Naukowego w Moskwie. Sekcja matematyczno-przyrodnicza* 2. Moscow: Popławski, 1916.
- Leśniewski, S. "On the Foundations of Mathematics." *Topoi* 2 (1983): 7–52.
- Lesses, G. "Content, Cause and Stoic Impressions" ["Content, Cause"]. *Phronesis* 43, no. 1 (1998): 1–25.
- Lewis, D. *Parts of Classes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Lewis, D. and Lewis, S. "Holes." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 48, no. 2 (1970): 206–12.
- Lewis, E. "Diogenes Laertius and the Stoic Theory of Mixture" ["DL and Mixture"]. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 35 (1988): 84–90.
- Lewis, E. "The Stoics on Identity and Individuation" ["Identity and Individuation"]. *Phronesis* 40, no. 1 (1995): 89–108.
- Lloyd, A. C. "Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa" ["Grammar and Metaphysics"]. In *Problems in Stoicism*, A. A. Long, ed. 58–74. London: The Athlone Press, 1971.
- Lloyd, A. C. "Parhypostasis in Proclus" In *Proclus et son influence: actes du colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985*, G. Boss, G. Seel, eds. 145–57. GMB Editions du Grand Midi, 1987.
- Long, A. A. "Language and Thought in Stoicism" ["Language and Thought"]. In *Problems in Stoicism*, A. A. Long ed. 75–113. London: The Athlone Press, 1971.
- Long, A. A., ed. *Problems in Stoicism*. London: Athlone Press, 1971.
- Long, A. A. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics [Hellenistic Philosophy]*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Long, A. A. "Soul and Body in Stoicism" ["Soul and Body"]. *Phronesis* 27, no. 1 (1982): 34–57.
- Long, A. A. "The stoics on world-conflagration and everlasting recurrence" ["Everlasting recurrence"]. *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 23(S1) (1985): 13–37.
- Long, A. A. "Hierocles on *Oikeiosis* and Self-perception" ["*Oikeiosis*"]. In *Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. J. Boudouris, ed. 93–104. Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1993.
- Long, A. A. "Representation and the Self in Stoicism" ["Representation and the Self"]. In *Companions to Ancient Thought* 2, S. Everson, ed. 101–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, reprinted in A. A. Long, *Stoic Studies*. 264–85. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- Long, A. A. "Stoic psychology and the elucidation of language" ["Stoic psychology and language"]. In *Knowledge Through Signs: Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices*, G. Manetti, ed. 109–31. Turnhout: Brepols, 1996.
- Long, A. A. *Stoic Studies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- Long, A. A. "Theophrastus and the Stoics." In *Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources*, J. M. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte, eds. 355–84. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997.
- Long, A. A. "Stoic linguistics, Plato's *Cratylus*, and Augustine's *De dialectica*" ["Stoic linguistics"]. In *Language and Learning, Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age*, D. Frede, B. Inwood, eds. 36–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- Long, A. A. *From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Ludlam, I. "Two Long-Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs" ["Two Stoic Myths"]. *Elenchos* 24, no. 1 (2003): 33–55.
- Łukasiewicz, J. "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik" [Aussagenlogik], *Erkenntnis* 5 (1935): 111–31.
- Mann, W.-R. "Elements, Causes, and Principles: A Context for *Metaphysics* Z.17" ["Elements, Causes, and Principles"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 40 (2011): 29–61.
- Mansfeld, J. "Zeno of Citium. Critical Observations on a Recent Study" ["Zeno of Citium"]. *Mnemosyne* 31 (1978): 134–78.
- Mansfeld, J. "Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought" ["Providence and Destruction"]. In *Studies in Hellenistic Religions*, M. Vermaseren, ed. 129–88. Leiden: Brill, 1979.
- Mansfeld, J. "Zeno and Aristotle on Mixture." *Mnemosyne* 36 (1983): 306–10.
- Mansfeld, J. "Versions of the Nobody" ["Nobody"]. *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984): 445–7.
- Mansfeld, J. "Substance, Being and Division in Middle Platonist and Later Aristotelian Contexts" ["Substance, Being and Division"]. In *Heresiography in Context*, 78–109. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
- Mansfeld, J. Review of *Essays on Stoicism* by B. Inwood ["Essays on Stoicism"]. *The Classical Review* 55, no. 1 (2005): 66–9.
- Marmodoro, A. "Stoic Blends." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 32, no. 1 (2017): 1–24.
- Marmodoro, A. "Stoic Gunk." In *Everything in Everything*, 156–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Mates, B. "Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus." *American Journal of Philology* 70, no. 3 (1949): 290–8.
- Mates, B. *Stoic Logic*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
- Mattingly, J. R. "Early Stoicism and the Problem of its Systematic Form" ["Early Stoicism"]. *The Philosophical Review* 48, no. 3 (1939): 273–95.
- McDaniel, K. "Being and Almost Nothingness." *Nous* 44, no. 4 (2010), 628–49.
- Menn, S. "The Stoic Theory of Categories" ["Categories"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 17 (1999): 215–47.
- Meyer, S. S. "Passion, Impulse, and Action in Stoicism" ["Passion, Impulse, and Action"]. *Rhizomata* 6 (2018): 109–34.
- Mignucci, M. "Sur la logique modale des Stoïciens" ["Logique modale"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 317–46. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Mignucci, M. "The Stoic Notion of Relatives" ["Relatives"]. In *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Barnes and M. Mignucci, eds. 129–221. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Mikeš, V. "Stoic principles: Bodies? What kind of bodies?" ["Bodies?"]. (Unpublished).
- Miller, J. "Spinoza and the Stoics on Substance Monism" ["Substance Monism"]. In *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics*, O. Koistinen, ed. 99–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Mouroutsou, G. "The Plasticity of the Present Moment in Marcus Aurelius' Meditations" ["Plasticity of the Present"]. *Ancient Philosophy* 40, no. 2 (2020): 411–34.
- Moravcsik, J. M. E. "Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*" ["Being and Meaning"]. *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 14 (1962): 23–78.
- Moreau, J. *L'âme du monde de Plato aux Stoïciens*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1939.
- Mouraviev, S. "Zeno's Cosmology and the Presumption of Innocence: Interpretations and Vindications" ["Zeno's Cosmology"]. *Phronesis* 50, no. 3 (2005): 232–49.
- Muller, I. "An Introduction to Stoic Logic." In *The Stoics*, J. M. Rist, ed. 1–26. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Nawar, T. "The Stoic Account of Apprehension" ["Apprehension"]. *Philosopher's Imprint* 14, no. 29 (2014): 1–21.
- Nawar, T. "The Stoics on Identity, Identification, and Peculiar Qualities" ["Identity, Identification"]. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 32, no. 1 (2017): 113–59.

- Nolan, D. "Stoic Gunk." *Phronesis* 51, no. 2 (2006): 162–83.
- Nolan, D. "Stoic Trichotomies." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 51 (2016): 207–30.
- Nuchelmans, G. *Theories of the Proposition, Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity [Theories of the Proposition]*. Turnhout: Brepols, 1973.
- Obdrzalek, S. "Platonic Dualism Reconsidered." *Phronesis* 69, no. 1 (2024): 31–62.
- Owen, G. E. L. "Plato on Not-Being." In *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, vol. 1: *Metaphysics and Epistemology*, G. Vlastos, ed. 223–67. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971.
- Papazian, M. B. "Stoic Ontology and the Reality of Time" ["Stoic Ontology"]. *Ancient Philosophy* 19, no. 1 (1999): 105–19.
- Parsons, J. "Theories of Location." In *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, Vol. 3, D. Zimmerman, ed. 201–32. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
- Pasquino, P. "Le statut ontologique des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme" ["Incorporels"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 333–46. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Paul, L. A. "Logical Parts." *Noûs* 36, no. 4 (2002): 578–96.
- Perin, C. "Stoic Epistemology and the Limits of Externalism" ["Externalism"]. *Ancient Philosophy* 25, no. 2 (2005): 383–401.
- Pohlenz, M. *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959.
- Powers, N. M. "Void and Space in Stoic Ontology" ["Void and Space"]. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 52, no. 3 (2014): 411–32.
- Quine, W. V. "On What There Is." *The Review of Metaphysics* 2, no. 5 (1948): 21–38.
- Rashed, M. "Chrysippe et la Division à l'Infini (D. L. VII 150–151)" ["Division à l'Infini"]. *Acta Antiqua Hungarica* 49 (2009): 345–51.
- Reed, B. "The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression" ["Cognitive Impression"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 23 (2002): 147–80.
- Reesor, M. "The Stoic Concept of Quality" ["Quality"]. *American Journal of Philology* 75, no. 1 (1954): 40–58.
- Reesor, M. "The Stoic Categories" ["Categories"]. *American Journal of Philology* 78, no. 1 (1957): 63–82.
- Reesor, M. "Poion and Poiotes in Stoic Philosophy" ["Poion and Poiotes"]. *Phronesis* 17, no. 3 (1972): 279–85.
- Reesor, M. *The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy [Nature of Man]*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
- Reinhardt, K. *Kosmos und Sympathie: neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios [Kosmos und Sympathie]*. München: CH Beck, 1926.
- Reydams-Schils, G. *Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato's Timaeus [Demiurge and Providence]*. Turnhout: Brepols, 1999.
- Rheins, J. "A Critical Problem with the Corporeality of the Stoic Principles" ["A Critical Problem"]. Presented at 2016 Pacific APA, March 30, 2016.
- Rist, J. M. *Stoic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Rist, J. M. "Categories and their Uses." In *Problems in Stoicism*, A. A. Long, ed. 41–57. London: Athlone Press, 1971.
- Rist, J. M. "Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic." In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 13–28. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Rist, J. M., ed. *The Stoics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Robertson, D. "Chrysippus on Mathematical Objects" ["Mathematical Objects"]. *Ancient Philosophy* 24, no. 1 (2004): 169–91.
- Romeyer Dherbey, G. and Gourinat, J.-B. eds. *Les stoïciens*. Paris: Vrin, 2005.
- Rosen, G. "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction" ["Metaphysical Dependence"]. In *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology*, B. Hale, A. Hoffmann, eds. 109–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Ross, W. D. Review of *Davidson's Stoic Creed*, by W. L. Davidson. ["Davidson's Stoic Creed"]. *The Classical Review* 21, no. 8 (1907): 240–1.
- Ruben, D.-H. "The Ontology of Explanation." In *Freedom and Rationality: Essays in Honor of John Watkins From his Colleagues and Friends*, F. D'Agostino and I. C. Jarvie, eds. 67–85. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989.

- Salles, R. "On the Individuation of Times and Events in Orthodox Stoicism" ["Times and Events"]. In *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, R. Salles, ed. 95–116. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Salles, R. *The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism* [*Determinism and Compatibilism*]. Farnham: Ashgate, 2005.
- Salles, R., ed. *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* [*God and Cosmos*]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Salles, R. "Roman Stoicism." In *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, J. Warren, F. Sheffield, eds. 541–53. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Salles, R. "¿Qué tan elementales son los cuatro elementos? Una lectura de Ario Dídimo fr. 21 Diels" ["Elementos"]. *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* 9, no. 2 (2015): 1–33.
- Salles, R. "Two early Stoic theories of cosmogony" ["Two Stoic theories"]. In *Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity*, A. Marmodoro and B. Prince, eds. 11–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Salles, R. "Two Classic Problems in the Stoic Theory of Time" ["Two Classic Problems"]. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 55 (2018): 133–83.
- Salles, R. *The Stoic Cosmos. Conflagration, Cosmogony and Recurrence in early Stoicism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
- Sambursky, S. *Physics of the Stoics* [*Physics*]. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959.
- Sandbach, F. H. "Ennoia and Prolēpsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge" ["Ennoia and Prolēpsis"]. *Classical Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (1930): 44–51.
- Sandbach, F. H. *The Stoics*, 2 ed. London: Chatto and Windus, 1975. London: Hackett, 1994.
- Sandbach, F. H. *Aristotle and the Stoics*. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1985.
- Scade, P. "Stoic Cosmological Limits and their Platonic Background" ["Cosmological Limits"]. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 54 (2010): 143–83.
- Scade, P. "Plato and the Stoics on Limits, Parts and Wholes" ["Limits, Parts and Wholes"]. In *Plato and the Stoics*, A. G. Long, ed. 80–105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Schaffer, J. "Monism, The Priority of the Whole" ["Monism"]. *Philosophical Review* 119, no. 1 (2010): 31–76.
- Schaffer, J. "On What Grounds What" ["Grounds"]. In *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman, eds. 347–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Schleiermacher, F. *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato* [*Dialogues of Plato*], W. Dobson, trans. London: J. W. Parker & Deighton, 1836.
- Schofield, M. "Ariston of Chios and the Unity of Virtue" ["Ariston"]. *Ancient Philosophy* 4, no. 1 (1984): 83–96.
- Schofield, M. "ARXH." *Hyperboreus* 3 (1997): 218–35.
- Schofield, M. "The Retrenchable Present" ["Retrenchable"]. In *Matter and Metaphysics: Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Barnes and M. Mignucci, eds. 331–74. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1988.
- Schwab, W. "Non-Perceptual Katalēptic Impressions in Stoicism" ["Katalēptic Impressions"]. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 62, no. 3 (2024): 367–93.
- Schwab, W. and Shogry, S. "Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception" ["Rationality of Perception"]. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 106, no. 1 (2023): 58–83.
- Sedley, D. "On Signs." In *Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice*, J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, and M. Schofield, eds. 239–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1982.
- Sedley, D. "The Stoic Criterion of Identity" ["Criterion"]. *Phronesis* 27, no. 3 (1982): 255–75.
- Sedley, D. "Two Conceptions of Vacuum." *Phronesis* 27, no. 2 (1982): 175–93.
- Sedley, D. "The Stoic Theory of Universals" ["Universals"]. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 23, no. S1 (1985): 87–92.
- Sedley, D. "Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causation" ["Psychophysical Causation"]. In *Passions & Perceptions, Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum*, J. Brunschwig, M. Nussbaum, eds. 313–31. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

- Sedley, D. "The Foundations of Stoic Physics: Stoicism" ["Foundations of Physics"]. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Taylor and Francis, 1998. <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/stoicism/v-1/sections/the-foundations-of-physics>.
- Sedley, D. "Stoicism." In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Taylor and Francis, 1998. <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/stoicism/v-1/sections/the-parts-of-philosophy>.
- Sedley, D. "Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics" ["Physics and Metaphysics"]. In *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield, eds. 355–411. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Sedley, D. "The origins of Stoic god" ["Origins"]. In *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath*, D. Frede, A. Laks, eds. 41–83. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
- Sedley, D. "Stoic Metaphysics at Rome." In *Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, R. Salles, ed. 117–42. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- Sedley, D. "Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy" ["Matter"]. In *Materia: XIII Colloquio internazionale: Roma, 7-8-9 gennaio 2010*, D. Giovannozzi, M. Veneziani, eds. 53–66. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2011.
- Sedley, D. "The Stoics and their Critics on Diachronic Identity" ["Diachronic"]. *Rhizomata* 6, no. 1 (2018): 24–39.
- Sellars, J. "Stoic Ontology and Plato's *Sophist*" ["Stoic Ontology"]. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 54, no. 107 (2010): 185–203.
- Sharples, R. W. *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy [Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics]*. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Shields, C. "The Truth Evaluability of Stoic *Phantasiai*: Adversus Mathematicos VII 242–46" ["*Phantasiai*"]. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 31, no. 3 (1993): 325–47.
- Shogry, S. "What do our impressions say? The Stoic theory of perceptual content and belief formation" ["Impressions"]. *Apeiron* 52, no. 1 (2018): 29–63.
- Shogry, S. "The Stoic Appeal to Expertise: Platonic Echoes in the Reply to Indistinguishability" ["Expertise"]. *Apeiron* 54, no. 2 (2021): 129–59.
- Simons, P. *Parts: A Study in Ontology [Parts]*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Smyth, H. W. *Greek Grammar*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920.
- Solmsen, F. "Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought" ["Nature as Craftsman"]. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24, no. 4 (1963): 473–96.
- Sorabji, R. *Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages [TCC]*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Sorabji, R. *Matter, Space, and Motion [MSM]*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Sorabji, R. "Perceptual Content in the Stoics" ["Perceptual Content"]. *Phronesis* 35, no. 3 (1990): 307–14.
- Stephens, W. O. "The Stoics and their Philosophical System." In *The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy*, K. Arenson, ed. 22–34. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Striker, G. "κρῖναι τῆς ἀληθείας." *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, I. Phil-hist. Klasse* 2 (1974): 48–110.
- Taylor, A. E. *Plato, the Man and His Work [Plato]*. London: Methuen & Co., 1926.
- Thein, K. "Stoic Fictions: The Prehistory of Analysis" ["Stoic Fictions"]. In *Fictionality—Possibility—Reality*, P. Kotatko, M. Pokorny, M. Sabates, eds. 259–79. Bratislava: Aleph, 2010.
- Thomas, C. J. "Speaking of Something: Plato's *Sophist* and Plato's Beard" ["Speaking of Something"]. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 38, no. 4 (2008): 631–67.
- Teleman, T. "Posidonius on the Void. A Controversial Case of Divergence Revisited" ["Posidonius on the Void"]. In *Space in Hellenistic Philosophy: Critical Studies in Ancient Physics*, C. Helmig, C. Horn, G. Ranocchia, eds. 69–81. Berlin, München, Boston: De Gruyter, 2014.
- Todd, R. B. "Stoic Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics" ["Monism and Immanence"]. In *The Stoics*, J. Rist, ed. 137–60. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Todd, R. B. "Cleomedes and the Stoic Concept of the Void" ["Cleomedes and Void"]. *Apeiron* 16, no. 2 (1982): 129–36.

- Totschnig, W. "Bodies and Their Effects" ["Effects"]. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 95, no. 2 (2013): 119–47.
- Tzamalikos, P. "Origen and the Stoic View of Time" ["Origen"]. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 52, no. 4 (1991): 535–61.
- van Inwagen, P. "Creatures of Fiction." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (1977): 299–308.
- van Inwagen, P. *Material Beings*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- van Inwagen, P. *Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Essays in Metaphysics* [Ontology, Identity, and Modality]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Varzi, A. C. "On Doing Ontology Without Metaphysics" ["Ontology Without Metaphysics"]. *Philosophical Perspectives* 25, *Metaphysics* (2011): 407–23.
- Vasilou, I. "Ancient Philosophy and Disjunctivism: The Case of the Stoics" ["Disjunctivism"]. In *New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism*, C. Doyle, J. Milburn, D. Pritchard, eds. 61–88. New York: Routledge, 2019.
- Verbeke, G. "La philosophie du signe chez les stoïciens" ["La philosophie du signe"]. In *Les stoïciens et leur logique*, J. Brunschwig, ed. 261–82. Paris: Vrin, 1978.
- Vlastos, G. "An Ambiguity in the Sophist" ["Ambiguity"]. In *Platonic Studies*, 2 ed. 270–322. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Vogt, K. "Sons of the Earth: Are the Stoics Metaphysical Brutes?" ["Brutes"]. *Phronesis* 54, no. 2 (2009): 135–54.
- Vogt, K. *Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato* [Belief and Truth]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Vogt, K. "A Unified Notion of Cause" ["Unified Notion"]. *Rhizomata* 6, no. 1 (2018): 65–86.
- Watson, G. *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* [Theory of Knowledge]. Belfast: The Queen's University, 1966.
- Weil, E. "Remarques sur le matérialisme des stoïciens." *L'Aventure de l'Esprit, Mélanges A. Koyré* 2 (1964): 556–72.
- White, M. J. "The Stoic Model." In *The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a Contemporary Perspective*, 284–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- White, M. J. "Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology)" ["Stoic Natural Philosophy"]. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, B. Inwood, ed. 124–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- White, S. "Posidonius and Stoic Physics" ["Posidonius"]. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 94 (2007): 35–76.
- Wiggins, D. *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
- Wiggins, D. "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time" ["Same Place Same Time"]. *The Philosophical Review* 77, no. 1 (1968): 90–5.
- Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.
- Zeller, E. *Outlines of The History of Greek Philosophy* [Outlines]. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955.

Index Locorum

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

Numbers in bold indicate where lettered passages are quoted.

Aëtius

- 1.7.10 (EK F101) **165**, 165
- 1.7.33 (46A) **165**, 165
- 1.20.1 (SVF 2.504) **288**, 288, 312–15, 318
- 2.9 (Mansfeld & Runia) **309**, 309–11
- 4.12.1–5 (39B) **391**, 391–93, 401

Alexander

- In Ar. An. pr.*
 - 180,33–6...181,25–31 (52F) **345**, 345–47
- In Ar. Meta.*
 - 178,15–9 (SVF 2.306) **147**
- In Ar. Top.*
 - 301,19–25 (27B) **53**
- Mixt.*
 - 213,2–6 **118**
 - 216,14–217,2 (48C1–4) **109**,
109–10, 151–52
 - 217,14–7 **112**
 - 217,26–32 (48C9) **112–13**, 113
 - 218,15–24 (Todd) **115**, 115–16
 - 219,9–13 ... 18–20 (Todd) **122**, 123
 - 220,26–9 **112**
 - 224,23–6 (47I2) **163–64**

Ammonius

- In Ar. De int.*
 - 43,9–15 (33K) **409**

Aristocles ap. Eusebius

- Pr. Ev.*
 - 15.14.1 (45G) **134**, 134–36

Augustine

- De Dialectica*
 - 5.8,5–6 (Jackson & Pinborg) **379–80**
 - 5.8,17–9 (Jackson & Pinborg) **380**, 387,
406, 429

Boethius

- Contra Eutychen*
 - 3.44–79 **478**

Calcidius

- In Tim.*
 - 279–94 (Magee) **159–61**

- 289 (Magee) **143**, 143–44, 159
- 293 (44E1-3) **82–83**, **159**, 159–61
- 293 (44E5) **150**
- 294 (SVF 1.87, IG II–56) **146**
- 295 (Magee) **139**, 139–40, 152–53
- 311 (Magee) **142**
- 312 (Magee) **139**, 139–40

Cicero

- Acad.*
 - 1.39 (45A) **48**, 48–49
 - 2.21 (39C) **399**, 399–401
- Top.*
 - 27 (Hubbell) **67–68**

Clement

- Strom.*
 - 8.9.26.3–4 (55C) **419**, 420–22, 425–26
 - 8.9.29.1–2 (Stählin) **422**
 - 8.9.30.1–3 (55D) **419**, 420–22

Cleomedes

- Cael.*
 - I.1,17–24 (Todd; SVF 2.538+) **288**, 293–96,
313, 318
 - I.1,39–43 (Todd) **295**
 - I.1,64–6 (49C) **289**, 290–94

Dexippus

- In Ar. Cat.*
 - 30,20–29...33–34 (Dillon; 28J+) **188–89**,
189–90, 216–19

Diogenes Laertius (DL)

- Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
 - 2.119 **485**
 - 7.43–63 **382–90**, 404–5
 - 7.49 (39A2/33D) **377**, 386, **394**,
395, 398–99
 - 7.49–53 **66–67**
 - 7.51 (39A6–7) **394**, 395, 398–402
 - 7.53 (39D) **415**, 440
 - 7.57 (33A) **377–78**, **384–85**, 385
 - 7.60–1 (30C1–2) **215–16**, **490**, 490–93
 - 7.63 (33F) **372**
 - 7.132 (43B) **133**, **267**, 268–75, 424

Diogenes Laertius (DL) (*cont.*)

- 7.134 (44B) 133, 134–43, 167–68
 7.135 (50E) 324, 324–27, 450–53
 7.136 (Dorandi) 156, 157–61
 7.140 (SVF 2.543) 289, 290
 7.150 (Dorandi) 202, 202–3
 7.150–1 (Dorandi) 99, 100–1, 107–8,
 110–12, 117, 138, 160–61, 200–1
 7.157 (Dorandi; 53N+) 392, 393

Epictetus

- Diss.*
 2.18.24 (Schenkl) 397–98

Galen

- Caus. cont.*
 1.1–3 (55F1 part) 164, 167–68
De usu partium
 1.1 (May) 91, 91–92
Plac.
 2.5.16–20 (De Lacy) 405, 405–10
 7.1.12–5 (29E) 238–39, 241, 241–42
Qual. inc.
 19.464,10–4 (49E) 291

Iamblichus

- De an.*
 Stob. 1.368, 12–20 (53K) 213, 214

Marcus Aurelius

- Meditations*
 9.1.2 439

Nemesius

- 81,6–10 (45D) 275, 275–77
 309,5–311,2 (52C) 342–43, 343–44, 347

Origen

- Contra Cels*
 4.68 346
 5.20 (52G) 346, 346–47
Princ.
 3.1.3 (53A5) 397

Philo

- Aet. Mundi*
 52–54 (Colson) 335–36, 336–37, 369

Philoponus

- In Ar. Phys.*
 613,23–7 (Vitelli; SVF 1.96) 289,
 290, 293–94
In An. pr.
 242,28–9 (Wallies) 377
 243,1–10 (Wallies) 377

Plato

- Sophist*
 237 A 2–242 A 4 (Patricide) 36–38
 242 A 5–245 E 5 (Presocratics) 38
 245 E 6–251 A 7 (Battle) 39–43
 246 A 8–B 3 39, 39–40
 247 C 9–D 4 40
 247 D 8–E 4 40–41, 41
 251 A 8–B 3 170
 251 A 8–B 3 (Late Learners) 44
Theaetetus
 184 B 2–6 A 1 395

Plotinus

- Enn.*
 2.7.1,32–4 116
 6.1.25,30–34 (Armstrong) 101, 203
 6.1.26,17–28 (SVF 2.315) 84–85, 85,
 87, 136–37
 6.1.30,24–8 (Armstrong) 222–23

Plutarch

- Adv. Col.*
 1116B–C (Einarson & DeLacy) 433
Comm. not.
 1077D (28O3) 224
 1078A (Cherniss) 123–24, 124
 1078E–1079C (50C1–3 part) 102, 103–6,
 321, 461–63
 1079B–C (50C3) 359, 359–60
 1079D 463
 1079E (50C5) 460, 460–67
 1080A–B 465–67
 1081C–D 103–4
 1081C–1082A (51C) 351–52, 352–58,
 366–67, 432–33
 1083A–1084A (28A) 181–82, 182–84, 189,
 200–1, 232–35, 238
 1084C–D (51G) 365, 365–66
 1085B–C (Cherniss) 86, 86–88,
 135–36, 142–43
De defectu oracularum
 28, 425D–E (Babbitt) 297–98, 298–99, 301
St. rep.
 1050 A (Cherniss) 344, 347
 1054 B–E...1055B–C (Cherniss) 302–5,
 305–8, 317

Virt. mor.

- 440E–441D (61B) 237–43, 239–40

Proclus

- In Eucl. El.*
 I 89,15–21 (50D) 435, 454, 454–55
 I 143.5–4.5 (EK fr. 196) 456–57, 457–58
In Plat. Tim.
 1.266,21–28 (Diehl; SVF 2.307) 147–48, 148
 3.95, 7–15 (Diehl; 51F) 435, 455, 456

Pseudo-Alexander

In Ar. S.E.

20,27–9 (Kapetanaki & Sharples) 376–77

Seneca

Ep.

58.13...15 (27A) 470–71, 471–78, 502–6

117.13 (33E) 404

Sextus Empiricus (SE)

M.

1.9–17 56–59

1.15...1.17 (27C) 54, 54–59, 435, 459, 500

7.162 (70A6) 393–94

7.251 (40E3) 393

7.344 (Bury) 400

8.10 (Bury) 389

8.11–2 (33B) 383, 384, 386, 388–89, 404–5, 415, 440

8.69–70 (Bury; 33C+) 377, 383, 384–88, 395, 403–4

8.75–8.90 (Bury) 436

8.80 377–78, 386, 409–10

8.85 438

8.275–6 (53T) 397, 397–99, 404

8.400–10 60–62

8.409–10 (27E) 60, 60–66, 140–41, 229, 266, 325, 391–92, 440

9.211 (55B) 419, 420–22

9.254 (Bury) 152–53

9.336 (Bury) 97

10.3–4 (49B+) 294, 312–18, 322–23

Simplicius

In Ar. Cat.

66,32–7 (27F) 171

105,7–16 (30E) 69–70, 70–71

165,32–6,29 (29c) 194–96, 209–10, 236–37

212,12–3,1 (28N) 190–91, 192–93, 196–97,

209–10, 235–37, 244–45, 341

214,24–37 (28M) 193, 193–97, 207,

210–11, 219–20, 230–31, 235–37, 242–44

217,32–8,1 (28L) 274, 274–75

222,30–3 (28H) 212, 242, 270, 496

222,34–3,11 212–13

271,20–2 (28K) 458

361,10–2...361,15–7

(Kalbfleisch) 318, 318–19

397,10 (Kalbfleisch) 389

Stobaeus

1.102.19 339

1.105,8–16 (51D, part) 333, 333–37

1.105,12–16 (51D, part) 350, 357, 359, 360, 362

1.105,21–106,4 (51E3–5) 350, 351, 353, 357, 359, 362, 366–67

1.106,5–7 (51B1) 334, 335–40, 370

1.106,13–23 (51B3–4) 349, 349–50, 357, 359–60, 363–64

1.106,18–23 (51B4) 437

1.136,21–7,6 (30A) 429, 488–89, 489–93

1.138,14–139,4 (55A) 422, 423–24, 428

1.142,2–6 (50A) 101–2, 277–78, 325, 334, 354–55, 467

1.161,8–26 (49A) 292, 292–94, 312–16, 319–20, 322

1.177,21–179,17 (28D) 92, 184–85, 185–89, 200–1, 205–7, 219, 221–22, 228–30, 234–35, 344–45

1.219,11–24 (SVF 2.677) 365–66

2.97,15–8,6 (33J2–3) 410, 411

Syrianus

In Ar. Met.

105,25 (Kroll) 389

Index Nominum

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

- Alessandrelli, M. 296–97, 301, 319–20, 373–74, 387–88, 413, 426, 433–34
Algra, K. 290–91, 296–97, 300, 309–17
Annas, J. 402
Assaturian, S. 377–78
Aubenque, P. 34–35, 37
- Bailey, D. T. J. 2–3, 33–34, 51–52, 260–61, 283–84, 436–37, 442–43, 485–86, 488, 493, 495–96, 499, 500, 502–3
Baker, L. R. 225
Barnes, J. 90–91, 93–98, 225, 340, 409–10, 417–18, 496
Berrettoni, P. 354, 368
Betegh, G. 115–16
Bobzien, S. 143–44, 340–42, 423–24
Boeri, M. 258, 281–82
Boeri & Salles 359
Boys-Stones, G. R. 296–97, 300–1
Bréhier, E. 18–19, 176, 261–62, 353, 373–74, 425
Bronowski, A. 49–51, 53, 57–59, 64–66, 152–53, 258–59, 277, 282, 373–74, 378–79, 387–89, 395, 404–5, 429–30, 436–39, 493
Brown, L. 41–42, 47, 75–76, 79, 126, 270–71
Brunschwig, J. 11, 33–36, 47, 49, 62–63, 69, 71–74, 131, 170–71, 174–75, 255, 262–63, 268, 328–30, 354, 364–66, 478, 485, 503, 510–11
Bury, R. G. 62–63, 280–81, 389
- Caston, V. 47, 54–56, 59, 68–69, 74, 260, 475–76, 485–91, 493, 499–501
Cherniss, H. 460
Christensen, J. 172, 262, 374
Collette-Dučić, B. 197–99, 240–41
Cooper, J. 130–31, 140–41, 156, 161–62
Cornford, F. M. 43–44
- Dillon, J. 188
Dillon & O'Meara 280–81, 389
Durand, M. 372, 378–79
- Frede, D. 18–19, 282, 373–74, 431–32
Frede, M. 19–20, 130, 160–61, 373–74, 376–79, 396, 408, 425–30
- Gaskin, R. 280–81, 318–19, 389
Goldschmidt, V. 364–65
Gourinat, J.-B. 13, 50–51, 130, 336–37, 345–46, 426
Graeser, A. 173, 196–97, 262, 284, 374
- Hadot, P. 174, 246, 439, 505
Hahm, D. 18–19, 21–22, 48–49, 131, 146, 296–300
Hankinson, R. J. 424
Helle, R. 109–10
Hensley, I. 129, 145–50
- Imbert, C. 387
Inwood, B. 15–16, 295–96, 315–17, 452–53, 470–71, 475–76, 478
Irwin, T. 176, 179–80, 183, 187–89, 198, 205–7, 211, 230–31
- Johnson, B. E. 197–99
Ju, A. 448, 454–57, 502–3
- Kahn, C. 364–65, 410
Kerferd, G. 438–39
Kidd, I. G. 309–10, 451–52, 457
Kneale, M. & W. Kneale 373
Konstan, D. 286–87, 292, 312
Koslicki, K. 4–5, 8–10, 27, 118, 226–27, 246–47, 265–67, 330, 480–81
- Lewis, E. 189
Lloyd, A. C. 172, 280–81, 318–19, 389
Long, A. A. 170–71, 347, 375, 379–80, 406–8, 413, 429, 437–39, 499
Long & Sedley 50–51, 89, 129–30, 174–75, 196–97, 216, 218, 236–38, 246, 259–60, 268, 271–72, 368–69, 374, 385, 404–5, 447, 449–51, 467–68, 480, 502–3, 508–9
Ludlam, I. 14–15
Lukasiewicz, J. 373
- Mann, W.-R. 5
Mansfeld, J. 50–51, 120–21, 131–32, 326–27, 504–5
Marmodoro, A. 132

- Mates, B. 174, 373
 Mattingly, J. R. 18
 May, M. T. 92
 Menn, S. 176–80, 194–99, 200–2, 235–45
 Mensch & Miller 404–5, 415

 Nawar, T. 176, 189–90, 199
 Nolan, D. 89, 99–107, 114, 462–63

 Papazian, M. B. 332–33
 Pasquino, P. 261–62, 373–74
 Powers, N. M. 294, 295, 310–11, 315–16

 Quine, W. V. O. 1–3, 74, 502

 Reesor, M. 173
 Reydam-Schils, G. 132
 Rist, J. M. 174, 502–3
 Robertson, D. 333–34

 Salles, R. 332–33, 335–42, 348–49, 352–55,
 358–61, 469–70, 505–6
 Sambursky, S. 116, 361–62
 Schaffer, J. 3, 6–10
 Schofield, M. 127–29, 354–55, 357–59, 362–64,
 438–39

 Sedley, D. N. 131, 174, 180, 183–87, 198–99,
 208, 221–25, 228–30, 232–35, 258, 281–82,
 286–87, 337–38, 469–70, 477, 478, 487, 502–3,
 506
 Shogry, S. 396, 400–4
 Sorabji, R. 130–31, 162–63, 165–66, 176–77,
 354, 355, 359, 368

 Thomas, C. J. 37–38
 Tieleman, T. 310
 Todd, R. B. 13, 121
 Totschnig, W. 261–62, 284, 373–74, 420–21,
 424–25, 434–36
 Tzamalikos, P. 332–33, 338–39

 Varzi, A. C. 4–5
 Vogt, K. 35, 153–54, 471
 von Arnim, H. 148

 Watson, G. 19, 262, 284, 374
 White, M. J. 130–31, 361–62, 448, 451–52,
 474–75
 White, S. 310–11, 453
 Wiggins, D. 175, 208–9

 Zeller, E. 174

Index Rerum

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

- all, the (*to pan*) 93, 314–15, 485
- antitupia* *see* body, solidity & resistance
- apoios* *see* unqualified
- archai* *see* principles
- Aristotle
 - four causes 127–29, 135–36, 153–54
 - influence on the Stoics 21–22, 153–54, 171, 178–79, 193, 355, 368–69, 374, 425–28, 497
- Battle of Gods & Giants *see* Plato, *Sophist*
- being and non-being* *see* counting; *dunamis* proposal
- blending (*krasis di' holou*) 26, 89, 99–100, 108–25, 129–33, 141–53, 156–58, 160–69, 176–78, 186–87, 198, 211, 228–30, 234, 271–72, 276–77, 319, 463
- body
 - continuous, infinitely divisible (not gunky) 88–107, 111, 117, 121, 321, 354–55
 - definite vs. determinate 73, 87–88, 119, 137–41, 150, 156–57, 161–62, 166–68, 204–5, 250–51, 271, 507
 - definition (solid, three-dimensional extension with resistance), 23–24, 50–51, 80–89, 115–16, 126, 324–25
 - density & rarity 82–83, 110–12, 115–17, 121–24, 138, 163–64, 169, 390
 - fundamentality 3–4, 6–14, 25–26, 41, 51–52, 73, 76, 79–80, 84–88, 95–96, 128–29, 132–36, 142–50, 152–55, 161–62, 166–69, 255–57, 269–73, 274, 276, 281–83, 431, 439–40, 443–44, 509–10
 - malleability 82–84, 87–89, 100–1, 107, 108, 110–12, 117, 121–25, 126, 132–33, 159–61, 169, 250–51
 - solidity & resistance (*antitupia*) 80–85, 110–11, 114–15, 121, 420
- broad or rough conception (vs. precise or exact)
 - of parts of body 102–4, 461–64, 496
 - of place 320–21
 - of time 349–51, 353–54, 357–63, 366–70
- Categories 170–99, 200–52
 - hupokeimenon* (substrate) 61–62, 101, 103–5, 135, 165–66, 170–80, 182–86, 189, 197–98, 200–9, 220, 222, 224–31, 234, 245–48, 251, 458, 508
 - poion* (qualified individual) 170–80, 190–94, 196–97, 201–2, 205–11, 224–30, 232–45, 246–48
 - idiōs poion* (uniquely qualified individual) 170–71, 173, 175, 182–86, 190–98, 208–10, 216–20, 221–22, 224, 226–27, 240–42, 244–45, 249, 250–51, 344–46, 510
 - koinōs poion* (commonly qualified individual) 171, 173, 209–10, 215–16, 217, 250–51, 265–66
 - vs. *poiōtēs* (quality) 190–94, 209–17, 223–25
 - pōs echon* (individual disposed) 170–80, 194, 196–98, 207–11, 224, 226–27, 237–45, 248
 - pros ti pōs echon* (individual relatively disposed) 170–73, 179–80, 194–98, 200, 208–10, 220, 224, 226–27, 230, 236–37, 241–42, 245, 248
- causation *see also* *dunamis* proposal
 - agent and patient 126, 128–29, 134–36, 137–43, 151–54, 161–69
 - cause* to vs. *cause of* relation 341, 418–25
 - digital vs. analog (homunculus) readings 140–41, 148, 150–51, 158–61, 168
 - as interaction 2, 11–13, 48–52, 60–66, 74–75, 80–82, 92, 113, 126–33, 134, 140–41, 150
 - predicates as “effects” of causes *see* incorporeals, *lekta*
- composition *see* generation; mereology, wholes, composite
- concepts (*ennoēmata*) 98, 214–16, 399–401, 411–12, 475–76, 485–501
- constitution
 - as identity *see* identity conditions, quantitative
 - as a mereological relation, not identity *see* generation, by alteration; mereology, wholes, non-composite

- continuum *see* body, continuous; infinite
divisibility
- corporealism 10–11, 19–20, 25, 28–29, 41–42,
44, 45, 52, 73, 120–21, 126, 135–36, 169,
170–72, 208, 227–28, 248–52, 256–57,
431, 470, 489
- cosmogony 155–69, 271–73
- counting, by ontological criteria 2, 47, 70–76
existence criterion (*dunamis* proposal) 48–
52, 74–75
subsistence criterion 52–378, 440–41, 507
availability for thought 53–69, 440, 474, 479
particularity (Not Someone test) 69–73, 201,
370, 440–41, 449–50, 479, 485–86, 500–1
- counting & grounding *see also* ontology, Stoic
in reflective equilibrium 1–6, 10–12, 16, 50,
70–76, 79–82, 134, 255–57, 284–85, 327–
28, 330, 370, 375–76, 414, 450, 479–80,
486, 507–10
- creatures of fiction 469–81
- developmentalism *see also* orthodoxy; principle
of maximal charity, vs. uncharitable bias
about the Stoics 178–81, 183–88, 196–99,
232–45, 249–50, 426–28, 448, 450, 458–
59, 506
- drill sergeant 60–66, 140–41, 266–67, 325,
370, 476
- dunamis* proposal 2, 33–34, 40–43, 47–53, 73–
75, 134, 224–25, 256–57, 273, 493–94
- endiathetos logos* (internal discourse) 397–98,
402–3, 410–11, 413–15
- everlasting recurrence 340–48, 369–70
- existence* *see* counting; *dunamis* proposal
- figments or appearances *see also* creatures of
fiction; concepts
phantasmata 54, 66–68, 438–39, 475–76,
485–89, 490, 495–96
- generation *see also* mereology, wholes,
composite; wholes, non-composite
by alteration 184–86, 206, 221, 233–34, 251
by composition 12–13, 95, 96, 113, 126, 145,
151–53, 161–69, 210–11, 216–17, 220
- grounding 2–3, 6–10, 79–80, 256–78, 284–85,
330, 479, 508–10
- Constituent Dependence 9, 27–28, 246–47,
265–66, 271, 276, 480
- composition 166–68
- constitution 246–47
- Feature Dependence 9, 27–28, 118, 246–47,
265–67, 276, 281, 330, 371, 480–81
- as construction *see* *subsistence*, neither
corporeal nor incorporeal
- as privation *see* *subsistence*, incorporeal
- fundamentality *see* body
- Growing Argument 181–84, 198, 202–3, 206, 208,
221, 227–28, 230–34, 238, 248, 346–47
- gunk, denial of *see* body, continuous; infinite
divisibility
- heteron* *see* separability
- huparxis* *see* obtaining
- hypostasis* *see* *subsistence*
- hylomorphic perspective *see also* principle of
maximal charity, vs. uncharitable bias
on the Stoics 25–26, 84–88, 129, 135–36, 141–
43, 146, 147, 152–53, 159, 160, 168–69,
177–80, 186, 200–5, 207–12, 221–25,
231–32, 234–45, 274–75, 497
- identity conditions *see also* mereology, unities
and individuals
diachronic and synchronic 183–84, 189–90,
198, 200, 216–20, 223, 249, 319, 344–45
- of a *lekton* 414–18
- qualitative 92–93, 216–32, 234, 238, 250–51
- quantitative (constitution as identity) 92,
111–12, 185–88, 204–7, 221–32,
238, 250–51
- idia perigraphē* *see* mereology, unities and
individuals
- impressions (*phantasiai*) 60–69, 390–94, 438–39
- rational impressions 394–403
- impressors (*phantasta*)
as measure of reality *see* counting, *subsistence*
criterion, availability for thought
- sensory vs. non-sensory 55–56, 60–69, 74,
262–63, 266, 391–92, 415, 474
- incorporeals (*asōmata*)
as a class 255–85
- void 286–312
- room 312–17
- place 119–20, 318–24
- limits (surface, line, point) 324–27
- time 332–71
as *diastēma* (extension) 332–33, 338
as measure 338–39, 370
- linear vs. circular 332–37, 346–48, 369–70
- point-like 351–54, 366–69
- present 348–70
- lekta* 372–444
- definition 384–90
- Categories seen as 172–74, 246
- incomplete, predicates (*katēgorēmata*)
341–42, 362–64, 372, 418–32

as what is signified (*sēmainomena*) 382–84
 as facts or states of affairs, denial of 380,
 382–83, 385, 408, 425–26
 as “effects” of causes, denial of 418–32
 indistinguishability 343–48, 369–70
 infinite divisibility (not gunk)
 of body 90–107, 111, 114–15, 117, 121, 455,
 460–64, 467
 of space and time 262–63, 277–78, 291–92,
 321, 325, 329–30, 334, 348–50, 352–71,
 455, 460–64, 467
katēgorēmata (predicates) *see* incorporeals, *lekta*
 Leibniz’s Law 11, 205–9, 221–22, 225–26, 234–
 35, 248–49, 340, 343–48
lekta see incorporeals, *lekta*
 limits (surface, line, point)
 corporeal, absence of 167–69, 271–72, 326–
 27, 361–62, 454–55, 457–58
 incorporeal (*kath’ hupostasin*) 117–20, 271–
 73, 324–27
 neither corporeal nor incorporeal (*kat’
 epinoian*) 326–27
 geometrical limits 459–67, 476–77
 limits of the continuum 327, 334, 360, 448,
 454–59, 474–75, 477, 496, 498–99
logos see principles
 mass terms & count nouns at once 73, 88, 270,
 287, 312, 328–30, 370–71
 materialism *see* corporealism
 matter (*hulē*) *see* principles
 mereology 90–98, 186–87, 198, 221–32,
 234–35
 aggregates and sums 93, 95–96, 218, 316, 491
 neither same nor different 96–98, 186–87,
 221–22, 228–29, 235, 276
 parts 90–93, 212–14, 216, 354–55, 359–60
 disjoint *see* separability
 vs. partitions (*moria*) 94, 102–4, 107, 111,
 117–19, 355
 Proper Parts, Strict Partial Ordering 90–91,
 225, 228
 with and without remainder *see* wholes,
 composite; wholes, non-composite
 unities and individuals (with an *idia
 perigraphē*) 91–94, 97, 100, 104–7, 214,
 217–18, 225–27, 240–41, 495–96
 qualitative 92–93, 95, 225–27, 247–48
 quantitative 92–94, 225–27, 247
 wholes 93–96
 composite (by composition) 95, 96,
 225, 227–28

non-composite (by constitution) 95, 96,
 208–9, 221–32, 246–47
 whole_{Count} 95, 96, 134, 167–68, 169, 225–
 27, 246–47
 whole_{Integrated} 13–14, 93, 95–96, 134,
 169, 226–27
 whole_{Predicate} 95, 106–11, 113, 116–17,
 120, 123
metabasis 66–67, 415, 440
 monism 13–14
 Not Someone (*Outis*) test *see* counting,
subsistence criterion, particularity
 Not-Somethings (*outina*) 3–4, 273, 325–27,
 449–50, 477, 487–88, 492, 499–
 503, 508–9
 obtaining (*huparchein*, *huparxis*) 35–36, 45–46,
 54–59, 69, 214–15, 255, 261–62, 279–80,
 283–84, 332, 349–54, 356–58, 362–64,
 366, 369–70, 397–98, 418, 421–22, 427–
 29, 431, 432–40, 442–43
 ontological criteria *see* counting
 ontological dependence *see* grounding
 ontology
 flat, sorted, ordered 3, 255–57, 261, 273
 vs. metaphysics *see* counting & grounding
 Stoic 2–3, 79, 246, 255–57, 271–72, 439–40,
 442, 448–50, 486, 490–91, 502–11
 orthodoxy *see also* developmentalism
 Stoic 14–18, 22–24, 162–63, 269, 311, 316–17,
 320–24, 326–27, 346–47, 450–59, 469–
 70, 472, 478–79, 491, 502, 506, 509
phantasia see impressions
phantasmata see figments
phōnē see voice
 physicalism *see also* grounding
 non-reductive 10–12, 248, 255–57, 273–75,
 284–85, 380–81, 430, 442, 447, 453–54,
 479, 508–10
 Plato, *Parmenides* 34–35, 96–97, 493–94
 Plato, *Sophist* 33–46
 challenges 44–45, 47, 52–53, 69, 74–75, 79,
 92–93, 126, 132–33, 151, 169, 170–71,
 250–52, 255–57, 270–71, 273, 274, 282,
 284–85, 381, 427, 428, 432, 441–43, 450,
 481, 493–94, 510–11
 Battle of Gods & Giants 33–36, 38–43, 135–
 36, 169, 170–72, 208, 244, 250–51, 255–
 57, 273, 278, 427, 431–32
 Late Learners 44, 170–72, 244, 251–52
 Patricide of Parmenides 36–38
 Plato, *Timaeus* 13, 33–34, 132, 137–38, 155, 467

- Platonizing, Stoics as 10, 21–22, 137, 149–50,
258–61, 282–83, 432, 442, 485–86
- Plato's beard 1–2, 5, 35–36, 70–71, 74, 509–11
- Plato's labor, division of 28–29, 179–80, 231,
250–52, 436–37, 489, 494–95, 497–99
- pneuma* (fiery breath) 96, 113, 135, 151–52, 157,
158, 161–69, 176–77, 179–80, 193, 196–
97, 200–1, 203–5, 207–8, 210–11, 214–18,
220, 227–28, 235–36, 241–44, 247–48,
250, 271, 274–75, 276, 298–99, 306, 361–
62, 390–91, 393, 401–2, 422, 457–58, 490
- pragmata* 376–77, 382–85, 386, 389, 397, 406–7,
413–14, 420–21, 440, 441
- predicates (*katēgorēmata*) *see* incorporeals, *lekta*,
incomplete
- principle of maximal charity 21–28, 74, 88–89,
102, 116, 168–69, 224, 228–30, 249–50,
297, 307–8, 356–57, 409–10, 455, 467–68,
497–98, 511
- vs. uncharitable bias 18–21, 117, 120–21,
129–33, 178–80, 187–88, 194, 197, 198–
99, 204–5, 228–31, 232–45, 249–50, 346–
47, 351, 352–53, 427–28, 443–44, 450
- principles (*archai*) 2–3, 12–13, 28–29, 51–52,
73, 75, 84, 87, 95–96, 113, 126–54, 155–
69, 271, 276
- Real Definition 8–10, 246–48, 265–67, 273, 330–
31, 371, 388, 441, 480–81
- resistance (*antitupia*) *see* body, solidity &
resistance
- separability 97–98, 111–12, 130, 143–50, 168,
186–87, 212–14, 221–22, 226–30, 275–78
- Something (*ti*) *see* ontology, Stoic
- Special Composition *see* generation
- subsistence* (*hupostasis*) *see also* grounding,
Feature Dependence
- incorporeal, by privation 72, 118–20, 257–
67, 277–85, 290–91, 293–96, 311–12,
317–22, 324–27, 332–40, 348, 356, 361,
368–70, 375–76, 386–89, 394–95, 404–5,
410, 414, 428, 432–40, 441, 476
- neither corporeal nor incorporeal,
according to thought (*kat' epionoian*),
by construction 16, 29, 75, 264, 272,
325–27, 361–62, 367, 435, 447–68, 469–
81, 508–9
- ontological criterion for *see* counting
- substance (*ousia*)
- is body 99, 135, 158–61, 185–86, 200–5
as substrate *see* Categories, *hupokeimenon*
- substrate *see* Categories, *hupokeimenon*
- sumpatheia* 83–84, 151–53, 156, 163–64,
167–69
- surface *see* limits
- unity 4–6
- being one *see* mereology, unities and
individuals; generation, by composition
- being whole *see* mereology, wholes
- of Stoic metaphysics *see* counting &
grounding
- of Stoicism *see* orthodoxy
- unqualified (*apoios*) 131, 133, 137–41, 150, 157,
159–60, 165–68, 203–5
- voice (*phōnē*) 376, 384–86, 405–6, 413